Advanced Web Technology 10) XSS, CSRF and SQL Injection

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1 Berner Fachhochschule, Technik und Informatik Advanced Web Technology 10) XSS, CSRF and SQL Injection Dr. E. Benoist Fall Semester 2010/2011 1

2 Table of Contents Cross Site Request Forgery - CSRF Presentation Vulnerability CSRF allows to access the intranet Protection Conclusion Injection Flows Presentation Vulnerability Protection Examples Conclusion 2

3 Cross Site Request Forgery Not a new attack, but simple and devastating CSRF attack forces a logged-on victim s browser to send a request to a vulnerable web application Target: Perform the chosen action on behalf of the victim Cross Site Request Forgery - CSRF 3

4 Sending a request without the consent of the victim? Insert an image in a HTML file <img src= > Browser: Downloads an image GET /image/test.gif HTTP/ An image can be generated by a PHP program (or any program) <img src= > Browser: Downloads an image Cross Site Request Forgery - CSRF: Presentation 4

5 Sending a request? (Cont.) An image can be generated according to some parameters <img src= /barcode.php?number= > Browser: Downloads an image An image tag can contain something else <img src= logout > Browser????? Cross Site Request Forgery - CSRF: Presentation 5

6 Very widespread vulnerability Touches any web application that has no authorization checks for vulnerable actions will process an action if a default login is able to be given in the request <img src= pwd=123 > Authorizes requests based only on credentials that are automatically submitted cookies if currently logged into the application or Remember me functionality if not logged into the application or a Kerberos token if part of an Intranet participating in integrated logon with Active Directory. Cross Site Request Forgery - CSRF: Presentation 6

7 State of the art Most of web applications rely solely on automatically submitted credentials cookies basic authentication credentials source IP addresses SSL certificates or windows domain credentials Vulnerability also known as Session Riding, One-Click Attacks, Cross Site Reference Forgery, Hostile Linking, and Automation Attack Acronym XSRF is also used together with CSRF Cross Site Request Forgery - CSRF: Presentation 7

8 Vulnerability A typical CSRF attack directs the user to invoke some function for instance application s logout page The following tag can be inserted in any page viewed by the victim <img src= > it generates the same request as clicking on a link containing this address! Example: Online banking transfer <img src= frmacct=document.form.frmacct&toacct= &amt = > Could transfer the money from the account of the user, to a given account. Cross Site Request Forgery - CSRF: Vulnerability 8

9 Vulnerability (Cont.) Jeremiah Grossman 1 Succeeded in making changes in victims DSL routers Even if the user doesn t know that he can configure his router ;-) He used the router s default account name to perform his attack Example <img src= > Then you just have to reconfigure the system <img src= = > Once DNS changed, user will never be able to access a site securely! 1 Talk in Blackhat 2006 : Hacking Intranet Sites from the outside Cross Site Request Forgery - CSRF: Vulnerability 9

10 How such a link could reach a victim Web-site Owner embedded JavaScript malware Web page defaced with embedded JavaScript malware JavaScript Malware injected into a public area of a website. (persistent XSS) Clicked on, a specially-crafted link causing the website to echo JavaScript malware. (non-persistent XSS) Cross Site Request Forgery - CSRF: Vulnerability 10

11 CSRF allows to access the intranet The attacker sends requests from inside the Intranet Doesn t have to go throw the firewall, the victim is already CSRF combined with javascript allows to send many requests sequentially javascript adds an image in the DOM (possibly invisible). when the request is sent, another image is added and so on Cross Site Request Forgery - CSRF: CSRF allows to access the intranet 11

12 Internet is protected, but Intranet? You would never dare doing this on Internet! But what about Intranet? Leaving hosts unpatched Servers are always patched regularly, but local PC s? Using default passwords What the use of changing the password, the IP address can only be reached from inside my network x.y Do not putting a firewall in front of a host Everything seams OK because the perimeter firewalls black external access So CSRF attacks can be very fruitful Cross Site Request Forgery - CSRF: CSRF allows to access the intranet 12

13 Why do CSRF attacks work? User authorization credential is automatically included in any request by the browse Typical: Session Cookie The Attacker doesn t need to supply that credential It belongs to the victim s browser Success of CSRF belongs on the probability that the victim is logged in the attacked system Idea: attack the site the victim visits Mean : XSS Cross Site Request Forgery - CSRF: CSRF allows to access the intranet 13

