I Know Where You are and What You are Sharing

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "I Know Where You are and What You are Sharing"

Transcription

1 I Know Where You are and What You are Sharing Exploiting P2P Communications to Invade Users Privacy Stevens Le Blond, Chao Zhang, Arnaud Legout, Keith Ross, Walid Babbous CS558 Presentation Natasa Ntagianta dagianta

2 Introduction Large web sites see our source IP and cookies and can track our whereabouts to some extend - major privacy infringement Major Internet application providers will not disclose this information Can small, less-trustworthy entities periodically track our whereabouts? CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

3 Introduction Real-time communication is done peer-to-peer (P2P) P2P nature exposes the IP addresses of all the participants in a conversation to each other VoIP can potentially be used to collect a targeted user s location VoIP can also potentially be combined with P2P file sharing to determine what a user is uploading/downloading CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

4 Introduction Technical challenges Alice as attacker Bob as victim For a specific individual can Alice determine with certainty his VoIP ID? Can Alice determine which packets come from Bob, call him inconspicuously and obtain his IP even if Bob blocks her? Is it possible to verify Bob is uploading/downloading specific files, given NATs wide deployment? CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

5 Introduction In this paper using a Skype-based developed scheme Find a person s Skype ID and inconspicuously call to find IP, even behind NAT Used periodically to observe the mobility of Skype users Introduce a linkability threat a person s identity can be associated to his Internet usage - using BitTorrent challenge: users are often NATed CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

6 Introduction Solution Design the VoIP system so that the callee s IP is not revealed until the user accepts the call Use blacklist to block strangers from calling Anyone in targeted user s contact list can still obtain his IP CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

7 Legal and Ethical Considerations Motivation for Running Privacy Measurements Personal information can be correlated in many ways Volunteers One set of 14 research faculty one set of 20 individuals in the world Second set is used to - determine Skype packet patterns - develop and test inconspicuous calling - evaluate accuracy of mobility measurements Anonymized users CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

8 Mapping a Person to an IP Address Finding a Person s ID Obvious step input into the directory s search service the person s or birth name Skype provides additional side information along with the results containing the IDs CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

9 Mapping a Person to an IP Address Finding a Person s IP Address Given the person s ID it is possible to find the IP address of the machine the person is currently active from Call the Skype ID and sniff the packets received The callee s IP address can be extracted from the source and destination fields of IP datagrams Complication: the call triggers communication with many IPs CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

10 Mapping a Person to an IP Address Observation of three identifiable patterns of communication (i) Callee is online and public; (ii) Callee online and behind a NAT; (iii) Callee is offline CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

11 Mapping a Person to an IP Address Inconspicuous calling The need to design a scheme so the tracking client exchanges packets directly with the callee arises without notifying the callee of the call If the TCP connections are prevented from being established with the calle, the callee is not notified about the call CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

12 Mapping a Person to an IP Address Skype privacy settings White list allows call from people in person s contact list only Black list blocks everyone whose Skype ID is in that list Scheme was tested and in both cases it was possible to retrieve the IP address of the callee Skype privacy setting failed to protect the callee CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

13 Mobility of Skype Users MaxMind was used Given an IP address it provides a city, country and AS with high accuracy Obtaining Millions of Skype IDs The Skype API has a search users command that takes a string as parameter and returns a list of users whose information match the string Facebook was used for a list of birth names to obtained to build the search string CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

14 Mobility of Skype Users Parallel Calling Several tracking clients were deployed in parallel each calling a subset of randomly picked Skype IDs on an hourly basis - the time s between two successive calls for a given client should be short Simple approach: wait long enough so the complete packet pattern elapses - once a pattern starts, it completes even if the call is terminated - all patterns begin within 3 seconds after making the call CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

15 Mobility of Skype Users Cost of the Scaling The number of called users would be increased by one order of magnitude with visualization Running several tracking clients on a machine makes it hard to isolate packets from each one - Solution: run several tracking clients per physical machine, each one in a different virtual machine CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

16 Mobility of Skype Users Measurement Results CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

17 File-Sharing Usage of Skype Users Basic challenge: many file-sharing users are NATed Exploiting the identification field in the IP datagrams can check whether two different applications run on the same machine Scheme Methodology The Skype Tracker The Infohash Crawler The BitTorrent Crawler CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

18 File-Sharing Usage of Skype Users The Skype Tracker To daily call users uses ten tracking clients Analyze packet patterns to determine the latest IP address of these users and temporarily save them to a shared storage IP addresses then loaded from shared storage by the BitTorrent crawler to determine which files are distributed from these IP addresses CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

19 File-Sharing Usage of Skype Users The Infohash Crawler Collects file identifiers (infohashes) from the PublicBitTorrent tracker PublicBitTorrent tracker publishes a file with the infohashes it tracks on its website this file is the dump of a scrape-all request This request returns all infohashes of files it is tracking and the number of leechers and seeders CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

20 File-Sharing Usage of Skype Users The BitTorrent Crawler Used to obtain the IP addresses participating in the most popular torrent PublicBitTorrent supports an announce started request returning a list of peers participating in a torrent identified by an infohash - limited number of requests per peer Solution: used a decentralized tracker to collect IP addresses - DHT nodes do not implement blacklisting strategies CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

21 The NAT Problem Several users can share the same IP address All BitTorrent clients multiplex torrents on a single port picked at random at the client installation and remains the same in subsequent utilizations - it is possible to associate each IP/port pair to a single BitTorrent user A significant fraction of the tested users are behind a NAT and may be not the ones using BitTorrent CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

