Improved and Multiple Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round Serpent
|
|
- Clementine Conley
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Improved and Multiple Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round Serpent Description of the Linear Approximations B. Collard, F.-X. Standaert, J.-J. Quisquater UCL Crypto Group, Microelectronics Laboratory, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium This appendix contains the precise description of the linear approximations used in the attacks scenarios against the reduced round cipher Serpent described in: - B. Collard, F.-X. Standaert, J.-J. Quisquater, Improved and Multiple Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round Serpent, proceedings of InsCrypt Postdoctoral researcher of the Belgian fund for scientific research (FNRS).
2 A 6-round approximation The convention adopted throughout this appendix to describe the linear approximations are also used in [2 4]. We refer to these papers for more details. This section presents a 6-round approximation returned by our algorithm. The approximation has a bias of It starts with S-box 4, and the first round approximation holds with a bias of 2 4 : S 4 P rob = 1/2 2 4 After the linear transformation and the application of S 5, we get the following approximation with bias 2 4 : S 5 P rob = 1/ After the linear transformation and the application of S 6, we get the following approximation with bias 2 3 : S 6 P rob = 1/ After the linear transformation and the application of S 7, we get the following approximation with bias 2 5 :
3 S 7 P rob = 1/2 2 5 After the linear transformation and the application of S 0, we get the following approximation with bias 2 6 : S 0 P rob = 1/ After the linear transformation and the application of S 1, we get the following approximation with bias 2 5 : S 1 P rob = 1/2 2 5 After the linear transformation, we get the following output mask with 13 active S-boxes: The total bias of the approximation is thus = In the first round, any input of the 3 active S-boxes can be replaced by another mask, provided that the biases are left unchanged. It appears that there are 2 such masks for each active S-box. In the last round, there are 4 active S-boxes. Among them, two S-boxes have 4 output masks with maximal bias for
4 the given input, the two other S-boxes have 2 output masks with maximal bias for the given input. We can consequently generate = 2 9 approximations with the same bias. Alternatively, we can decrease the number of active S-boxes by replacing the last round approximation by the following one: S 1 P rob = 1/2 2 7 After the linear transformation, we get the following output mask with only 5 active S-boxes: However, the bias of the modified approximation equals 2 25.
5 B 7-round approximation The approximation has a bias of It starts with S-box 4, and the first round approximation holds with a bias of 2 4 : S 4 P rob = 1/2 2 4 After the linear transformation and the application of S 5, we get the following approximation with bias 2 5 : S 5 P rob = 1/ After the linear transformation and the application of S 6, we get the following approximation with bias 2 3 : S 6 P rob = 1/ After the linear transformation and the application of S 7, we get the following approximation with bias 2 5 :
6 S 7 P rob = 1/2 2 5 After the linear transformation and the application of S 0, we get the following approximation with bias 2 6 : S 0 P rob = 1/ After the linear transformation and the application of S 1, we get the following approximation with bias 2 7 : S 1 P rob = 1/2 2 7 After the linear transformation and the application of S 2, we get the following approximation with bias 2 6 : S 2 P rob = 1/2 2 6
7 After the last linear transformation, we get the following output mask with only 5 active S-boxes: The total bias of the approximation is thus = In the first round, any input of the 3 active S-boxes can be replaced by another mask, provided that the biases are left unchanged. There are 2 such masks for each active S-box. In the last round, there are 5 active S-boxes. Among them, one has 4 output masks with maximal bias for the given input, the others have 2 output masks with maximal bias for the given input. We can consequently generate = 2 9 approximations with the same bias.
8 C 8-round approximation This section describes an 8-round approximation with bias In contrast with the other approximations presented in this report, it can be used to attack a reduced version of Serpent by partial encryption of the first round with a keyguess (in all other cases, we must perform a partial decryption of the last round). This is because the number of active S-boxes before the first round of the approximation is much smaller than it could possibly be after the linear transformation in the last round. The next figure shows the input mask of the approximation as well as the 23 active S-boxes: After the linear transformation, the approximation starts with S-box 4, and the first round approximation holds with a bias of 2 4 : S 4 P rob = 1/ After the linear transformation and the application of S 5, we get the following approximation with bias 2 5 : S 5 P rob = 1/ After the linear transformation and the application of S 6, we get the following approximation with bias 2 3 :
9 S 6 P rob = 1/ After the linear transformation and the application of S 7, we get the following approximation with bias 2 5 : S 7 P rob = 1/2 2 5 After the linear transformation and the application of S 0, we get the following approximation with bias 2 6 : S 0 P rob = 1/ After the linear transformation and the application of S 1, we get the following approximation with bias 2 7 : S 1 P rob = 1/2 2 7
10 After the linear transformation and the application of S 2, we get the following approximation with bias 2 6 : S 2 P rob = 1/2 2 6 After the linear transformation and the application of S 3, we get the following approximation with bias 2 8 : S 3 P rob = 1/2 2 8 The total bias of the approximation is thus = In the first round, any input of the 3 active S-boxes can be replaced by another mask, provided that the biases are left unchanged. It appears that there are 2 such masks for each active S-box. In the last round, there are 7 active S-boxes. For these S-boxes, we can choose between two output masks with bias 0.25 for the given input. We can consequently generate = 2 10 approximations with the maximal bias. However, the 23 active S-boxes in the input of the linear approximation do not yield effective attacks as the key guess is too large. We can slightly modify the first round approximation to reduce the size of the key guess to 11 4 bits. This gives the following input mask: After the linear approximation, we use the the following approximation:
