ON SECURITY OF BLUETOOTH WIRELESS SYSTEM. Pavel Kucera, Petr Fiedler, Zdenek Bradac, Ondrej Hyncica

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1 ON SECURITY OF BLUETOOTH WIRELESS SYSTEM Pavel Kucera, Petr Fiedler, Zdenek Bradac, Ondrej Hyncica Brno University of Technology Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Communication Department of Control and Instrumentation Kolejni 4, 61200, Abstract: This paper describes security features of Bluetooth PAN wireless network. Security aspects are explained step-by-step from the basic items and management to the authentication and data encryption. Finally, current problem with the Bluetooth security are presented. Copyright 2005 IFAC Keywords: System security, Wireless, PAN, Authentication, Encryption. 1. BLUETOOTH TECHNOLOGY Bluetooth technology is intended for wireless connection between human-oriented devices: PC, board, mouse, headset, mobile phone, PDA, GPS..., (SIG, 1998). IEEE approved Bluetooth-based wireless PAN standard in 2002 as IEEE Bluetooth v1.1 specification (IEEE , 2002). The Bluetooth technology provides peer-to-peer communication over relatively close proximity. The range for Bluetooth transmission varies form about 10 meters up to 100 meters for the most powerful devices (Class 1), similar to a typical wi-fi network. Typical application of Bluetooth is to create a temporary computer network. For example, several people in a meeting room are able to connect their laptops and PDAs to each other to share files. When you use Bluetooth to create a network, it is usually an ad hoc network. Computers communicate directly with each other; there is not a wireless access point, which can ensure security control over the network. Thus, security becomes a major concern because important data are exposed to the other member of the network not only in the meeting room but also anywhere in the above mentioned transmission range even not within your sight (Toms, 2005). 2. SECUTIRY ITMES In order to provide protection of the communication, the security at the link layer and application layer is ensured. Every Bluetooth device has four identification items used for the security features at the link layer (Bluetooth, 2001): 1. Bluetooth device address (BD_ADDR) - every Bluetooth transceiver has a unique 48 bits address that is derived from the IEEE802 standard. Structure of BD_ADDR is shown in Fig. 1. LAP and UAP are significant part of the BD_ADDR and enable total address space 232. BD_ADDR of the device is publicly known; it can be obtained either manually via test system interface, or automatically via inquiry command at every Bluetooth device. BD_ADDR - 48 bits NAP UAP 16 bits 8 bits Non-significant Address Part Upper Address Part MSB LAP 24 bits Lower Address Part Fig. 1. Structure of the Bluetooth device address 2. Private authentication, which is always 128 bits random number used by the authentication algorithm. 3. Private encryption is derived from the authentication during the authentication process. The size of the may vary between bits due to different requirements imposed on cryptographic algorithms in different countries and due to the increasing computing power of the attackers. The encryption is entirely different from the LSB

2 authentication and each time the encryption is activated a new encryption is generated; thus, the life time of the encryption is different to the authentication. 4. A random number RAND, which can be derived from a random or pseudo-random process in the Bluetooth device. The RAND is always 128 bits and it is changed frequently. For practical reasons, a software based solution with a pseudo-random generator is often used. Within Bluetooth, the requirements placed on the random numbers used are that they be non repeating and randomly generated. Non repeating means that the number shall not be repeated during the lifetime of the authentication. The expression randomly generated means that it shall not be possible to predict its value with the likehood that is greater than 1/2L, where L is a length). Bluetooth can operate in one of three security models shown in Fig. 2. Security Mode 1 non security Security Mode 2 security at the service level, after the communication channel is established Security Mode 3 security at the link level, after the communication channel is established Fig. 2. Bluetooth security modes Different security levels for Bluetooth devices and services are shown in Fig. 3. Level 1 - trusted Bluetooth Device Level 2 - untrusted Level 1 - authorisation and authentication is required Bluetooth Service Level 2 - only authentication is required Level 3 - open all devices Fig. 3. Security Levels for devices and services 3. KEY MANAGEMENT The encryption used during communication has a specific size and cannot be set by the user. The s size is set by a factory and the Bluetooth baseband processing does not accept an encryption given from higher software layers in order to prevent the user over-riding the permitted size. Changing a link should also be done through the defined baseband procedures. All security transactions between two or more parties are handled by the link. The link is a 128 bits random number which is used in the authentication routine and during the generation of the encryption. The lifetime of a link depends on whether it is a semi-permanent or a temporary. A semi-permanent link is stored in non volatile memory and may be used after the current session is terminated. The session is defined as the time interval for which the unit is a member of a particular piconet. A temporary lasts only until the current session is terminated and it cannot be reused. Temporary s are commonly used in pointto-multipoint connections, where the same information is transmitted to several recipients. In order to accommodate for different types of applications, four types of link s have been defined: the combination K AB the unit K A (K B ) the temporary K master the initialization K init The combination K AB and the unit K A (K B ) are functionally indistinguishable. The unit K A (K B ) is generated in a single unit A (B). The unit is generated once at installation of the Bluetooth unit. The combination K AB is derived from information in both units A and B, and is therefore always dependent on two units. The master K master is a temporary, which replaces the current link. It can be used when the master unit wants to transmit information to more than one recipient simultaneously using the same encryption. The initialization K init is used as link during the initialization process when there are not yet any unit or combination s or when a link has been lost. The is derived from a random number, Personal Identification Number (PIN) code, and a BD_ADDR. This is only to be used during initialization. The length of the PIN code used in Bluetooth devices can vary between 1 and 16 bytes. For the longer lengths the units exchange PIN codes not through human interaction, but rather through methods supported by software at the application layer. The PIN code of the device can be fixed, so that it needs to be entered only to the device wishing to connect. Another possibility is that the PIN code must be entered to the both devices during the initialization. 4. KEY GENERATION AND INITIALIZATION The link s have to be generated and distributed among the Bluetooth units in order to be used in the authentication procedure. The exchange of the s takes place during an initialization phase which has to be carried out separately for each two units that want to implement authentication and encryption. All initialization procedures consist of the following five parts: generation of an initialization, generation of link, link exchange, authentication, generating of encryption in each unit.

