Time Synchronization Security using IPsec and MACsec
|
|
|
- Tyler Aron Atkins
- 6 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Time Synchronization using IPsec and MACsec Appeared in ISPCS 2011 Tal Mizrahi Israel ing Seminar May 2012
2 Time Synchronization Time synchronization is used for various applications. Securing the time protocol is a must for securing the applications that use it. IEEE 1588 standard: Precision Time Protocol (PTP). IEEE 1588 is challenging to secure: A large number of nodes involved in the protocol. Hop-by-hop data modification. IEEE Annex K: experimental security appendix. Time Synchronization using IPsec and MACsec 2
3 Agenda Brief overview of IPsec, MACsec, and Annex K. The IPsec and MACsec scenarios. Attacker types. Effectiveness of each attacker in the IPsec and MACsec scenarios, Annex K. Summary and comparison. Conclusion. Time Synchronization using IPsec and MACsec 3
4 IPsec A suite of security protocols defined by the IETF (RFC 4301 architecture). Two main functions: Integrity protection using Authentication Header (AH). Confidentiality using Encapsulating Payload (ESP). Both functions support: Integrity protection using Integrity Check Value (ICV). Replay protection using Sequence Number. Both functions support: Tunnel mode. Transport mode. IPsec AH encapsulation. Partly Protected by ICV Protected by ICV Time Synchronization using IPsec and MACsec Next Header 1B Ethernet Header IPv4 Header Payload Len 1B Reserved 2B Parameters Index (SPI) 4B Sequence Number Field 4B Integrity Check Value ICV (variable length) IP Header (tunnel mode) IP Payload Ethernet FCS 4B 4
5 MACsec IEEE 802.1AE MAC security protocol. IEEE 802.1X authentication, key exchange. Supports both encrypted and non-encrypted mode. Integrity protection using Integrity Check Value (ICV). L2 header protected by ICV. Replay protection using Sequence Number. MACsec encrypted packet. Protected by ICV Encrypted MAC DA MAC SA MACsec Ethertype 2B MACsec Header 6B / 14B Ethertype 2B Ethernet Payload Integrity Check Value ICV 16B Ethernet FCS 4B Time Synchronization using IPsec and MACsec 5
6 IEEE 1588 Annex K Experimental annex in IEEE (v2). Provides data integrity using symmetric key scheme. Authentication TLV includes: Integrity Check Value (ICV). Replay protection using replaycounter. Annex K authenticated packet. Protected by ICV Ethernet Header IPv4/IPv6 + UDP Headers (optional) PTP Header PTP Payload Authentication TLV Ethernet FCS 4B Time Synchronization using IPsec and MACsec 6
7 PTP the IPsec Scenario Can be used when PTP is transported over an IP network. -to-network configuration. IPsec can be used in encrypted (ESP) or authenticated (AH) mode. Either dedicated tunnel for time sync, or single tunnel for all traffic. Typical example: Femtocells in 3GPP. Slave IPsec Tunnel Operator Customer Public Time Synchronization using IPsec and MACsec 7
8 PTP the MACsec Scenario Can be used in L2 networks. Either with/without encryption. All data is secured on a hop-by-hop basis. Typical example: Audio and Video Bridging (AVB). L2 Slave MACsec Tunnel L2 Bridge MACsec Tunnel Time Synchronization using IPsec and MACsec 8
9 Typical Attackers Mary internal man-in-the-middle (MITM). Jeanie internal injector. Emma external MITM. Enya external injector. Slave 2 Jeanie (2) Emma Mary (2) Mary (1) Enya Jeanie (1) Time Synchronization using IPsec and MACsec 9
10 MACsec IPsec 1588 Annex K Enya WHAT can Enya do? Slave 2 Jeanie (2) Emma Mary (2) Mary (1) Enya Jeanie (1) Cryptographic Performance Attack. L2/L3 DoS attacks. Time Synchronization using IPsec and MACsec 10
11 MACsec IPsec 1588 Annex K Emma WHAT can Emma do? Slave 2 Jeanie (2) Emma Mary (2) Mary (1) Enya Packet Interception and Removal. Packet Delay Manipulation. Cryptographic Performance Attack. L2/L3 DoS attacks. Jeanie (1) Time Synchronization using IPsec and MACsec 11
12 Jeanie WHAT can Jeanie do? Slave 2 Jeanie (2) Emma Mary (2) Mary (1) Enya Spoofing. Replay. Attack. Rogue Attack. L2/L3 DoS attacks. Jeanie (1) Time Synchronization using IPsec and MACsec 12
13 Jeanie (1) WHERE can Jeanie be found? IPsec scenario. Jeanie 1 is relevant specifically in the IPsec scenario. -to-network scheme. Slave 2 IPsec Tunnel Jeanie (2) Mary (1) Jeanie (1) MACsec scenario / Annex K Slave 2 Jeanie (2) Time Synchronization using IPsec and MACsec 13