11 S 4 P rob = 1/ This way, the bias of the approximation is reduced to 2 39.
12 D 9-round approximation D.1 First approximation In this section, we present one of the three 9-round approximation with bias 2 50 returned by our algorithm. It starts with S-box 3, and the first round approximation holds with a bias of 2 12 : S 3 P rob = 1/ After the linear transformation and the application of S 4, we get the following approximation with bias 2 6 : S 4 P rob = 1/ After the linear transformation and the application of S 5, we get the following approximation with bias 2 5 : S 5 P rob = 1/ After the linear transformation and the application of S 6, we get the following approximation with bias 2 3 :
13 S 6 P rob = 1/ After the linear transformation and the application of S 7, we get the following approximation with bias 2 5 : S 7 P rob = 1/2 2 5 After the linear transformation and the application of S 0, we get the following approximation with bias 2 6 : S 0 P rob = 1/ After the linear transformation and the application of S 1, we get the following approximation with bias 2 7 : S 1 P rob = 1/2 2 7
14 After the linear transformation and the application of S 2, we get the following approximation with bias 2 6 : S 2 P rob = 1/2 2 6 After the linear transformation and the application of S 3, we get the following approximation with bias 2 8 : S 3 P rob = 1/2 2 8 After the last linear transformation, we get the following output mask with 23 active S-boxes: The total bias of the approximation is = Any input (resp. output) of the 11 (resp. 7) active S-box in the first round (resp. the last round) can be replaced by another mask, provided that the biases are left unchanged. As there are 2 such masks for each active S-box, We can generate = 2 18 approximations with the bias This applies to the three approximations with bias 2 50 generated by our algorithm, hence the total number rises to As the number of active S-boxes in the output mask of the approximation is too large, it is possible to slightly modify the last round. Several trade-off can be achieved, whether we wish to reduce the data complexity or the timememory complexity. Using the following approximation reduces the bias to 2 53 but activates only 15 S-boxes:
15 S 3 P rob = 1/ After the last linear transformation, we get the following output mask: Alternatively, the following approximation has a bias of 2 54 but only 12 active S-boxes: S 3 P rob = 1/ After the last linear transformation, we get the following output mask: Finally, the following approximation has a bias of 2 55 but only 11 active S-boxes: S 3 P rob = 1/ After the last linear transformation, we get the following output mask:
16
17 D.2 Second approximation The following approximation can be used in order to attack 11-round Serpent using a partial decryption of the first and the last rounds. It was designed so as to minimize the number of active S-boxes in its input and output. It has a bias of The input mask of the approximation (before the linear transformation) has 15 active S-boxes: After the linear transformation, the approximation starts with S-box 3, and the first round approximation holds with a bias of 2 15 : S 3 P rob = 1/ After the linear transformation and the application of S 4, we get the following approximation with bias 2 7 : S 4 P rob = 1/2 2 7 After the linear transformation and the application of S 5, we get the following approximation with bias 2 5 :
18 S 5 P rob = 1/ After the linear transformation and the application of S 6, we get the following approximation with bias 2 3 : S 6 P rob = 1/ After the linear transformation and the application of S 7, we get the following approximation with bias 2 5 : S 7 P rob = 1/2 2 5 After the linear transformation and the application of S 0, we get the following approximation with bias 2 6 : S 0 P rob = 1/
19 After the linear transformation and the application of S 1, we get the following approximation with bias 2 7 : S 1 P rob = 1/2 2 7 After the linear transformation and the application of S 2, we get the following approximation with bias 2 6 : S 2 P rob = 1/2 2 6 After the linear transformation and the application of S 3, we get the following approximation with bias 2 12 : S 3 P rob = 1/ After the last linear transformation, we get the following output mask with 12 active S-boxes: The total bias of the approximation is = 2 58.