3 After the initialization procedure, the units can proceed to communicate, or the link can be disconnected. If encryption is implemented, the E0 algorithm is used with the proper encryption derived from the current link. 4.1 Generation of an initialization The initialization is needed when two devices with no prior engagements need to communicate. During the initialization process, the PIN code is entered to both devices. The initialization itself is generated by the E22 algorithm shown in Fig. 4, which uses the PIN code, the length of the PIN code L and a 128 bits random number IN_RAND generated by the verifier device as inputs. IN_RAND 128 bits PIN 8L L <1;16> E 22 algorithm Fig. 4. Generation of an initialization K init K master When the initialization is generated, the PIN is augmented with the BD_ADDR. If one unit has a fixed PIN the BD_ADDR of the other unit is used. If both units have a variable PIN the BD_ADDR of the device that received IN_RAND is used. If both units have a fixed PIN they cannot be paired. 4.2 Generation of a unit The unit K A (K B ) is generated with the generating algorithm E21 (Fig. 5) when the Bluetooth device is in operation for the first time; i.e. not during each initialization. Once created, the unit is stored in non-volatile memory and is rarely changed. Another device can use the other device's unit as a link between these devices. During the initialization process, the application decides which party should provide its unit as the link. time. First, both of the units generate a random number. With the generating algorithm E21, both devices generate a, combining the random number RAND_A and RAND_B and their BT device addresses. After that, the two random numbers are exchanged securely by XORing with the current link and each unit recalculates the other unit contribution to the combination. This is possible since each unit knows the Bluetooth device address of the other unit. 4.4 Generation of a master The master is a temporary of the link s. It is generated by the master device by using the generating algorithm E22 with two 128-bit random numbers and L = 16. The reason to use the generating algorithm E22 in the first place is just to make sure the resulting random number is random enough. A third random number is then transmitted to the slave and with the generating algorithm and the current link an overlay is computed by both the master and the slave. The master is then sent to the slave, bitwise XORed with the overlay and slave can calculate the master. This procedure is then repeated for each slave who shall receive the new link. 4.5 Generation of the encryption The encryption KC is derived by E3 algorithm (Fig. 6) from the current link, a 96 bits Ciphering OFfset number (COF), and a 128 bits random number. The COF is determined in one of two ways. If the current link is a master, then COF is derived from the master BD_ADDR. Otherwise the value of COF is set to the value of Authenticated Ciphering Offset (ACO), which is generated during the authentication procedure. The encryption is automatically changed every time the Bluetooth device enters the encryption mode. IN_RAND 128 bits COF 96 bits E 3 algorithm 128 bits K C IN_RAND 128 bits E 21 algorithm Link Key 128 bits K A(B) Fig. 6. Generation of the encryption K AB BD_ADDR 48 bits 5. ENCRYPTION Fig. 5. Generation of a unit and a combination 4.3 Generation of a combination The combination is generated during the initialization process if the devices have decided to use one. It is generated by both devices at the same The Bluetooth encryption system encrypts the payloads of the packets; the access code and the packet header are never encrypted. Encryption is done with a stream cipher E0, which is re-synchronized for every new payload, which disrupt so-called correlation attacks. At each iteration, E0 generates a bit using four shift registers of differing lengths and two internal states, each 2 bits long. At each clock tick, the registers are shifted