14 Mary WHAT can Mary do? Slave 2 Jeanie (2) Emma Mary (2) Mary (1) Enya Packet Interception and Manipulation. Packet Delay Manipulation. Packet Interception and Removal. Spoofing. Replay. Rogue Attack. L2/L3 DoS attacks. Jeanie (1) Time Synchronization using IPsec and MACsec 14
15 Mary WHERE can Mary be found? IPsec scenario. Mary 1 is relevant specifically in the IPsec scenario. -to-network scheme. Slave 2 IPsec Tunnel Jeanie (2) Mary (1) Jeanie (1) Mary 2 is relevant specifically in the MACsec scenario. Hop-by-hop scheme. MACsec scenario / Annex K Time Synchronization using IPsec and MACsec Slave 2 Mary (2) 15
16 Threats Characteristics Analysis Summary IPsec IEEE 1588 Annex MACsec Scenario Scenario K L3 L2 typically public Any typically LAN network approach Hop-by-hop -to-network Hop-by-hop Accuracy + (TCs/BCs) ~ (no TCs/BCs) + (TCs/BCs) L2/L3 DoS Attack Prevention Internal attackers in the trusted network (Jeanie 1, Mary 1) Internal MITM attacks in intermediate nodes (Mary 2) Jeanie (2) Emma Mary (2) Mary (1) Enya Time Synchronization using IPsec and MACsec Jeanie (1) 16
17 Conclusion IPsec and MACsec are used in different topologies and scenarios. Two complementary building blocks for securing time synchronization. Intermediate solutions in the absence of a standard security solution for PTP. Hybrid solutions can be used in certain topologies. Slave IPsec Tunnel Public Hybrid MACsec Tunnel L2 Time Synchronization using IPsec and MACsec 17
18 Thanks!
CSC 6575: Internet Security Fall 2017
CSC 6575: Internet Security Fall 2017 Network Security Devices IP Security Mohammad Ashiqur Rahman Department of Computer Science College of Engineering Tennessee Tech University 2 IPSec Agenda Architecture
IPSec. Overview. Overview. Levente Buttyán
IPSec - brief overview - security associations (SAs) - Authentication Header (AH) protocol - Encapsulated Security Payload () protocol - combining SAs (examples) Overview Overview IPSec is an Internet
Virtual Private Networks (VPN)
CYBR 230 Jeff Shafer University of the Pacific Virtual Private Networks (VPN) 2 Schedule This Week Mon September 4 Labor Day No class! Wed September 6 VPN Project 1 Work Fri September 8 IPv6? Project 1
IPSec. Slides by Vitaly Shmatikov UT Austin. slide 1
IPSec Slides by Vitaly Shmatikov UT Austin slide 1 TCP/IP Example slide 2 IP Security Issues Eavesdropping Modification of packets in transit Identity spoofing (forged source IP addresses) Denial of service
CIS 6930/4930 Computer and Network Security. Topic 8.1 IPsec
CIS 6930/4930 Computer and Network Security Topic 8.1 IPsec 1 IPsec Objectives Why do we need IPsec? IP V4 has no authentication IP spoofing Payload could be changed without detection. IP V4 has no confidentiality
CSCE 715: Network Systems Security
CSCE 715: Network Systems Security Chin-Tser Huang huangct@cse.sc.edu University of South Carolina Security in Network Layer Implementing security in application layer provides flexibility in security
Network Encryption 3 4/20/17
The Network Layer Network Encryption 3 CSC362, Information Security most of the security mechanisms we have surveyed were developed for application- specific needs electronic mail: PGP, S/MIME client/server
Secure PTP - Protecting PTP with MACsec without losing accuracy. ITSF 2014 Thomas Joergensen Vitesse Semiconductor
Secure PTP - Protecting PTP with MACsec without losing accuracy ITSF 2014 Thomas Joergensen Vitesse Semiconductor Security issues with PTP It is possible to spoof time and attack PTP if the PTP traffic
The IPsec protocols. Overview
The IPsec protocols -- components and services -- modes of operation -- Security Associations -- Authenticated Header (AH) -- Encapsulated Security Payload () (c) Levente Buttyán (buttyan@crysys.hu) Overview
Internet Security. - IPSec, SSL/TLS, SRTP - 29th. Oct Lee, Choongho
Internet Security - IPSec, SSL/TLS, SRTP - 29th. Oct. 2007 Lee, Choongho chlee@mmlab.snu.ac.kr Contents Introduction IPSec SSL / TLS SRTP Conclusion 2/27 Introduction (1/2) Security Goals Confidentiality
Cryptography and Network Security Chapter 16. Fourth Edition by William Stallings