20 References 1. R. Anderson, E. Biham, L. Knudsen, Serpent: A Proposal for the Advanced Encryption Standard, in the proceedings of the First Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Conference, Ventura, CA, E. Biham, O. Dunkelman, N. Keller, Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round Serpent, in the Proceedings of FSE 2001, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2355, pp , Yokohama, Japan, April E. Biham, O.Dunkelman, N.Keller, The Rectangle Attack - Rectangling the Serpent, Advances in Cryptology - Eurocrypt 01 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science no.2045), pp , Springer-Verlag, T. Kohno, J.Kelsey, B.Schneier, Preliminary Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round Serpent, AES Candidate Conference, pp , 2000
Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round Serpent
Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round Serpent Eli Biham 1, Orr Dunkelman 1, and Nathan Keller 2 1 Computer Science Department, Technion Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa 32000, Israel, {biham,orrd}@cs.technion.ac.il,
More informationDifferential-Linear Cryptanalysis of Serpent
Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis of Serpent Eli Biham 1, Orr Dunkelman 1, and Nathan Keller 2 1 Computer Science Department, Technion, Haifa 32000, Israel {biham,orrd}@cs.technion.ac.il 2 Mathematics
More informationDierential-Linear Cryptanalysis of Serpent? Haifa 32000, Israel. Haifa 32000, Israel
Dierential-Linear Cryptanalysis of Serpent Eli Biham, 1 Orr Dunkelman, 1 Nathan Keller 2 1 Computer Science Department, Technion. Haifa 32000, Israel fbiham,orrdg@cs.technion.ac.il 2 Mathematics Department,
More informationA Methodology for Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis and Its Applications
A Methodology for Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis and Its Applications Jiqiang Lu Presenter: Jian Guo Institute for Infocomm Research, Agency for Science, Technology and Research, 1 Fusionopolis Way,
More informationImproved Truncated Differential Attacks on SAFER
Improved Truncated Differential Attacks on SAFER Hongjun Wu * Feng Bao ** Robert H. Deng ** Qin-Zhong Ye * * Department of Electrical Engineering National University of Singapore Singapore 960 ** Information
More informationICEBERG : an Involutional Cipher Efficient for Block Encryption in Reconfigurable Hardware.
ICEBERG : an Involutional Cipher Efficient for Block Encryption in Reconfigurable Hardware. Francois-Xavier Standaert, Gilles Piret, Gael Rouvroy, Jean-Jacques Quisquater, Jean-Didier Legat UCL Crypto
More informationCryptanalysis of KeeLoq with COPACOBANA
Cryptanalysis of KeeLoq with COPACOBANA Martin Novotný 1 and Timo Kasper 2 1 Faculty of Information Technology Czech Technical University in Prague Kolejní 550/2 160 00 Praha 6, Czech Republic email: novotnym@fit.cvut.cz
More informationWeak Keys. References
Weak Keys The strength of the encryption function E K (P) may differ significantly for different keys K. If for some set WK of keys the encryption function is much weaker than for the others this set is
More informationA Chosen-Plaintext Linear Attack on DES
A Chosen-Plaintext Linear Attack on DES Lars R. Knudsen and John Erik Mathiassen Department of Informatics, University of Bergen, N-5020 Bergen, Norway {lars.knudsen,johnm}@ii.uib.no Abstract. In this
More informationA Related Key Attack on the Feistel Type Block Ciphers
International Journal of Network Security, Vol.8, No.3, PP.221 226, May 2009 221 A Related Key Attack on the Feistel Type Block Ciphers Ali Bagherzandi 1,2, Mahmoud Salmasizadeh 2, and Javad Mohajeri 2
More informationNew Attacks against Reduced-Round Versions of IDEA
New Attacks against Reduced-Round Versions of IDEA Pascal Junod École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne Switzerland pascal@junod.info Abstract. In this paper, we describe a sequence of simple, yet efficient
More informationKey Separation in Twofish
Twofish Technical Report #7 Key Separation in Twofish John Kelsey April 7, 2000 Abstract In [Mur00], Murphy raises questions about key separation in Twofish. We discuss this property of the Twofish key
More informationCryptanalysis of Block Ciphers: A Survey
UCL Crypto Group Technical Report Series Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers: A Survey Francois-Xavier Standaert, Gilles Piret, Jean-Jacques Quisquater REGARDS GROUPE http://www.dice.ucl.ac.be/crypto/ Technical
More informationIntegral Cryptanalysis of the BSPN Block Cipher
Integral Cryptanalysis of the BSPN Block Cipher Howard Heys Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering Memorial University hheys@mun.ca Abstract In this paper, we investigate the application of
More informationBlock Ciphers Tutorial. c Eli Biham - May 3, Block Ciphers Tutorial (5)
Block Ciphers Tutorial c Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 146 Block Ciphers Tutorial (5) A Known Plaintext Attack on 1-Round DES After removing the permutations IP and FP we get: L R 48 K=? F L R c Eli Biham -
More informationInternational Journal for Research in Applied Science & Engineering Technology (IJRASET) Performance Comparison of Cryptanalysis Techniques over DES
Performance Comparison of Cryptanalysis Techniques over DES Anupam Kumar 1, Aman Kumar 2, Sahil Jain 3, P Kiranmai 4 1,2,3,4 Dept. of Computer Science, MAIT, GGSIP University, Delhi, INDIA Abstract--The
More informationA Meet-in-the-Middle Attack on 8-Round AES
A Meet-in-the-Middle Attack on 8-Round AES Hüseyin Demirci 1 and Ali Aydın Selçuk 2 1 Tübitak UEKAE, 41470 Gebze, Kocaeli, Turkey huseyind@uekae.tubitak.gov.tr 2 Department of Computer Engineering Bilkent
More informationDFA on AES. Christophe Giraud. Oberthur Card Systems, 25, rue Auguste Blanche, Puteaux, France.
