Perfect forward not so secrecy

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1 Perfect forward not so secrecy By: Joey Dreijer and Sean Rijs December 16, 2013 Final version

2 Abstract Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) is a technique that gives each session a new key and removes it when the session ends. An extension to Transport Layer Security (TLS) called SessionTickets was included since version 1.0. It sends the session key encrypted to the client so it can later reuse it for performance purposes. This violates the original idea behind PFS as it does not remove the key at the end of the session. A SessionTicket is sent unencrypted (except for the key in the ticket) and is at the start of TLS sessions. If we could decrypt the ticket it is very useful to use for correlating keys with sessions. Keys can be extracted by nding the Session ID inside the server's memory. With PFS, the use of Session ID's are very limited. Finding the master key for decryption is found unecrypted inside the same section of memory as the Session ID, but PFS attempts to enforce the use of SessionTickets. When a Ticket is used, the Session ID will be set to 0 (although sometimes still regenerated and used), after which the master key can only be found encrypted inside memory. The Session ID will no longer be found in memory after several minutes, even though it should have disappeared immediately. However, the TLS Ticket (name) being used afterwards is stored until the web server restarts. Until that point, the keys can always be potentially decrypted. 1

3 Contents Abstract Introduction 3 2 Correlating TLS sessions Perfect Forward Secrecy TLS SessionTicket extension Conclusion Recording TLS tickets Memory Crawler Conclusion Who did what 10 Appendices A Acronyms 11 B References 12 2

4 Introduction Chapter 1 1 Introduction Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) is an extension to the already existing Public key-based connections. With the 'traditional' Transport Layer Security (TLS) sessions, the private key correspdonding to a domain is used for the actual en/decryption. When PFS is enabled server-side, each TLS(v1+) gets a Ticket assigned that includes a 'Master Key' which is being used for the actual en/decryption of the data. The generated Master Key is not derived from the private key, which means that comprimised Private Keys can no longer be used for decryption. The research will mainly focus on investigating possible decryption techniques when PFS is enabled. The two main research topics are: 1. Research how we can correlate TLS sessions keys with captured TLS sessions 2. Research how we can store session keys with limited rights. The main goal is to disprove the statements [1] being made regarding PFS and impossible future decryption techniques. Rumors (according to leaked Documents by Snowden) have been made that the NSA is demanding private keys from major corporations to decrypt trac. Twitter and Google already implemented PFS to make this 'impossible'. 3

5 Correlating TLS sessions Chapter 2 2 Correlating TLS sessions Before we answer the related research question we need to dene the context of decrypting TLS trac. With a TLS connection both the client and server are sending encrypted packets that are practically impossible to decrypt without the private key. Before the trac is encrypted, the client and server need to communicate what ciphers and extensions can be used. A summarized handshake process looks as follows: (TLS) CLIENT HELLO Starts the initial TLS 'handshake' procedure Including a list of supported ciphers inside the CIPHER SUITES eld. e.g.: TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA Cipher Suite: SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA... (TLS) SERVER HELLO Respond to initial TLS 'handshake' procedure Sends the chosen cipher to be used that the client and server both support e.g. TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA Server sends the certicate Server ends the initial handshake procedure After this initial handshake an encrypted channel is established and the server is authenticated. Within this channel an other handshake is done exchanging the Master Key to be used for encrypting subsequent packets. If someone in between the end points records this trac it can not be decrypted. The aforementioned is visualized in gure 2.1, the green boxes represent the initial handshake procedure which encrypts the packets marked by the red arrow. The rst packet in the info column shows 'Encrypted Handshake Message' which contains the encrypted Master Key i. We can't decrypt it unless we meet one of these conditions: 1. If the Master key is known the trac after the handshakes can be decrypted for that session. 2. If the Private key is known the packets in the second handshake containing the Master Key can be decrypted, implying exception 1. i If you want to try this in Wireshark use TLS 1.1, as TLS 1.2 is buggy at this time 4

