Use of Formal Methods in Assessment of IA Properties
|
|
|
- Abraham Barber
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Use of Formal Methods in Assessment of IA Properties George W. Dinolt 44 th Meeting of IFIP Working Group 10.4 Computer Science Department Naval Postgraduate School 833 Dyer Road Monterey, CA USA
2 Outline What is the Question Some Previous Work A Proposal on Measuring Assessment CISR Exemplar Project Center for INFOSEC Studies and Research June 26,
3 The Question Who is the enemy? Can one use Formal Methods to measure how well IA properties have been implemented in a system to defend against the enemy? If so how? Center for INFOSEC Studies and Research June 26,
4 What Properties? Describe the Desired Functionaliy Provide Assurance that the Functionality Makes Sense Provide Assurance that the Functionality is correctly implemented Center for INFOSEC Studies and Research June 26,
5 Formal Methods in IA By Formal Methods we mean application of mathematics and mathematical models to: Describe the (Security) Properties of the System Describe the (Security) Functionality of the System Prove that the Functionality is Consistent with the Policy Prove that the Implementation is an Instance of the Functionality Center for INFOSEC Studies and Research June 26,
6 Previous Work Previous IA Assessment Schemes Include: Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) Common Criteria Other Risk Management/Mitigation Schemes Center for INFOSEC Studies and Research June 26,
7 TCSEC Criteria C1 - Simple Testing and Audit (Unix/Linux) C2 - ACLS, Testing, Protected Audit, No Object Reuse, B1 - MLS Security Policy, Documentation, Testing B2 - Stronger MAC Policy, Trusted Path, Audit B3 - Reference Monitor, Highly Structured, More... A1 - Mathematical Model of Security Policy, Center for INFOSEC Studies and Research June 26,
8 Assurance Measures in the TCSEC Documentation Test Plan Structures Certain Functionality System Structure Documentation of Design, Implementation, Use System Security Policy Security Model Formal Top Level Specifications Verified Implementation Center for INFOSEC Studies and Research June 26,
9 Formalisms for Security Policy Security Policy (textual description) Mathematical Model of Security Policy Informal mapping between Security Policy and Mathematical Model Proof that Mathematical Model is Consistent Center for INFOSEC Studies and Research June 26,
10 Measures of Effectiveness Is there a Security Policy? Is there a Mathematical Model of the Policy? How Transparent is the Mapping between the Textual Policy and the Mathematical Model How was the Consistency of the Mathematical Model Shown Center for INFOSEC Studies and Research June 26,
11 System Architecture Goals Partition System into Trusted and Untrusted Parts Trusted Part Required to Enforce the Security Policy, the Trusted Computing base No Behavior of the Untrusted Part can Affect the Security of the System Center for INFOSEC Studies and Research June 26,
12 Formal Top Level Specification Choose Specification Language Translate Mathematical Model to Specification Language and redo proofs in the terms of the Language Describes the Security Properties of the Trusted Portion of the System in the Terms of the Specification Language (FTLS) Verify that the FTLS is Consistent with the Security Model Center for INFOSEC Studies and Research June 26,
13 Measures of Effectiveness Does the FTLS exist? Does it Adequately Describe the Security Model - Is the mapping between the Security Model and the FTLS complete in some sense Is the FTLS small enough to be analyzable Center for INFOSEC Studies and Research June 26,