22 The Verifier A tool responsible for definitively establishing whether Skype and BitTorrent are run on the same machine To detect false positives, the predictability of the identification field in the IP datagrams originating from the same machine was leveraged If the distance between the IP-IDs generated by Skype and BitTorrent is small, then it is the same machine, otherwise there is a false positive CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

23 The Verifier Limitations Communication can only be initiate to public or NATed peers that accept incoming communications It is assumed that IP-IDs originating from the same machine are predictable, which depends on two conditions - IP-IDs originating from the same machine should be predictable - NATs do not modify the IP-IDs as attributed by the TCP stack of the machine CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

24 Experimental Results For each of the top 10 verified users, table shows the number of files shared by that user and whether the user provides a first name, last name, city or country in his Skype profile CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

25 Defenses The callee s IP is not revealed to the caller until the callee accepts the call - no longer possible to make inconspicuous calls to a target - if there is a blacklist, no stranger will be able to determine target s IP address and observe its mobility Defense against attacks from contacts is to have calls pass through relays CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

26 Defenses Main problem with the relay solution is it detracts from the efficiencies of P2P communications, because - relays must made available to support huge bandwidth demands - access ISPs will see increase of upstream/downstream relay traffic The system can be designed so that the callee can specify for which of his contacts the calls are to be routed through relays CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

27 Conclusion It is possible for an attacker, with modest resources to determine the current IP address of identified and targeted Skype user Such an attack could be used for many malicious purposes such as monitoring the mobility and Internet usage of the target This scheme can be easily scaled to not just one user but tens of thousands users simultaneously CS558: Internet Systems and Technologies - Spring

I Know Where You Are and What You Are Sharing:

I Know Where You Are and What You Are Sharing: I Know Where You Are and What You Are Sharing: Exploiting P2P Communications to Invade Users Privacy Stevens Le Blond Chao Zhang Arnaud Legout Keith Ross Walid Dabbous MPI-SWS, Germany NYU-Poly, USA INRIA,

More information

I Know Where You are and What You are Sharing: Exploiting P2P Communications to Invade Users Privacy

I Know Where You are and What You are Sharing: Exploiting P2P Communications to Invade Users Privacy I Know Where You are and What You are Sharing: Exploiting P2P Communications to Invade Users Privacy Stevens Le Blond, Chao Zhang, Arnaud Legout, Keith Ross, Walid Dabbous To cite this version: Stevens

More information

Chapter 2: Application layer

Chapter 2: Application layer Chapter 2: Application layer 2. Principles of network applications app architectures app requirements 2.2 Web and HTTP 2.4 Electronic Mail SMTP, POP3, IMAP 2.5 DNS 2.6 P2P applications 2.7 Socket programming

More information

CMSC 332 Computer Networks P2P and Sockets

CMSC 332 Computer Networks P2P and Sockets CMSC 332 Computer Networks P2P and Sockets Professor Szajda Announcements Programming Assignment 1 is due Thursday Where are we? What sorts of problems are we having? 2 Recap SMTP is the language that

More information

Beyond Blind Defense: Gaining Insights from Proactive App Sec

Beyond Blind Defense: Gaining Insights from Proactive App Sec Beyond Blind Defense: Gaining Insights from Proactive App Sec Speaker Rami Essaid CEO Distil Networks Blind Defense Means Trusting Half Your Web Traffic 46% of Web Traffic is Bots Source: Distil Networks

More information

Computer Security. 15. Tor & Anonymous Connectivity. Paul Krzyzanowski. Rutgers University. Spring 2017

Computer Security. 15. Tor & Anonymous Connectivity. Paul Krzyzanowski. Rutgers University. Spring 2017 Computer Security 15. Tor & Anonymous Connectivity Paul Krzyzanowski Rutgers University Spring 2017 April 24, 2017 CS 419 2017 Paul Krzyzanowski 1 Private Browsing Browsers offer a "private" browsing modes

More information

Private Browsing. Computer Security. Is private browsing private? Goal. Tor & The Tor Browser. History. Browsers offer a "private" browsing modes

Private Browsing. Computer Security. Is private browsing private? Goal. Tor & The Tor Browser. History. Browsers offer a private browsing modes Private Browsing Computer Security 16. Tor & Anonymous Connectivity Paul Krzyzanowski Rutgers University Spring 2017 Browsers offer a "private" browsing modes Apple Private Browsing, Mozilla Private Browsing,

More information

A SIMPLE INTRODUCTION TO TOR

A SIMPLE INTRODUCTION TO TOR A SIMPLE INTRODUCTION TO TOR The Onion Router Fabrizio d'amore May 2015 Tor 2 Privacy on Public Networks Internet is designed as a public network Wi-Fi access points, network routers see all traffic that

More information

CS Paul Krzyzanowski

CS Paul Krzyzanowski Computer Security 17. Tor & Anonymous Connectivity Anonymous Connectivity Paul Krzyzanowski Rutgers University Spring 2018 1 2 Anonymity on the Internet Often considered bad Only criminals need to hide

More information

Opportunities for Exploiting Social Awareness in Overlay Networks. Bruce Maggs Duke University Akamai Technologies

Opportunities for Exploiting Social Awareness in Overlay Networks. Bruce Maggs Duke University Akamai Technologies Opportunities for Exploiting Social Awareness in Overlay Networks Bruce Maggs Duke University Akamai Technologies The Akamai Intelligent Platform A Global Platform: 127,000+ Servers 1,100+ Networks 2,500+

More information

Peer to Peer Networks

Peer to Peer Networks Sungkyunkwan University Peer to Peer Networks Prepared by T. Le-Duc and H. Choo Copyright 2000-2017 Networking Laboratory Presentation Outline 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Client-Server Paradigm 2.3 Peer-To-Peer

More information

Internet Networking recitation #

Internet Networking recitation # recitation # UDP NAT Traversal Winter Semester 2013, Dept. of Computer Science, Technion 1 UDP NAT Traversal problems 2 A sender from the internet can't pass a packet through a NAT to a destination host.