4 and the two states are updated with the current state, the previous state and the values in the shift registers. Four bits are then extracted from the shift registers and added together. The algorithm XORs that sum with the value in the 2-bit register. The first bit of the result is output for the encoding. The E0 stream cipher system consists of the payload generator, the stream generator and the encryption/decryption part - Fig. 7. K C address clock RAND payload generator payload stream generator Fig. 7. Stream ciphering with E0 plain text cipher text Z cipher text plain text encryption/ decryption part Depending on whether a device uses a semi-permanent link (i.e. a combination or a unit ), or a master, there are several encryption modes available. If a unit or a combination is used, broadcast traffic is not encrypted. Individually addressed traffic can be either encrypted or not. If a master is used, there are three possible modes: mode 1, nothing is encrypted, mode 2, broadcast traffic is not encrypted, but the individually addressed traffic is encrypted with the master mode 3, all traffic is encrypted with the master. 6. AUTHENTICATION The Bluetooth authentication scheme uses a challenge response scheme in which a claimant s knowledge of a secret is checked through a 2-move protocol using symmetric secret s; a successful authentication is based on the fact that both participants share the same. As a side product, the ACO is computed and stored in both devices and is used for cipher generation later on. AU_RAND A BD_ADDR B E 1 Link Key Verifier (Unit A) Claimant (Unit B) SRES'? = SRES AU_RAND A SRES SRES Fig. 8. Authentication scheme in Bluetooth E 1 AU_RAND A BD_ADDR B Link Key First, the verifier sends the claimant a random number AU_RANDA to be authenticated. Then, both participants use the authentication function E1 with the random number, the claimants Bluetooth Device Address BD_ADDRB and the current link to get a response. The claimant sends the response SRES to the verifier, who then makes sure the responses match. Authentication scheme is shown in Fig. 8. When the authentication attempt fails, a certain waiting interval must pass before the verifier will initiate a new authentication attempt to the same claimant, or before it will respond to an authentication attempt initiated by a unit claiming the same identity as the suspicious unit. For each subsequent authentication failure with the same Bluetooth address, the waiting interval shall be increased exponentially. 7. PROBLEMS IN THE SECURITY The encryption scheme of Bluetooth has some serious weaknesses. The most important is a fact that E0 algorithm has flaw in the resynchronization mechanism and there were some investigation of conditional correlations in the Finite State Machine (FSM) governing the stream output of E0 (Lu, 2005) The best attack finds the original encryption for two-level E0 using the first 24 bits of frames and with 2 38 computations. The generation of the initialization is also a problem. The strength of the initialization is based on the used PIN code. The E22 initialization generation algorithm derives the from the PIN code, the length of the PIN code and a random number, which is transmitted over the air. When using 4 digit PIN codes there are only different possibilities; in fact most of the PINs are like Thus, the security of the initialization is quite low. The unique Bluetooth Device Address introduces another problem. When a connection is made that a certain Bluetooth device belongs to a certain person, it is easy to track and monitor the behaviour of this person. For instance, with the appropriate equipment (easy accessible) it is possible to track Bluetooth devices from more than mile away (Toms, 2005). The initial exchange takes place over an unencrypted link, so it is especially vulnerable because there is no such thing as a secure location anymore. Finally the well known Denial of Service (DoS) Attack. This nuisance is very simply; a constant request for response from a hacker s Bluetooth enabled computer to another Bluetooth enabled device such that it causes some temporary battery degradation in the receiving device. While occupying the Bluetooth link with invalid communication requests, the hacker can temporarily disable the product s Bluetooth services. 8. CONCLUSION Security aspects are very important for wireless technologies due to easy access of the attackers to the communication medium. Anyone with the

5 appropriate HW can scan radio communication, log it and use today s powerful computer performance to obtain sensitive information. Bluetooth has serious vulnerability due to E0 cryptographic algorithm. However even more secure algorithms, like AES-128 which seems to bee secure at present time, have side channels due to poor implementation of the algorithm in 32 bits processor (Bernstein, 2005). PAN technology is primary designed for devices based on 8 bits microcontrollers where the correct implementation without side channels will be even more challenging. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This work was supported by the Centre of Applied Cybernetics and Brno University of Technology under the Project 1M0567, Ministry of Trade and Industry of the Czech Republic (FT-TA2/095), Grant agency of the Czech Republic (GA 102/03/1097, GA 102/05/0663 and GA 102/05/0467). REFERENCES SIG (1998). Official home page: IEEE (2002). Official home page: Toms Networking (2005). How to build a BlueSnipper Rifle. Bluetooth specification (2001). Version 1.1, February Lu, Y., W. Meier and S. Vaudenay (2005). The Conditional Correlation Attack. A Practical Attack on Bluetooth Encryption. Crypto'05, Santa Barbara, Aug 05, Bernstein D.J. Cache-timing attacks on AES. (2005) pdf

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