14 Measuring Assurance Using Formal Methods The measure is how deep the process has been carried. Security Policy Articulated Model Constructed of Security Policy (including mapping) FTLS Constructed and Mapped Detailed Specification Constructed and Mapped Implementation Constructed and Verified Hardware Specified and Verified Center for INFOSEC Studies and Research June 26,
15 CISR MicroKernel Project Goal is to Provide an Open Demonstration of how to build a very high assurance component. We are: Developing an CC EAL 7 evaluatable Micro Kernel All the Documentation, Processes, etc. will be available over the Web We expect to provide examples of appropriate Life Cycle Management, Configuration Management, Application of Formal Methods, Implementation Strategies, Documentation, Testing, etc. Center for INFOSEC Studies and Research June 26,
MILS Multiple Independent Levels of Security. Carol Taylor & Jim Alves-Foss University of Idaho Moscow, Idaho
MILS Multiple Independent Levels of Security Carol Taylor & Jim Alves-Foss University of Idaho Moscow, Idaho United states December 8, 2005 Taylor, ACSAC Presentation 2 Outline Introduction and Motivation
Security System and COntrol 1
Security System and COntrol 1 Security Management By: Joseph Ronald Canedo It is a Risky World Vulnerabilities Security objectives: Prevent attacks Detect attacks Recover from attacks Attacks: against
Policy Enforced Remote Login
NPS-CS-03-004 February 2003 white paper The Center for INFOSEC Studies and Research Policy Enforced Remote Login Thuy D. Nguyen and Timothy E. Levin Center for Information Systems Security Studies and
Introduce the major evaluation criteria. TCSEC (Orange book) ITSEC Common Criteria
Introduce the major evaluation criteria. TCSEC (Orange book) ITSEC Common Criteria Evaluation: assessing whether a product has the security properties claimed for it. Certification: assessing whether a
Computer Security CS 426 Lecture 17
Computer Security CS 426 Lecture 17 Trusted Computing Base. Orange Book, Common Criteria Elisa Bertino Purdue University IN, USA bertino@cs.purdue.edu 1 Trusted vs. Trustworthy A component of a system
An Experiment with CC Version 3.0 Migration
An Experiment with CC Version 3.0 Migration Thuy D. Nguyen, Cynthia E. Irvine Department of Computer Science, Naval Postgraduate School Richard M. Harkins Department of Physics, Naval Postgraduate School
Chapter 18: Evaluating Systems
Chapter 18: Evaluating Systems Goals Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria FIPS 140 Common Criteria SSE-CMM Slide #18-1 Overview Goals Why evaluate? Evaluation criteria TCSEC (aka Orange Book) FIPS
IT Security Evaluation : Common Criteria
AfriNIC-9 MEETING Mauritius 22-28 November 2008 IT Security Evaluation : Common Criteria Ministry of Communication Technologies National Digital Certification Agency Mounir Ferjani November 2008 afrinic
CCM 4350 Week 22. Security Architecture and Engineering. Dr A. Lasebae School of Science and Technology CCM4350 1
CCM 4350 Week 22 Security Architecture and Engineering Dr A. Lasebae School of Science and Technology CCM4350 1 Security Evaluation CCM4350 2 Security Evaluation How do you get assurance that your computer
Introduce the major evaluation criteria. TCSEC (Orange book) ITSEC Common Criteria
Introduce the major evaluation criteria. TCSEC (Orange book) ITSEC Common Criteria Evaluation: assessing whether a product has the security properties claimed for it. Certification: assessing whether a
DTOS LESSONS LEARNED REPORT
Part Number Version Date 27 June 1997 DTOS LESSONS LEARNED REPORT CONTRACT NO. MDA904-93-C-4209 CDRL SEQUENCE NO. A008 Prepared for: Maryland Procurement Office Prepared by: 2675 Long Lake Road Roseville,
FeliCa Approval for Security and Trust (FAST) Overview. Copyright 2018 FeliCa Networks, Inc.
