National Information Assurance Partnership

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1 National Information Assurance Partnership TM Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report High Security Labs Secure KVM (identified 2, 4, 8, 16 port models) Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID Dated: March 24, 2016 Version: 1.0 National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense Information Technology Laboratory National Security Agency 100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road Gaithersburg, MD Fort Meade, MD

2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Validation Team Chris Thorpe Daniel Faigin Ken Stutterheim Tony Chew Brad O Neill Common Criteria Testing Laboratory CSC Global Cybersecurity, Computer Sciences Corporation 7459A Candlewood Drive Hanover, Maryland 21076

3 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report is intended to assist the end-user of this product and any security certification Agent for the end-user with determining the suitability of this Information Technology (IT) product in their environment. End-users should review both the Security Target (ST), which is where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this Validation Report (VR), which describes how those security claims were evaluated. This report documents the assessment by the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of the High Security Labs Secure KVM, the Target of Evaluation (TOE), performed by CSC Global Cybersecurity, Security Testing & Certification Lab. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This report is not an endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied. The evaluation was performed by CSC Global Cybersecurity, Security Testing & Certification Lab of Hanover, MD in accordance with the United States evaluation scheme and completed on October 2, The information in this report is largely derived from the ST, the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and the functional testing report. The evaluation was performed to conform to the requirements of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 4, dated September 2012, ; the Common Evaluation Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012; and the NIAP Peripheral Sharing Switch (PSS) Protection Profile (PSSPP) version 3.0. The High Sec Labs Secure Peripheral Sharing Switches (PSS) allows the secure sharing of a single set of peripheral components such as keyboard, Video Display and Mouse/Pointing devices among multiple computers through standard USB, DVI, HDMI, and DisplayPort interfaces. The Evaluation Team performed an analysis of the NIAP Technical Decisions and determined that Technical Decisions TD0083 and TD0086 apply to this TOE or PP. The TOE is also compliant with all International interpretations with effective dates on or before April 28, 2015.

4 2. IDENTIFICATION The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this program, commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) and NIAP approved Protection Profiles in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation conduct security evaluations. The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across evaluations. Developers of IT products desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product s evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP s Validated Products List. Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including: The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated; The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product; The conformance result of the evaluation; Any Protection Profile to which the product is conformant; The organizations participating in the evaluation.

5 Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers Item Evaluation Scheme Target of Evaluation Protection Profile Security Target Identifier United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme High Security Labs Secure KVM, selected 2, 4, and 8 port models NIAP Peripheral Sharing Switch for Human Interface Devices Protection Profile, Version 3.0, February 13, 2015 High Security Labs Ltd. High Security Labs Secure KVM and Matrix Security Target, Document Number HDC11543, v3.14, January 26, 2016 Dates of evaluation April 28, 2015 February 17, 2016 Evaluation Technical Report HSL Evaluation Technical Report: HSL KVM Switch Evaluation Technical Report, Document Version 1.0, February 17, Assurance Activity Report Assurance Activity Report, Document Version 1.0. February 17, This evaluation has the following CC conformance claims: Conformance Result Part 2 extended Part 3 conformant Common Criteria version Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) version Sponsor Developer Evaluators Validation Team Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012: 1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model, CCMB , Version 3.1 Revision 4, September Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB , Version 3.1 Revision 4, September Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB , Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012 Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, CCMB , Version 3.1, Revision 4, September High Security Labs High Security Labs CSC Global Cybersecurity, Security Testing & Certification Lab: Brian Pleffner, John F. Daniels, Cheryl Dugan, Brittany Conti The Aerospace Corporation: Daniel Faigin, Tony Chew, Kenneth Stutterheim The MITRE Corporation: Chris Thorpe, Brad O Neill

