3 rd SKINNY Breaking Competition
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1 3 rd SKINNY Breaking Competition C. Beierle, J. Jean, S. Kӧlbl, G. Leander, A. Moradi, T. Peyrin, Y. Sasaki, P. Sasdrich and S.M. Sim Eurocrypt 2018 Rump Tel Aviv 01/May/2018
2 SKINNY Overview Lightweight tweakable block cipher 64 or 128-bit block, various tweakey sizes: n, 2n, and 3n bits Aiming an alternative of SIMON (designed by NSA) Perform and share full security analysis: guarantee against differential/linear cryptanalysis (both single and related-key) Paper, Specifications, Results and Updates are available at : 2
3 Previous Competition competition Goal: attack 18 rounds or more for SKINNY Result: The winner attacked 23 rounds 3
4 Previous Competition competition Goal: attack 18 rounds or more for SKINNY Result: The winner attacked 23 rounds competition Goal: attack 24 rounds or more for SKINNY Result: 4
5 Previous Competition competition Goal: attack 18 rounds or more for SKINNY Result: The winner attacked 23 rounds competition Goal: attack 24 rounds or more for SKINNY Result: No winner 5
6 Previous Competition competition Goal: attack 18 rounds or more for SKINNY Result: The winner attacked 23 rounds competition Goal: attack 24 rounds or more for SKINNY Result: No winner competition 6
7 Previous Competition competition Goal: attack 18 rounds or more for SKINNY Result: The winner attacked 23 rounds competition Goal: attack 24 rounds or more for SKINNY Result: No winner competition low data & practical complexity 7
8 New Direction of the Competition Rules We give sets of 2 20 plaintext-ciphertexts encrypted under a 128-bit key for Skinny reduced to r rounds, 4 r 18 Skinny reduced to r rounds, 4 r 20 Your goal is to recover the secret key. Deadline: Feb 2019 You can find a C code to read the challenge file in the correct format and to verify your results. 8
9 Award for Competition Award Categories Number of attacked rounds for Skinny Number of attacked rounds for Skinny Most interesting cryptanalysis We will award with prizes from the designers home countries 9
10 Possible/Impossible Approaches No Chosen-Plaintext Attack No differential cryptanalysis No impossible differential cryptanalysis No (amplified)boomerang/rectangle attacks No integral attacks No cube attacks Known Plaintext Attacks Linear cryptanalysis (classical) Meet-in-the-Middle attacks 10
11 Current Status for SKINNY New record 3 days ago!! 11
12 Current Status for SKINNY
13 Summary Competition is actively studied. 13
14 Summary Competition is actively studied. Join the competition!! 14
15 Summary Competition is actively studied. Join the competition!! We have not yet received any submission for most interesting cryptanalysis award. 15
16 Summary Competition is actively studied. Join the competition!! We have not yet received any submission for most interesting cryptanalysis award. We do not know how they got broken. 16
17 Summary Competition is actively studied. Join the competition!! We have not yet received any submission for most interesting cryptanalysis award. We do not know how they got broken. Most interesting cryptanalysis prize can be won by any teams, not necessary be first to break the particular round. 17
18 Summary Competition is actively studied. Join the competition!! We have not yet received any submission for most interesting cryptanalysis award. We do not know how they got broken. Most interesting cryptanalysis prize can be won by any teams, not necessary be first to break the particular round. Join the competition from 4-round attacks!! 18
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