Privacy, Discovery, and Authentication for the Internet of Things
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1 Privacy, Discovery, and Authentication for the Internet of Things David J. Wu Ankur Taly Asim Shankar Dan Boneh Stanford University Google Google Stanford University
2 The Internet of Things (IoT) Lots of smart devices, but only useful if users can discover them!
3 Private Service Discovery Many existing service discovery protocols: Multicast DNS (mdns), Apple Bonjour, Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) A typical discovery protocol Screenshot taken on a public Wireless network Device owner s name / user ID revealed! Device location revealed!
4 Private Service Discovery Each service specifies an authorization policy Samsung TV Guide Setup Philips Hue Brightness ADT Security Manage Door Lock Manage Alice Samsung TV Guide Setup Philips Hue Brightness ADT Security Manage Door Lock Manage Guest Samsung TV Guide Setup Philips Hue Brightness ADT Security Manage Door Lock Manage Stranger
5 Private Service Discovery Each service specifies an authorization policy Samsung TV Guide Setup Philips Hue Brightness ADT Security Manage Door Lock Manage Alice Samsung TV Guide Setup Philips Hue Brightness ADT Security Manage Door Lock Manage Guest Samsung TV Mutual privacy: privacy Guide Setup Philips Hue should also hold for Brightness ADT Security Manage Door Lock Manage devices trying to discover services! Stranger
6 Bob security system Private Mutual Authentication Will only reveal identity to devices owned by Alice. How to authenticate between mutually distrustful parties? Will only reveal identity to Alice s family members.
7 Bob security system Private Mutual Authentication In most existing mutual authentication protocols (e.g., TLS, IKE, SIGMA), one party must reveal its identity first
8 Primary Protocol Requirements Mutual privacy: Identity of protocol participants are only revealed to authorized recipients Lightweight: privacy should be as simple as setting a flag in key-exchange (as opposed to a separate protocol e.g., using secret handshakes [BDSSSW03])
9 Identity and Authorization Model Every party has a signing + verification key, and a collection of human-readable names bound to their public keys via a certificate chain verification key alice/family/ bob/ alice/device/ security/ popular_corp/ prod/s1234
10 Identity and Authorization Model Every party has a signing + verification key, and a collection of human-readable names bound to their public keys via a certificate chain alice/ alice/family/ alice/device/ alice/family/ bob/ alice/family/ charlie/ alice/device/ security/
11 Identity and Authorization Model Authorization decisions expressed as prefix patterns Policy: alice/devices/* Policy: alice/family/* alice/family/ bob/ alice/device/ security/
12 Protocol Construction
13 Starting Point: Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange g xy x R Z p g x g y g xy y R Z p G : cyclic group of prime order p with generator g Shared key: KDF g x, g y, g xy
14 Starting Point: Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange g xy x R Z p g x g y g xy y R Z p G : cyclic group of prime order p with generator g Shared key: KDF g x, g y, g xy
15 Secure Key Agreement: SIGMA-I Protocol [CK01] x R Z p g x y R Z p g y, ID B, SIG B ID B, g x, g y k
16 Secure Key Agreement: SIGMA-I Protocol [CK01] x R Z p Bob s signature of the ephemeral DH exponents g x y R Z p g y, ID B, SIG B ID B, g x, g y k Bob s certificate message encrypted and authenticated Note: in the actual protocol, session ids are also included for replay prevention.
17 Secure Key Agreement: SIGMA-I Protocol [CK01] x R Z p g x y R Z p g y, ID B, SIG B ID B, g x, g y k ID A, SIG A (ID A, g x, g y ) k Alice s certificate Alice s signature message encrypted and authenticated Note: in the actual protocol, session ids are also included for replay prevention.
18 Secure Key Agreement: SIGMA-I Protocol [CK01] x R Z p g x y R Z p g y, ID B, SIG B ID B, g x, g y k ID A, SIG A (ID A, g x, g y ) k session key derived from g x, g y, g xy Note: in the actual protocol, session ids are also included for replay prevention.
19 Properties of the SIGMA-I Protocol Mutual authentication against active network adversaries Hides server s (Bob s) identity from a passive attacker Hides client s (Alice s) identity from an active attacker Bob s identity is revealed to an active attacker!
20 Identity Based Encryption (IBE) [Sha84, BF01, Coc01] Public-key encryption scheme where public-keys can be arbitrary strings (identities) message public parameters m mpk Bob id IBE.Encrypt ct ciphertext Alice can encrypt a message to Bob without needing to have exchanged keys with Bob
![Identity Based Encryption (IBE) [Sha84, BF01, Coc01] msk root authority To decrypt messages, users go to a (trusted) identity](/docs-images/76/73170240/images/21-0.jpg "provider to obtain a decryption key for their identity sk Alice sk Bob Bob can decrypt all messages encrypted to his identity using")
21 Identity Based Encryption (IBE) [Sha84, BF01, Coc01] msk root authority To decrypt messages, users go to a (trusted) identity provider to obtain a decryption key for their identity sk Alice sk Bob Bob can decrypt all messages encrypted to his identity using sk Bob
22 Prefix-Based Encryption Secret-keys and ciphertexts both associated with names secret key ciphertext alice/devices/ security/ + alice/devices/ m m Decryption succeeds if name in ciphertext is a prefix of the name in the secret key
23 Prefix-Based Encryption Can be leveraged for prefix-based policies Policy: alice/devices/* Bob encrypts his message to the identity alice/devices/. Any user with a key that begins with alice/devices/ can decrypt.
24 Prefix-Based Encryption Can be leveraged for prefix-based policies Policy: alice/devices/* Bob encrypts Can his be message built to the identity alice/devices/. directly from Any user with a key that begins with IBE! alice/devices/ can decrypt.
25 Private Mutual Authentication Key idea: encrypt certificate using prefix-based encryption x R Z p g x CT B g y, {PE. Enc(π B, ID B ), SIG B CT B, g x, g y } k y R Z p ID A, SIG A (ID A, g x, g y ) k
26 Private Mutual Authentication x R Z p g x CT B g y, {PE. Enc(π B, ID B ), SIG B CT B, g x, g y } k y R Z p ID A, SIG A (ID A, g x, g y ) k Privacy for Alice s identity: Alice sends her identity only after verifying Bob s identity Privacy for Bob s identity: Only users with a key that satisfies Bob s policy can decrypt his identity
27 Private Service Discovery Prefix-based encryption can also be leveraged for private service discovery See paper for details:
28 Implementation and Benchmarks Instantiated IBE scheme with Boneh-Boyen (BB 2 ) IBE scheme (DCLXVI library) Integrated private mutual authentication and private service discovery protocols into the Vanadium open-source framework for building distributed applications
29 Implementation and Benchmarks Intel Edison Raspberry Pi Comparison of private mutual authentication protocol with non-private SIGMA-I protocol Note: x86 assembly optimizations for pairing curve operations available only on desktop Nexus 5X Desktop SIGMA-I ms 88.0 ms 91.6 ms 5.3 ms Private Mutual Auth ms ms ms 9.5 ms Slowdown 6.7x 3.7x 3.9x 1.8x
30 Conclusions Existing key-exchange and service discovery protocols do not provide privacy controls Prefix-based encryption can be combined very naturally with existing key-exchange protocols to provide privacy + authenticity Overhead of resulting protocol small enough that protocols can run on many existing devices
31 Questions? Paper:
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