6 3. SECURITY POLICY The TOE implements the Data Separation Security Function Policy (SFP) as outlined in Section 4 of the claimed Protection Profile. Isolated USB device emulators are used for the keyboard and mouse. There is one USB device emulator per each connected computer. The use of isolated USB device emulators assures that connected computers will not interact electrically or logically with shared TOE or peripheral resources. Data exchange from computer emulators to device emulators is uses a proprietary protocol called UNIDIR. The UNIDIR protocol is limited to basic HID transactions. No other data may flow between emulators as it is not supported by the limited protocol. Keyboard and mouse data flows are not combined or connected to any other TOE data flow. The keyboard and mouse functions are completely isolated from all other functions (audio, video etc.). There are no shared microcontrollers or any other electronic components. No other external interfaces are coupled to the keyboard and mouse data flow paths. a. Wireless keyboards are not allowed per applicable user guidance. b. Wireless mice are not allowed per applicable user guidance. c. TOE Keyboard and mouse USB console ports are interchangeable.

7 4. ARCHITECTURAL INFORMATION 4.1. Logical Scope and Boundary Secure KVMs are used to enable a single user having a single set of peripherals to operate in an environment having multiple isolated computers. KVM switches keyboard, mouse, display, audio, and other peripheral devices to one user selected computer. The following subsections summarize the various KVM TOE features and services that were verified in the current evaluation Keyboard and mouse security Isolated keyboard and mouse USB device emulators per connected computer to prevent direct interface between the TOE shared peripheral devices and connected computers. TOE uses host (computer) emulators to interface with connected keyboard and mouse peripheral devices, thus isolating external peripherals from TOE internal circuitry and from connected computers. Keyboard user data is not stored on TOE non-volatile memory. All USB stacks are implemented in the TOE using SRAM (Static Random Access Memory) a volatile memory that clears data once TOE is powered down TOE external interface security The TOE supports only the following external interfaces protocols: USB keyboard and mouse; Analog audio output; User authentication device or other assigned USB devices (TOE model specific); Power (AC or DC); and Video (VGA, DVI, HDMI, DisplayPort or MHL video only) Audio Subsystem security The TOE audio data flow path is electrically isolated from all other functions and interfaces to prevent signaling data leakages to and from the audio paths Video subsystem security Video input interfaces are isolated from one another. Isolation is achieved through the use of different power and ground planes, different electronic components and different emulated EDID chips per channel. TOE supports Display Port 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3. TOE video function filters the AUX channel by converting it to I2C EDID only. DisplayPort video is converted into HDMI video stream.

8 User authentication device subsystem security TOE supports User Authentication Device function (called DPP or fusb). These products are configured by default as FDF (Fixed Device Filtration) with filter set to qualify only the following devices: Standard smart-card reader USB token or biometric authentication device having USB smart-card class interface complying with USB Organization standard CCID Revision 1.1 or ICCID Revision 1.0. An administrator after successfully logging-in to the TOE administrative function may switch the TOE to CDF (Configurable Device Filtration) mode trough loading any white-list/black-list or traffic rules. Note that device must be bus powered User control and monitoring security TOE is controlled and monitored by the user through front panel illuminated pushbuttons and switches. These controls and indications are coupled to the TOE system controller function Tampering protection Always-on anti-tampering system mechanically coupled to the TOE enclosure to detect and attempt to access the TOE internal circuitry. TOE is equipped with special holographic Tampering Evident Labels that located in critical location on the TOE enclosure Self-testing and Log TOE is equipped with self testing function that operating at TOE power up prior to normal use. The self-test function is running independently at each one of the TOE microcontrollers following power up. TOE is equipped with event log non-volatile memory that stores information about abnormal security related events Administrative and User configuration of the KVM TOE The KVM TOE enable user configuration of various operational parameters. This access may be performed using one of the following methods (as further explained in the relevant TOE user guidance): 1. Using predefined keyboard shortcuts; 2. Using connected computer and text editor application; and 3. Using special USB configuration loading cable and special configuration utility software.