More information

0x1A Great Papers in Computer Security

0x1A Great Papers in Computer Security CS 380S 0x1A Great Papers in Computer Security Vitaly Shmatikov http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/courses/cs380s/ Privacy on Public Networks Internet is designed as a public network Wi-Fi access points,

More information

Application Layer: P2P File Distribution

Application Layer: P2P File Distribution Application Layer: P2P File Distribution EECS 3214 Slides courtesy of J.F Kurose and K.W. Ross, All Rights Reserved 29-Jan-18 1-1 Chapter 2: outline 2.1 principles of network applications 2.2 Web and HTTP

More information

Anonymity C S A D VA N C E D S E C U R I T Y TO P I C S P R E S E N TAT I O N BY: PA N AY I OTO U M A R KO S 4 T H O F A P R I L

Anonymity C S A D VA N C E D S E C U R I T Y TO P I C S P R E S E N TAT I O N BY: PA N AY I OTO U M A R KO S 4 T H O F A P R I L Anonymity C S 6 8 2 A D VA N C E D S E C U R I T Y TO P I C S P R E S E N TAT I O N BY: PA N AY I OTO U M A R KO S 4 T H O F A P R I L 2 0 1 9 Tor: The Second- Generation Onion Router R. DINGLEDINE N.

More information

Lesson 9 Applications of DHT: Bittorrent Mainline DHT, the KAD network

Lesson 9 Applications of DHT: Bittorrent Mainline DHT, the KAD network Lesson 9 Applications of DHT: Bittorrent Mainline DHT, the KAD network 20/03/2017 1 IMPLEMENTATION OF KADEMLIA Kademlia is the protocol used by the largest public DHTs. Vuze ( before known as Azureus),

More information

CE Advanced Network Security Anonymity II

CE Advanced Network Security Anonymity II CE 817 - Advanced Network Security Anonymity II Lecture 19 Mehdi Kharrazi Department of Computer Engineering Sharif University of Technology Acknowledgments: Some of the slides are fully or partially obtained

More information

LIBSWIFT P2P PROTOCOL: AN ANALYSIS AND EXTENSION

LIBSWIFT P2P PROTOCOL: AN ANALYSIS AND EXTENSION Master Thesis - TRITA-ICT-EX-2012-262 LIBSWIFT P2P PROTOCOL: AN ANALYSIS AND EXTENSION Fu Tang Design and Implementation of ICT products and systems Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) fut@kth.se October

More information

Lecture 8: Application Layer P2P Applications and DHTs

Lecture 8: Application Layer P2P Applications and DHTs Lecture 8: Application Layer P2P Applications and DHTs COMP 332, Spring 2018 Victoria Manfredi Acknowledgements: materials adapted from Computer Networking: A Top Down Approach 7 th edition: 1996-2016,

More information

Anti-DDoS. FAQs. Issue 11 Date HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD.

Anti-DDoS. FAQs. Issue 11 Date HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD. Issue 11 Date 2018-05-28 HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD. Copyright Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 2019. All rights reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any

More information

CSC 4900 Computer Networks: P2P and Sockets

CSC 4900 Computer Networks: P2P and Sockets CSC 4900 Computer Networks: P2P and Sockets Professor Henry Carter Fall 2017 Recap SMTP is the language that mail servers use to exchange messages. SMTP is push-based... why? You can run SMTP from a telnet

More information

P2P Applications. Reti di Elaboratori Corso di Laurea in Informatica Università degli Studi di Roma La Sapienza Canale A-L Prof.ssa Chiara Petrioli

P2P Applications. Reti di Elaboratori Corso di Laurea in Informatica Università degli Studi di Roma La Sapienza Canale A-L Prof.ssa Chiara Petrioli P2P Applications Reti di Elaboratori Corso di Laurea in Informatica Università degli Studi di Roma La Sapienza Canale A-L Prof.ssa Chiara Petrioli Server-based Network Peer-to-peer networks A type of network

More information

CS 3516: Advanced Computer Networks

CS 3516: Advanced Computer Networks Welcome to CS 3516: Advanced Computer Networks Prof. Yanhua Li Time: 9:00am 9:50am M, T, R, and F Location: Fuller 320 Fall 2017 A-term 1 Some slides are originally from the course materials of the textbook

More information

A Case For OneSwarm. Tom Anderson University of Washington.