Cryptography and Network Security Chapter 16 Fourth Edition by William Stallings Chapter 16 IP Security If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he must be put to death,
IP Security. Cunsheng Ding HKUST, Kong Kong, China
IP Security Cunsheng Ding HKUST, Kong Kong, China Agenda Some attacks against the IP Brief introduction to IPSec Building Block: Security Association Building Block: Security Association Database Building
Chapter 32 Security in the Internet: IPSec, SSL/TLS, PGP,
Chapter 32 Security in the Internet: IPSec, SSL/TLS, PGP, VPN, and Firewalls 32.1 Copyright The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. Permission required for reproduction or display. 32.2 Figure 32.1 Common structure
Cryptography and Network Security. Sixth Edition by William Stallings
Cryptography and Network Security Sixth Edition by William Stallings Chapter 20 IP Security If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he must be put to death, together with
IP Security. Have a range of application specific security mechanisms
IP Security IP Security Have a range of application specific security mechanisms eg. S/MIME, PGP, Kerberos, SSL/HTTPS However there are security concerns that cut across protocol layers Would like security
The Internet community has developed application-specific security mechanisms in a number of application areas, including electronic mail (S/MIME,
1 The Internet community has developed application-specific security mechanisms in a number of application areas, including electronic mail (S/MIME, PGP), client/server (Kerberos), Web access (Secure Sockets
Junos Security. Chapter 8: IPsec VPNs Juniper Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. Worldwide Education Services
Junos Security Chapter 8: IPsec VPNs 2012 Juniper Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. www.juniper.net Worldwide Education Services Chapter Objectives After successfully completing this chapter, you will
Firewalls, Tunnels, and Network Intrusion Detection
Firewalls, Tunnels, and Network Intrusion Detection 1 Firewalls A firewall is an integrated collection of security measures designed to prevent unauthorized electronic access to a networked computer system.
IPv6 Protocol. Does it solve all the security problems of IPv4? Franjo Majstor EMEA Consulting Engineer Cisco Systems, Inc.
IPv6 Protocol Does it solve all the security problems of IPv4? Franjo Majstor EMEA Consulting Engineer fmajstor@cisco.com Cisco Systems, Inc. 1 Agenda IPv6 Primer IPv6 Protocol Security Dual stack approach
THOUGHTS ON TSN SECURITY
THOUGHTS ON TSN SECURITY Contributed by Philippe Klein, PhD (philippe@broadcom.com) 1 METWORK SECURITY PROTOCOLS Description Complexity Performance Layer 4..7 Layer 3 Layer 2 SSL / TLS, IPsec MACsec Application
SECURE ROUTER DISCOVERY MECHANISM TO OVERCOME MAN-IN THE MIDDLE ATTACK IN IPV6 NETWORK
1 SECURE ROUTER DISCOVERY MECHANISM TO OVERCOME MAN-IN THE MIDDLE ATTACK IN IPV6 NETWORK Navaneethan C. Arjuman nava@nav6.usm.my National Advanced IPv6 Centre, Universiti Sains Malaysia March 2018 Copyright
Cryptography and Network Security
Cryptography and Network Security Third Edition by William Stallings Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown Chapter 15 Electronic Mail Security Despite the refusal of VADM Poindexter and LtCol North to appear,
Lecture 33. Firewalls. Firewall Locations in the Network. Castle and Moat Analogy. Firewall Types. Firewall: Illustration. Security April 15, 2005
Firewalls Lecture 33 Security April 15, 2005 Idea: separate local network from the Internet Trusted hosts and networks Intranet Firewall DMZ Router Demilitarized Zone: publicly accessible servers and networks
Lecture 12 Page 1. Lecture 12 Page 3
IPsec Network Security: IPsec CS 239 Computer Software February 26, 2003 Until recently, the IP protocol had no standards for how to apply security Encryption and authentication layered on top Or provided
Effects of Residential Ethernet Standard on other 802.1/ Yong Kim
Effects of Residential Ethernet Standard on other 802.1/802.3 Yong Kim 1 802.1 Dependencies 802.1D Bridge Residential Ethernet is compatible and deemed to be complaint to 802.1D Bridges for existing services.