9 The KVM TOE enable administrator configuration of various operational and security parameters. Access requires password authentication. This access may be performed using one of the following methods (as further explained in the relevant TOE administrator guidance): 1. Using connected computer and text editor application; and 2. Using special USB configuration loading cable and special configuration utility software Physical Scope and Boundary The TOE is a peripheral sharing switch configured as a KVM or Mini-Matrix. The physical boundary of the TOE consists of: One HSL Secure KVM Switch or Matrix, typically, consisting of a system controller board and video board; The firmware embedded inside the TOE that is permanently programmed into the TOE multiple microcontrollers; The log, state and settings data stored in the TOE; The TOE power supply that is shipped with the product (or integrated inside some of the products having 4 ports or more); The TOE computer interface cables that are shipped with the product. The TOE also includes the user documentation identified elsewhere in this ST. The latest version of the documentation may be found at the High Security Labs website: at any time. The evaluated TOE configuration does not include any peripherals or computer components, but do include supplied computer interface cables attached to the TOE. It should be noted that some TOE models support multiple instances of the same peripheral for example Dual Head KVM and Matrix TOE models that support two or more instances of user displays. It also should be noted that some TOE models support only a partial set of peripheral devices. For example, some TOE models do not support user authentication device function (parts are not populated on the board) Evaluated Environment This table identifies hardware components and indicates whether or not each component is in the TOE or Environment. Evaluated TOE and Environment Components TOE / Environment Component Description

10 TOE Selectable product from Evaluated KVM Products table. TOE Hardware and firmware Environment Standard USB Console USB user mouse port Environment Standard USB Console USB user keyboard port Environment Environment TOE Standard USB User Authentication Device. Any other predefined USB device based on the Configurable Device Filtration (CDF) settings. Standard computer display (VGA, DVI, HDMI, DisplayPort depending on TOE product) HSL KVM Cables (as needed): P/N CWR05117 Description KVM Cable short (1.8 m), USB Type-A to USB Type-B, Black Console user authentication device interface Console user display interface Cables for connection of computers to TOE computers CWR05116 CWR05205 CWR05114 CWR05115 HWR08154 CWR05113 CWR06246 KVM Cable short (1.8 m), Audio out, DPP, Black KVM Cable short (1.8 m), DVI-A to VGA, USB, Black KVM Cable short (1.8 m), DVI-D to DVI-D Single-Link, USB, Black KVM Cable short (1.8 m), DVI-D to DVI-D Dual-Link, USB, Black KVM Cable short (1.8m), HDMI to HDMI, USB, Black KVM Cable short (1.8 m), DVI-D to DVI-D Single-Link, USB, Audio out, DPP, Black KVM Cable short (1.8 m), DP to DP, USB A to USB B, Black

11 TOE Special Administrator Configuration Loading Cable (as needed): P/N Description USB-A to USB-A Configuration Loading Cable HWR06579 HSL USB Type-A to USB Type-A Configuration Loading Cable, 1.8m, Black Environment Standard amplified stereo speakers or analog headphones Audio output console port Environment Standard PC, Server, portable computer, tablet, thin-client or zero-client running any operating system; or KVM extender connected to remote platform. Connected computers Typical TOE Deployment KVM TOE details Evaluated KVM Products Model P/N Description Eval. Version 2-Port SK21D-3 CGA10107 HSL Secure SH KVM Switch 2-Port DVI-I video, PP C4C4 SK21P-3 CGA10108 HSL Secure SH KVM Switch 2-Port DisplayPort video, PP C4C4 SK21H-3 CGA10109 HSL Secure SH KVM Switch 2-Port 4K HDMI video, PP C4C4