A Case For OneSwarm. Tom Anderson University of Washington. A Case For OneSwarm Tom Anderson University of Washington http://oneswarm.cs.washington.edu/ With: Jarret Falkner, Tomas Isdal, Alex Jaffe, John P. John, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Harsha Madhyastha and Mike

More information

One Bad Apple Spoils the Bunch: Exploiting P2P Applications to Trace and Profile Tor Users

One Bad Apple Spoils the Bunch: Exploiting P2P Applications to Trace and Profile Tor Users One Bad Apple Spoils the Bunch: Exploiting P2P Applications to Trace and Profile Tor Users Stevens Le Blond, Pere Manils, Chaabane Abdelberi, Mohamed Ali Kaafar, Claude Castelluccia, Arnaud Legout, Walid

More information

Unit 8 Peer-to-Peer Networking

Unit 8 Peer-to-Peer Networking Unit 8 Peer-to-Peer Networking P2P Systems Use the vast resources of machines at the edge of the Internet to build a network that allows resource sharing without any central authority. Client/Server System

More information

CS 3516: Computer Networks

CS 3516: Computer Networks Welcome to CS 3516: Computer Networks Prof. Yanhua Li Time: 9:00am 9:50am M, T, R, and F Location: AK219 Fall 2018 A-term 1 Some slides are originally from the course materials of the textbook Computer

More information

P2P Applications. Reti di Elaboratori Corso di Laurea in Informatica Università degli Studi di Roma La Sapienza

P2P Applications. Reti di Elaboratori Corso di Laurea in Informatica Università degli Studi di Roma La Sapienza P2P Applications Reti di Elaboratori Corso di Laurea in Informatica Università degli Studi di Roma La Sapienza Versione originale delle slides fornita da Dora Spenza e Marco Barbera P2P Paradigm Late 80

More information

Onion services. Philipp Winter Nov 30, 2015

Onion services. Philipp Winter Nov 30, 2015 Onion services Philipp Winter pwinter@cs.princeton.edu Nov 30, 2015 Quick introduction to Tor An overview of Tor Tor is a low-latency anonymity network Based on Syverson's onion routing......which is based

More information

Content Distribution and BitTorrent [Based on slides by Cosmin Arad]

Content Distribution and BitTorrent [Based on slides by Cosmin Arad] ID2210 - Distributed Computing, Peer-to-Peer and GRIDS Content Distribution and BitTorrent [Based on slides by Cosmin Arad] Today The problem of content distribution A popular solution: BitTorrent Underlying

More information

Karaoke. Distributed Private Messaging Immune to Passive Traffic Analysis. David Lazar, Yossi Gilad, Nickolai Zeldovich

Karaoke. Distributed Private Messaging Immune to Passive Traffic Analysis. David Lazar, Yossi Gilad, Nickolai Zeldovich Karaoke Distributed Private Messaging Immune to Passive Traffic Analysis David Lazar, Yossi Gilad, Nickolai Zeldovich 1 Motivation: Report a crime without getting fired You re Fired if you talk to the

More information

Last Lecture SMTP. SUNY at Buffalo; CSE 489/589 Modern Networking Concepts; Fall 2010; Instructor: Hung Q. Ngo 1

Last Lecture SMTP. SUNY at Buffalo; CSE 489/589 Modern Networking Concepts; Fall 2010; Instructor: Hung Q. Ngo 1 Last Lecture SMTP SUNY at Buffalo; CSE 489/589 Modern Networking Concepts; Fall 2010; Instructor: Hung Q. Ngo 1 This Lecture Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Applications SUNY at Buffalo; CSE 489/589 Modern Networking

More information

Anonymous Communication and Internet Freedom

Anonymous Communication and Internet Freedom Anonymous Communication and Internet Freedom CS 161: Computer Security Prof. David Wagner May 2, 2013 Goals For Today State-sponsored adversaries Anonymous communication Internet censorship State-Sponsored

More information

Network Address Translation (NAT) Contents. Firewalls. NATs and Firewalls. NATs. What is NAT. Port Ranges. NAT Example

Network Address Translation (NAT) Contents. Firewalls. NATs and Firewalls. NATs. What is NAT. Port Ranges. NAT Example Contents Network Address Translation (NAT) 13.10.2008 Prof. Sasu Tarkoma Overview Background Basic Network Address Translation Solutions STUN TURN ICE Summary What is NAT Expand IP address space by deploying

More information

Anonymous Communication and Internet Freedom

Anonymous Communication and Internet Freedom Anonymous Communication and Internet Freedom CS 161: Computer Security Prof. David Wagner April 29, 2016 Announcements Final exam in RSF Fieldhouse, 5/10, arrive by 7PM HW4 due Monday, 5/2, 11:59pm Review

More information

Peer-to-Peer Networks

Peer-to-Peer Networks Peer-to-Peer Networks 14-740: Fundamentals of Computer Networks Bill Nace Material from Computer Networking: A Top Down Approach, 6 th edition. J.F. Kurose and K.W. Ross Administrivia Quiz #1 is next week

More information

Experimental Study of Skype. Skype Peer-to-Peer VoIP System

Experimental Study of Skype. Skype Peer-to-Peer VoIP System An Experimental Study of the Skype Peer-to-Peer VoIP System Saikat Guha (Cornell) Neil Daswani (Google) Ravi Jain (Google) IPTPS 2006 About Skype Voice over IP (VoIP) 50 million users Valued at $2.6 billion

More information

SIP and VoIP What is SIP? What s a Control Channel? History of Signaling Channels

SIP and VoIP What is SIP? What s a Control Channel? History of Signaling Channels Network Security - ISA 656 Voice Over IP (VoIP) Security Simple SIP ing Alice s Bob Session Initiation Protocol Control channel for Voice over IP (Other control channel protocols exist, notably H.323 and