6 Correlating TLS sessions Chapter 2 Figure 2.1: Wireshark example TLS session 2.1 Perfect Forward Secrecy The previous section explained that the Master Key can be found inside an encrypted packet for every session. To demonstrate the same using a PFS ciphers, we need to use a cipher that supports PFS. The following two group of ciphers should point out the use of PFS: 1. ECDHE-* (Elliptic Curve - Die Hellman Exchange) 2. DHE-* (Die Hellman Exchange) We set up a connection with the OpenSSL s_client function. By using the command openssl s_client -cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA -tls1_2 -host ssn01.oxford.practicum.os3.nl -port 443 we set the client to use a PFS cipher to our testing server. The command show the following output: No c l i e n t c e r t i f i c a t e CA names s e n t SSL handshake has r e a d 1700 b y t e s and w r i t t e n 315 b y t e s New, TLSv1/SSLv3, C i p h e r i s ECDHE RSA AES256 SHA S e r v e r p u b l i c key i s 2048 b i t S e c u r e R e n e g o t i a t i o n I S s u p p o r t e d Compression : NONE E x p a nsion : NONE SSL S e s s i o n : P r o t o c o l : TLSv1. 2 C i p h e r : ECDHE RSA AES256 SHA S e s s i o n ID : 52F6BE685AC67D7D8AD6148D6B47BD7C707FC CC99B11E2B49DE20FC926A27374 S e s s i o n ID c t x : Master Key : 34 F6B453F3F01FA FC7DCECE56524A1054C71FC 5A468E9B7439D9EC F5BEEC224CCCFF1662AA6B Key Arg : None PSK i d e n t i t y : None PSK i d e n t i t y h i n t : None SRP username : None TLS s e s s i o n t i c k e t l i f e t i m e h i n t : 300 ( s e c o n d s ) TLS s e s s i o n t i c k e t : SNIP REMOVED, TOO MUCH TEXT S t a r t Time : Timeout : 7200 ( s e c ) V e r i f y r e t u r n code : 18 ( s e l f s i g n e d c e r t i f i c a t e ) 5

7 Correlating TLS sessions Chapter 2 As can be seen in the output snippet above, the Master key is present inside the Master-Key eld. The dierence between a non-pfs cipher with a PFS cipher is that the Master Key isn't send over the network in the second handshake. Therefor the second condition to decrypt recorded trac mentioned in the introduction of this chapter is removed. It's not possible to decrypt a Master Key from the handshake trac using the private key. 2.2 TLS SessionTicket extension Although the Master Key isn't sent anymore over the network in the same way, a TLS extension dened in RFC 5077[2] requires new connections to send an encrypted version of the Master Key. This extension is called SessionTicket and enabled since TLS 1.0, on most implementations enable this by default. Its goal is to reuse a previously established Master Key, so you don't have to regenerate a key and the server doesn't need to send it to the client thus saving one packet. Note that this feature is independent of what cipher you use and isn't only limited to PFS ciphers. Figure 2.1 on page 5 shows in the red arrow section that the server returns a TLS session ticket in the clear. The RFC denes a ticket structured as follows: s t r u c t { opaque key_name [ 1 6 ] ; opaque i v [ 1 6 ] ; opaque e n c r y p t e d _ s t a t e <0..2^16 1 >; opaque mac [ 3 2 ] ; } t i c k e t ; They eld key_name is used by the server to identify what key encrypts the eld encrypted_state. It is encrypted by a 128-bit AES with the IV eld. The encrypted_state also contains a time-stamp so that after a certain time it is expired. 2.3 Conclusion The original paper of PFS denes that the key used during a session should be deleted[3]. However the TLS SessionTicket extension prevents this requirement. A SessionTicket is always sent in clear text, its condentiality and integrity depends on the following two points: The encryption of the SessionTicket depends on 128-bit AES with the IV eld. The timeout of the ticket. The answer to our research question is therefor TLS SessionTickets in combination with the IP address. SessionTickets are always sent in the beginning of a TLS session and are unique. It contains useful data to possibly decrypt TLS trac which we will work on in the next chapter. 6