12 SX22D-3 CGA10110 HSL Secure SH Mini-Matrix KVM 2-Port x 2 DVI-I video, PP 3.0 SX22H-3 CGA10111 HSL Secure SH Mini-Matrix KVM 2-Port x 2 HDMI video, PP C4C C4C4 DK22H-3 CGA10113 HSL Secure DH KVM Switch 2-Port 4K HDMI video, PP C4C4 DK22P-3 CGA10114 HSL Secure DH KVM Switch 2-Port DisplayPort video, PP C4C4 DK22D-3 CGA10115 HSL Secure DH KVM Switch 2-Port DVI-I, PP C4C4 DK22PD-3 CGA10116 HSL Secure DH KVM Switch 2-Port DVI-I and DisplayPort, PP C4C4 4-Port SK41D-3 CGA10129 HSL Secure SH KVM Switch 4-Port DVI-I video, PP C4C4 SK41DU-3 CGA10130 HSL Secure SH KVM Switch 4-Port DVI-I video, w/fusb (2), PP C4C4 SK41P-3 CGA10131 HSL Secure SH KVM Switch 4-Port DisplayPort video, PP C4C4 SK41PU-3 CGA10132 HSL Secure SH KVM Switch 4-Port DisplayPort video, w/fusb, PP C4C4 SK41H-3 CGA10133 HSL Secure SH KVM Switch 4-Port 4K HDMI video, PP C4C4 SK41HU-3 CGA10134 HSL Secure SH KVM Switch 4-Port 4K HDMI video, w/fusb, PP C4C4 DK42D-3 CGA10135 HSL Secure DH KVM Switch 4-Port DVI-I video, PP C4C4 DK42DU-3 CGA10136 HSL Secure DH KVM Switch 4-Port DVI-I video, w/fusb, PP C4C4 DK42P-3 CGA10137 HSL Secure DH KVM Switch 4-Port DisplayPort video, PP C4C4 DK42PU-3 CGA10138 HSL Secure DH KVM Switch 4-Port DisplayPort video, w/fusb, PP C4C4 DK42H-3 CGA10139 HSL Secure DH KVM Switch 4-Port HDMI video, PP C4C4 DK42HU-3 CGA10140 HSL Secure DH KVM Switch 4-Port HDMI video, w/fusb, PP 3.0 SX42DU-3 CGA10143 HSL Secure SH Mini-Matrix KVM 4-Port DVI video, w/fusb, PP 3.0 SX42PU-3 CGA10144 HSL Secure SH Mini-Matrix KVM 4-Port DisplayPort video, w/fusb, PP 3.0 SX42HU-3 CGA10145 HSL Secure SH Mini-Matrix KVM 4-Port HDMI video, w/fusb, PP C4C C4C C4C C4C4 8/16-Port

13 SK81DU-3 CGA10149 HSL Secure SH KVM Switch 8-port DVI video w/fusb, PP C4C4 DK82DU-3 CGA10150 HSL Secure DH KVM Switch 8-port DVI video w/fusb, PP 3.0 SK161DU-3 CGA10151 HSL Secure SH KVM Switch 16-port DVI video w/fusb, PP C4C C4C4

14 5. ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE 5.1. Assumptions The ST identified the following security assumptions: Table: Secure Usage Assumptions Assumption A.NO_TEMPEST A.NO_SPECIAL_ANALOG_CAPABILITIES A.PHYSICAL A.TRUSTED_ADMIN A.TRUSTED_CONFIG Definition It is assumed that the computers and peripheral devices connected to the TOE are not TEMPEST approved. It is assumed that the computers connected to the TOE are not equipped with special analog data collection cards or peripherals such as: Analog to digital interface, high performance audio interface, Digital Signal Processing function, and analog video capture function. Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is assumed to be provided by the environment. TOE Administrators and users are trusted to follow and apply all guidance in a trusted manner. Personnel configuring the TOE and its operational environment will follow the applicable security configuration guidance Threats The ST identified the following threats addressed by the TOE: Table: Threats Threat Definition T.DATA_LEAK T.SIGNAL_LEAK T.RESIDUAL_LEAK A connection via the PSS between computers may allow unauthorized data flow through the PSS or its connected peripherals. A connection via the PSS between computers may allow unauthorized data flow through bit-bybit signaling. A PSS may leak (partial, residual, or echo) user data between the intended connected computer and another unintended connected computer. More specifically, a PSS may leak user keyboard entries to a PSS-connected computer other than

