HyperSafe: A Lightweight Approach to Provide Lifetime Hypervisor Control-Flow Integrity
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1 31 st IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy, Oakland CA, May HyperSafe: A Lightweight Approach to Provide Lifetime Hypervisor Control-Flow Integrity Zhi Wang, Xuxian Jiang North Carolina State University
2 Outline Motivation Design Implementation & Evaluation Related Work Summary
3 Outline Motivation Design Implementation & Evaluation Related Work Summary
4 Virtualization Adoption Rapidly growing in industry 16% server workloads on virtual machines now 50% by Widely applied to security problems Guest integrity monitoring ReVirt (Dunlap et al, OSDI 02), Livewire (Garfinkel et al, NDSS 03), VMwatcher (Jiang et al, CCS 07), Lares (Payne et al, Oakland 08), (Sharif et al, CCS 09) Guest integrity protection SecVisor (Seshadri et al, SOSP 07), NICKLE (Riley et al, RAID 08), HookSafe (Wang et al, CCS 09) System software analysis AfterSight (Chow et al, USENIX ATC 08), K-Tracer (Lanzi et al, NDSS 09), PoKeR (Riley et al, EuroSys 09) SIM 1 :Gartner Symposium/ITxpo 2009
5 Common Assumption A Trustworthy Hypervisor!
6 Bloated TCB of Type I Hypervisors Hypervisor Hypervisor SLOC TCB Xen K Xen, Dom0 VMware ESXi 1 200K VM Kernel Hyper-V 1 100K Hyper-V, Windows 2008 Server BitVisor 194K BitVisor 1. NOVA: A Microhypervisor-Based Secure Virtualization Architecture (Udo Steinberg et al, EuroSys 10)
7 Vulnerabilities & Attacks Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) Xen - 26, VMware ESX - 18 (til 11/2009) VM escape attacks Xen 0wning Trilogy (Invisible Things Lab, Blackhat 08) Cloudburst: A VMware Guest to Host Escape (Kostya Kortchinsky, Blackhat 09) Hypervisor based rootkits SubVirt (King et al, Oakland 06), Blue Pill (Invisible Things Lab, Blackhat 06), Virtiol (Dino A. Dai Zovi, Blackhat 06)
8 Existing Solutions Reduce TCB TrustVisor (McCune et al, Oakland 10), NOVA (Steinberg et al, EuroSys 10), Improving Xen Security through Disaggregation (Murray et al, VEE 08), Formal verification sel4 (Klein et al, SOSP 09), Our goal is to enable self-protection of commodity type-i (bare-metal) hypervisors!
9 Outline Motivation Design Implementation & Evaluation Related Work Summary
10 Assumptions Trustworthy (x86) hardware IOMMU to prevent malicious DMA transactions Trusted System Management Mode (SMM) Software bugs in the hypervisor
11 Our Approach: HyperSafe load-time integrity trusted booting (e.g. tboot) lifetime hypervisor CFI code integrity non-bypassable memory lockdown runtime CFI control data integrity restricted pointer indexing
12 Non-bypassable Memory Lockdown
13 x86 Paging Mode Page tables determine memory properties Permissions in a page table entry: NX Non-executable R/W Read-only or Writable U/S User or supervisor page W X: a page can be either writable or executable, but not both All memory accesses by software are translated and controlled by page tables Including reads/writes of page tables N X N X N X R W R W R W U S U S U S
14 HyperSafe s Memory Lockdown Pitfalls in existing W X Mixed code and data Mixed code and data are prohibited Double mapping with conflicting attributes Double mapping must have conforming attributes Writable page tables Read-only page tables No code can modify the write-protected hypervisor code and data!
15 Challenge How to safely allow benign page table updates???
16 Hardware Feature to the Rescue! Write-protect (WP) bit in CR0 controls interaction of supervisor and read-only pages WP = 1: Read-only pages are protected even from supervisor WP = 0: Supervisor can write into read-only pages
17 Benign Page Table Updates WP = 1 by default to lock down memory Update page table atomically 1. Disable interrupt 2. WP = 0 3. Verify proposed change 4. Update read-only page table 5. WP = 1 6. Enable interrupt Read-only Page Tables WP WP off on
18 Restricted Pointer Indexing (RPI)
19 Control Flow Integrity (CFI) CFI: runtime execution paths must follow control flow graph (CFG) CFG may have different granularities Indirect call may go to: All indirectly called functions Functions with same type Points-to set Coarse-grained Fine-grained
20 CFG Construction in HyperSafe Points-to analysis required Manual analysis to handle domain knowledge / assembly code in prototype e.g. assembly code to access per-cpu data (function pointers) in gs segments
21 Enforce Control Flow Integrity Restricted Pointer Indexing Collect control data into tables (protected by memory lockdown) Replace control data with the indexes to the table Convert the index back to transfer control Only legitimate control data in the table can be used for control flow transfer!
22 Outline Motivation Design Implementation & Evaluation Related Work Summary
23 Implementation Implementing techniques: Memory lockdown: modify hypervisor s memory management code Restricted Pointer Indexing: extend LLVM compiler to instrument related instructions Prototypes of HyperSafe: Full support for BitVisor Partial support for Xen, additional engineering needed
24 Security Analysis Disable WP bit Misuse page table update function RPI Subvert page table Misuse page table update function RPI Map hypervisor memory to a compromised guest VM Memory lockdown Return-oriented programming Memory lockdown, RPI
25 Performance: Applications Normalized Application Overhead Compared to Original BitVisor HS-2 HS-m 6% 5% 1% 1% 1% 0% Decompress Kernel Build ApacheBench HS-2 implements coarse-grained RPI with two target tables (return instructions and indirect calls) HS-m implements fine-grained RPI with one target table per function and indirect call
26 Performance: LMbench Normalized LMbench Overhead Compared to Original BitVisor HS-2 HS-m 5.5% 5.4% 4.5% 3.4% 3.5% 2.8% 1.2% 0.6% 0.0% 0.6% ctx stat mmap sh proc 10K file bcopy -2.4% -2.2%
27 Related Work Program Analysis and Formal Proof sel4 (Klein et al, SOSP 09), WIT (Akritidis et al, SOSP 08), KLEE (Cadar et al, OSDI 08), Guest Integrity Monitoring or Protection SIM (Sharif et al, CCS 09), SecVisor (Seshadri et al, SOSP 07), SBCFI (Petroni et al, CCS 07), Trusted Computing TrustVisor (McCune et al, Oakland 10), Flicker (McCune et al, EuroSys 08), Pioneer (Seshadri et al, SOSP 05),
28 Summary HyperSafe is a lightweight approach to provide lifetime control-flow integrity for commodity Type- I hypervisors. load-time integrity trusted booting (e.g. tboot) lifetime hypervisor CFI code integrity non-bypassable memory lockdown runtime CFI control data integrity restricted pointer indexing
29 Thanks, Questions?
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