FeliCa Approval for Security and Trust (FAST) Overview Introduction The security certification scheme called FeliCa Approval for Security and Trust (FAST) has been set up to enable the evaluation and certification
MILS Middleware: High Assurance Security for Real-time, Distributed Systems
2001 Objective Interface Systems, Inc. MILS Middleware: High Assurance Security for Real-time, Distributed Systems Bill Beckwith bill.beckwith@ois.com Objective Interface Systems, Inc. 13873 Park Center
Session objectives. Security Evaluation. Evaluation Standards. Can we trust a secure product/system? CSM27 Computer Security
Overview Session objectives Security Evaluation CSM27 Computer Security Dr Hans Georg Schaathun University of Surrey Discuss advantages and limitations of security evaluations Clarify fundamental concepts
The Trusted Computing Exemplar Project
Proceedings of the 5th IEEE Systems, Man and Cybernetics Information Assurance Workshop, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, 10 11 June 2004, pp. 109-115 The Trusted Computing Exemplar Project
Using Common Criteria Methodology to Express Informal Security Requirements
Using Common Criteria Methodology to Express Informal Security Requirements Thuy D. Nguyen, Cynthia E. Irvine, Douglas R. Kane Jr. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California tdnguyen@nps.edu, irvine@nps.edu,
Towards Formal Evaluation of a High-Assurance Guard
Towards Formal Evaluation of a High-Assurance Guard Mark R. Heckman Roger R. Schell Edwards E. Reed 2012 Layered Assurance Workshop,
CYSE 411/AIT 681 Secure Software Engineering Topic #3. Risk Management
CYSE 411/AIT 681 Secure Software Engineering Topic #3. Risk Management Instructor: Dr. Kun Sun Outline 1. Risk management 2. Standards on Evaluating Secure System 3. Security Analysis using Security Metrics
The MILS Partitioning Communication System + RT CORBA = Secure Communications for SBC Systems
The MILS Partitioning Communication System + RT CORBA = Secure Communications for SBC Systems Kevin Buesing Objective Interface Systems Field Applications Engineer kevin.buesing@ois.com Jeff Chilton Objective
EXPRESSING AN INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY WITHIN A SECURITY SIMULATION GAME
EXPRESSING AN INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY WITHIN A SECURITY SIMULATION GAME Cynthia E. Irvine and Michael F. Thompson Naval Postgraduate School Abstract: Key words: The Center for the Information Systems
Trusted OS Design CS461/ECE422
Trusted OS Design CS461/ECE422 1 Reading Material Section 5.4 of Security in Computing 2 Design Principles Security Features Kernelized Design Virtualization Overview 3 Design Principles Simplicity Less
Red Hat Enterprise Linux
Red Hat Enterprise Linux Security www.redhat.com A Powerful Collection of Red Hat Enterprise Linux Security Tools Computing security has never been more important. Increasing regulations, differing requirements
Formal Methods for Assuring Security of Computer Networks
for Assuring of Computer Networks May 8, 2012 Outline Testing 1 Testing 2 Tools for formal methods Model based software development 3 Principals of security Key security properties Assessing security protocols
W3737 TRUSTED PRODUCT EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE NATIONAL COMPUTER SECURITY CENTER. toe BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSEmrazinoN u( 7100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
NCSC-TG-019 VERSION-2 NATIONAL COMPUTER SECURITY CENTER TRUSTED PRODUCT EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE 19980309 293 PLEASE RETURN TO: ~..., n Bm TE CHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER 2 May J 1992 BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSEmrazinoN
Applied IT Security. Device Security. Dr. Stephan Spitz 10 Development Security. Applied IT Security, Dr.
Applied IT Security Device Security Dr. Stephan Spitz Stephan.Spitz@gi-de.com Overview & Basics System Security Network Protocols and the Internet Operating Systems and Applications Operating System Security
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL THESIS
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS WEB-BASED DISSEMINATION SYSTEM FOR THE TRUSTED COMPUTING EXEMPLAR PROJECT by Douglas Robert Kane Jr. June 2005 Thesis Advisor: Co-Advisor: Cynthia
Formal Methods for MILS: Formalisations of the GWV Firewall Ruud Koolen and Julien Schmaltz
Formal Methods for MILS: Formalisations of the GWV Firewall Ruud Koolen and Julien Schmaltz Eindhoven University of Technology Department of Mathematics and Computer Science Model Driven Software Engineering
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL THESIS
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS AN ANALYSIS OF SPECWARE AND ITS USEFULNESS IN THE VERIFICATION OF HIGH ASSURANCE SYSTEMS by Daniel P. DeCloss June 2006 Thesis Advisor: Co-Advisor:
Common Criteria. Introduction Emilie Barse Magnus Ahlbin
Common Criteria Introduction 2015-02-23 Emilie Barse Magnus Ahlbin 1 Magnus Ahlbin Head of EC/ITSEF Information and Security Combitech AB SE-351 80 Växjö Sweden magnus.ahlbin@combitech.se www.combitech.se
National Information Assurance Partnership. Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report
