Security Protocols and Infrastructures
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1 Security Protocols and Infrastructures Dr. Michael Schneider Chapter 5: Standards for Security Infrastructures November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 1
2 1 Introduction and naming scheme 2 X.509 and its core fields 3 X.509 extensions November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 2
3 1 Introduction and naming scheme 2 X.509 and its core fields 3 X.509 extensions November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 3
4 ITU-T X.50x family and RFC 5280 ITU-T X.501 resp. ISO/IEC : ITU-T Recommendation X.501: Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Models, 1993 Defines directory services November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 4
5 ITU-T X.50x family and RFC 5280 ITU-T X.501 resp. ISO/IEC : ITU-T Recommendation X.501: Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Models, 1993 Defines directory services ITU-T X.509 resp. ISO/IEC : Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Authentication Framework, 1997 Defines certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRL) November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 4
6 ITU-T X.50x family and RFC 5280 ITU-T X.501 resp. ISO/IEC : ITU-T Recommendation X.501: Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Models, 1993 Defines directory services ITU-T X.509 resp. ISO/IEC : Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Authentication Framework, 1997 Defines certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRL) PKIX: RFC 5280 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile, 2008 Describes internet profile for X.509-certificates and -CRLs November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 4
7 Format of names: X.501 Format makes use of a hierarchical directory tree Objects are characterised by attributes: Type = Value Container-Objects: Have subordinate objects Leaf-Objects: Do not have subordinate objects Default format of names within X.509-certificates November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 5
8 X.501 object classes Container object classes: Country: C State or province: SP Locality: L Organization: O Organizational unit: OU Leaf object class: Common name: CN November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 6
9 X.501-name: Example November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 7
10 ASN.1-Struktur of X.501-names ASN.1 type: Name Name ::= CHOICE { RDNSequence } RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName RelativeDistinguishedName ::= SET OF AttributeTypeAndValue AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { type AttributeType, value AttributeValue } AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 8
11 1 Introduction and naming scheme 2 X.509 and its core fields 3 X.509 extensions November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 9
12 Aim and contents of a X.509-certificate Key objective: Bind a public key to its holder (person, service, URL) November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 10
13 Aim and contents of a X.509-certificate Key objective: Bind a public key to its holder (person, service, URL) Contents of a X.509-certificate: Name / Pseudonym of the certificate holder Public Key (and corresponding algorithm) of its owner Unique ID of the certificate Validity period of the certificate Issuer s identity Signature algorithm (i.e. algorithm used to sign the certificate) Issuer signs relevant data (= to be signed) digitally November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 10
14 Scheme of a X.509-certificate November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 11
15 Why extensions? Drawbacks of X.509v1 and X.509v2: Default name representation according to X.501: Mailing addresses not relevant (v2 from 1993!) Details on phone, fax, or URL difficult No statement on key usage: Encryption and/or signature verification key? May certificates be verified using the certified public key? Does the certificate belong to a certification authority? No information about the underlying policy: In which way did the certificate holder prove his identity? Where may the verifier download the policy? Solution: Flexible extension fields are needed November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 12
16 Extensions in X.509v3 Extensions enable additional attributes for: End entity (i.e. a participant) Certification Authority (CA) Public or private key The most common extensions are standardised in X.509v3 and in the PKIX standard (RFC 5280) Extendable May cause interoperability problems Each extension gets an attribute from his issuer: critical non-critical November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 13
17 How does the client handle the critical flag? November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 14
18 ASN.1 structure of a X.509-certificate Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { tbscertificate TBSCertificate, signaturealgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signaturevalue BIT STRING } November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 15
