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1 1 of 5 26/06/ :27 Home Projects Qualys.com Contact You are here: Home > Projects > SSL Server Test > printware.co.uk SSL Report: printware.co.uk ( ) Assessed on: Fri, 26 Jun :53:08 UTC HIDDEN Clear cache Scan Another» Summary Overall Rating Certificate 100 Protocol Support 90 Key Exchange 90 Cipher Strength Visit our documentation page for more information, configuration guides, and books. Known issues are documented here. This server is vulnerable to the POODLE attack. If possible, disable SSL 3 to mitigate. Grade capped to C. MORE INFO» Certificate uses a weak signature. When renewing, ensure you upgrade to SHA2. MORE INFO» The server does not support Forward Secrecy with the reference browsers. MORE INFO» Authentication Server Key and Certificate #1 Common names Alternative names Prefix handling Valid from printware.co.uk Both (with and without WWW) Mon, 17 Feb :09:59 UTC Sat, 19 Mar :09:59 UTC (expires in 8 months and 22 days) Weak key (Debian) Extended Validation Certificate Transparency Revocation information Revocation status Trusted CRL, OCSP Good (not revoked) Additional Certificates (if supplied) Certificates provided Chain issues 3 (3720 bytes) ne #2 Subject

2 2 of 5 26/06/ :27 Additional Certificates (if supplied) Wed, 13 Apr :00:00 UTC (expires in 6 years and 9 months) #3 Subject Fingerprint: 69ff62102aa7da9c7f7b74662aa31c6a2f0bd00d Fri, 28 Jan :00:00 UTC (expires in 12 years and 7 months) Root CA Certification Paths Path #1: Trusted 1 Sent by server 2 Sent by server 3 In trust store Fingerprint: b9c1620dc088a49aee72448d f73e0e Self-signed Fingerprint: 75e0abb c04f85fddde38e4b7242efe Weak or insecure signature, but no impact on root certificate Path #2: Trusted 1 Sent by server 2 Sent by server 3 Sent by server 4 In trust store Fingerprint: b9c1620dc088a49aee72448d f73e0e Fingerprint: 69ff62102aa7da9c7f7b74662aa31c6a2f0bd00d Root CA Self-signed Fingerprint: b1bc968bd4f49d622aa89a81f a41d829c Weak or insecure signature, but no impact on root certificate Configuration Protocols TLS 1.2 TLS 1.1 TLS 1.0 SSL 3 INSECURE SSL 2 Cipher Suites (sorted by strength; the server has no preference)