14 CSRF and XSS Combine CSRF and XSS The tag is already posted inside the vulnerable application Risk is increased by that combination Probability to find a logged in user is higher CSRF does not require XSS One can attack a site from another one Any application with XSS flaws is susceptible to CSRF CSRF attacks can exploit the XSS flaw to steal any non-automatically submitted credential When building defenses against CSRF attacks, you must eliminate XSS vulnerabilities Cross Site Request Forgery - CSRF: CSRF allows to access the intranet 14

15 Protection Application must ensure that they are not only relying on credentials or tokens that are automatically submitted by browsers Session Cookies Certificates Remember me... Application should use a custom token that the browser will not Remember So it can not be included in the Requests sent automatically Cross Site Request Forgery - CSRF: Protection 15

16 Strategies Ensure that there are no XSS vulnerabilities in your application Otherwise, any protection is useless, since javascript could access the hidden data. Insert custom random tokens into every form and URL It will not be automatically submitted by the browser Example: <form action= /transfer.do method= POST > <input type= hidden name= value= >... </form> Then you have to verify that token Token can be unique for a session or even for each page The more focused the token is, the higher the security is, but the application is then much more complicated to write Cross Site Request Forgery - CSRF: Protection 16

17 Strategies (Cont.) For sensitive data or value transactions, re-authenticate or use transaction signing to ensure that the request is genuine. Set up external mechanism to verify requests (phone, ) Notify the user of the request using an Do not use GET requests for sensitive data or to perform value transactions Use only POST methods when processing sensitive data from the user. However the URL may contain the random token as this creates a unique URL, which makes CSRF almost impossible to perform POST alone is an insufficient protection You must also combine it with random tokens Cross Site Request Forgery - CSRF: Protection 17

18 Verifying Security Goal: Verify that the application generates and requires some authorization token that is not resent automatically by the browser Automated approaches: Automated approach: few automated scanners can detect CSRF vulnerabilities. Manual Approach: Penetration testing and verification of the code Cross Site Request Forgery - CSRF: Protection 18

19 Conclusion - CSRF Cross Site Scripting - XSS Exploits the trust a user has in a website Cross Site Request Forgery - CSRF Exploits the trust the site has in a user by forging the enactor and making a request appear to come from a trusted user 2 2 wikipedia Cross Site Request Forgery - CSRF: Conclusion 19

20 Injection Flows Principle: Occurs when user supplied data is sent to an interpreter as part of a command or a query. Injection Flows may be done on: SQL (most common) LDAP XPath XSLT HTML OS Command injection... This vulnerability is very common on Web Application Injection Flows: Presentation 20

21 How does it work? Attacker tricks the interpreter into executing unintended command Attacker supplies unexpected content to a site Data is especially designed to fool the site Attacker may take control of the interpreter, for instance SQL: Read data (unintended, of course) update, delete or create any arbitrary data For the Operating System interpreter Attacker may have the opportunity to execute any command Injection Flows: Presentation 21

22 Vulnerability Environments affected Any framework using an interpreter or invoke process SQL Command line... System is vulnerable when user input is passed without tests PHP $query = select from guestbook ; $query.= where title like.$ REQUEST[ search ]; $result = mysql query($query, $conn); Java String query = select from user where username= ; query += req.getparameter( userid ); query += and password = +req.getparameter( pwd ) + ; Injection Flows: Vulnerability 22

23 Protection Avoid the use of interpreter if possible Otherwise: Use safe APIs Strongly typed parameterized queries Object Relational Mapping (ORM) They handle data escaping Validation is still recommended in order to detect attacks Injection Flows: Protection 23

24 Take Extra Care when using interpreters Input Validation Validate all input data: length, type, syntax, business rules validation is done before displaying or storing any data Validation must be done server-side Javascript validation doesn t bring any security Use strongly typed parameterized query APIs with placeholder substitution markers, Enforce least privilege Configure your DB such that the web account can t do more than what is expected restrict the rights of your user when executing an OS command Injection Flows: Protection 24

25 Take Extra Care (Cont.) Avoid detailed error messages Give access to versions numbers Give access to parts of the code Give access to configurations Use stored procedures They are generally safe from SQL injection Can however be injected (for instance using exec()) Do not use dynamic query interfaces (such as mysql query()) Injection Flows: Protection 25

26 Take Extra Care (Cont.) Do not use simple escaping functions such as addslashes() in PHP str replace(" "," ") it is weak and has been successfully exploited Prefer following methods use mysql real escape string() or preferably PDO which does not require escaping Injection Flows: Protection 26

27 Language Specific recommendations Java EE use strongly typed PreparedStatement or use an ORM (Object Relational Manager) such as Hibernate or Spring PHP Use PDO with strongly typed parameterized queries (using bindparam()). Injection Flows: Protection 27