DFA on AES Christophe Giraud Oberthur Card Systems, 25, rue Auguste Blanche, 92800 Puteaux, France. c.giraud@oberthurcs.com Abstract. In this paper we describe two different DFA attacks on the AES. The
More informationRelated-key Attacks on Triple-DES and DESX Variants
Related-key Attacks on Triple-DES and DESX Variants Raphael C.-W. han Department of Engineering, Swinburne Sarawak Institute of Technology, 1st Floor, State Complex, 93576 Kuching, Malaysia rphan@swinburne.edu.my
More informationNew Cryptanalytic Results on IDEA
New Cryptanalytic Results on IDEA Eli Biham, Orr Dunkelman, Nathan Keller Computer Science Dept., Technion Dept. of Electrical Engineering ESAT SCD/COSIC, KUL Einstein Institute of Mathematics, Hebrew
More informationA Weight Based Attack on the CIKS-1 Block Cipher
A Weight Based Attack on the CIKS-1 Block Cipher Brian J. Kidney, Howard M. Heys, Theodore S. Norvell Electrical and Computer Engineering Memorial University of Newfoundland {bkidney, howard, theo}@engr.mun.ca
More informationin a 4 4 matrix of bytes. Every round except for the last consists of 4 transformations: 1. ByteSubstitution - a single non-linear transformation is a
Cryptanalysis of Reduced Variants of Rijndael Eli Biham Λ Nathan Keller y Abstract Rijndael was submitted to the AES selection process, and was later selected as one of the five finalists from which one
More informationPreliminary Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round Serpent
Preliminary Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round Serpent Tadayoshi Kohno 1,JohnKelsey 2, and Bruce Schneier 2 1 Reliable Software Technologies kohno@rstcorp.com 2 Counterpane Internet Security, Inc. {kelsey,schneier}@counterpane.com
More informationNew Cryptanalytic Results on IDEA
New Cryptanalytic Results on IDEA Eli Biham, Orr Dunkelman, Nathan Keller Computer Science Dept., Technion Dept. of Electrical Engineering ESAT SCD/COSIC, KUL Einstein Institute of Mathematics, Hebrew
More informationThe Rectangle Attack
The Rectangle Attack and Other Techniques for Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers Orr Dunkelman Computer Science Dept. Technion joint work with Eli Biham and Nathan Keller Topics Block Ciphers Cryptanalysis
More informationPower Analysis Attacks against FPGA Implementations of the DES
Power Analysis Attacks against FPGA Implementations of the DES François-Xavier Standaert 1, Sıddıka Berna Örs2, Jean-Jacques Quisquater 1, Bart Preneel 2 1 UCL Crypto Group Laboratoire de Microélectronique
More informationTreatment of the Initial Value in Time-Memory-Data Tradeoff Attacks on Stream Ciphers
Treatment of the Initial Value in Time-Memory-Data Tradeoff Attacks on Stream Ciphers Orr Dunkelman 1, and Nathan Keller 2, 1 Département d Informatique École normale supérieure 45 rue d Ulm, Paris 75005,
More informationThe Case for Serpent
The Case for Serpent Ross Anderson, Eli Biham and Lars Knudsen 24th March 2000 Summary Serpent should be chosen because it is the most secure of the AES finalists. Not only does it have ample safety margin,
More informationA Related-Key Attack on TREYFER
The Second International Conference on Emerging Security Information, Systems and Technologies A Related-ey Attack on TREYFER Aleksandar ircanski and Amr M Youssef Computer Security Laboratory Concordia
More informationDesigning a New Lightweight Image Encryption and Decryption to Strengthen Security
2016 IJSRSET Volume 2 Issue 2 Print ISSN : 2395-1990 Online ISSN : 2394-4099 Themed Section: Engineering and Technology Designing a New Lightweight Image Encryption and Decryption to Strengthen Security
More informationTwo Attacks on Reduced IDEA (Extended Abstract)
1 Two Attacks on Reduced IDEA (Extended Abstract) Johan Borst 1, Lars R. Knudsen 2, Vincent Rijmen 2 1 T.U. Eindhoven, Discr. Math., P.O. Box 513, NL-5600 MB Eindhoven, borst@win.tue.nl 2 K.U. Leuven,
More informationA Brief Outlook at Block Ciphers
A Brief Outlook at Block Ciphers Pascal Junod École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Suisse CSA 03, Rabat, Maroc, 10-09-2003 Content Generic Concepts DES / AES Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers Provable
More informationPUFFIN: A Novel Compact Block Cipher Targeted to Embedded Digital Systems
PUFFIN: A Novel Compact Block Cipher Targeted to Embedded Digital Systems Huiju Cheng, Howard M. Heys, and Cheng Wang Electrical and Computer Engineering Memorial University of Newfoundland St. John's,
More informationPAPER Attacking 44 Rounds of the SHACAL-2 Block Cipher Using Related-Key Rectangle Cryptanalysis
IEICE TRANS FUNDAMENTALS VOLExx?? NOxx XXXX 2x PAPER Attacking 44 Rounds of the SHACAL-2 Block Cipher Using Related-Key Rectangle Cryptanalysis Jiqiang LU a and Jongsung KIM b SUMMARY SHACAL-2 is a 64-round
More informationSoftware implementation and performance comparison of popular block ciphers on 8-bit low-cost microcontroller
International Journal of the Physical Sciences Vol. 5(9), pp. 1338-1343, 18 August, 21 Available online at http://www.academicjournals.org/ijps ISSN 1992-195 21 Academic Journals Full Length Research Paper
More informationAlgebraic-Differential Cryptanalysis of DES
Algebraic-Differential Cryptanalysis of DES Jean-Charles FAUGÈRE, Ludovic PERRET, Pierre-Jean SPAENLEHAUER UPMC, Univ Paris 06, LIP6 INRIA, Centre Paris-Rocquencourt, SALSA Project CNRS, UMR 7606, LIP6