National Information Assurance Partnership TM Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report SGI Red Hat Enterprise Linux Version 5.1 Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10286-2008 Dated: 2008-04-21
CUBE-TYPE ALGEBRAIC ATTACKS ON WIRELESS ENCRYPTION PROTOCOLS
CUBE-TYPE ALGEBRAIC ATTACKS ON WIRELESS ENCRYPTION PROTOCOLS George W. Dinolt, James Bret Michael, Nikolaos Petrakos, Pantelimon Stanica Short-range (Bluetooth) and to so extent medium-range (WiFi) wireless
Certification Report
Certification Report EAL 2+ Evaluation of McAfee Deep Defender 1.0.1 and epolicy Orchestrator 4.6.1 Issued by: Communications Security Establishment Canada Certification Body Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation
UNICOS/mp Common Criteria Evaluation
UNICOS/mp Common Criteria Evaluation Janet Lebens, Cray Inc. Cray Proprietary Agenda Definitions NIAP CCEVS Common Criteria CC vs TCSEC Why Evaluate? Steps of Evaluation Details of Steps for Cray / Progress
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
NPS-CS-07-022 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA SecureCore Software Architecture: Trusted Management Layer (TML) Kernel Extension Module Integration Guide by David J Shifflett Paul C Clark
National Information Assurance Partnership. Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report
National Information Assurance Partnership TM Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report IEEE IEEE 2600.1-2009 Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10340 Dated: 2009-06-09 Version: 2.0 National
Topics in Systems and Program Security
Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Network and Security Research Center Department of Computer Science and Engineering Pennsylvania State University, University Park PA Topics in Systems and
National Information Assurance Partnership. Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme. Validation Report
National Information Assurance Partnership Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme TM Validation Report Cisco Systems, Inc. 170 West Tasman Drive, San Jose, CA 95134-1706 Cisco Catalyst 2K/3K
Development of Informal Security Policy Models
Development of Informal Security Policy Models Erin Connor, Mark Gauvreau, and Samuel E. Moore EWA-Canada 19 September 2006 Presenter: Erin Connor (econnor@ewa-canada.com) Overview Introduction To EWA-Canada
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
NPS-CS-08-012 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA Use of Trusted Software Modules for High Integrity Data Display by Timothy E. Levin, Thuy N. Nguyen, Paul C. Clark, Cynthia E. Irvine, David
Evaluation. Common Criteria. Questions & Answers. Xerox Advanced Multifunction Systems. WorkCentre M35/M45/M55 WorkCentre Pro 35/45/55
Xerox Security Common Criteria Evaluation Questions & Answers Xerox Advanced Multifunction Systems WorkCentre M35/M45/M55 WorkCentre Pro 35/45/55 Written by: Larry Kovnat and Betty Ingerson Prepared by:
Brocade FastIron SX, ICX, and FCX Series Switch/Router
National Information Assurance Partnership Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme TM Validation Report Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. 130 Holger Way San Jose, CA 95134 Brocade FastIron
modern software negatively effects the
Foreign Sour rce Software Systems & Software Technology Conference April 2009 Presen nted by: Jennife er Guild 1 Rea ality Almost all software, open source, has some form of foreign involvement Foreign
Certification Report
Certification Report EAL 2+ Evaluation of Data ONTAP Version 7.2.5.1 Issued by: Communications Security Establishment Canada Certification Body Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme
Operating systems and security - Overview
Operating systems and security - Overview Protection in Operating systems Protected objects Protecting memory, files User authentication, especially passwords Trusted operating systems, security kernels,
Operating systems and security - Overview
Operating systems and security - Overview Protection in Operating systems Protected objects Protecting memory, files User authentication, especially passwords Trusted operating systems, security kernels,
Least Privilege in Separation Kernels
Least Privilege in Separation Kernels Timothy E. Levin, Cynthia E. Irvine, and Thuy D. Nguyen Department of Computer Science, Naval Postgraduate School 833 Dyer d., Monterey, CA USA {Levin,irvine,tdnguyen}@nps.edu
HAMES Review at SRI, 7 October 2008 partly based on Layered Assurance Workshop 13, 14 August 2008, BWI Hilton and based on Open Group, 23 July 2008,
HAMES Review at SRI, 7 October 2008 partly based on Layered Assurance Workshop 13, 14 August 2008, BWI Hilton and based on Open Group, 23 July 2008, Chicago Component Security Integration John Rushby Computer
National Information Assurance Partnership. Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report
National Information Assurance Partnership TM Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme NetScreen Technologies, Incorporated Report Number: CCEVS-VR-02-0027 Version 1.0 Dated: 30 November 2002 National
The Evolution of Secure Operating Systems
