1. Übungsblatt. Vorlesung Embedded System Security SS 2017 Trusted Computing Konzepte. Beispiellösung

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1 Technische Universität Darmstadt Fachbereich Informatik System Security Lab Prof. Dr.-Ing. Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi Raad Bahmani 1. Übungsblatt Vorlesung Embedded System Security SS 2017 Trusted Computing Konzepte Beispiellösung 1 Integrity Measurement a) Erklären und vergleichen Sie Secure Boot und Authenticated Boot. Secure Boot and Authenticated Boot are mechanisms to ensure the integrity of the initial state of a computer system. Both mechanisms are based on creation of a chain-of-trust during the system boot. Secure Boot validates the state of the software components executed during the boot process and allows the computer system only to boot into a specific trusted state. In other words, the system boots only if all of its boot components are in the expected state (are not modified). Secure Boot can be realized as follows: Each boot component is validated prior to execution. To achieve this, during the boot process, each software entity E i measures the next entity E i+1 to be executed and compares the measurement with a known reference value which represents the expected measurement of E i+1. If the values match the boot process is continued by executing E i+1, otherwise the boot process is aborted. The first boot component (E 0 ) is trusted and its integrity is given. Authenticated Boot generates a cumulative digest representing the system s software configuration at startup (right after the completion of the boot process) and stores this digest in a way that its integrity is ensured. Authenticated Boot can be realized as follows: At the start of the boot process, a secure storage location (in the following referred to as R sec ) is reset. During the boot process and beginning with a trusted software component, every component extends the R sec with the measurement of the next boot component to be executed. When the boot process is completed, the R sec contains the digest. Remark: Authenticated Boot does not validate the integrity of the boot process. The validation happens at a later stage, e.g. through Remote Attestation. 1

2 b) Kann ein TPM genutzt werden um Secure Boot zu implementieren? Begründen Sie Ihre Antwort. The TPM does not have a dedicated Secure Boot functionality. However, the sealing functionality, provided by the TPM, can be used to implement Secure Boot, by ensuring that the system is only operational if its initial software state matches a predefined state. In this context, sealing refers to a special type of encryption which binds the generated ciphertext to the TPM. This means that the generated ciphertext can only be decrypted (unsealed) by the TPM which have performed the sealing. When sealing data, the user has the option to specify the state of the TPM (the contents of a subset of the PCRs) in which the corresponding unsealing is allowed. For implementing Secure Boot using TPM each boot component (except the first one) is required to be sealed to the trusted system state in which it is expected to be executed. In a platform with integrated TPM, the boot process always starts with the execution of in immutable software component referred to as Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM). CRTM is the core component of RTM from which the execution begins. The CRTM measures itself and the next component to be executed and extends the TPM states with these measurements. We assume a system in which, the boot process consists of components E 0, E 1, and E 2 (to be executed in the order implied by indices). Further, we use pcr to refer to the PCR to which the sealing operations are bound. In such a system, to prepare Secure Boot: i) E 0 would remain unsealed (E 0 represents the boot component which is measured and executed by the CRTM). ii) E 1 would be sealed to the state pcr 1 = SHA 1 (SHA 1 (0 digest(crt M)) digest(e 0 )). iii) E 2 would be sealed to the state pcr 2 = SHA 1 (pcr 1 digest(e 1 )). The boot process, as described above, starts with execution of CRTM and E 0 and extending the pcr. E 0 attempts to unseal E 1. Only if the CRTM E 0 have the expected state, pcr would contain the value to which, during the preparation, E 1 has been sealed. After successful unsealing, E 0 extends pcr with the measurement of E 1 and executes E 1. In the same way, E 1 unseals E 2, extends the pcr and transfers the control. At any point during the boot process, an unsealing operation would only succeed if the boot process has been performed as expected up to this stage. c) Erklären Sie kurz wie mit Hilfe der TPM-Funktionen eine Festplattenverschlüsselung umgesetzt werden kann, so dass die Festplatte nur genutzt werden kann, wenn das System sich in einem definierten Zustand befindet. The disk is to be encrypted symmetrically (for efficiency) and encryption key is to be sealed to a specific state of the TPM. To decrypt the contents of the disk, it is required to unseal the encryption key. This will be only possible if the TPM is in the state to which the encryption key is sealed. d) Erklären Sie wie der definierte Zustand aus der vorherigen Aufgabe bestimmt werden kann. A trusted system state should be used. For example, the state after the first system start can be considered as trusted. Another possibility is that the manufacturer specifies the systems trusted state. 2

3 e) Nehmen Sie an, dass die System Partition durch ein TPM geschützt ist, d.h., dass das System nur im unverändertes Zustand geladen werden kann. Welche Softwarekomponenten können in diesem Fall in die Prüfung der Systemintegrität einbezogen werden? Begründen Sie kurz. To be part of the system integrity check, a software component needs to be part of the CoT. The software components included in the CoT are required to be measured and executed (before the partition can be decrypted). Therefore, only software components can be involved in the system integrity check which are not included in this partition. For example, if the boot process is performed by BIOS, Bootloader, and Kernel and the last two components are included in the system partition, only the BIOS can be involved in the process of integrity check. f) Beschreiben Sie wie eine Softwarekomponente aktualisiert werden kann, wenn diese Bestandteil der Systemintegritätsprüfung ist. A software being part of the system integrity check means that it is part of the CoT and its measurement is compared with an expected reference value during the system boot. Updating a software component results in calculation of an unexpected measurement and therefore failing the integrity check. To overcome this problem, after updating a component involved in the integrity check, the measurement of the new version is to be used for the validation tasks. For example, in the system described in part b of this exercise, if the component E 1 is to be replaced with E 1 -New the followings precautions are to be taken: i) E 1 -New should be sealed to the state pcr 1 = SHA 1 (SHA 1 (0 digest(crt M)) digest(e 0 )). ii) E 2 would be sealed to the state pcr 2 = SHA 1 (pcr 1 digest(e 1 -New)). 2 Integrity Verification a) Kann ein System seine eigene Integrität prüfen? Falls ja, beschreiben Sie das Verfahren. Falls nein, beschreiben Sie welche Entität(en) die Prüfung durchführen kann/können. The answer depends on the system. A conventional system, without a trusted component, is not able to validate its own integrity. Only a system with the trusted functionality for quantifying and evaluating of its state is able to to perform this task. For example, a system with integrated TPM can use the sealing functionality to verify its own integrity. b) Was ist ein Attestation Identity Key (AIK) und wozu wird er verwendet? Refer to slide 24 of the lecture on Authenticated and Secure Boot. 3