More information

UDP NAT Traversal. CSCI-4220 Network Programming Spring 2015

UDP NAT Traversal. CSCI-4220 Network Programming Spring 2015 UDP NAT Traversal CSCI-4220 Network Programming Spring 2015 What is NAT Traversal? NAT traversal means establishing a connection between two hosts when one or both is behind NAT. Many of today s network

More information

Department of Computer Science Institute for System Architecture, Chair for Computer Networks. File Sharing

Department of Computer Science Institute for System Architecture, Chair for Computer Networks. File Sharing Department of Computer Science Institute for System Architecture, Chair for Computer Networks File Sharing What is file sharing? File sharing is the practice of making files available for other users to

More information

Computer Networks. Pushing BitTorrent locality to the limit. Stevens Le Blond, Arnaud Legout, Walid Dabbous. abstract

Computer Networks. Pushing BitTorrent locality to the limit. Stevens Le Blond, Arnaud Legout, Walid Dabbous. abstract Computer Networks 55 (20) 54 557 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Computer Networks journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/comnet Pushing locality to the limit Stevens Le Blond, Arnaud Legout,

More information

Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor

Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor Steven J. Murdoch, George Danezis University of Cambridge, Computer Laboratory Review of Tor Support anonymous transport of TCP streams over the Internet Support anonymous

More information

IPv4 addressing, NAT. Computer Networking: A Top Down Approach 6 th edition Jim Kurose, Keith Ross Addison-Wesley.

IPv4 addressing, NAT. Computer Networking: A Top Down Approach 6 th edition Jim Kurose, Keith Ross Addison-Wesley. IPv4 addressing, NAT http://xkcd.com/195/ Computer Networking: A Top Down Approach 6 th edition Jim Kurose, Keith Ross Addison-Wesley Some materials copyright 1996-2012 J.F Kurose and K.W. Ross, All Rights

More information

ENEE 459-C Computer Security. Security protocols

ENEE 459-C Computer Security. Security protocols ENEE 459-C Computer Security Security protocols Key Agreement: Diffie-Hellman Protocol Key agreement protocol, both A and B contribute to the key Setup: p prime and g generator of Z p *, p and g public.

More information

A Multi-Perspective Analysis of Carrier-Grade NAT Deployment

A Multi-Perspective Analysis of Carrier-Grade NAT Deployment A Multi-Perspective Analysis of Carrier-Grade NAT Deployment Philipp Richter, Florian Wohlfart, Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez, Mark Allman, Randy Bush, Anja Feldmann, Christian Kreibich, Nicholas Weaver, and

More information

Anonymity With Tor. The Onion Router. July 5, It s a series of tubes. Ted Stevens. Technische Universität München

Anonymity With Tor. The Onion Router. July 5, It s a series of tubes. Ted Stevens. Technische Universität München Anonymity With Tor The Onion Router Nathan S. Evans Christian Grothoff Technische Universität München July 5, 2012 It s a series of tubes. Ted Stevens Overview What is Tor? Motivation Background Material

More information

ENSC 427: COMMUNICATION NETWORKS

ENSC 427: COMMUNICATION NETWORKS ENSC 427: COMMUNICATION NETWORKS Comparison of TCP with "utp" for BitTorrent transfers Spring 2009 FINAL PROJECT Adam Ciapponi Robert Hueber Robert Szolomicki aciappon@sfu.ca rhueber@sfu.ca rms6@sfu.ca

More information

ENEE 459-C Computer Security. Security protocols (continued)

ENEE 459-C Computer Security. Security protocols (continued) ENEE 459-C Computer Security Security protocols (continued) Key Agreement: Diffie-Hellman Protocol Key agreement protocol, both A and B contribute to the key Setup: p prime and g generator of Z p *, p

More information

The Telephony Denial of Service (TDoS) Threat

The Telephony Denial of Service (TDoS) Threat The Telephony Denial of Service (TDoS) Threat An Analysis of the TDoS Threat in Voice Network Security A Whitepaper From SecureLogix Corporation Telephony Denial-of-Service (TDoS) and The Public Voice

More information

Bitcoin, Security for Cloud & Big Data

Bitcoin, Security for Cloud & Big Data Bitcoin, Security for Cloud & Big Data CS 161: Computer Security Prof. David Wagner April 18, 2013 Bitcoin Public, distributed, peer-to-peer, hash-chained audit log of all transactions ( block chain ).

More information

Peer-to-Peer Applications. From BitTorrent to Privacy

Peer-to-Peer Applications. From BitTorrent to Privacy Peer-to-Peer Applications From BitTorrent to Privacy Arnaud Legout INRIA, Sophia Antipolis, France Projet Planète Email: arnaud.legout@inria.fr version 2 January 2012 This work is licensed under the Creative

More information

Content distribution networks

Content distribution networks Content distribution networks v challenge: how to stream content (selected from millions of videos) to hundreds of thousands of simultaneous users? v option 2: store/serve multiple copies of videos at

More information

Lecture 17: Peer-to-Peer System and BitTorrent

Lecture 17: Peer-to-Peer System and BitTorrent CSCI-351 Data communication and Networks Lecture 17: Peer-to-Peer System and BitTorrent (I swear I only use it for Linux ISOs) The slide is built with the help of Prof. Alan Mislove, Christo Wilson, and

More information

Defending against Flooding-Based Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks: A Tutorial

Defending against Flooding-Based Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks: A Tutorial Defending against Flooding-Based Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks: A Tutorial Paper by Rocky K C Chang, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University Published in the October 2002 issue of IEEE Communications

More information

Application-Layer Protocols Peer-to-Peer Systems, Media Streaming & Content Delivery Networks

