PRESERVED DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE FOR WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS IN THE OCCURRENCE OF CONFEDERACY ATTACKS

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1 PRESERVED DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE FOR WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS IN THE OCCURRENCE OF CONFEDERACY ATTACKS L.Sujitha #1, S.Vijayakumar *2 #1 Paavai Engineering College, Namakkal, Tamilnadu, India *2 Associate Professor (ECE), Paavai Engineering College, Namakkal, Tamilnadu, India Abstract- A wireless sensor network (WSN) refers to a network designed for special applications that it's tough to use a backbone network. In WSNs, applications square measure principally involved sensitive and secret data. Since WSN assumes a trusty surroundings for routing, security could be a major issue. during this paper we have a tendency to analyze the vulnerabilities of a pro-active routing protocol known as optimized link state routing (OLSR) against a selected form of denial-of-service (DOS) attack known as node isolation attack. Analyzing the attack, we have a tendency to propose a mechanism known as increased OLSR (EOLSR) protocol that could be a trust primarily based technique to secure the OLSR nodes against the attack. Our technique is capable of finding whether or not a node is advertising correct topology data or not by confirmative its hullo packets, therefore sleuthing node isolation attacks. The experiment results show that our protocol is ready to attain routing security with forty fifth increase in packet delivery quantitative relation and four hundred and forty yards reduction in packet loss rate compared to plain OLSR beneath node isolation attack. Our technique is lightweight weight as a result of it doesn t involve high procedure quality for securing the networks. Key Words: Ad hoc networks, denial-of-service (DOS) attack, node isolation attack, optimized linkstaterouting(olsr) I. INTRODUCTION A mobile unexpected networks (MANET) may be a assortment of mobile devices that square measure connected by wireless links while not the employment of any mounted infrastructures or centralized access points. In MANET, every node acts not solely as a number however additionally as a router to forward messages for alternative nodes that aren't among identical direct wireless transmission vary. every device in a very Edouard Manet is liberated to move severally in any direction, and can so amendment its links to alternative devices oftentimes. MANETs square measure rather more vulnerable and square measure prone to varied styles of security attacks 84 [1] as a result of its cooperating surroundings. within the absence of a hard and fast infrastructure that establishes a line of defense by characteristic and uninflected non-trusted nodes, it's attainable that the management messages generated by the routing protocols square measure corrupted or compromised therefore poignant the performance of the network. Routing protocols in Edouard Manet is classified into 2 categories: reactive protocol and proactive protocol. In proactive routing protocols, all nodes have to be compelled to maintain an identical read of the topology. once a topology changes, several updates should be propagated throughout the network to give notice the amendment. In reactive routing protocols for mobile unexpected networks, that are referred to as on-demand routing protocols, routing methods square measure sought for, once required. even supposing several analysis works had been dispensed for routing attacks in Edouard Manet, most of it targeted principally on reactive routing protocols. Optimized link state routing (OLSR) routing protocol that may be a proactive routing protocol [2] offers promising performance in terms of information measure and traffic overhead however it doesn't incorporate any security measures. As a result, OLSR is susceptible to varied styles of attacks [3] and [4] like flooding attack, link withholding attack, replay attack, denial-of-service (DOS) attack and colluding misrelay attack. during this paper, we have a tendency to analyze a particular DOS attack referred to as node isolation attack [5] and propose an answer for it. Node isolation attack is simply launched on OLSR when observant the network activity for a amount of your time. we have a tendency to propose an answer referred to as increased OLSR (EOLSR) that's supported substantiative the greeting packets coming back from the node before choosing it as a multipoint relay (MPR) node for forwarding packets.