3 3 of 5 26/06/ :27 Cipher Suites (sorted by strength; the server has no preference) TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x2f) 128 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x33) DH 2048 bits (p: 256, g: 1, Ys: 256) FS 128 TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA (0x41) 128 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA (0x45) DH 2048 bits (p: 256, g: 1, Ys: 256) FS 128 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc013) ECDH 256 bits (eq bits RSA) FS 128 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0x3c) 128 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0x67) DH 2048 bits (p: 256, g: 1, Ys: 256) FS 128 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x9c) 128 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x9e) DH 2048 bits (p: 256, g: 1, Ys: 256) FS 128 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0xc027) ECDH 256 bits (eq bits RSA) FS 128 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02f) ECDH 256 bits (eq bits RSA) FS 128 TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0xa) 112 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0x16) DH 2048 bits (p: 256, g: 1, Ys: 256) FS 112 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0xc012) ECDH 256 bits (eq bits RSA) FS 112 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x35) 256 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x39) DH 2048 bits (p: 256, g: 1, Ys: 256) FS 256 TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA (0x84) 256 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA (0x88) DH 2048 bits (p: 256, g: 1, Ys: 256) FS 256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc014) ECDH 256 bits (eq bits RSA) FS 256 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 (0x3d) 256 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 (0x6b) DH 2048 bits (p: 256, g: 1, Ys: 256) FS 256 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x9d) 256 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x9f) DH 2048 bits (p: 256, g: 1, Ys: 256) FS 256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (0xc028) ECDH 256 bits (eq bits RSA) FS 256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc030) ECDH 256 bits (eq bits RSA) FS 256 Handshake Simulation Android SNI 2 TLS 1.0 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x2f) FS 128 Android TLS 1.0 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc014) FS 256 Android TLS 1.0 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc014) FS 256 Android TLS 1.0 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc014) FS 256 Android 4.3 TLS 1.0 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc014) FS 256 Android TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc030) FS 256 Android TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc014) FS 256 Baidu Jan 2015 TLS 1.0 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc014) FS 256 BingPreview Jan 2015 TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc030) FS 256 Chrome 42 / OS X R TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02f) FS 128 Firefox ESR / Win 7 TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02f) FS 128 Firefox 37 / OS X R TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02f) FS 128 Googlebot Feb 2015 TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02f) FS 128 IE 6 / XP FS 1 SNI 2 SSL 3 TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0xa) FS 112 IE 7 / Vista TLS 1.0 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x2f) FS 128 IE 8 / XP FS 1 SNI 2 TLS 1.0 TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0xa) FS 112 IE 8-10 / Win 7 R TLS 1.0 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x2f) FS 128 IE 11 / Win 7 R TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (0xc028) FS 256 IE 11 / Win 8.1 R TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (0xc028) FS 256 IE Mobile 10 / Win Phone 8.0 TLS 1.0 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x2f) FS 128 IE Mobile 11 / Win Phone 8.1 TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (0xc028) FS 256 Java 6u45 SNI 2 TLS 1.0 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x2f) FS 128 Java 7u25 TLS 1.0 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc013) FS 128

4 4 of 5 26/06/ :27 Handshake Simulation Java 8u31 TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0xc027) FS 128 OpenSSL 0.9.8y TLS 1.0 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x39) FS 256 OpenSSL 1.0.1l R TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc030) FS 256 OpenSSL R TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc030) FS 256 Safari / OS X TLS 1.0 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc013) FS 128 Safari 6 / ios R TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (0xc028) FS 256 Safari / OS X R TLS 1.0 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc014) FS 256 Safari 7 / ios 7.1 R TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (0xc028) FS 256 Safari 7 / OS X 10.9 R TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (0xc028) FS 256 Safari 8 / ios R TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (0xc028) FS 256 Safari 8 / OS X R TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (0xc028) FS 256 Yahoo Slurp Jan 2015 TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc030) FS 256 YandexBot Jan 2015 TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc030) FS 256 (1) Clients that do not support Forward Secrecy (FS) are excluded when determining support for it. (2) support for virtual SSL hosting (SNI). Connects to the default site if the server uses SNI. (R) Denotes a reference browser or client, with which we expect better effective security. (All) We use defaults, but some platforms do not use their best protocols and features (e.g., Java 6 & 7, older IE). Protocol Details Secure Renegotiation Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation Supported Insecure Client-Initiated Renegotiation BEAST attack POODLE (SSLv3) POODLE (TLS) Downgrade attack prevention TLS compression RC4 Heartbeat (extension) Heartbleed (vulnerability) OpenSSL CCS vuln. (CVE ) Forward Secrecy Next Protocol Negotiation (NPN) Session resumption (caching) Session resumption (tickets) OCSP stapling Strict Transport Security (HSTS) Public Key Pinning (HPKP) Long handshake intolerance TLS extension intolerance TLS version intolerance t mitigated server-side (more info) SSL 3: 0x2f, TLS 1.0: 0x2f Vulnerable INSECURE (more info) (more info), TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV not supported (more info) (more info) (more info) With some browsers (more info) Incorrect SNI alerts - Uses common DH prime SSL 2 handshake compatibility Miscellaneous Test date Test duration Fri, 26 Jun :50:58 UTC seconds HTTP status code 200 HTTP server signature Apache/ (Debian) OpenSSL/1.0.1i Server hostname -

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