Application-Layer Protocols Peer-to-Peer Systems, Media Streaming & Content Delivery Networks COMP 431 Internet Services & Protocols Application-Layer Protocols Peer-to-Peer Systems, Media Streaming & Content Delivery Networks Jasleen Kaur February 14, 2019 Application-Layer Protocols Outline Example

More information

SDN-based Network Obfuscation. Roland Meier PhD Student ETH Zürich

SDN-based Network Obfuscation. Roland Meier PhD Student ETH Zürich SDN-based Network Obfuscation Roland Meier PhD Student ETH Zürich This Talk This thesis vs. existing solutions Alice Bob source: Alice destination: Bob Hi Bob, Hi Bob, Payload encryption ǾǼōĦ

More information

A Secure Method to Deliver Access Tokens to End Hosts

A Secure Method to Deliver Access Tokens to End Hosts A Secure Method to Deliver Access Tokens to End Hosts Dr.V Asha 1, Ashwini M 2, Divyansh 3 1,2,3 Department of Master of Computer Applications, New Horizon College of Engineering, Abstract--IP traceback

More information

Compromising Tor Anonymity Exploiting P2P Information Leakage

Compromising Tor Anonymity Exploiting P2P Information Leakage Compromising Tor Anonymity Exploiting P2P Information Leakage Pere Manils, Abdelberi Chaabane, Stevens Le Blond, Mohamed Ali Kaafar, Claude Castelluccia, Arnaud Legout, Walid Dabbous Contact: pere.manils@inria.fr

More information

COMPUTER FORENSICS (CFRS)

COMPUTER FORENSICS (CFRS) Computer Forensics (CFRS) 1 COMPUTER FORENSICS (CFRS) 500 Level Courses CFRS 500: Introduction to Forensic Technology and Analysis. 3 credits. Presents an overview of technologies of interest to forensics

More information

Large-Scale Internet Crimes Global Reach, Vast Numbers, and Anonymity

Large-Scale Internet Crimes Global Reach, Vast Numbers, and Anonymity Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section Large-Scale Internet Crimes Global Reach, Vast Numbers, and Anonymity Anthony V. Teelucksingh Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) Criminal

More information

Black and White Lists

Black and White Lists Black and White Lists Open Source Sensor Grids and Highly Predictive Black Lists Marcus H. Sachs SANS Internet Storm Center marc@sans.org Black Lists A collection of source IP addresses that have been

More information

P2PSIP, ICE, and RTCWeb

P2PSIP, ICE, and RTCWeb P2PSIP, ICE, and RTCWeb T-110.5150 Applications and Services in Internet October 11 th, 2011 Jouni Mäenpää NomadicLab, Ericsson Research AGENDA Peer-to-Peer SIP (P2PSIP) Interactive Connectivity Establishment

More information

DoS Cyber Attack on a Government Agency in South America- February 2012 Anonymous Mobile LOIC in Action

DoS Cyber Attack on a Government Agency in South America- February 2012 Anonymous Mobile LOIC in Action DoS Cyber Attack on a Government Agency in South America- February 2012 Anonymous Mobile LOIC in Action 1 Table of Content Preamble...3 About Radware s DefensePro... 3 About Radware s Emergency Response

More information

Security+ Guide to Network Security Fundamentals, Third Edition. Chapter 3 Protecting Systems

Security+ Guide to Network Security Fundamentals, Third Edition. Chapter 3 Protecting Systems Security+ Guide to Network Security Fundamentals, Third Edition Chapter 3 Protecting Systems Objectives Explain how to harden operating systems List ways to prevent attacks through a Web browser Define

More information

Spying the World from your Laptop

Spying the World from your Laptop Spying the World from your Laptop Identifying and Profiling Content Providers and Big Downloaders in BitTorrent Stevens Le Blond, Arnaud Legout, Fabrice Lefessant, Walid Dabbous, Mohamed Ali Kaafar I.N.R.I.A,

More information

Onion Routing. Varun Pandey Dept. of Computer Science, Virginia Tech. CS 6204, Spring

Onion Routing. Varun Pandey Dept. of Computer Science, Virginia Tech. CS 6204, Spring Onion Routing Varun Pandey Dept. of Computer Science, Virginia Tech 1 What is Onion Routing? a distributed overlay network to anonymize TCP based routing Circuit based (clients choose the circuit) Each

More information

Practical Anonymity for the Masses with MorphMix

Practical Anonymity for the Masses with MorphMix Practical Anonymity for the Masses with MorphMix Marc Rennhard, Bernhard Plattner () Financial Cryptography 2004 12 th February 2004 http://www.tik.ee.ethz.ch/~morphmix Overview Circuit-based mix networks

More information

Overview Computer Networking Lecture 17: Delivering Content Peer to Peer Examples Peter Steenkiste

Overview Computer Networking Lecture 17: Delivering Content Peer to Peer Examples Peter Steenkiste Overview 15-441 15-441 Computer Networking 15-641 Lecture 17: Delivering Content Peer to Peer Examples Peter Steenkiste Fall 2014 www.cs.cmu.edu/~prs/15-441-f14 Web Consistent hashing Peer-to-peer Motivation

More information

anonymous routing and mix nets (Tor) Yongdae Kim

anonymous routing and mix nets (Tor) Yongdae Kim anonymous routing and mix nets (Tor) Yongdae Kim Significant fraction of these slides are borrowed from CS155 at Stanford 1 q Why? Anonymous web browsing 1. Discuss health issues or financial matters anonymously