The Evolution of Secure Operating Systems Trent Jaeger Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security (SIIS) Lab Computer Science and Engineering Department Pennsylvania State University 1 Operating Systems
Last time. Security Policies and Models. Trusted Operating System Design. Bell La-Padula and Biba Security Models Information Flow Control
Last time Security Policies and Models Bell La-Padula and Biba Security Models Information Flow Control Trusted Operating System Design Design Elements Security Features 10-1 This time Trusted Operating
Justifying Integrity Using a Virtual Machine Verifier
Justifying Integrity Using a Virtual Machine Verifier Joshua Schiffman, Thomas Moyer, Christopher Shal, Trent Jaeger, and Patrick McDaniel ACSAC 09 1 1 Cloudy Horizons Utility-based cloud computing is
Certification Requirements for High Assurance Systems
for High Assurance Systems Gordon M. Uchenick Senior Mentor/Principal Engineer Objective Interface Systems, Inc. and W. Mark Vanfleet Senior Cryptologic Mathematician/ Senior INFOSEC Analyst National Security
Formal Methods and their role in Software and System Development. Riccardo Sisto, Politecnico di Torino
Formal Methods and their role in Software and System Development Riccardo Sisto, Politecnico di Torino What are Formal Methods? Rigorous (mathematical) methods for modelling and analysing (computer-based)
National Information Assurance Partnership. Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report
National Information Assurance Partnership TM Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report Blue Ridge Networks BorderGuard Centrally Managed Embedded PKI Virtual Private Network (VPN)
DTOS General System Security and Assurability Assessment Report
Part Number Version Date 26 June 1997 DTOS General System Security and Assurability Assessment Report CONTRACT NO. MDA904-93-C-4209 CDRL SEQUENCE NO. A011 Prepared for: Maryland Procurement Office Prepared
Certification Report
Certification Report Curtiss-Wright Issued by: Communications Security Establishment Canada Certification Body Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme Government of Canada, Communications
Certification Report
Certification Report EMC VNX OE for Block v05.33 and File v8.1 with Unisphere v1.3 running on VNX Series Hardware Models VNX5200, VNX5400, VNX5600, VNX5800, VNX7600, and VNX8000 Issued by: Communications
Building the IA Workforce
Building the IA Workforce Julie Ryan Assistant Professor The George Washington University Washington, DC http://www.seas.gwu.edu/~infosec/ 1 The First Question What s an IA Professional? The IA field is
National Information Assurance Partnership. Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report
National Information Assurance Partnership TM Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report Delta Security Technologies Sentinel Model III Computer Security System Report Number: CCEVS-VR-02-0023
National Information Assurance Partnership. Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report
National Information Assurance Partnership TM Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report Microsoft Corporation Windows 2000 Report Number: CCEVS-VR-02-0025 Dated: 25 October 2002
MINIMUM SECURITY CONTROLS SUMMARY
APPENDIX D MINIMUM SECURITY CONTROLS SUMMARY LOW-IMPACT, MODERATE-IMPACT, AND HIGH-IMPACT INFORMATION SYSTEMS The following table lists the minimum security controls, or security control baselines, for
Certification Report
Certification Report Standard Edition v2.8.2 RELEASE Issued by: Communications Security Establishment Canada Certification Body Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme Government of
Operating System Security, Continued CS 136 Computer Security Peter Reiher January 29, 2008
Operating System Security, Continued CS 136 Computer Security Peter Reiher January 29, 2008 Page 1 Outline Designing secure operating systems Assuring OS security TPM and trusted computing Page 2 Desired
Electronic Contracting: creating legally binding agreements
Electronic Contracting: creating legally binding agreements Presented by Caryn Pass NWAIS Business Managers Conference April 2014 1 rules Information is power Fear is the enemy Culture is key Legal Exposure
Certification Report
Certification Report Security Intelligence Platform 4.0.5 Issued by: Communications Security Establishment Certification Body Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme Government of
Cyber Security Training and Awareness Through Game Play
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Center for Information Systems Security Studies and Research (CISR)Faculty and Researcher Publications 2006-00-00 Cyber Security Training and Awareness Through Game
Cisco IoT Industrial Ethernet and Connected Grid Switches running IOS
National Information Assurance Partnership Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report Cisco Systems, Inc. 170 West Tasman Drive, San Jose, CA 95134-1706 Cisco IoT Industrial Ethernet
National Information Assurance Partnership
National Information Assurance Partnership TM Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report Sun Java System Identity Manager v5.0 Report Number: CCEVS-VR-05-0117 Dated: 6 September
High-Assurance Security/Safety on HPEC Systems: an Oxymoron?