More informationmoment (due to problems of auxiliary memory): another weak point is the associated cost. A possible alternative solution is to use an auxiliary unit (
Secure acceleration of DSS signatures using insecure server Philippe Beguin? Jean-Jacques Quisquater Philippe.Beguin@ens.fr Quisquater@dice.ucl.ac.be Laboratoire d'informatique?? Laboratoire DICE Ecole
More informationA Meet in the Middle Attack on Reduced Round Kuznyechik
IEICE TRANS. FUNDAMENTALS, VOL.Exx??, NO.xx XXXX 200x 1 LETTER Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security A Meet in the Middle Attack on Reduced Round Kuznyechik Riham ALTAWY a), Member and
More informationFuture Challenges for Lightweight Cryptography
Future Challenges for Lightweight Cryptography F.-X. Standaert UCL Crypto Group Crypto for 2020, Tenerife, January 2013 Outline 1 1. Past results 2. Future challenges 1. Block ciphers 2 TEA, NOEKEON, AES,
More informationSome Thoughts on Time-Memory-Data Tradeoffs
Some Thoughts on Time-Memory-Data Tradeoffs Alex Biryukov Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Dept. ESAT/SCD-COSIC, Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, B 3001 Heverlee, Belgium Abstract. In this paper we show that Time-Memory
More informationA New Meet-in-the-Middle Attack on the IDEA Block Cipher
A New Meet-in-the-Middle Attack on the IDEA Block Cipher Hüseyin Demirci 1, Ali Aydın Selçuk, and Erkan Türe 3 1 Tübitak UEKAE, 41470 Gebze, Kocaeli, Turkey huseyind@uekae.tubitak.gov.tr Department of
More informationAttacks on Double Block Length Hash Functions
Attacks on Double Block Length Hash Functions Xuejia Lai 1 and Lars R. Knudsen 2 1 R 3 Security Engineering Aathal, Switzerland 2 Aarhus University, Denmark Abstract. Attacks on double block length hash
More informationMeet-in-the-Middle Attack on 8 Rounds of the AES Block Cipher under 192 Key Bits
Meet-in-the-Middle Attack on 8 Rounds of the AES Block Cipher under 192 Key Bits Yongzhuang Wei 1,3,, Jiqiang Lu 2,, and Yupu Hu 3 1 Guilin University of Electronic Technology, Guilin City, Guangxi Province
More informationLinear Cryptanalysis of FEAL 8X Winning the FEAL 25 Years Challenge
Linear Cryptanalysis of FEAL 8X Winning the FEAL 25 Years Challenge Yaniv Carmeli Joint work with Prof. Eli Biham CRYPTODAY 2014 FEAL FEAL Published in 1987, designed by Miyaguchi and Shimizu (NTT). 64-bit
More informationEfficient Implementation of Grand Cru with TI C6x+ Processor
Efficient Implementation of Grand Cru with TI C6x+ Processor Azhar Ali Khan 1, Ghulam Murtaza 2 1 Sichuan University, Chengdu, China 2 National University of Sciences and Technology, Islamabad, Pakistan
More informationA New Attack on the LEX Stream Cipher
A New Attack on the LEX Stream Cipher Orr Dunkelman, and Nathan Keller, École Normale Supérieure Département d Informatique, CNRS, INRIA 5 rue d Ulm, 50 Paris, France. orr.dunkelman@ens.fr Einstein Institute
More informationThe Davies-Murphy Power Attack. Sébastien Kunz-Jacques Frédéric Muller Frédéric Valette DCSSI Crypto Lab
The Davies-Murphy Power Attack Sébastien Kunz-Jacques Frédéric Muller Frédéric Valette DCSSI Crypto Lab Introduction Two approaches for attacking crypto devices traditional cryptanalysis Side Channel Attacks
More informationAES Variants Secure Against Related-Key Differential and Boomerang Attacks
AES Variants Secure Against Related-Key Differential and Boomerang Attacks Jiali Choy 1, Aileen Zhang 1, Khoongming Khoo 1, Matt Henricksen 2 and Axel Poschmann 3 1 DSO National Laboratories 20 Science
More informationAn Optimal Key Enumeration Algorithm and its Application to Side-Channel Attacks
An Optimal Key Enumeration Algorithm and its Application to Side-Channel Attacks Nicolas Veyrat-Charvillon, Benoît Gérard, Mathieu Renauld, François-Xavier Standaert UCL Crypto Group, Université catholique
More informationKey Recovery Attacks of Practical Complexity on AES-256 Variants With Up To 10 Rounds
Key Recovery Attacks of Practical Complexity on AES-256 Variants With Up To 10 Rounds Alex Biryukov 1, Orr Dunkelman 2,4, Nathan Keller 3,4, Dmitry Khovratovich 1, and Adi Shamir 4 1 University of Luxembourg,
More informationOn the Design of Secure Block Ciphers
On the Design of Secure Block Ciphers Howard M. Heys and Stafford E. Tavares Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering Queen s University Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6 email: tavares@ee.queensu.ca
More informationAnalysis of MARS. January 12, 2001
Analysis of MARS January 12, 2001 Executive Summary This report presents the results of a limited evaluation of the block cipher MARS. No important weaknesses or flaws were found on MARS. The round function
More informationChapter 2 Introduction to Side-Channel Attacks
Chapter 2 Introduction to Side-Channel Attacks François-Xavier Standaert 2.1 Introduction A cryptographic primitive can be considered from two points of view: on the one hand, it can be viewed as an abstract
More informationImproved Integral Attacks on MISTY1
Improved Integral Attacks on MISTY1 Xiaorui Sun and Xuejia Lai Department of Computer Science Shanghai Jiao Tong University Shanghai, 200240, China sunsirius@sjtu.edu.cn, lai-xj@cs.sjtu.edu.cn Abstract.