2 II. OLSR OVERVIEW Optimized link state routing (OLSR) [2], [5] is one amongst the foremost vital proactive routing protocols designed for Edouard Manet. It employs periodic exchange of messages to keep up topology data of the network at every node. The key construct of OLSR is that the use of multipoint relay (MPR) to supply economical flooding mechanism by reducing the quantity of transmissions needed. every node selects a group of its neighbor nodes as MPR. solely nodes elite as MPR nodes ar to blame for advertising furthermore as forwarding topology data into the network. Fig. one illustrates a node broadcast its messages throughout the network victimization commonplace flooding wherever all neighbors relay message transmitted by the left node and MPR flooding wherever solely MPR nodes relay the message. The protocol is best appropriate for big and dense network because the technique of MPRs works well during this context. A node selects MPRs from among its one hop neighbors with symmetric, i.e., bi-directional, links. Therefore, choosing the route through MPRs mechanically avoids the issues related to knowledge packet transfer over uni-directional links. In OLSR protocol, 2 forms of routing message square measure used, namely, hullo message and TC message. A hullo message is that the message that's used for neighbor sensing and MPR choice. In OLSR, every node generates hullo message sporadically (every hullo INTERVAL). A node s hullo message contains its own address and therefore the list its 1-hop neighbors. A TC message is that the message that's used for route calculation. In OLSR, every MPR node advertises TC message sporadically (every TC INTERVAL). A TC message contains the list of the sender s MPR selector. III. EXISTING SYSTEM When a configuration changes, individual updates ought to be propagated throughout the network to apprise the modification. In reactive routing protocols for wireless device networks, that are observed as on-demand routing protocols, routing strategies ar probe for, once needed. albeit many analysis works had been assigned for routing attacks in WSN, most of it centered within the main on reactive routing protocols. Optimized link state routing (OLSR) routing protocol that would be a proactive routing protocol offers promising performance in terms of data live and traffic overhead but it does not incorporate any security measures. OLSR is in danger of various styles of attacks like flooding attack, link withholding attack, replay attack, denial-ofservice (DOS) attack and colluding misrelay attack. IV. PROPOSED SYSTEM 85 In this paper, we have a tendency to tend to research a selected DOS attack called node isolation attack and propose a solution for it. Node isolation attack is solely launched on OLSR once perceptive the network activity for a quantity of it slow. we have a tendency to tend to propose a solution called inflated OLSR (EOLSR) that is supported collateral the acknowledgment packets coming from the node before selecting it as a multipoint relay (MPR) node for forwarding packets. The proposed solution called EOLSR, which is based on OLSR, uses a simple verification scheme of hello packets coming from neighbor nodes to detect the malicious nodes in the network. The experiment results show that the percentage of packets received through our proposed work is better than OLSR in presence of multiple attacker nodes. Compared to other related works, the proposed protocol has more merits; the most important merit is that it achieves degradation in packet loss rate without any computational complexity or promiscuous listening. V. RELATED WORK Recently, several crypto logical based techniques had been contributed for securing OLSR [6] [9]. In [6], a crypto logical based approach has been projected for safeguarding the network. this methodology classifies the OLSR nodes into either dependable or un-trusted nodes with associate assumption that dependable nodes are not compromised. It integrates a timestamp and a signature with each routing management message: The signature is used to manifest messages from dependable nodes, and timestamps unit accustomed forestall replay attacks. the disadvantage of this approach is that it does not lookout of defense against compromised dependable nodes. but in our theme, the hi packets generated by the documented nodes are verified that modify U.S.A. to sight the documented but compromised nodes. In [9], the authors rely on the compromise of fiducial nodes. it's assumed that a public key infrastructure (PKI) and a timestamp formula unit in place. with the exception of routing management packets additionally this technique uses a message ADVSIG that contains time stamp and signature information. each node maintains a table where information received in ADVSIGs is unbroken. supported this information, each node verifies the correctness of the link state information in sequent messages.