15 the selected computer in real-time or at a later time. T.UNINTENDED_SWITCHING T.UNAUTHORIZED_DEVICES T.AUTHORIZED_BUT_UNTRUSTED_DEVICES T.MICROPHONE_USE T.AUDIO_REVERSED T.LOGICAL_TAMPER T.PHYSICAL_TAMPER T.REPLACEMENT T.FAILED A threat in which the user is connected to a computer other than the one to which they intended to be connected. The use of an unauthorized peripheral device with a specific PSS peripheral port may allow unauthorized data flows between connected devices or enable an attack on the PSS or its connected computers. The use of an authorized peripheral device with the PSS may still cause unauthorized data flows between connected devices or enable an attack on the PSS or its connected computers. Such threats are possible due to known or unknown device vulnerabilities or due to additional functions within the authorized peripheral device. Microphone connected to the TOE used for audio eavesdropping or to transfer data across an airgap through audio signaling. Audio output device used by an attacker as a lowgain microphone for audio eavesdropping. This threat is an abuse of the computer and TOE audio output path to reverse the analog data flow from the headphones to the computer. The computer then amplifies and filters the weak signal, and then digitizes and streams it to another location. An attached device (computer or peripheral) with malware, or otherwise under the control of a malicious user, could modify or overwrite code embedded in the TOE s volatile or non-volatile memory to allow unauthorized information flows between connected devices. A malicious human agent could physically tamper with or modify the TOE to allow unauthorized information flows between connected devices. A malicious human agent could replace the TOE during shipping, storage, or use with an alternate device that does not enforce the TOE security policies. Detectable failure of a PSS may cause an unauthorized information flow, weakening of PSS security functions, or unintended switching.

16 5.3. Organizational Security Policies The Protection Profile claimed identifies no Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) to which the TOE must comply Security Objectives The following table, Security Objectives for the TOE, identifies the security objectives of the TOE. These security objectives reflect the stated intent to counter identified threats and/or comply with any security policies identified. Security Objective O.COMPUTER_INTERFACE_ ISOLATION O.COMPUTER_INTERFACE_ ISOLATION_TOE_UNPOWERED O.USER_DATA_ISOLATION O.NO_USER_DATA_RETENTION O.PURGE_TOE_KB_DATA_WHILE_ SWITCHING O.NO_DOCKING_PROTOCOLS O.NO_OTHER_EXTERNAL_ INTERFACES O.NO_ANALOG_AUDIO_INPUT O.UNIDIRECTIONAL_AUDIO_OUT Definition as applied to KVM type TOE The TOE must prevent unauthorized data flow to assure that the TOE and/or its connected peripheral devices would not be exploited in an attempt to leak data. The TOE computer interface shall be isolated from all other TOE computer interfaces while TOE is powered. The same level of isolation defined in the dataflow objectives must be maintained at all times, including periods while TOE is unpowered. User data such as keyboard entries should be switched (i.e., routed) by the TOE only to the computer selected by the user. The TOE must provide isolation between the data flowing from the peripheral device to the selected computer and any non-selected computer. The TOE shall not retain user data after it is powered down. The TOE shall purge all user keyboard data from computer interfaces following channel switching and before interacting with the new connected computer. The use of docking protocols such as DockPort, USB docking, Thunderbolt etc. is not allowed in the TOE. The TOE may not have any wired or wireless external interface with external entities (external entity is an entity outside the TOE evaluated system, its connected computers and peripheral devices). Shared audio input peripheral functions (i.e., analog audio microphone input or line input) are not allowed in the TOE. The TOE shall be designed to assure that reverse audio signal attenuation will be at least 30 dbv measured with 200 mv and 2V input pure sinus wave at the extended audio frequency range including negative swing signal. The level of the reverse audio signal received by the