More informationImproved Multi-Dimensional Meet-in-the-Middle Cryptanalysis of KATAN
Improved Multi-Dimensional Meet-in-the-Middle Cryptanalysis of KATAN Shahram Rasoolzadeh and Håvard Raddum Simula Research Laboratory {shahram,haavardr}@simula.no Abstract. We study multidimensional meet-in-the-middle
More informationEvaluation of security level of CLEFIA
Evaluation of security level of CLEFIA An anonymous reviewer Version 1.0 January 25, 2011 1 Evaluation of security level of CLEFIA 1 Contents Executive Summary 3 References 4 1 Introduction 8 2 CLEFIA
More informationImproved Multi-Dimensional Meet-in-the-Middle Cryptanalysis of KATAN
Improved Multi-Dimensional Meet-in-the-Middle Cryptanalysis of KATAN Shahram Rasoolzadeh and Håvard Raddum Simula Research Laboratory Abstract. We study multidimensional meet-in-the-middle attacks on the
More informationNew Attacks on Feistel Structures with Improved Memory Complexities
New Attacks on Feistel Structures with Improved Memory Complexities Itai Dinur 1, Orr Dunkelman 2,4,, Nathan Keller 3,4,, and Adi Shamir 4 1 Département d Informatique, École Normale Supérieure, Paris,
More informationFault Analysis Study of IDEA
Fault Analysis Study of IDEA Christophe Clavier 1, Benedikt Gierlichs 2, and Ingrid Verbauwhede 2 1 Gemalto, Security Labs Avenue du Jujubier, ZI Athélia IV, 13705 La Ciotat Cedex, France christophe.clavier@gemalto.com
More informationA New Attack on the LEX Stream Cipher
A New Attack on the LEX Stream Cipher Orr Dunkelman, and Nathan Keller, École Normale Supérieure Département d Informatique, CNRS, INRIA 45 rue d Ulm, 750 Paris, France orr.dunkelman@ens.fr Einstein Institute
More informationPower-Analysis Attack on an ASIC AES implementation
Power-Analysis Attack on an ASIC AES implementation Sıddıka Berna Örs 1 Frank Gürkaynak 2 Elisabeth Oswald 3,4 Bart Preneel 1 1 Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Dept. ESAT/SCD-COSIC, Kasteelpark Arenberg
More informationDifferential Cryptanalysis of Madryga
Differential Cryptanalysis of Madryga Ken Shirriff Address: Sun Microsystems Labs, 2550 Garcia Ave., MS UMTV29-112, Mountain View, CA 94043. Ken.Shirriff@eng.sun.com Abstract: The Madryga encryption algorithm
More informationElastic Block Ciphers: The Feistel Cipher Case
Elastic Block Ciphers: The Feistel Cipher Case Debra L. Cook Moti Yung Angelos D. Keromytis Department of Computer Science Columbia University, New York, NY dcook,moti,angelos @cs.columbia.edu Technical
More informationFortification of AES with Dynamic Mix-Column Transformation
Fortification of AES with Dynamic Mix-Column Transformation Ghulam Murtaza 1 Azhar Ali Khan 2 Syed Wasi Alam 2 Aqeel Farooqi 3 1 National University of Science and Technology Islamabad Pakistan 2 Sichuan
More informationUpdate on Tiger. Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, B 3001 Heverlee, Belgium
Update on Tiger Florian Mendel 1, Bart Preneel 2, Vincent Rijmen 1, Hirotaka Yoshida 3, and Dai Watanabe 3 1 Graz University of Technology Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications
More informationCOZMO - A New Lightweight Stream Cipher
COZMO - A New Lightweight Stream Cipher Rhea Bonnerji 0000-0002-5825-8800, Simanta Sarkar 0000-0002-4210-2764, Krishnendu Rarhi 0000-0002-5794-215X, Abhishek Bhattacharya School of Information Technology,
More informationA Cautionary Note on Weak Implementations of Block Ciphers
A Cautionary Note on Weak Implementations of Block Ciphers Tim Kerins and Klaus Kursawe Information and System Security Group, Philips Research Europe Prof. Holstlaan 4, 5656 AA, Eindhoven, The Netherlands.