3 In [7], the authors utilised distributed key management techniques to prevent hole and message replay attacks. The technique planned in uses signature and timestamp schemes to verify authentication and protection against replay attacks. The techniques in imposes Associate in Nursing outsized overhead to the network in terms of any traffic and signature computations that lands up in high energy consumption at each node. Since our theme does not depend on any encryption and decryption techniques, it does not add any procedure complexity at each node. a totally distributed certificate authority (CA) [10] supported threshold cryptography is planned. throughout this method a node can requests a certificate from any k nodes (shareholders) of the network that ar approved CAs. each of the share holders make sure whether or not or to not serve the request supported whether or not or not the node in question is well behaving. but this method does not use any observance system to examine the good behaviour of network nodes, so as that it does not manage compromised trustworthy nodes. In [5] and [11], the authors planned a simple mechanism to sight the link withholding and misrelay launched by MPR nodes supported overhearing of traffic generated by 1-hop neighbour s. but this method wants promiscuous listening of neighbour nodes that finish in energy drop at this node whereas we tend to tend to do not use any neighbour observance approach. In [12], Vilela et al. planned a cooperative security theme using a whole path message (CPM) and rating table. This approach wants each node that receives a TC packet to send CPM back to the TC offer. supported the path information from the CPM, the TC offer can sight the link spoofing attack. but this technique incurs Associate in Nursing oversize overhead in terms of additional traffic, since it wants all nodes that receive TC message to return up with a CPM message. Since CPM contains complete path it traversed, the dimensions of the message can increase as network grows. Our technique uses besides three management messages that does not pass the network quite 3-hops, so as that it does not incurs Associate in Nursing oversize overhead in terms of traffic. a correct approach to handle the MPR alternative and defense against the protection attacks in OLSR is sometimes suggested. This approach validates the routing table and conjointly the topology information pattern trust based totally reasoning. Hence, each node can verify the validity of the received hi and TC messages simply by correlating the information provided by these messages. A formal approach to handle the MPR choice and defense against the protection attacks in OLSR is recommended in [13]. This approach validates the routing table and therefore the topology data victimization trust primarily based reasoning. Hence, every node will verify the validity of the received salutation and TC messages just by correlating the data provided by these messages. VI. NODE ISOLATION ATTACK Node isolation attack may be a reasonably DOS attack launched by malicious nodes against OLSR protocol. The goal of this attack is to isolate a node from human activity with different nodes within the network. a lot of specifically, this attack prevents a victim node from receiving knowledge packets from different nodes within the network. the thought of this attack is that attacker(s) forestall link data of a selected node or a gaggle of nodes from being unfold to the entire network. Thus, different nodes UN agency couldn't receive link data of those target nodes won't be ready to build a route to those target nodes and therefore won't be ready to send knowledge to those nodes. In this attack, aggressor creates virtual links by causation pretend salutation messages as well as the address list of target node s 2- hop neighbors, (the aggressor will learn victim s 2-hop neighbors by analyzing TC message of its 1-hop neighbors). in keeping with OLSR protocol, the MPR choice relies on the utmost coverage of any node s 2-hop neighbors. therefore the target node can choose the aggressor to be its solely MPR node as a result of it assumes that it will reach all its 2-hop neighbors through the aggressor itself. Thus, the sole node that has got to forward and generate TC messages for the target node is that the offensive node. By dropping TC messages received from the target and not generating TC messages for the target node, the aggressor will forestall the link data of target node from being disseminated to the complete network. As a result, alternative nodes wouldn't be able to receive link data of a target node and can conclude that a target node doesn't exist within the network so launching DOS attack on the victim. Therefore, a target node s address are going to be off from alternative nodes routing tables. Since in OLSR, through salutation messages every node will acquire solely data regarding its 1-hop and 2-hop neighbors, alternative nodes that square measure quite 2 hops off from a target node won't be able to discover the existence of the target node. As a consequence, the target node are going to be utterly prevented from receiving information packets from nodes that square measure 3 or additional hops off from it. 86