17 selected computer shall be minimal to assure that the signal level generated by headphones will be well under the noise floor level. O.COMPUTER_TO_AUDIO_ ISOLATION O.USER_AUTHENTICATION_ ISOLATION O.USER_AUTHENTICATION_RESET O.USER_AUTHENTICATION_ADMIN O.AUTHORIZED_SWITCHING O.NO_AMBIGUOUS_CONTROL O.CONTINUOUS_INDICATION O.KEYBOARD_AND_MOUSE_TIED O.NO_CONNECTED_COMPUTER_ CONTROL O.PERIPHERAL_PORTS_ISOLATION O.DISABLE_UNAUTHORIZED_ PERIPHERAL The audio dataflow shall be isolated from all other TOE functions. Signal attenuation between any TOE computer interface and any TOE audio interface shall be at least 45 dbv measured with 2V input pure sinus wave at the extended audio frequency range including negative swing signal. The user authentication function shall be isolated from all other TOE functions. Upon switching computers, the TOE shall reset (turn off and then turn on) the power supplied to the user authentication device for at least 1 second TOE CDF configuration may only performed by an administrator. The TOE shall allow only authorized switching mechanisms to switch between connected computers and shall explicitly prohibit or ignore unauthorized switching mechanisms. Only one switching method shall be operative at any given time to prevent ambiguous commands. The TOE shall provide continuous visual indication of the computer to which the user is currently connected. The TOE shall ensure that the keyboard and mouse devices are always switched together The TOE shall not allow TOE control through a connected computer. The TOE shall prevent data flow between peripheral devices of different SPFs and the TOE peripheral device ports of different SPFs shall be isolated. The TOE shall only allow authorized peripheral device types (See Annex C) per peripheral device port; all other devices shall be identified and then rejected or ignored by the TOE. O.DISABLE_UNAUTHORIZED_ ENDPOINTS O.KEYBOARD_MOUSE_EMULATED The TOE shall reject unauthorized peripheral devices connected via a USB hub. Alternatively, the TOE may reject all USB hubs. The TOE keyboard and pointing device functions shall be emulated (i.e., no electrical connection other than the

18 common ground is allowed between peripheral devices and connected computers). O.KEYBOARD_MOUSE_ UNIDIRECTIONAL O.UNIDIRECTIONAL_VIDEO O.UNIDIRERCTIONAL_EDID O.TAMPER_EVIDENT_LABEL O.ANTI_TAMPERING O.ANTI_TAMPERING_BACKUP_ POWER O.ANTI_TAMPERING_BACKUP_ FAIL_TRIGGER O.ANTI_TAMPERING_INDICATION The TOE keyboard and pointing device data shall be forced to unidirectional flow from the peripheral device to the switched computer only. The TOE shall force native video peripheral data (i.e., red, green, blue, and TMDS lines) to unidirectional flow from the switched computer to the connected display device. The TOE shall force the display EDID peripheral data channel to unidirectional flow and only copy once from the display to each one of the appropriate computer interfaces during the TOE power up or reboot sequence. The TOE must prevent any EDID channel write transactions initiated by connected computers. The TOE shall be identifiable as authentic by the user and the user must be made aware of any procedures or other such information to accomplish authentication. This feature must be available upon receipt of the TOE and continue to be available during the TOE deployment. The TOE shall be labeled with at least one visible and one invisible unique identifying tamper-evident marking that can be used to authenticate the device. The TOE manufacturer must maintain complete list of manufactured TOE articles and their respective identification markings unique identifiers. The TOE shall be physically enclosed so that any attempts to open or otherwise access the internals or modify the connections of the TOE would be evident. This shall be accomplished through the use of an always-on active anti-tampering system that serves to permanently disable the TOE should its enclosure be opened. The TOE shall use an always-on active antitampering system to permanently disable the TOE in case physical tampering is detected. The anti-tampering system must have a backup power source to enable tamper detection while the TOE is unpowered. A failure or depletion of the anti-tampering system backup power source shall trigger TOE to enter tampered state. The TOE shall have clear user indications when tampering is detected.