Lecture 13 Page 1. Lecture 13 Page 3
IPsec Network Security: IPsec CS 239 Computer Software March 2, 2005 Until recently, the IP protocol had no standards for how to apply security Encryption and authentication layered on top Or provided
IPSECv6 Peach Pit User Guide. Peach Fuzzer, LLC. v3.7.50
IPSECv6 Peach Pit User Guide Peach Fuzzer, LLC v3.7.50 Copyright 2015 Peach Fuzzer, LLC. All rights reserved. This document may not be distributed or used for commercial purposes without the explicit consent
Chapter 6. IP Security. Dr. BHARGAVI H. GOSWAMI Department of Computer Science Christ University
Chapter 6 IP Security Dr. BHARGAVI H. GOSWAMI Department of Computer Science Christ University +91 9426669020 bhargavigoswami@gmail.com Topic List 1. IP Security Overview 2. IP Security Architecture 3.
S Series Switches. MACsec Technology White Paper. Issue 1.0. Date HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD.
S Series Switches MACsec Technology White Paper Issue 1.0 Date 2016-03-25 HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD. Copyright Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 2016. All rights reserved. No part of this document may be
Computer Security 3e. Dieter Gollmann. Security.di.unimi.it/sicurezza1415/ Chapter 16: 1
Computer Security 3e Dieter Gollmann Security.di.unimi.it/sicurezza1415/ Chapter 16: 1 Chapter 16: Communications Security Chapter 16: 2 Agenda Threat model Secure tunnels Protocol design principles IPsec
Corso di Network Security a.a. 2012/2013. Solutions of exercises on the second part of the course
University of Parma Department of Information Engineering Corso di Network Security a.a. 2012/2013 Solutions of exercises on the second part of the course 1) Specify the name of the CHAP messages exchanged
IPv6 Security Considerations: Future Challenges
IPv6 Security Considerations: Future Challenges Prof. Sukumar Nandi Company LOGO Dept of Computer Sc. & Engg. Indian Institute of Technology Guwahati Agenda Outline Motivation for IPv6 Brief comparision
AIT 682: Network and Systems Security
AIT 682: Network and Systems Security Final Exam Review Instructor: Dr. Kun Sun Topics covered by Final Topic before Midterm 10% Topic after Midterm 90% Date: 12/13/2017 7:30am 10:15am Place: the same
Control Plane Security Overview
Control Plane Security Overview Wes Doonan Control Plane R&D Hybrid Networks Packet-based Delivery ( ) Packets delivered via standard IP infrastructure Routes configured or learned, packets forwarded per
Security and Lawful Intercept In VoIP Networks. Manohar Mahavadi Centillium Communications Inc. Fremont, California
Security and Lawful Intercept In VoIP Networks Manohar Mahavadi Centillium Communications Inc. Fremont, California Agenda VoIP: Packet switched network VoIP devices VoIP protocols Security and issues in
Secure Ethernet Communication for Autonomous Driving. Jared Combs June 2016
Secure Ethernet Communication for Autonomous Driving Jared Combs June 2016 Agenda Motivation for Security The Multi-Level Security Architecture Proposal Level 1: Restrict access to the network Level 2:
Virtual Private Network
VPN and IPsec Virtual Private Network Creates a secure tunnel over a public network Client to firewall Router to router Firewall to firewall Uses the Internet as the public backbone to access a secure
CIT 380: Securing Computer Systems. Network Security Concepts
CIT 380: Securing Computer Systems Network Security Concepts Topics 1. Protocols and Layers 2. Layer 2 Network Concepts 3. MAC Spoofing 4. ARP 5. ARP Spoofing 6. Network Sniffing Protocols A protocol defines
Network Security - ISA 656 IPsec IPsec Key Management (IKE)
Network Security - ISA 656 IPsec IPsec (IKE) Angelos Stavrou September 28, 2008 What is IPsec, and Why? What is IPsec, and Why? History IPsec Structure Packet Layout Header (AH) AH Layout Encapsulating
CONTENTS. vii. Chapter 1 TCP/IP Overview 1. Chapter 2 Symmetric-Key Cryptography 33. Acknowledgements
CONTENTS Preface Acknowledgements xiii xvii Chapter 1 TCP/IP Overview 1 1.1 Some History 2 1.2 TCP/IP Protocol Architecture 4 1.2.1 Data-link Layer 4 1.2.2 Network Layer 5 1.2.2.1 Internet Protocol 5 IPv4
IP Security IK2218/EP2120
IP Security IK2218/EP2120 Markus Hidell, mahidell@kth.se KTH School of ICT Based partly on material by Vitaly Shmatikov, Univ. of Texas Acknowledgements The presentation builds upon material from - Previous
INTERNET PROTOCOL SECURITY (IPSEC) GUIDE.