19 ASN.1 structure of a X.509-certificate TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1, serialnumber CertificateSerialNumber, signature AlgorithmIdentifier, issuer Name, validity Validity, subject Name, subjectpublickeyinfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo, issueruniqueid [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3 subjectuniqueid [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3 extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider If present, version shall be v3 }
20 Details of the certificate fields of X.509v1 (1/4) version : Aim: Statement on the underlying X.509 version ASN.1 type: Version ASN.1 definition: Version ::= INTEGER {v1(0),v2(1),v3(2)} November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 17
21 Details of the certificate fields of X.509v1 (1/4) version : Aim: Statement on the underlying X.509 version ASN.1 type: Version ASN.1 definition: Version ::= INTEGER {v1(0),v2(1),v3(2)} serialnumber : Aim: Unique identifier of the certificate for the signing issuer ASN.1 type: CertificateSerialNumber ASN.1 definition: CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 17
22 Details of the certificate fields of X.509v1 (2/4) signature : Aim: Information on the algorithm used to sign the certificate ASN.1 type: AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 definition: AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL } November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 18
23 Details of the certificate fields of X.509v1 (2/4) signature : Aim: Information on the algorithm used to sign the certificate ASN.1 type: AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 definition: AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL } issuer : Aim: Holds the name of the signing CA ASN.1 type: Name ASN.1 definition: See description of X.501 before November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 18
24 Details of the certificate fields of X.509v1 (3/4) validity : Aim: Indication of the validity period of the certificate ASN.1 type: Validity ASN.1 definition: Validity ::= SEQUENCE { notbefore Time, notafter Time } Time ::= CHOICE { utctime UTCTime, generaltime GeneralizedTime } Key question: Validity period of public or private key??? November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 19
25 Details of the certificate fields of X.509v1 (4/4) subject : Aim: Statement on the certificate holder (CH) CH possesses the corresponding private key: Natural person, legal body, server, CA,... ASN.1 type: Name (see X.501 before) November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 20
26 Details of the certificate fields of X.509v1 (4/4) subject : Aim: Statement on the certificate holder (CH) CH possesses the corresponding private key: Natural person, legal body, server, CA,... ASN.1 type: Name (see X.501 before) subjectpublickeyinfo : Aim: Hold the certified public key of the CH ASN.1 type: SubjectPublicKeyInfo ASN.1 def.: SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, subjectpublickey BIT STRING } November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 20
27 Object Identifier Simple data type in ASN.1 Hierarchical numbers seperated by a point or space Aim: Reference of global valid objects E.g. to indicate the public key algorithm within a certificate Owner of the n-th place is responsible for the (n+1)-th place E.g. the owner of the OID assigns OID Top level numbers are assigned by ISO and ITU Further assignment by IANA, DoD, ANSI, BSI Web site of Harald Alvestrand yields a search engine: November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 21
28 Object Identifier: Examples Top-Level-OIDs: 0: ITU-T assigned 1: ISO assigned 2: Joint ISO/ITU-T assignment November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 22
29 Object Identifier: Examples Top-Level-OIDs: 0: ITU-T assigned 1: ISO assigned 2: Joint ISO/ITU-T assignment Example: id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) } id-ce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 29 } Technical University of Darmstadt (Germany), Computer Science Department November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 22
30 Well known OIDs of public key algorithms Public Key Algorithm Algorithm Identifier Algorithm OID Parameter RSA rsaencryption none DSA id-dsa Optional Diffie-Hellman dhpublicnumber Obligatory ECC id-ecpublickey Optional November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 23
31 Well known OIDs of public key algorithms Public Key Algorithm Algorithm Identifier Algorithm OID Parameter RSA rsaencryption none DSA id-dsa Optional Diffie-Hellman dhpublicnumber Obligatory ECC id-ecpublickey Optional Remark: Algorithm of public key: RSA, DSA, ECC Algorithm of signature: Public key algorithm + hash function (e.g. RSA and SHA-256) November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 23
32 Details of the certificate fields of X.509v2 issueruniqueid : Aim: Definition of a global and permanent issuer s ID Typically not used ASN.1 type: UniqueIdentifier ASN.1 definition: UniqueIdentifier ::= BIT STRING November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 24
33 Details of the certificate fields of X.509v2 issueruniqueid : Aim: Definition of a global and permanent issuer s ID Typically not used ASN.1 type: UniqueIdentifier ASN.1 definition: UniqueIdentifier ::= BIT STRING subjectuniqueid : Aim: Definition of a global and permanent end entity s ID Typically not used ASN.1 type: UniqueIdentifier ASN.1 definition: UniqueIdentifier ::= BIT STRING November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 24