More information

Peer-to-Peer Systems and Distributed Hash Tables

Peer-to-Peer Systems and Distributed Hash Tables Peer-to-Peer Systems and Distributed Hash Tables CS 240: Computing Systems and Concurrency Lecture 8 Marco Canini Credits: Michael Freedman and Kyle Jamieson developed much of the original material. Selected

More information

Page 1. How Did it Start?" Model" Main Challenge" CS162 Operating Systems and Systems Programming Lecture 24. Peer-to-Peer Networks"

Page 1. How Did it Start? Model Main Challenge CS162 Operating Systems and Systems Programming Lecture 24. Peer-to-Peer Networks How Did it Start?" CS162 Operating Systems and Systems Programming Lecture 24 Peer-to-Peer Networks" A killer application: Napster (1999) Free music over the Internet Key idea: share the storage and bandwidth

More information

«On the Internet, nobody knows you are a dog» Twenty years later

«On the Internet, nobody knows you are a dog» Twenty years later «On the Internet, nobody knows you are a dog» Twenty years later This lecture is about identity and authenticity, but also other security properties. It is largely about the Internet, but some of this

More information

Simple and Powerful Security for PCI DSS

Simple and Powerful Security for PCI DSS Simple and Powerful Security for PCI DSS The regulations AccessEnforcer helps check off your list. Most merchants think they are too small to be targeted by hackers. In fact, their small size makes them

More information

IPv6 at Google. Lorenzo Colitti

IPv6 at Google. Lorenzo Colitti IPv6 at Google Lorenzo Colitti lorenzo@google.com Why IPv6? IPv4 address space predictions (G. Huston) Why IPv6? Cost Buying addresses will be expensive Carrier-grade NAT may be expensive Lots of session

More information

CS 161 Computer Security

CS 161 Computer Security Paxson Spring 2013 CS 161 Computer Security Homework 4 Due: Monday Apr 29, at 10:00PM Version 1.1 (Apr 19) Instructions. Submit your solution electronically via your class account by Monday Apr 29, at

More information

Configuring BIG-IP ASM v12.1 Application Security Manager

Configuring BIG-IP ASM v12.1 Application Security Manager Course Description Configuring BIG-IP ASM v12.1 Application Security Manager Description The BIG-IP Application Security Manager course gives participants a functional understanding of how to deploy, tune,

More information

Definition. Quantifying Anonymity. Anonymous Communication. How can we calculate how anonymous we are? Who you are from the communicating party

Definition. Quantifying Anonymity. Anonymous Communication. How can we calculate how anonymous we are? Who you are from the communicating party Definition Anonymous Communication Hiding identities of parties involved in communications from each other, or from third-parties Who you are from the communicating party Who you are talking to from everyone

More information

On Feasibility of P2P Traffic Control through Network Performance Manipulation

On Feasibility of P2P Traffic Control through Network Performance Manipulation THE INSTITUTE OF ELECTRONICS, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION ENGINEERS TECHNICAL REPORT OF IEICE On Feasibility of P2P Traffic Control through Network Performance Manipulation HyunYong Lee Masahiro Yoshida

More information

Denial of Service, Traceback and Anonymity

Denial of Service, Traceback and Anonymity Purdue University Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security Denial of Service, Traceback and Anonymity Clay Shields Assistant Professor of Computer Sciences CERIAS Network

More information

OnlineAnonymity. OpenSource OpenNetwork. Communityof researchers, developers,usersand relayoperators. U.S.501(c)(3)nonpro%torganization

OnlineAnonymity. OpenSource OpenNetwork. Communityof researchers, developers,usersand relayoperators. U.S.501(c)(3)nonpro%torganization The Tor Project Our mission is to be the global resource for technology, advocacy, research and education in the ongoing pursuit of freedom of speech, privacy rights online, and censorship circumvention.

More information

Computer Security and Privacy

Computer Security and Privacy CSE P 590 / CSE M 590 (Spring 2010) Computer Security and Privacy Tadayoshi Kohno Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for

More information

How Alice and Bob meet if they don t like onions

How Alice and Bob meet if they don t like onions How Alice and Bob meet if they don t like onions Survey of Network Anonymisation Techniques Erik Sy 34th Chaos Communication Congress, Leipzig Agenda 1. Introduction to Anonymity Networks Anonymity Strategies

More information

internet technologies and standards

internet technologies and standards Institute of Telecommunications Warsaw University of Technology 25 internet technologies and standards Piotr Gajowniczek Andrzej Bąk Michał Jarociński Internet application layer peer-to-peer systems overview

More information

Pass4sure q. Cisco Securing Cisco Networks with Sourcefire IPS

Pass4sure q. Cisco Securing Cisco Networks with Sourcefire IPS Pass4sure.500-285.42q Number: 500-285 Passing Score: 800 Time Limit: 120 min File Version: 6.1 Cisco 500-285 Securing Cisco Networks with Sourcefire IPS I'm quite happy to announce that I passed 500-285

More information

Peer to Peer Networks

Peer to Peer Networks Sungkyunkwan University Peer to Peer Networks Prepared by T. Le-Duc and H. Choo Copyright 2000-2018 Networking Laboratory P2P Applications Traditional P2P applications: for file sharing BitTorrent, Emule

More information

The hidden locality in swarms

The hidden locality in swarms The hidden locality in swarms John S. Otto and Fabián E. Bustamante Northwestern University {jotto,fabianb}@eecs.northwestern.edu Abstract People use P2P systems such as BitTorrent to share an unprecedented