INTERNET PROTOCOL SECURITY (IPSEC) GUIDE www.insidesecure.com INTRODUCING IPSEC NETWORK LAYER PACKET SECURITY With the explosive growth of the Internet, more and more enterprises are looking towards building
IPsec (AH, ESP), IKE. Guevara Noubir CSG254: Network Security
IPsec (AH, ESP), IKE Guevara Noubir noubir@ccs.neu.edu Securing Networks Control/Management (configuration) Applications Layer telnet/ftp: ssh, http: https, mail: PGP (SSL/TLS) Transport Layer (TCP) (IPSec,
CHAPTER 18 INTERNET PROTOCOLS ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
CHAPTER 18 INTERNET PROTOCOLS ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS 18.1 (1) The communications network may only accept blocks of data up to a certain size. (2) Error control may be more efficient with a smaller PDU size.
IPSec Transform Set Configuration Mode Commands
IPSec Transform Set Configuration Mode Commands The IPSec Transform Set Configuration Mode is used to configure IPSec security parameters. There are two core protocols, the Authentication Header (AH) and
Key Encryption as per T10/06-103
1 T10/06-144r0 Key Encryption as per T10/06-103 David L. Black (author) Jack Harwood (presenter) 2 Problem and Design Goals 05-446 only specifies encryption key transfer in clear Keys can be entirely too
TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER TITLE PAGE
vii TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER TITLE PAGE DECLARATION ACKNOWLEDGMENT ABSTRACT ABSTRAK TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES LIST OF FIGURES LIST OF APPENDICES ii iv v vi vii xiii xiv xvi 1 OVERVIEW 1 1.1 Introducation
Cryptography and secure channel. May 17, Networks and Security. Thibault Debatty. Outline. Cryptography. Public-key encryption
and secure channel May 17, 2018 1 / 45 1 2 3 4 5 2 / 45 Introduction Simplified model for and decryption key decryption key plain text X KE algorithm KD Y = E(KE, X ) decryption ciphertext algorithm X
8. Network Layer Contents
Contents 1 / 43 * Earlier Work * IETF IP sec Working Group * IP Security Protocol * Security Associations * Authentication Header * Encapsulation Security Payload * Internet Key Management Protocol * Modular
CSE509: (Intro to) Systems Security
CSE509: (Intro to) Systems Security Fall 2012 Invited Lecture by Vyas Sekar IPSec 2005-12 parts by Matt Bishop, used with permission Security in Real Life: Motivation Site SF Company X $$$ Site NY Site
Protocol Architecture (2) Suguru Yamaguchi Nara Institute of Science and Technology Department of Information Science
Protocol Architecture (2) Suguru Yamaguchi Nara Institute of Science and Technology Department of Information Science History of computer network protocol development in 20 th century. Development of hierarchical
Protocols, Technologies and Standards Secure network protocols for the OSI stack P2.1 WLAN Security WPA, WPA2, IEEE i, IEEE 802.1X P2.
P2 Protocols, Technologies and Standards Secure network protocols for the OSI stack P2.1 WLAN Security WPA, WPA2, IEEE 802.11i, IEEE 802.1X P2.2 IP Security IPsec transport mode (host-to-host), ESP and
Lehrstuhl für Netzarchitekturen und Netzdienste Fakultät für Informatik Technische Universität München. ilab. Lab 8 SSL/TLS and IPSec
Lehrstuhl für Netzarchitekturen und Netzdienste Fakultät für Informatik Technische Universität München ilab Lab 8 SSL/TLS and IPSec Outlook: On Layer 4: Goal: Provide security for one specific port SSL
Chapter 6/8. IP Security
Chapter 6/8 IP Security Prof. Bhargavi H Goswami Department of MCA, Sunshine Group of Institutes, Rajkot, Gujarat, India. Mob: +918140099018. Email: bhargavigoswami@gmail.com Topic List 1. IP Security
School of Computer Sciences Universiti Sains Malaysia Pulau Pinang
School of Computer Sciences Universiti Sains Malaysia Pulau Pinang Information Security & Assurance Assignment 2 White Paper Virtual Private Network (VPN) By Lim Teck Boon (107593) Page 1 Table of Content
INFS 766 Internet Security Protocols. Lectures 7 and 8 IPSEC. Prof. Ravi Sandhu IPSEC ROADMAP
INFS 766 Internet Security Protocols Lectures 7 and 8 IPSEC Prof. Ravi Sandhu IPSEC ROADMAP Security Association IP AH (Authentication Header) Protocol IP ESP (Encapsulating Security Protocol) Authentication
CSC 4900 Computer Networks: Security Protocols (2)
CSC 4900 Computer Networks: Security Protocols (2) Professor Henry Carter Fall 2017 Chapter 8 roadmap 8.1 What is network security? 8.2 Principles of cryptography 8.3 Message Integrity 8.4 End point Authentication
CloudBridge :31:07 UTC Citrix Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Terms of Use Trademarks Privacy Statement
CloudBridge 1.1 2013-06-30 04:31:07 UTC 2013 Citrix Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Terms of Use Trademarks Privacy Statement Contents CloudBridge 1.1... 3 CloudBridge... 4 About the CloudBridge...