19 O.ANTI_TAMPERING_ PERMANENTLY_DISABLE_TOE O.NO_TOE_ACCESS O.SELF_TEST O.SELF_TEST_FAIL_TOE_DISABLE O.SELF_TEST_FAIL_INDICATION Once the TOE anti-tampering is triggered, the TOE shall become permanently disabled. No peripheral-tocomputer data flows shall be allowed. The TOE shall be designed so that access to the TOE firmware, software, or its memory via its accessible ports is prevented. The TOE shall perform self-tests following power up or powered reset. Upon critical failure detection the TOE shall disable normal operation of the whole TOE or the respective failed component. The TOE shall provide clear and visible user indications in the case of a self-test failure. Notes: 1. Objective O.USER_AUTHENTICATION_TERMINATION is not applicable to the Secure KVM and Matrix TOEs in accordance with the referenced PP as they do not support emulated user authentication device function. 2. O.DISPLAYPORT_AUX_FILTERING is not applicable for HSL KVM TOEs as none of the TOEs support DisplayPort display (Native DisplayPort format video) Security Objectives for the Operational Environment The following IT security objectives for the environment are to be addressed by the Operational Environment by technical means. Environment Security Objective Definition OE. NO_TEMPEST The operational environment will not require the use of TEMPEST approved equipment. OE. NO_SPECIAL_ANALOG_ CAPABILITIES OE.PHYSICAL OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN The operational environment will not require special analog data collection cards or peripherals such as: Analog to digital interface, high performance audio interface, Digital Signal Processing function, and analog video capture function. The operational environment will provide physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains. The operational environment will ensure that appropriately trained and trusted TOE Administrators

20 and users are available to administer, configure and use the TOE Clarification of Scope All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation. Note that: 1. As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this evaluation is defined within the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Switches. 2. Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not specifically search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not obvious or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an obvious vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources. 3. The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities included in the product were not covered by this evaluation. 4. The evaluated configuration of the TOE includes the products identified in Section using the identified version in the same section for each product. The TOE includes all the code that enforces the policies identified.

21 6. DOCUMENTATION The following guidance documents are provided with the TOE upon delivery in accordance with the PP: 1. High Security Labs Ltd. 2-Port Dual-Head Secure KVM Switch User Manual. Document Number HDC10345, Rev E. August 13, High Security Labs Ltd. Secure KVM Switch 8-16 ports User Manual. Document Number HDC10349, Rev E. August 13, High Security Labs Ltd. 2-Port Single-Head Secure KVM Switch User Manual. Document Number HDC10346, Rev E. August 13, High Security Labs Ltd. 4-Port Single-Head Secure KVM Switch User Manual. Document Number HDC10348, Rev E. August 13, High Security Labs Ltd. 4-Port Secure KVM Mini-Matrix User Manual. Document Number HDC08357, Rev E. August 13, High Security Labs Ltd. 2-Port Secure KVM Mini-Matrix User Manual. Document Number HDC08357, Rev E. August 13, High Security Labs Ltd. 4-Port Dual-Head Secure KVM Switch User Manual. Document Number HDC10347, Rev E. August 13, High Security Labs Ltd. DK22PD-3: 2-Port Dual-Head Secure KVM User Manual. Document Number HDC10350, Rev E. August 13, High Security Labs Ltd. HSL fusb Configuration Utility Manual. Document Number HDC10951, Rev C. January 28, High Security Labs Ltd. HSL Administrator Guide. Document Number HDC10956, Rev C. August 13, All documentation delivered with the product is relevant to and within the scope of the TOE. The User Guidance and Administrator Guidance can be downloaded from High Sec Labs website: at any time.