4 c) Erklären Sie anhand eines Bildes wie mit Hilfe von Trusted Computing die Plattformintegrität einer entfernten Rechnerplattform verifiziert werden kann. In the figure bellow Verifier represents the party who verifies the integrity of the remote platform, referred to as Prover. Prover includes a TPM and an untrusted software component, referred to as Host. Host is responsible for interaction with the TPM and the communication with the Verifier. 1 The Verifier sends a nonce (N) to the Prover. 2 3 On the Prover side, the functionality provided by the TPM is used to create a signature using an AIK key. This signature contains the nonce received from the verifier and the contents of the PCRs. 4 The signature and the value of the PCRs are sent to the verifier. 5 Verifier verifies signature and compares the value of the PCRs with reference values to verify the prover s integrity. d) Die TCG Spezifikationen definieren, dass ein AIK nur PCRs signieren darf. Ein Schlüssel vom Typ Signing Key kann hingegen auch Daten, die von außerhalb des TPMs stammen, signieren. Zeigen Sie ein Angriffsszenario auf das Protokoll aus Aufgabenteil (c), falls diese Unterscheidung zwischen Signing und Attestation Keys nicht bestünde! If an AIK could be used for signing arbitrary data, a malicious host could subvert the protocol so that the integrity of a compromised platform is confirmed. In a compromised system, where at least one of the boot components is modified, the PCRs would have an unexpected value. In such a system, the host could use the TPM functionality to sign the expected value of PCRs using an AIK (instead of signing the current values) and send the results to the verifier. On the verifier side, the signature would be verified and received values would match the reference values. 4

5 3 Chain-of-Trust a) Erklären Sie das Konzept der Chain-of-Trust (CoT). Nennen Sie die Annahmen und Anforderungen die für die CoT gelten bzw. erfüllt sein müssen. Stellen Sie besonders heraus wie das Vertrauen in die Messungen (measurements) der einzelnen Elemente der Kette entsteht. Chain-of-Trust (CoT) is a concept for building trust in a component based on the existing trust in another component. According to CoT, starting from a component referred to as the Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM), each component measures the successive component before transferring the control to it. The figure below shows the idea of this concept. E 0 represents the RTM, a trusted and immutable portion of platform s initialization code, which is executed on every platform boot. Trust in the integrity of measurements is based on the integrity of the RTM. To trust E i+1 it is required to know if its integrity is preserved. The integrity of this component is evaluated based on its measurement created by E i and to trust this measurement E i needs to be trusted. In the same way, trust in E i requires trust in E i 1 and so on. Therefore, to trust E i+1 it is necessary to trust all components E j with j <= i. Trust in these components is created successively starting with E 0 (RTM) which is initially trusted and performs the measurement of the E 1. The requirements for building a CoT are the existence of a RTM in the system and secure storage to ensure the integrity of measurements. b) Erklären Sie wie die Chain-of-Trust und remote attestation miteinander zusammenhängen. Nennen Sie die involvierten Parteien und erklären Sie die Interaktionen, die zwischen den Parteien stattfinden. Chain-of-trust (CoT) creates a digest which represents the software configuration of a computing system. During remote attestation, this digest is sent to a verifier. It is essential that the authenticity, the integrity, and the freshness of the digest transferred to the verifier is guaranteed. The involved parties are: Verifier and Prover. The Prover includes an RTM. Starting with the RTM, a CoT is created at boot time and the generated digest is stored securely. Remote attestation is initiated by the Verifier by sending a nonce as challenge to the Prover. The Prover-Side: i) A signature for the nonce and the digest is created. The signature is generated by a trusted function with exclusive access to a signing key. ii) A response consisting of the signature and the digest is sent to the verifier. The verifier: i) verifies the signature and ii) compares the digest with a known reference value to decide on the integrity of the Prover. In this protocol: i) the freshness of the digest is ensured by using a nonce, ii) the authenticity of the response is ensured by signing the digest, and iii) the integrity of the digest is guaranteed by (a) starting the boot process with the RTM and using secure storage for the digest on the Prover-Side and (b) providing the verifier with the signature of the digest. 5

6 c) In der Vorlesung wurde das Konzept der Chain-of-Trust eingeführt unter der Annahme, dass jede Entität E n der Kette durch ihre direkte Vorgänger-Entität E n 1 gemessen wird. Kann diese Annahme durch eine allgemeinere Annahme ersetzt werden? Falls ja, nennen und erklären Sie diese allgemeinere Annahme. Falls nein, erklären Sie weshalb dies nicht möglich ist. Yes, the concept could be relaxed as: the component E i needs to be measured by any component E j with j < i (not necessarily by the component E i 1 ). j being smaller than i means that the component which measures E i should be already trusted either because it is trusted per se (as it is the case e.g. for RTM) or because it has been measured by a trusted component. 6

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