More informationComputer and Data Security. Lecture 3 Block cipher and DES
Computer and Data Security Lecture 3 Block cipher and DES Stream Ciphers l Encrypts a digital data stream one bit or one byte at a time l One time pad is example; but practical limitations l Typical approach
More informationCryptanalysis of the Speck Family of Block Ciphers
Cryptanalysis of the Speck Family of Block Ciphers Farzaneh Abed, Eik List, Stefan Lucks, and Jakob Wenzel Bauhaus-Universität Weimar, Germany {farzaneh.abed, eik.list, stefan.lucks, jakob.wenzel}@uni-weimar.de
More informationRECTIFIED DIFFERENTIAL CRYPTANALYSIS OF 16 ROUND PRESENT
RECTIFIED DIFFERENTIAL CRYPTANALYSIS OF 16 ROUND PRESENT Manoj Kumar 1, Pratibha Yadav, Meena Kumari SAG, DRDO, Metcalfe House, Delhi-110054, India mktalyan@yahoo.com 1 ABSTRACT In this paper, we have
More informationSerpent: A New Block Cipher Proposal
Serpent: A New Block Cipher Proposal Eli Biham 1, Ross Anderson 2, and Lars Knudsen 3 1 Technion, Haifa, Israel; biham@cs.technion.ac.il 2 Cambridge University, England; rja14@cl.cam.ac.uk 3 University
More informationLecture 3: Symmetric Key Encryption
Lecture 3: Symmetric Key Encryption CS996: Modern Cryptography Spring 2007 Nitesh Saxena Outline Symmetric Key Encryption Continued Discussion of Potential Project Topics Project proposal due 02/22/07
More informationNew Time-Memory-Data Trade-Off Attack on the Estream Finalists and Modes of Operation of Block Ciphers
New Time-Memory-Data Trade-Off Attack on the Estream Finalists and Modes of Operation of Block Ciphers Khoongming Khoo DSO National Laboratories, 20 Science Park Drive, S118230, Singapore. kkhoongm@dso.org.sg
More informationSecurity Evaluations beyond Computing Power
Security Evaluations beyond Computing Power How to Analyze Side-Channel Attacks You Cannot Mount? Nicolas Veyrat-Charvillon 1,Benoît Gérard 2,andFrançois-Xavier Standaert 1 1 UCL Crypto Group, Université
More informationImproved Impossible Differential Attacks against Round-Reduced LBlock
Improved Impossible Differential Attacks against Round-Reduced LBlock Christina Boura, Marine Minier, María Naya-Plasencia, Valentin Suder To cite this version: Christina Boura, Marine Minier, María Naya-Plasencia,
More informationStream Ciphers and Block Ciphers
Stream Ciphers and Block Ciphers Ruben Niederhagen September 18th, 2013 Introduction 2/22 Recall from last lecture: Public-key crypto: Pair of keys: public key for encryption, private key for decryption.
More informationAn Introduction to Block Cipher Cryptanalysis
An Introduction to Block Cipher Cryptanalysis CHRISTOPHE DE CANNIÈRE, ALEX BIRYUKOV, AND BART PRENEEL Invited Paper Since the introduction of the Data Encryption Standard (DES) in the mid-1970s, block
More informationFew Other Cryptanalytic Techniques
Few Other Cryptanalytic Techniques Debdeep Mukhopadhyay Assistant Professor Department of Computer Science and Engineering Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur INDIA -721302 Objectives Boomerang Attack
More informationSelf evaluation of FEAL-NX
Self evaluation of FEAL-NX 1 Evaluation of security 1.1. Differential cryptanalysis In extending differential cryptanalysis, Aoki, Kobayashi, and Moriai [1] greatly reduced the computational amount needed
More informationA Differential Fault Attack against Early Rounds of (Triple-)DES
A Differential Fault Attack against Early Rounds of (Triple-)DES Ludger Hemme Giesecke & Devrient GmbH Prinzregentenstr. 159, 81677 Munich, Germany ludger.hemme@de.gi-de.com Abstract. Previously proposed
More informationA SIMPLIFIED IDEA ALGORITHM
A SIMPLIFIED IDEA ALGORITHM NICK HOFFMAN Abstract. In this paper, a simplified version of the International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) is described. This simplified version, like simplified versions
More informationImproved DST Cryptanalysis of IDEA
Improved DST Cryptanalysis of IDEA Eyüp Serdar Ayaz and Ali Aydın Selçuk Department of Computer Engineering Bilkent University Ankara, 06800, Turkey {serdara,selcuk}@cs.bilkent.edu.tr Abstract. In this
More informationImproved Integral Attacks on MISTY1
Improved Integral Attacks on MISTY1 Xiaorui Sun Xuejia Lai Abstract We present several integral attacks on MISTY1 using the F O Relation, which is derived from Sakurai-Zheng Property used in previous attacks.