22 7. IT PRODUCT TESTING This section describes the testing efforts of the evaluation team Evaluation team independent testing The evaluation team conducted independent testing at the HSL facilities in Huntsville, Alabama. The evaluation team installed and configured the TOE according to vendor installation instructions and the evaluated configuration as identified in the Security Target. The testing configuration and the testing results were documented in the Assurance Activity Report (AAR) and the Test Report (TR) identified in the Bibliography. The evaluation team confirmed the technical accuracy of the setup and installation guide during installation of the TOE. The evaluation team confirmed that the TOE version delivered for testing was identical to the version identified in the ST. The evaluation team used the Protection Profile test procedures as a basis for creating each of the Independent tests as required by the Assurance Activities. Each Assurance Activity was tested as required by the conformant Protection Profiles and the evaluation team verified that each test passed Vulnerability analysis The evaluation team performed a vulnerability analysis of the TOE evidence and a search of publicly available information to identify potential vulnerabilities in the TOE. Based on the results of this effort, there were no identifiable vulnerabilities found at the time of certification.

23 8. RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) processes and procedures. The TOE was evaluated against the criteria contained in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1R4. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1R4. Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) has determined that the product meets the security criteria in the Security Target, which specifies conformance to the NIAP Peripheral Sharing Switch for Human Interface Devices Protection Profile, Version 3.0, February 13, A team of Validators, on behalf of the CCEVS Validation Body, monitored the evaluation. The evaluation effort was finished on February 17, 2016.

24 9. VALIDATOR COMMENTS This evaluation was one of the first evaluations performed against the updated Peripheral Sharing Switch (PSS) Protection Profile (PP) version 3.0. The updates to the protection profile required some significant changes to the document. During the initial evaluation and validation processes for this updated PP, several issues necessitated review by the PSS Technical Rapid Response Team (TRRT). The TRRT has formally posted two technical decisions related to the PSS PP (TD0083 and TD0086) and they are posted on the NIAP website. It should be noted that the nature of a PSS presents challenges when reviewing validation evidence against detailed assurance activities. Since most of the evidence is pictorial in nature several iterations, between the validators and the lab, were required to agree the appropriateness of presentation of the evidence. In addition to the items mentioned above some additional product administration and usability features are worth considering: An administrator mode is supported in the product, but its usability and features are limited. The administrator should make sure they enable multiple users and change default passwords. An audit feature is supported, but is of a limited nature given the product. The product uses a unique syntax where both the left and right control buttons are pressed at the same time to invoke special modes. The notation CTRL (Left), CTRL (Right), X or CTRL CTRL X is used to indicate this.

25 10. ANNEXES None

26 11. SECURITY TARGET High Security Labs Ltd. High Security Labs Secure KVM and Matrix Security Target, Document Number HDC11543, v3.14, January 26, 2016.

27 12. GLOSSARY Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL): An IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations. Evaluation: The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated. Evaluation Evidence: Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities. Target of Evaluation (TOE): A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the CC. Threat: Means through which the ability or intent of a threat agent to adversely affect the primary functionality of the TOE, facility that contains the TOE, or malicious operation directed towards the TOE. A potential violation of security. Validation: The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a Common Criteria certificate. Validation Body: A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme. Vulnerabilities: A vulnerability is a hardware, firmware, or software flaw that leaves an Automated Information System (AIS) open for potential exploitation. A weakness in automated system security procedures, administrative controls, physical layout, internal controls, and so forth, which could be exploited by a threat to gain unauthorized access to information or disrupt critical processing.

28 13. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model, CCMB , Version 3.1 Revision 4, September Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB , Version 3.1 Revision 4, September Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB , Version 3.1 Revision 4, September Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, CCMB , Version 3.1, Revision 4, September High Security Labs Ltd. High Security Labs Secure KVM and Matrix Security Target, Document Number HDC11543, v3.14, January 26, CSC Global Cybersecurity, Security Testing & Certification Lab. HSL Evaluation Technical Report: HSL KVM Switch Evaluation Technical Report, Document Version 1.0, February 17, CSC Global Cybersecurity, Security Testing & Certification Lab. HSL Secure KVM Switch Assurance Activity Report, Document Version 1.0. February 17, CSC Global Cybersecurity, Security Testing & Certification Lab. Evaluation Test Results High Sec Labs Secure KVM and Matrix, Document Version 1.0. January 28, 2016.