High-Assurance Security/Safety on HPEC Systems: an Oxymoron? Bill Beckwith Objective Interface Systems, Inc. Phone: 703-295-6519 Email Address: bill.beckwith@ois.com W. Mark Vanfleet National Security
Check Point Endpoint Security Media Encryption
National Information Assurance Partnership TM Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report Check Point Endpoint Security Media Encryption Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10231-2010 Dated:
COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT
COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT EMC VPLEX v5.5 Version 1.0 11 May 2016 FOREWORD This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security
Secure Programming Techniques
Secure Programming Techniques Meelis ROOS mroos@ut.ee Institute of Computer Science Tartu University spring 2014 Course outline Introduction General principles Code auditing C/C++ Web SQL Injection PHP
Recordkeeping Standards Analysis of HealthConnect
Recordkeeping Standards Analysis of HealthConnect Electronic Health Records: Achieving an Effective and Ethical Legal and Recordkeeping Framework Australian Research Council Discovery Grant, DP0208109
Gatekeeper Public Key Infrastructure Framework. Information Security Registered Assessors Program Guide
Gatekeeper Public Key Infrastructure Framework Information Security Registered Assessors Program Guide V 2.1 December 2015 Digital Transformation Office Commonwealth of Australia 2015 This work is copyright.
GREEN HILLS SOFTWARE: EAL6+ SECURITY FOR MISSION CRITICAL APPLICATIONS
GREEN HILLS SOFTWARE: EAL6+ SECURITY FOR MISSION CRITICAL APPLICATIONS 15 December 2008: EAL6+ Security for Mission Critical Applications INTERVIEWEE. DAVID KLEIDERMACHER CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER TEL.
The Common Criteria, Formal Methods and ACL2
The Common Criteria, Formal Methods and ACL2 Raymond Richards, David Greve, Matthew Wilding Rockwell Collins Advanced Technology Center Cedar Rapids, Iowa 52498 USA {rjricha1,dagreve,mmwildin}@rockwellcollins.com
This is to certify that. Chris FitzGerald. has completed the course. Systems Security Engineering _eng 2/10/08
This is to certify that Chris FitzGerald has completed the course Systems Security Engineering - 206760_eng on 2/10/08 Systems Security Engineering About This Course Overview/Description To define the
COMPUTER & INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CENTER. Information Transfer Policy
COMPUTER & INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CENTER Information Transfer Policy Document Controls This document is reviewed every six months Document Reference Document Title Document Owner ISO 27001:2013 reference
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
NPS-CS-07-021 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA SecureCore Software Architecture: Trusted Management Layer (TML) Kernel Extension Module Interface Specification by David J. Shifflett Paul
Gerwin Klein Kevin Elphinstone Gernot Heiser June Andronick David Cock Philip Derrin Dhammika Elkaduwe Kai Engelhardt Rafal Kolanski Michael Norrish
Gerwin Klein Kevin Elphinstone Gernot Heiser June Andronick David Cock Philip Derrin Dhammika Elkaduwe Kai Engelhardt Rafal Kolanski Michael Norrish Thomas Sewell Harvey Tuch Simon Winwood 1 microkernel
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL THESIS
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS A CONFIGURATION FRAMEWORK AND IMPLEMENTATION FOR THE LEAST PRIVILEGE SEPARATION KERNEL by Chee Luan Quek December 2010 Thesis Co-Advisors: Cynthia
TEITP User and Evaluator Expectations for Trusted Extensions. David Hardin Rockwell Collins Advanced Technology Center Cedar Rapids, Iowa USA
TEITP 2010 User and Evaluator Expectations for Trusted Extensions David Hardin Rockwell Collins Advanced Technology Center Cedar Rapids, Iowa USA Outline What Does a Security Evaluation Entail? Example:
Data Erasure Software Changes
Data Erasure Software Changes Current Process Permanent data erasure goes beyond basic file deletion and format commands which only remove part of the information stored on a device. The Secure Data Erasure
Audit Report. The Prince s Trust. 27 September 2017
Audit Report The Prince s Trust 27 September 2017 Contents 1 Background 1 1.1 Scope 1 1.2 Audit Report and Action Plan Timescales 2 1.3 Summary of Audit Issues and Recommendations 3 1.4 Risk Rating of
Introduction of the Identity Assurance Framework. Defining the framework and its goals
Introduction of the Identity Assurance Framework Defining the framework and its goals 1 IAEG Charter Formed in August of 07 to develop a global standard framework and necessary support programs for validating
From imagination to impact
From imagination to impact Kernel Design for Isolation an Assurance of Physical Memory Dhammika Elkauwe Philip Derrin Kevin Elphinstone Embee Systems Increasing functionality Increasing software complexity
handled appropriately. The design of MILS/MSL systems guaranteed to perform correctly with respect to security considerations is a daunting challenge.