34 1 Introduction and naming scheme 2 X.509 and its core fields 3 X.509 extensions November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 25
35 X.509v3: Extensions extensions : Aim: More information about issuer, subject, key usage, policy, distribution points of revocation information,... Since version 3 of X.509 ASN.1 type: Extensions ASN.1 definition: Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension Extension ::= SEQUENCE { extnid OBJECT IDENTIFIER, critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, extnvalue OCTET STRING } November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 26
36 Extension Classes (1/2) 1 Subject Type: Is the certificate holder a CA or not? November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 27
37 Extension Classes (1/2) 1 Subject Type: Is the certificate holder a CA or not? 2 Names: Further information on names of issuer or subject Default naming of X.509 is the X.501 format, which is not applicable for internet applications Alternative name information like address or fax November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 27
38 Extension Classes (1/2) 1 Subject Type: Is the certificate holder a CA or not? 2 Names: Further information on names of issuer or subject Default naming of X.509 is the X.501 format, which is not applicable for internet applications Alternative name information like address or fax 3 Keys: Further information on the certified key pair Key usage of the public / private key Validity period of the private key (no more standardised in RFC 5280) November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 27
39 Extension Classes (2/2) November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 28
40 Extension Classes (2/2) 4 Policy: Further information on the underlying policy Identity check? Certificate classes: class 0,..., class 3 November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 28
41 Extension Classes (2/2) 4 Policy: Further information on the underlying policy Identity check? Certificate classes: class 0,..., class 3 5 Miscellaneous: Further general informationen Revocation information points Validity model Qualified certificate November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 28
42 Subject Extension: Basic Constraints Indicates, if the certificate belongs to a CA or not ASN.1 structure: BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { ca BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, pathlenconstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL } ca = TRUE for CA certificates pathlenconstraint: Max. number of intermediate certificates following this CA certificate pathlenconstraint = 0: CA must not issue CA certificates id-ce-basicconstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 19} MUST critical in CA certificates November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 29
43 Name Extension: Subject Alternative Name Additional name for certificate holder rfc822name DNS-Name: dnsname (RFC 1035) URI: uniformresourceidentifier (RFC 1630) IP address: ipaddress (RFC 791) Subject field may be empty, if this extension is used id-ce-subjectaltname OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 17} MUST critical, if subject field is not used November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 30
44 Name Extension: Issuer Alternative Name Additional name for the issuing CA Similar to Subject Alternative Name id-ce-issueraltname OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 18} Extension is not processed within certificate path validition according to PKIX SHOULD NOT critical November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 31
45 Name Extension: Name Constraints Only in CA certificates Not very common Defines name space for subordinate certificates in the chain Permitted subtrees Excluded subtrees id-ce-nameconstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 30} MUST critical November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 32
46 Key Extension: Key Usage Bit setting: KeyUsage ::= BIT STRING { digitalsignature (0), nonrepudiation (1), keyencipherment (2), dataencipherment (3), keyagreement (4), keycertsign (5), crlsign (6), encipheronly (7), decipheronly (8) } November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 33
47 Key Extension: Key Usage id-ce-keyusage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 15} SHOULD critical Must be included in a certificate, if certified public key shall be used for validating certificates or CRLs November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 34
48 Key Extension: Extended Key Usage (1/2) Further key usages besides extension Key Usage Typically in end-user certificates May be critical or non-critical id-ce-extkeyusage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 37} ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 35
49 Key Extension: Extended Key Usage (2/2) Standardised OIDs for extended key usages according to PKIX: TLS Web server authentication: id-pkix 3 1 TLS Web client authentication: id-pkix 3 2 Signed executable code: id-pkix 3 3 protection: id-pkix 3 4 Time stamping services: id-pkix 3 8 OCSP responder: id-pkix 3 9 November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 36