IPv6 Security Vendor Point of View. Eric Vyncke, Distinguished Engineer Cisco, CTO/Consulting Engineering
IPv6 Security Vendor Point of View Eric Vyncke, evyncke@cisco.com Distinguished Engineer Cisco, CTO/Consulting Engineering 1 ARP Spoofing is now NDP Spoofing: Threats ARP is replaced by Neighbor Discovery
Compression of IPsec AH and ESP Headers for Constrained Environments dra%-raza-6lo-ipsec-04
Compression of IPsec AH and ESP Headers for Constrained Environments dra%-raza-6lo-ipsec-04 {shahid.raza, simon.duquennoy}@sics.se goran.selandaer@ericsson.com 1 Status of the Document First submi
HIP Host Identity Protocol. October 2007 Patrik Salmela Ericsson
HIP Host Identity Protocol October 2007 Patrik Salmela Ericsson Agenda What is the Host Identity Protocol (HIP) What does HIP try to solve HIP basics Architecture The HIP base exchange HIP basic features
VPN and IPsec. Network Administration Using Linux. Virtual Private Network and IPSec 04/2009
VPN and IPsec Network Administration Using Linux Virtual Private Network and IPSec 04/2009 What is VPN? VPN is an emulation of a private Wide Area Network (WAN) using shared or public IP facilities. A
SFO17-406: IPsec Full Offload Support in OpenDataPlane. Bill Fischofer
SFO17-406: IPsec Full Offload Support in OpenDataPlane Bill Fischofer Credits The work described in this session represents the collaborative contribution of the LNG ODP team, particularly: Petri Savolainen,
Internet Protocol and Transmission Control Protocol
Internet Protocol and Transmission Control Protocol CMSC 414 November 13, 2017 Internet Protcol Recall: 4-bit version 4-bit hdr len 8-bit type of service 16-bit total length (bytes) 8-bit TTL 16-bit identification
IPSec Transform Set Configuration Mode Commands
IPSec Transform Set Configuration Mode Commands The IPSec Transform Set Configuration Mode is used to configure IPSec security parameters. There are two core protocols, the Authentication Header (AH) and
Computer Security 3e. Dieter Gollmann. Security.di.unimi.it/sicurezza1516/ Chapter 16: 1
Computer Security 3e Dieter Gollmann Security.di.unimi.it/sicurezza1516/ Chapter 16: 1 Chapter 16: Communications Security Chapter 16: 2 Agenda Threat model Secure tunnels Protocol design principles IPsec
Geneve Header Authentication and Encryption Option
Geneve Header Authentication and Encryption Option draft-mglt-nvo3-geneve-authentication-option-00 draft-mglt-nvo3-geneve-encryption-option-00 Migault IETF99 IPsec/DTLS? Can we use existing protocols?
