Spy vs. Spy: Rumor Source Obfuscation
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1 Spy vs. Spy: Rumor Source Obfuscation Peter Kairouz University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Joint work with Giulia Fanti, Sewoong Oh, and Pramod Viswanath
2 Some people have important, sensitive things to say. Political activism
3 Personal confessions Others have less important, but sensitive things to say.
4 Existing anonymous messaging apps
5 Existing anonymous messaging apps Bob Mary Alice
6 Existing anonymous messaging apps Bob Mary Alice
7 Existing anonymous messaging apps Bob Mary Server Alice
8 Existing anonymous messaging apps Bob Mary Server Alice
9 Existing anonymous messaging apps Bob Mary Server Alice centralized networks are not truly anonymous!
10 Compromises in anonymity anonymity loss extends beyond the network
11 Distributed messaging Bob Mary Alice
12 Distributed messaging Bob Mary Alice
13 Distributed messaging Bob Mary Alice what can an adversary do?
14 Adversarial model Craig Bob Mary David Alice
15 Adversarial model Craig Bob Mary David Alice
16 Adversarial model Craig Bob Mary David Alice
17 Adversarial model Craig Bob Mary David Alice the adversary can figure out who got the message
18 Information flow in social networks G is the graph representing the social network
19 Information flow in social networks Alice
20 Information flow in social networks Alice passes the message to her neighbors
21 Information flow in social networks her neighbors pass the message to theirs
22 Information flow in social networks the message spreads in all directions at the same rate
23 Information flow in social networks the message spreads in all directions at the same rate
24 Information flow in social networks the message spreads in all directions at the same rate
25 Information flow in social networks this spreading model is known as the diffusion model
26 Adversary s observation can the adversary locate the message author?
27 Concentration around the center the message author is in the center with high probability
28 Rumor source identification high likelihood low likelihood diffusion does not provide anonymity [Shah, Zaman 2011]
29 Our goal Probability of detection diffusion 1 N T adaptive diffusion log N T N T : expected number of nodes with the message at time T
30 Main result: adaptive diffusion
31 Main result: adaptive diffusion
32 Main result: adaptive diffusion
33 Main result: adaptive diffusion
34 Main result: adaptive diffusion
35 Main result: adaptive diffusion
36 Main result: adaptive diffusion
37 Main result: adaptive diffusion
38 Main result: adaptive diffusion high likelihood low likelihood provides provable anonymity guarantees!
39 let s start with line graphs Line graphs
40 Line graphs: diffusion T = 0 the message author starts a rumor at T = 0
41 Line graphs: diffusion T = 1 with probability α, the left (right) node receives the message
42 Line graphs: diffusion T = 1 the node to the right of the author receives the message
43 Line graphs: diffusion T = 2 the rumor propagates in both directions at the same rate
44 Line graphs: diffusion T = 2 the rumor propagates in both directions at the same rate
45 Line graphs: diffusion T = 3 α is independent of time or hop distance to message author
46 Line graphs: diffusion T = 3 diffusion on a line is equivalent to two independent random walks
47 Adversary s observation N = 5 nodes with the message can the adversary locate the message author?
48 Maximum likelihood detection Likelihoods 1 N T /2 N T v the node in the middle is the mostly likely author
49 Maximum likelihood detection Likelihoods 1 NN/2 T N T v Probability of detection 1 N T
50 Line graphs: adaptive diffusion consider a line graph
51 Line graphs: adaptive diffusion T = 0 node 0 starts a rumor at T = 0
52 Line graphs: adaptive diffusion /2 1/2 T = 1 with probability 1/2, the left (right) node receives the message
53 Line graphs: adaptive diffusion T = 1 right node 1 receives the message
54 Line graphs: adaptive diffusion /3 2/3 T = 2 hop distance to message author probability of passing message: α = h+1 T+1 elapsed time
55 Line graphs: adaptive diffusion T = 2 right node 2 receives the message
56 Line graphs: adaptive diffusion /4 3/4 T = 3 hop distance to message author probability of passing message: α = h+1 T+1 elapsed time
57 Line graphs: adaptive diffusion T = 3 left node 1 receives the message
58 Adversary s observation N T = 4 nodes with the message can the adversary locate the message author?
59 Maximum likelihood detection Likelihoods adaptive diffusion diffusion k 1 N T /2 N T
60 Maximum likelihood detection Likelihoods adaptive diffusion diffusion k 1 N T /2 N T Probability of detection 1 N T
61 what about d-regular trees? d-regular trees
62 d-regular trees: diffusion likelihoods concentrate heavily around the center
63 d-regular trees : adaptive diffusion
64 d-regular trees : adaptive diffusion initially, the source is also the virtual source
65 d-regular trees : adaptive diffusion at T = 1, the author selects one neighbor at random
66 d-regular trees : adaptive diffusion the author passes h = 1 and T = 2 to the chosen neighbor at T = 1, the author selects one neighbor at random
67 d-regular trees : adaptive diffusion the chosen neighbor becomes the new virtual source
68 d-regular trees : adaptive diffusion at T = 2, the virtual source passes the message to all her neighbors
69 d-regular trees : adaptive diffusion as T transitions from even to odd, the virtual source has two options: keeping the virtual source token passing the virtual source token
70 Symmetry properties the graph is always symmetric around the virtual source
71 Keeping the virtual source token adaptive rate virtual source token is kept with probability α = d 1 T d 1 2 h 1 1 T
72 Keeping the virtual source token happens in T = 3 and T = 4 all leaf nodes with the message pass it to their neighbors
73 Passing the virtual source token new virtual source current virtual source selects one of its neighbors at random
74 Passing the virtual source token previous virtual source passes h = 2 and T = 4 to new virtual source
75 Passing the virtual source token happens in T = 3 and T = 4 new virtual source passes the message to its neighbors which in turn pass it to their neighbors
76 Adversary s observation can the adversary locate the message author?
77 Maximum likelihood detection high likelihood low likelihood all nodes except for the final virtual source are equally likely
78 Main Theorem 1. We spread fast: N T d 1 T 2 2. All nodes except for the final virtual source are equally likely to be the source, hence P v ML = v = 1 N T 1 3. The expected distance between the estimated and true source is at least T 2.
79 General graphs adaptive diffusion for general graphs?
80 Simulation results: Facebook graph Probability of detection adaptive diffusion 1 N T bound likelihoods can be approximated numerically number of nodes with the message
81 Extensions and related work Theoretical Adversaries with timing information Peer-to-peer dynamic networks Hiding relays Multiple message sources Systems Cyber-bullying detection Anonymous video sharing Message caching Bootstrapping contacts
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