More information

Cooperation in Open Distributed Systems. Stefan Schmid

Cooperation in Open Distributed Systems. Stefan Schmid Cooperation in Open Distributed Systems Stefan Schmid T-Labs, Berlin, July 2, 2009 Distributed Systems 2008/9 Wireless: Many mobile phones today have WLAN (and even Skype) P2P: Olympic games 2008 live-broadcast

More information

Secure Telephony Enabled Middle-box (STEM)

Secure Telephony Enabled Middle-box (STEM) Report on Secure Telephony Enabled Middle-box (STEM) Maggie Nguyen 04/14/2003 Dr. Mark Stamp - SJSU - CS 265 - Spring 2003 Table of Content 1. Introduction 1 2. IP Telephony Overview.. 1 2.1 Major Components

More information

Localhost: A browsable peer-to-peer file sharing system

Localhost: A browsable peer-to-peer file sharing system Localhost: A browsable peer-to-peer file sharing system Aaron Harwood and Thomas Jacobs December 17, 2005 Abstract Peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing is increasing in use on the Internet. This thesis proposes

More information

Spying the World from your Laptop Identifying and Profiling Content Providers and Big Downloaders in BitTorrent

Spying the World from your Laptop Identifying and Profiling Content Providers and Big Downloaders in BitTorrent Spying the World from your Laptop Identifying and Profiling Content Providers and Big Downloaders in BitTorrent Stevens Le Blond, Arnaud Legout, Fabrice Le Fessant, Walid Dabbous, Mohamed Ali Kaafar To

More information

War Stories from the Cloud: Rise of the Machines. Matt Mosher Director Security Sales Strategy

War Stories from the Cloud: Rise of the Machines. Matt Mosher Director Security Sales Strategy War Stories from the Cloud: Rise of the Machines Matt Mosher Director Security Sales Strategy The Akamai Intelligent Platform The Platform 175,000+ Servers 2,300+ Locations 750+ Cities 92 Countries 1,227+

More information

Multi-Layered Security Framework for Metro-Scale Wi-Fi Networks

Multi-Layered Security Framework for Metro-Scale Wi-Fi Networks Multi-Layered Security Framework for Metro-Scale Wi-Fi Networks A Security Whitepaper January, 2004 Photo courtesy of NASA Image exchange. Image use in no way implies endorsement by NASA of any of the

More information

Goals for Today s Class. EE 122: Networks & Protocols. What Global (non-digital) Communication Network Do You Use Every Day?

Goals for Today s Class. EE 122: Networks & Protocols. What Global (non-digital) Communication Network Do You Use Every Day? Goals for Today s Class EE 122: & Protocols Ion Stoica TAs: Junda Liu, DK Moon, David Zats http://inst.eecs.berkeley.edu/~ee122/fa09 (Materials with thanks to Vern Paxson, Jennifer Rexford, and colleagues

More information

Extreme Computing. BitTorrent and incentive-based overlay networks.

Extreme Computing. BitTorrent and incentive-based overlay networks. Extreme Computing BitTorrent and incentive-based overlay networks BitTorrent Today we will focus on BitTorrent The technology really has three aspects A standard that BitTorrent client systems follow Some

More information

Addressing the P2P Bootstrap Problem for Small Overlay Networks

Addressing the P2P Bootstrap Problem for Small Overlay Networks Addressing the P2P Bootstrap Problem for Small Overlay Networks David Isaac Wolinsky, Pierre St. Juste, P. Oscar Boykin, and Renato Figueiredo Advanced Computing Information Systems Lab University of Florida

More information

Lecture 17: Network Layer Addressing, Control Plane, and Routing

Lecture 17: Network Layer Addressing, Control Plane, and Routing Lecture 17: Network Layer Addressing, Control Plane, and Routing COMP 332, Spring 2018 Victoria Manfredi Acknowledgements: materials adapted from Computer Networking: A Top Down Approach 7 th edition:

More information

Peer-to-Peer Architectures and Signaling. Agenda

Peer-to-Peer Architectures and Signaling. Agenda Peer-to-Peer Architectures and Signaling Juuso Lehtinen Juuso@netlab.hut.fi Slides based on presentation by Marcin Matuszewski in 2005 Introduction P2P architectures Skype Mobile P2P Summary Agenda 1 Introduction

More information

Internet Technology. 06. Exam 1 Review Paul Krzyzanowski. Rutgers University. Spring 2016

Internet Technology. 06. Exam 1 Review Paul Krzyzanowski. Rutgers University. Spring 2016 Internet Technology 06. Exam 1 Review Paul Krzyzanowski Rutgers University Spring 2016 March 2, 2016 2016 Paul Krzyzanowski 1 Question 1 Defend or contradict this statement: for maximum efficiency, at

More information

Anonymity Tor Overview

Anonymity Tor Overview Anonymity Tor Overview Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org April 21, 2011 Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () Anonymity Tor Overview April 21, 2011 1 / 1 What are we talking about? Crash course on anonymous

More information

Last time. Security Policies and Models. Trusted Operating System Design. Bell La-Padula and Biba Security Models Information Flow Control

Last time. Security Policies and Models. Trusted Operating System Design. Bell La-Padula and Biba Security Models Information Flow Control Last time Security Policies and Models Bell La-Padula and Biba Security Models Information Flow Control Trusted Operating System Design Design Elements Security Features 10-1 This time Trusted Operating

More information