let your network blossom Orchid One Security Features

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1 let your network blossom Orchid One Security Features Security Security Features Features Orchid Orchid One One Cataleya CataleyaPrivate PrivateLimited. Limited.All Allrights rightsreserved. reserved. Version

2 Table of Contents Orchid One Security 3 L2, L3, L4 Layers - Service aware firewall 3 L2, L3, L4 Layers - Protection against DoS 4 L2, L3, L4 Layers - Packet rate policing 4 L2, L3, L4 Layers - Dynamic pinholes for RTP security 4 Signaling Layer - Transport layer security 5 Signaling Layer - Malicious/maiformed packets 5 Session Layer - Dynamic black listing 5 Session Layer - Topology hiding 5 Management Layer - HTTP for web access 5 2

3 Orchid One security Orchid One security infrastructure ensures that system resources are always available for traffic from legitimate sources while blocking or mitigating attacks from rogue sources. Following are the security services provided by Orchid One system at different layers: B2BUA provides topology hiding Allow sessions from configured endpoints Dynamic black lis>ng Session Layer Malicious/ malformed SIP message handling SIP message flood handling TLS for SIP signaling Signaling Layer Service aware firewall with ACLs and L3, L4 protec>on measures Packet rate policing to mi>gate DoS AKacks Dynamic pinholes for RTP flows L2, L3, L4 Layer Figure1 Security services provided by Orchid One system L2, L3, L4 Layers - Service aware firewall Service aware firewall running on specialised network processor provides protection against L3/L4 attacks. All incoming packets are processed by the firewall to check any malformed or malicious packets. The following are handled: Packets with incorrect IP header length or checksum. Truncated packets IPv4 packets with options Unknown L3/L4 protocols IP address/ port based spoofing checks Large IP or ICMP packets Unexpected or fragmented ICMP messages Fragmentation checks (( Syndrop, Teardrop attacks and others) TCP vulnerabilities (NULL scan, XMAS scan, FIN scan and others) 3

4 L2, L3, L4 Layers - Protection against DoS The firewall provides Access Control Lists to selectively allow or deny traffic into the system. The application along with the service configuration would determine what sources to allow and all remaining sources will be blocked by default. Operator can also configure the ACL rules. L2, L3, L4 Layers - Packet rate policing Incoming traffic is classified into individual traffic flows and are continuously monitored. The flows are throttled if the received packet rate is too high thereby ensuring that no single source can overwhelm the system or misuse the system resources. The flows are further grouped into trusted and untrusted and each of these groups has a predefined bandwidth from network processor to the host processor. A sophisticated hierarchical rate control scheme on these flows and flow groups would ensure system resources are always available even under a variety of flooding attacks. The Access control lists in conjunction with packet rate policing provides protection against DoS attacks like: IP packets from rogue sources IP packets from spoofed addresses Excessive malformed messages Excessive packet rate SIP message flood (INVITE, BYE flood and others) L2, L3, L4 Layers - Dynamic pinholes for RTP security RTP sessions are setup dynamically for each session using the SDP information from SIP messages. UDP ports are opened for RTP traffic when the RTP session is created and are closed when the session ends, this dynamic pinhole mechanism ensures that traffic is only accepted from a specific remote source and mitigate DoS attacks on these ports. RTP flows are monitored for bandwidth usage, the flows are throttled when more than allowed bandwidth usage is detected. 4

5 Signaling Layer - Transport Layer Security Orchid One system supports secure SIP signaling using TLS protocol. By using TLS, it is possible to authenticate remote systems and also provide privacy and integrity for the SIP signaling messages. Signaling Layer - Malicious/ malformed packets SIP Application Layer Gateway provides a framework to verify SIP messages with the intent of detecting malformed or malicious messages using a set of rules. Where malformed messages could be potentially corrected, malicious messages are silently discarded. Session Layer - Dynamic black listing The application continuously monitors the traffic behavior from the remote endpoints: it will blacklist a remote source temporarily if it detects suspicious behavior (including various forms of DoS attackes). Session Layer - Topology hiding The B2BUA model of the SIP application inherently provides the topology hiding required for the signaling layer as it terminates an incoming session and re-originates an outgoing session. Additionally the SIP Adaption Framework provides the flexibility to manipulate the application messages. Similarly on the media side, the RTP stream is terminated and re-originated from the Orchid One system. Based on the call scenario, the media stream may simply be NATed or it could be terminated and new stream created for other leg like in the case of a transcoded session. Either way, the remote systems will see Orchid One as the originator or terminator of the traffic thus providing topology hiding for internal network. Management Layer - HTTP for web access Orchid One provides a Web UI based management system for FCAPS functionality. The web communications are secured using TLS (HTTPS) with selfsigned certificates. The management system itself is protected using a firewall and only authorised clients are allowed access the system. The management system also provides advanced role based user management and authentication. 5

6 About Cataleya Cataleya is a leader in IP networking innovation, with a strong track record in developing and deploying next generation carrier grade switching systems, pushing the envelope in an all IP paradigm. Cataleya is headquartered in Singapore with its own technology development team in Silicon Valley and a wholly owned subsidiary of Epsilon Global Communications. Cataleya is another outstanding result of Epsilon s innovation DNA and reflects a strong service provider influence in the design and functionality of its technology. A new approach to new challenges has led to a product of unparalleled performance, simplicity to operate and reduced cost of ownership. let your network blossom Cataleya Global Headquarters: Singapore New Tech Park # Lorong Chuan Singapore Telephone: USA R&D 1900 McCarthy Blvd, #412 Milpitas CA Telephone: EMEA Telephone House Paul Street London EC2A 4NW Telephone: USA Plaza America # 810 Reston VA Telephone:

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