28 Which site is subject to SQL injection? Such a site must access a DB The parameter should be given by the user This parameter is then used to select data in the DB Example Means there exists a request for the page number 100 If the site does not test its input You can test it by typing something like: If the site lets the user see error messages Test the output of your input Examples Search form (SELECT with LIKE) Login form (SELECT with two =) Insertion of new entries... Injection Flows: Examples 28

29 Example: Presentation Suppose we have the following HTML Form <form method= POST > <input type= text name= username ><br> <input type= password name= password ><br> <input type= submit value= Login > </form> and the following PHP line defining a SQL command: $query = SELECT FROM user WHERE username= $user ; $query.= AND password= $pwd ; For our examples, we disable a security feature from the php.ini file (normally this option is on, and it quotes all GET, POST and COOKIES parameters, means chars like: and are escaped and Advanced become Web\ Technology and 10) \ ): XSS, magic_quotes_gpc CSRF and SQL Injection = off Injection Flows: Examples 29

30 Example: Select user and password We want the select to work in any case Following expressions are always true SELECT FROM table WHERE 1=1; SELECT FROM table WHERE 1; SELECT FROM table WHERE ISNULL(NULL) SELECT FROM table WHERE 1 IS NOT NULL SELECT FROM table WHERE NULL IS NULL... Injection Flows: Examples 30

31 Example: Select user and password (Cont.) So we do not need a valid username and password if $user=" OR a = a" and $password remains empty then the previous expression becomes: SELECT FROM user WHERE username= OR a = a AND \ password= ; Returns the list of all users So we are logged in with the first provided Injection Flows: Examples 31

32 Login on a specific account We can specify the right username and change the password If we give $user="emmanuel" And $password=" OR b BETWEEN a AND c" The previous SQL statement becomes SELECT FROM user WHERE username= Emmanuel AND \ password= OR b BETWEEN a AND c ; So username is OK, but password is not checked! Injection Flows: Examples 32

33 Example, using Comments Another great principle in SQL injection is Comments It is also very common in all the other injections If we inject a #, the rest of the SQL expression is not evaluated if $user="john #" the request becomes SELECT FROM user WHERE username= John # AND password= which is equal to SELECT FROM user WHERE username= John If we use the comments /* comments */ we may escape some tests Injection Flows: Examples 33

34 More injection in SELECT Suppose we have the following query, for displaying the content of one single comment in our guestbook: $query = select from guestbook where guestbookid= $number ; We can copy the content in a file suppose we define $number="11 or 1=1 INTO OUTFILE /tmp/test.security.txt " The total content of the table is sent to a file. Suppose the Attacker has an account on the system (e.g. foobar). It is possible to change the password of foobar If we can write the following query: SELECT password FROM user WHERE login= foobar INTO OUTFILE\ /opt/lampp/htdocs/test.php Injection Flows: Examples 34

35 Attacks compatible with magic quotes Since most of the server have magic quotes gpc = on Attackers can not use or Use MySQL char() function Returns the character denoted by the number, For instance char(104,111,112) returns the string hop Previous attack becomes The following query is used to count one vote: UPDATE news SET votes=votes+1, score=score+$note WHERE\ newsid= $id, We have the following attack $note= 3, title=char(104,111,112) Injection Flows: Examples 35

36 How to protect yourself From SQL injection in PHP Configure PHP such that and are automatically escaped magic quotes gpc = on Always quote input before sending query to an interpreter mysql real escape string() Do not use any interpreter at all Use PDO Injection Flows: Examples 36

37 Conclusion (Injection Flows) SQL Injection allows attacker to Read data: Access passwords, data stored Change Data : Access security level Delete data SQL injection Vulnerabilities opens the door to: Privacy breach : Data can be accessed without consent Identity theft : idem + failure in authentication Compromission of the system : write of new files (maybe PHP)... Easy protection are already exploited Adding one (or more) layers between presentation and database layer is a must (also from the point of view of Design) Even this has also been successfully exploited. Solution? test your inputs! Injection Flows: Conclusion 37

38 Conclusion (Web Security) Infrastructure Security is Vital Good Network Architecture (Firewals, DMZ,... ) Application Security must not be forgotten Test Inputs Encode Outputs Teach your users No security is efficient is users aren t included for instance if they never log-out Security is expensive in Development time or in Usability Injection Flows: Conclusion 38

39 References OWASP Top A Guide for Building Secure Web Applications and Web Services Advanced SQL Injection in SQL Server Applications - Chris Anley injection.pdf L injection (My)SQL via PHP - leseulfrog Advanced version: SQLMAP (a SQL Injection Tool) Injection Flows: Conclusion 39