4 Node C is that the offensive node, and node B is that the target node. rather than causation correct salutation of sending correct HELLO message that contain {B, F} in neighbor address list, the attacker sends a fake. Topology perceived by node H when the attack salutation message that contains which has the target node s all 2-hop neighbors and one non-existent node. in line with the protocol, the target node B can choose the assaulter C as it s onlympr. Here node Z is declared solely by the assaulter and not by the other neighbor nodes of the victim. this is often to enhance the likelihood of assaulter being designated as a MPR. therefore the victim node B assumes that its 2-hop neighbor node Z are often reached solely via node C (attacker) and every one the opposite 2-hop neighbors can also be reached through node C itself. therefore it selects node C as it s solely MPR. Being node B s solely MPR, the assaulter refuses to forward and generate TC message for node B. Since the link info of node B isn't propagated to the whole network, different nodes whose distance to node B ismore than 2 hops (e.g., nodeh) wouldn't be able to build route to node B. The topology understand by node H when the node isolation attack. As a result, different nodes wouldn't be able to send information to node B. Despite being within the network, the target node B are going to be isolated from the network. associate assaulter will launch this attack, as long because the target node is among its transmission vary. VII. RESULT ANALYSIS The performance evaluation on our technique using extensive simulations conducted with the network simulator GLOMOSIM [14]. We generated random topologies with a maximum of 50 nodes over a rectangular field. The terrain dimension is fixed as m. The maximum transmission range of each node is 250 m. The duration of the simulation is 600 s. Random waypoint model is used as the mobility model for each node. Node speed is varied from 2 m/s to 25 m/s. The node pause time is varied from 0 second to 300 seconds. The default settings as in the specifications of OLSR [2] were used for HELLO and TC messages. In our simulation, we used 35% of malicious nodes out of the normal nodes to launch the attack. The malicious nodes are chosen randomly and also one of the neighbors of the nodes that are generating the data traffic is chosen as malicious nodes. The traffic load is simulated using 15 user datagram protocol-case based reasoning (UDP-CBR) connections (30 nodes) generating traffic of 5 kb UDP packets (data payload 512 Bytes) with an inter departure time of 1 s. To eliminate the randomness in the result [14], for each metric, simulation is done for ten different seed values with different random movement of nodes and the average value is taken for the result. Also our approach is compared with another existing approach [5]. Performance Evaluation We used the following metrics to evaluate the performance of our proposed solution EOLSR against OLSR under attack 1. Packet delivery ratio: The ratio between the number of packets originated by the CBR sources of source nodes and the number of packets received by the CBR sink at the destination node Packet loss rate: It is the number of data packets dropped by the malicious nodes that are selected as MPR nodes. 3. Control packet overhead: This is the ratio of number of control packets generated to the data packet received. The packet delivery ratio in the presence of node isolation attack. Here 1 to 5 malicious nodes are 87

5 randomly selected to launch the attack. They select any Packet loss ratio. the trustworthiness of a node before selecting it as an MPR. Instead after selecting the MPR node, it overhears the packet forwarded by that MPR node and compares it with the packets send by itself to verify whether the MPR node is forwarding the packets or not.since the detection of malicious MPR node is possible after the dropping of some TC and data packets by the MPR node, the throughput achieved in is lesser than our scheme. one of the neighbor nodes as their victim and after analyzing the TC messages and hello messages coming from that node; they create a fake hello message containing all the 2-hop neighbors of the victim and send it to the victim. Packet delivery ratio. Once the victim selects it as its MPR, they drop all the data packets and TC packets coming from the victim. As shown in the figure, The throughput achieved by OLSR was approximately 25%, while the throughput achieved in EOLSR under the same scenario was approximately 70%, increased by 45% i.e., EOLSR improved the throughput achieved by OLSR under attack. When the number of attackers increases, the throughput nearly drops to zero in normal OLSR whereas in our scheme, even though the number of attackers increases, the throughput achieved is more or less in steady state because the MPR selection is made only after verifying the correctness and trustworthiness of the node. Similarly, the throughput achieved by the existing approach is 65% which is 5% less than our scheme. This is because the existing solution in does not verify The number of packets