Virtual Private Networks
EN-2000 Reference Manual Document 8 Virtual Private Networks O ne of the principal features of routers is their support of virtual private networks (VPNs). This document discusses transmission security,
Diet-ESP: A flexible and compressed format for IPsec/ESP
unrestricted Diet-ESP: A flexible and compressed format for IPsec/ESP draft-mglt-ipsecme-diet-esp-01.txt D. Migault, T. Guggemos 25/02/2014- IETF89- London Table of Contents Securing IoT communications
ARP, IP, TCP, UDP. CS 166: Introduction to Computer Systems Security 4/7/18 ARP, IP, TCP, UDP 1
ARP, IP, TCP, UDP CS 166: Introduction to Computer Systems Security 4/7/18 ARP, IP, TCP, UDP 1 IP and MAC Addresses Devices on a local area network have IP addresses (network layer) MAC addresses (data
IPv6 migration challenges and Security
IPv6 migration challenges and Security ITU Regional Workshop for the CIS countries Recommendations on transition from IPv4 to IPv6 in the CIS region, 16-18 April 2014 Tashkent, Republic of Uzbekistan Desire.karyabwite@itu.int
CTS2134 Introduction to Networking. Module 08: Network Security
CTS2134 Introduction to Networking Module 08: Network Security Denial of Service (DoS) DoS (Denial of Service) attack impacts system availability by flooding the target system with traffic or by exploiting
A Solution Framework for Private Media in Privacy Enhanced RTP Conferencing (draft-jones-perc-private-media-framework-00)
A Solution Framework for Private Media in Privacy Enhanced RTP Conferencing (draft-jones-perc-private-media-framework-00) IETF 93 / July 2015 Paul E. Jones Nermeen Ismail David Benham Cisco Agenda Security
CIT 480: Securing Computer Systems
CIT 480: Securing Computer Systems Tunneling and VPNs CIT 480: Securing Computer Systems Slide #1 Topics 1. Tunneling 1. Encapsulation 2. Security 3. SSH 2. Virtual Private Networks 1. Site-to-site 2.
IP Security Part 1 04/02/06. Hofstra University Network Security Course, CSC290A
Network Security IP Security Part 1 1 IP Security Overview 1994 RFC1636, Security in the Internet Architecture Identified key needs: Secure network infrastructure from unauthorized monitoring Control network
COSC4377. Chapter 8 roadmap
Lecture 28 Chapter 8 roadmap 8.1 What is network security? 8.2 Principles of cryptography 8.3 Message integrity 8.4 Securing e mail 8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL 8.6 Network layer security: IPsec 8.7
Internet security and privacy
Internet security and privacy IPsec 1 Layer 3 App. TCP/UDP IP L2 L1 2 Operating system layers App. TCP/UDP IP L2 L1 User process Kernel process Interface specific Socket API Device driver 3 IPsec Create
802.1Q Forwarding PTP messages in an IEEE Transparent Clock Considerations in response to liaison from Q13/15
802.1Q Forwarding PTP messages in an IEEE Transparent Clock Considerations in response to liaison from Q13/15 John Messenger, Anthony Magee, Nir Laufer, November 2012 v03 Background ITU-T Q13/15 is developing
Wireless LAN Security. Gabriel Clothier
Wireless LAN Security Gabriel Clothier Timeline 1997: 802.11 standard released 1999: 802.11b released, WEP proposed [1] 2003: WiFi alliance certifies for WPA 2004: 802.11i released 2005: 802.11w task group
Distributed Systems. 27. Firewalls and Virtual Private Networks Paul Krzyzanowski. Rutgers University. Fall 2013
Distributed Systems 27. Firewalls and Virtual Private Networks Paul Krzyzanowski Rutgers University Fall 2013 November 25, 2013 2013 Paul Krzyzanowski 1 Network Security Goals Confidentiality: sensitive
IPv6 Security Fundamentals
IPv6 Security Fundamentals UK IPv6 Council January 2018 Dr David Holder CEng FIET MIEEE david.holder@erion.co.uk IPv6 Security Fundamentals Common Misconceptions about IPv6 Security IPv6 Threats and Vulnerabilities
Virtual Private Networks.