More informationChosen Ciphertext Attack on SSS
Chosen Ciphertext Attack on SSS Joan Daemen 1, Joseph Lano 2, and Bart Preneel 2 1 STMicroelectronics Belgium joan.daemen@st.com 2 Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Dept. ESAT/SCD-COSIC {joseph.lano,bart.preneel}@esat.kuleuven.ac.be
More informationA Simple Power Analysis Attack Against the Key Schedule of the Camellia Block Cipher
A Simple Power Analysis Attack Against the Key Schedule of the Camellia Block Cipher Lu Xiao and Howard M. Heys 2 QUALCOMM Incorporated, lxiao@qualcomm.com 2 Electrical and Computer Engineering, Faculty
More informationDeKaRT: A New Paradigm for Key-Dependent Reversible Circuits
DeKaRT: A New Paradigm for Key-Dependent Reversible Circuits Jovan D. Golić System on Chip, Telecom Italia Lab Telecom Italia Via Guglielmo Reiss Romoli 274, I-00148 Turin, Italy jovan.golic@tilab.com
More informationWeek 5: Advanced Encryption Standard. Click
Week 5: Advanced Encryption Standard Click http://www.nist.gov/aes 1 History of AES Calendar 1997 : Call For AES Candidate Algorithms by NIST 128-bit Block cipher 128/192/256-bit keys Worldwide-royalty
More informationI-PRESENT TM : An Involutive Lightweight Block Cipher
Journal of Information Security, 2014, 5, 114-122 Published Online July 2014 in SciRes. http://www.scirp.org/journal/jis http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/jis.2014.53011 I-PRESENT TM : An Involutive Lightweight
More informationLecture 2: Secret Key Cryptography
T-79.159 Cryptography and Data Security Lecture 2: Secret Key Cryptography Helger Lipmaa Helsinki University of Technology helger@tcs.hut.fi 1 Reminder: Communication Model Adversary Eve Cipher, Encryption
More informationSymmetric Key Encryption. Symmetric Key Encryption. Advanced Encryption Standard ( AES ) DES DES DES 08/01/2015. DES and 3-DES.
Symmetric Key Encryption Symmetric Key Encryption and 3- Tom Chothia Computer Security: Lecture 2 Padding Block cipher modes Advanced Encryption Standard ( AES ) AES is a state-of-the-art block cipher.
More informationLecture 4: Symmetric Key Encryption
Lecture 4: Symmetric ey Encryption CS6903: Modern Cryptography Spring 2009 Nitesh Saxena Let s use the board, please take notes 2/20/2009 Lecture 1 - Introduction 2 Data Encryption Standard Encrypts by
More informationA Fault Attack Against the FOX Cipher Family
A Fault Attack Against the FOX Cipher Family L. Breveglieri 1,I.Koren 2,andP.Maistri 1 1 Department of Electronics and Information Technology, Politecnico di Milano, Milano, Italy {brevegli, maistri}@elet.polimi.it
More informationCryptanalysis of Haraka
Cryptanalysis of Haraka Jérémy Jean Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d Information Crypto Laboratory FSE 2017 @ Tokyo, Japan March 6, 2017 Jeremy.Jean@ssi.gouv.fr Introduction Let n be a positive
More informationL3. An Introduction to Block Ciphers. Rocky K. C. Chang, 29 January 2015
L3. An Introduction to Block Ciphers Rocky K. C. Chang, 29 January 2015 Outline Product and iterated ciphers A simple substitution-permutation network DES and AES Modes of operations Cipher block chaining
More informationSecure Multiple SBoxes Implementation with Arithmetically Masked Input
Secure Multiple SBoxes Implementation with Arithmetically Masked Input Luk Bettale Oberthur Technologies 71-73 rue des Hautes Pâtures 92726 Nanterre Cedex - France l.bettale@oberthur.com Abstract The building
More informationTwo Attacks Against the HBB Stream Cipher
Two Attacks Against the HBB Stream Cipher Antoine Joux 1 and Frédéric Muller 2 1 DGA and Univ. Versailles St-Quentin Antoine.Joux@m4x.org 2 DCSSI Crypto Lab Frederic.Muller@sgdn.pm.gouv.fr Abstract. Hiji-Bij-Bij
More informationTiming Attack Prospect for RSA Cryptanalysts Using Genetic Algorithm Technique
80 The International Arab Journal of Information Technology, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 2004 Timing Attack Prospect for RSA Cryptanalysts Using Genetic Algorithm Technique Hamza Ali and Mikdam Al-Salami Computer
More informationEfficient DPA Attacks on AES Hardware Implementations
I. J. Communications, Network and System Sciences. 008; : -03 Published Online February 008 in SciRes (http://www.srpublishing.org/journal/ijcns/). Efficient DPA Attacks on AES Hardware Implementations
More informationFiroz Ahmed Siddiqui 1, Ranjeet Kumar 2 1 (Department of Electronics & Telecommunication, Anjuman College of Engineering & Technology, Nagpur,
VLSI Design of Secure Cryptographic Algorithm Firoz Ahmed Siddiqui 1, Ranjeet Kumar 2 1 (Department of Electronics & Telecommunication, Anjuman College of Engineering & Technology, Nagpur, India) 2 (Department
More informationVery High-Order Masking: Efficient Implementation and Security Evaluation
Very High-Order Masking: Efficient Implementation and Security Evaluation Anthony Journault and François-Xavier Standaert UCL (Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium) CHES 2017, Taipei, Taiwan Outline Background Masking
More information