dropped by the malicious nodes in OLSR and EOLSR. The packet loss rate of OLSR under attack was approximately 74%, while the packet loss rate of EOLSR was approximately 30%, reduced by 44%. Similarly the packet loss rate of existing solution was approximately 37%, which was increased by 7% when compared to our solution. This is because the existing solution is a detection technique, which detects the attack after it has been launched whereas our technique verifies the trustworthiness of a node before selecting it as anmpr. So packet drop ratio of our approach is less when compared to the solution. Moreover, the existing approach employs promiscuous listening to overhear packets forwarded by the MPR nodes which results in energy dropping at the individual nodes [16] and also this technique cannot withstand colluding attackers. Whereas our technique does not employ promiscuous listening so colluding attacks are not possible and also energy consumption at each node will be much lesser than the existing system. VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK This paper proposes a solution for node isolation attack launched against OLSR routing protocol. Here, we have discussed through an attack model, that it is easy for a malicious node to launch the node isolation attack to isolate an OLSR MANET node. This attack allows at least one attacker to prevent a specific node from receiving data packets from other nodes that are more than two hops away. Control packet overhead. 88

6 The proposed solution called EOLSR, which is based on OLSR, uses a simple verification scheme of hello packets coming from neighbor nodes to detect the malicious nodes in the network. The experiment results show that the percentage of packets received through our proposed work is better than OLSR in presence of multiple attacker nodes. The simulation is done using GloMoSim and our scheme is found to achieve routing security with 45% increase in packet delivery ratio than standard OLSR and also achieves 44% reduction in packet loss rate than OLSR. Compared to other related works, the proposed protocol has more merits; the most important merit is that it achieves degradation in packet loss rate without any computational complexity or promiscuous listening. Moreover, cooperative or colluding attack cannot be launched, because our technique doesn t employ any promiscuous listening of neighbor nodes for detecting the attackers. REFERENCES [1] B. Kannhavong, H. Nakayama, and A. Jamalipour, A survey of routing attacks in mobile ad hoc networks, IEEE trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 14, no. 5, pp , Oct [2] T. Clausen and P. Jacquet, IETF RFC3626: Optimized link state routing protocol (OLSR), Experimental, [3] T. Clausen and U.Herberg, Security issues in the optimized link state routing protocol version 2 (OLSRv2), Int. J. Netw. Security Appl., [4] B. Kannhavong, H. Nakayama and A. Jamalipour, A study of routing attack in OLSR-based mobile ad hoc networks, Int. J. Commun. Syst., [5] B. Kannhavong, H. Nakayama, N. Kato, Y. Nemoto, and A. Jamalipour, Analysis of the node isolation attack against OLSR-based mobile ad hoc network, in Proc. ISCN, 2006, pp [6] D. Raffo, C. Adjih, T. Clausen, and P. Muhlethaler, Securing the OLSR `protocol, in Proc. Med-Hoc-Net, [8] D. Raffo, C. Adjih, T. Clausen, and P. Muhlethaler, Attacks against OLSR: Distributed key management for security, in Proc. OLSR Interop and Workshop, [9] C. Adjih, T. Clausen, A. Laouiti, P. Muhlethaler, and D. Raffo, Securing the OLSR routing protocol with or without compromised nodes in the network, HIPERCOM Project, INRIA Rocquencourt, Tech. Rep. INRIA RR-5494, Feb [10] D. Dhillon, T. S. Randhawa, M. Wang, and L. Lamont, Implementing a fully distributed certificate autorithy in an OLSR MANET, in Proc. IEEE WCNC, [11] D. Dhillon, J. Zhu, J. Richards, and T. Randhawa, Implementation & evaluation of an IDS to safeguard OLSR integrity in MANETs, in Proc. IWCMC, [12] A. J. P. Vilela and J. Barros, A cooperative security scheme for optimized link state routing in mobile ad-hoc networks, in Proc. IST MWCS, [13] A. Adnane, R. de Sousa, C. Bidan, and L. Mé, Analysis of the implicit trust within the OLSR protocol, in Proc. IFIP, [14] X. Zeng, R. Bagrodia, and M. Gerla, GloMoSim: A library for parallel simulation of large-scale wireless networks, in Proc. PADS, [15] D. Raffo, Security schemes fo the OLSR protocol for ad hoc networks, Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. Paris, 2005 [16] M. Mohanapriya and S. Urmila, A novel technique for defending routing attacks in OLSR MANET, in Proc. IEEE ICCIC, [17] S.Vijayakumar, S.Sasirehka, S.Surya, S.Rajkumar, Enhancement of security in cognitive radio network using ADDC Algorithm International Journal of Applied Engineering Research., 2015,Vol.10 No.32 PP: [18] Sasirehka. S. Vijayakumar.S. Abinaya. K., "Unified trust management scheme that enhances the security in MANET using uncertain reasoning," Electronics and Communication Systems (ICECS), nd International Conference on, vol., no.,pp.1497,1505,26-27feb doi: /ECS [7] D. Raffo, C. Adjih, T. Clausen, and P. Muhlethaler, An advanced signature system for OLSR, in Proc. ACM SASN,