50 Key Extension: Private Key Usage Period Defines validity period of corresponding private key Should only be used for signature keys May be different from the validity period of the corresponding public key PKIX recommends not to use this extension (it is therefore no more used in RFC 5280) Typical example: Public key shall be valid when private key has become invalid PKI of electronic ID cards uses this extension November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 37
51 Key Extension: Authority Key Identifier Identifier of the CA public key used to verify a certificate Aim: Enable the establishment of a certificate chain Use case: A CA possesses multiple keys Generation methods for the identifier: SHA-1 value of encoding of the value field of public key Issuer name and serial number of issuer certificate MUST NOT critical id-ce-authoritykeyidentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 35} November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 38
52 Key Extension: Subject Key Identifier Identifier of the certified public key Shall be used in CA certificates Aim: Enable the establishment of a certificate chain MUST NOT critical id-ce-subjectkeyidentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 14} SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= KeyIdentifier KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 39
53 Policy Extension: Certificate Policies Information on the underlying policy: Conditions under which certificate is issued (e.g. for registration of certificate holders) Purposes for which certificate may be used Relative quality of the certificate: very good, good, mediocre URL where to download the policy or Certification Practice Statement (CPS) Referencing through object identifier (OID) critical or non-critical id-ce-certificatepolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 32} November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 40
54 Policy Extension: Policy Mappings Only allowed within CA certificates Two policies are considered to be equivalent: Client typically only has knowledge of a few OIDs Often used for cross certification Mapping via OID pairs: Issuer Policy: Policy of the issuing CA Subject Policy: Equivalent policy MUST non-critical id-ce-policymappings OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 33 } November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 41
55 Further Extensions: CRL Distribution Points Indicates where to get a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) SHOULD non-critical id-ce-crldistributionpoints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 31} ASN.1 structure: CRLDistributionPoints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE { distributionpoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL, reasons [1] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL, crlissuer [2] GeneralNames OPTIONAL } November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 42
56 Further Extensions: Freshest CRL Indicates where to get the newest Delta-CRL Delta-CRL are partial CRL Space efficiency MUST non-critical Same syntax as CRL Distribution Point Extension id-ce-freshestcrl OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 46 } ASN.1 structure: FreshestCRL ::= CRLDistributionPoints November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 43
57 Further Extensions: Authority Information Access In PKIX defined as a private extension: Only specified within PKIX id-pe OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 1 } id-pe-authorityinfoaccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pe 1} Indicates where to get information about: Online-validation services (e.g. OCSP-responder) Further information about the issuer MUST non-critical November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 44
58 Overview of standardised extensions Subject Key Identifier Key Usage Private Key Usage Period Subject Alternative Name Issuer Alternative Name Basic Constraints Name Constraints CRL Distribution Points Certificate Policies Policy Mappings Authority Key Identifier Policy Constraints Extended Key Usage Freshest CRL November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 45
59 Further Extensions: Netscape Extensions (1/2) Extensions of Netscape: Superseded Not all Microsoft clients can evaluate them SHOULD non-critical Types: netscape-cert-type (similar to [extended] key usage) netscape-base-url (prefix for all URIs in the certificate) netscape-revocation-url (URI for CRL) netscape-ca-revocation-url (URI for CA-CRL) netscape-ca-policy-url (URI for policy) November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 46
60 Further Extensions: Netscape Extensions (2/2) netscape-cert-type: Bit string to give information about key usage and certificate holder bit-0 SSL client bit-1 SSL server bit-2 S/MIME bit-3 Object Signing (z.b. Java applets and plugins) bit-4 Reserved (for future use) bit-5 SSL CA bit-6 S/MIME CA bit-7 Object Signing CA November 13, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 47
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