Virtual Private Networks thm@informatik.uni-rostock.de http://wwwiuk.informatik.uni-rostock.de/ Content Virtual Private Networks VPN Basics Protocols (IPSec, PPTP, L2TP) Objectives of VPNs Earlier Companies
Configuring Security for VPNs with IPsec
This module describes how to configure basic IPsec VPNs. IPsec is a framework of open standards developed by the IETF. It provides security for the transmission of sensitive information over unprotected
Cradlepoint to Palo Alto VPN Example. Summary. Standard IPSec VPN Topology. Global Leader in 4G LTE Network Solutions
Cradlepoint to Palo Alto VPN Example Summary This configuration covers an IPSec VPN tunnel setup between a Cradlepoint Series 3 router and a Palo Alto firewall. IPSec is customizable on both the Cradlepoint
Sharing IPsec with Tunnel Protection
The feature allows sharing an IPsec security association database (SADB) between two or more generic routing encapsulation (GRE) tunnel interfaces when tunnel protection is used. Shared tunnel interfaces
IPv6 Security (Theory vs Practice) APRICOT 14 Manila, Philippines. Merike Kaeo
IPv6 Security (Theory vs Practice) APRICOT 14 Manila, Philippines Merike Kaeo merike@doubleshotsecurity.com Current IPv6 Deployments Don t break existing IPv4 network Securing IPv6 Can t secure something
IPSec implementation for SCTP
SCTP and Proposed Modifications to Aditya Kelkar Alok Sontakke Srivatsa R. Dept. of CSE. IIT Bombay October 31, 2004 SCTP and Proposed Modifications to 1 2 3 SCTP and 4 Proposed Modifications to 5 SCTP
Introduction to IPsec. Charlie Kaufman
Introduction to IPsec Charlie Kaufman charliek@microsoft.com 1 IP Security (IPsec) IETF standard for Network Layer security Popular for creating trusted link (VPN), either firewall-firewall, or machine
A Study of Two Different Attacks to IPv6 Network
IOSR Journal of Computer Engineering (IOSR-JCE) e-issn: 2278-0661,p-ISSN: 2278-8727, Volume 19, Issue 5, Ver. IV (Sep.- Oct. 2017), PP 66-70 www.iosrjournals.org A Study of Two Different Attacks to IPv6
CSE543 Computer and Network Security Module: Network Security
CSE543 Computer and Network Security Module: Network Security Professor Trent Jaeger CSE543 - Introduction to Computer and Network Security 1 2 Communication Security Want to establish a secure channel
Network Security. Dr. Ihsan Ullah. Department of Computer Science & IT University of Balochistan, Quetta Pakistan. June 18, 2015
Network Security Dr. Ihsan Ullah Department of Computer Science & IT University of Balochistan, Quetta Pakistan June 18, 2015 1 / 19 ARP (Address resolution protocol) poisoning ARP is used to resolve 32-bit
INF3510 Information Security University of Oslo Spring Lecture 9 Communication Security. Audun Jøsang
INF3510 Information Security University of Oslo Spring 2011 Lecture 9 Communication Security Audun Jøsang Outline Network security concepts Communication security Perimeter security Protocol architecture
Configuration of an IPSec VPN Server on RV130 and RV130W
Configuration of an IPSec VPN Server on RV130 and RV130W Objective IPSec VPN (Virtual Private Network) enables you to securely obtain remote access to corporate resources by establishing an encrypted tunnel
Parallelizing IPsec: switching SMP to On is not even half the way
Parallelizing IPsec: switching SMP to On is not even half the way Steffen Klassert secunet Security Networks AG Dresden June 11 2010 Table of contents Some basics about IPsec About the IPsec performance
Int ernet w orking. Internet Security. Literature: Forouzan: TCP/IP Protocol Suite : Ch 28
Int ernet w orking Internet Security Literature: Forouzan: TCP/IP Protocol Suite : Ch 28 Internet Security Internet security is difficult Internet protocols were not originally designed for security The
Lecture 9: Network Level Security IPSec
Lecture 9: Network Level Security IPSec CS 336/536: Computer Network Security Fall 2015 Nitesh Saxena Adopted from previous lecture by Keith Ross, and Tony Barnard HW3 being graded Course Admin HW4 will
Network Security. Thierry Sans
Network Security Thierry Sans HTTP SMTP DNS BGP The Protocol Stack Application TCP UDP Transport IPv4 IPv6 ICMP Network ARP Link Ethernet WiFi The attacker is capable of confidentiality integrity availability
Managing and Securing Computer Networks. Guy Leduc. Chapter 7: Securing LANs. Chapter goals: security in practice: Security in the data link layer
Managing and Securing Computer Networks Guy Leduc Chapter 7: Securing LANs Computer Networking: A Top Down Approach, 7 th edition. Jim Kurose, Keith Ross Addison-Wesley, April 2016. (section 8.8) Also
Independent Submission Request for Comments: 6847 Category: Informational. Huawei January 2013
Independent Submission Request for Comments: 6847 Category: Informational ISSN: 2070-1721 D. Melman T. Mizrahi Marvell D. Eastlake 3rd Huawei January 2013 Fibre Channel over Ethernet (FCoE) over Transparent
Use of IPSec in Mobile IP
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering ELEG 777 Internet Engineering ( TERM PAPER ) Use of IPSec in Mobile IP DONE BY: SALEM ITANI ID #: 20011003 SUBMITTED TO: Dr. AYMAN KAYSSI DATE: MAY 21,