A Separation Kernel Formal Security Policy David Greve, Matthew Wilding, and W. Mark Vanfleet Rockwell Collins Advanced Technology Center Cedar Rapids, IA 52498 USA fdagreve,mmwilding@rockwellcollins.com
Exercises with solutions, Set 3
Exercises with solutions, Set 3 EDA625 Security, 2017 Dept. of Electrical and Information Technology, Lund University, Sweden Instructions These exercises are for self-assessment so you can check your
SAS 70 & SSAE 16: Changes & Impact on Credit Unions. Agenda
SAS 70 & SSAE 16: Changes & Impact on Credit Unions John Mason CISM, CISA, CGEIT, CFE SingerLewak LLP October 19, 2010 Agenda Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 70 background Background & purpose Types
Security Requirements for Crypto Devices
Security Requirements for Crypto Devices Version 1.0 02 May 2018 Controller of Certifying Authorities Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology 1 Document Control Document Name Security Requirements
Connecticut Curriculum Design Unit Planning Organizer Grade 8 Mathematics Congruence and Similarity
Pacing: 3 weeks Mathematical Practices Mathematical Practices #1 and #3 describe a classroom environment that encourages thinking mathematically and are critical for quality teaching and learning. Practices
Brocade MLXe and NetIron Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R
National Information Assurance Partnership Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. Brocade MLXe and NetIron Family Devices with Multi-Service
Mathematics Curriculum
New York State Common Core Mathematics Curriculum Table of Contents 1 MODULE 1... 3 Topic A: Basic Constructions (G-CO.A.1, G-CO.D.12, G-CO.D.13)... 11 Lessons 1 2: Construct an Equilateral Triangle...
An error will be returned by the services when invalid electronic requests are received.
Standard Life s Commercial and Technical Agreement These terms and conditions (the Commercial and Technical Agreement ) are in addition to, and are incorporated into The Origo Legal Framework Electronic
Evaluation & Certification
Evaluation & Certification Dr. Melanie Volkamer (TU Darmstadt) 26.11.2009 Dr. Melanie Volkamer CoE Overview Evaluation and Certification of Security Requirements Internet Voting Voting Devices Evaluation
National Information Assurance Partnership. Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report
National Information Assurance Partnership TM Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report IBM SUSE LINUX Enterprise Server Version 10 Service Pack 1 Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10271-2007
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
NPS-CS-08-012 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA Use of Trusted Software Modules for Emergency-Integrity Display by Timothy E. Levin, Thuy D. Nguyen, Paul C. Clark, Cynthia E. Irvine, David
Joint Interpretation Library
Object: Define concept and methodology applicable to composite product evaluation. Version 1.5 October 2017 October 2017 Version1.5 Page 1/55 This page is intentionally left blank Page 2/55 Version 1.5
How Formal Analysis and Verification Add Security to Blockchain-based Systems
Verification Add Security to Blockchain-based Systems January 26, 2017 (MIT Media Lab) Pindar Wong (VeriFi Ltd.) 2 Outline of this talk Security Definition of Blockchain-based system Technology and Security
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California THESIS
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California THESIS INTEGRATING A TRUSTED COMPUTING BASE EXTENSION SERVER AND SECURE SESSION SERVER INTO THE LINUX OPERATING SYSTEM by Mark V. Glover September 2001 Thesis