8 Recording TLS tickets Chapter 3 3 Recording TLS tickets A basic HTTP(S) request is session-less; which means that no active connection is maintained. An example to x this problem with default HTTP is the implementation of cookies to keep track of sessions or history. During the start of a TLS session, a key is generated for each session. One can imagine that this increases the load on a system if keys have to be created for each stateless request. To 'solve' this problem, SessionTickets (RFC5077) have been implemented to resume TLS sessions created earlier. The key used with TLS can continuously be used until the session Ticket Lifetime ends. How long this takes depends on the server-side application being used. In our OpenSSL example in the previous chapter, a single request does not keep an active session alive so the key can only be used ones and has to be re-generated after every request. When using a browser such as Firefox, it cryptographically saves the ticket locally, so that reconnecting does not require a new session key to be generated. The keys that encrypt the ticket are located on the TLS server. In NGINX terms; SSL_UNDERSCORE_CACHE. 3.1 Memory Crawler A specic attack scenario can be found on Apache (or NGINX) web-servers. The Apache processes run via the www-data user. The Apache root process is only needed to open the port/socket, so this process can be ignored for our research. When a client connects to an Apache web-server, a child worked is created to handle the request. These workers can either be processes or threads, which is dened inside the Apache cong. Each process can handle a certain amount of requests, after which a new process will be born. These processes are all run under the same www-data user. An exception can be in place when the user enables the Apache suexec module. This module makes sure that all dynamic CGI scripts can be run as a dierent user than the default www-data one. Each of the Apache processes have its own piece of memory allocated. When observing the memory map of the individual Apache processes, one can notice that they all have at least two pieces of HEAP memory assigned. The same applies for NGINX, the child process will have several HEAP (about two in our case) assigned. Dynamic data is stored inside the HEAP and stays there until the data has been freed or when the process has been terminated. The the session plus key is stored inside the Apache or NGINX HEAP memory and has the following structure [4]: 7

9 Recording TLS tickets Chapter 3 Name: Structure: SSL Version XX SSL Key Length SSL Key Master Key Length (Fixed Length) Master Key Content XX 48 (Variable content, 48 Bytes) Session ID Length (Fixed Length) Session ID Content XX 32 (Variable content, 32 Bytes) The above structure originates from the OpenSSL Source-code (with help from the people at Cloudshield) and is still relevant to the research. There is one fatal issue that Cloudshield forgot the mention; the Master Key can indeed by found by searching for the corresponding session ID, but this is only for a short amount of time until the client generates a TLS Ticket. We developed a small script that searches the NGINX memory HEAP according to the above specied structure. The Master key can still be extracted after several minutes after generation. After this, they key should disappear from the HEAP in it's original state. After an undened time the Master key will still be in memory, but encrypted in the TLS ticket with an unknown key. RFC5077 states that the actual state information is encrypted using AES-128-CBC, but that the key being used depends on the implementation of the standard. In the case of a TLS Ticket (and no Session ID), the key is stored in memory as follows Name: Structure: Key Name XX 16 (Variable content, 32 Bytes) (also explained in chapter 2.2): Initialization Vector XX (Variable content, 16 Bytes) Encrypted State (read:key) Variable size (H)MAC XX (Variable content, 32 Bytes) The encrypted state will include the master key, however we could not nd means to properly decrypt it (yet). The below piece of code will demonstrate a way to extract the master-key if a user/server is using session ID's instead of TLS tickets. #/u s r / b i n / env p y thon i m p o r t i m p o r t i m p o r t os r e b i n a s c i i d e f dumpmem ( ) : h e a p s p a c e = {} heapno = 0 p i d = os. popen ( ' p i d o f n g i n x awk \ '{ p r i n t $1 } \ ' ' ). r e a d ( ). s t r i p ( ) memmap = "/ proc /" + pid + "/maps" memcontent = "/ proc /" + pid + "/mem" w i t h open (memmap, ' r ' ) a s f i l e : f o r l i n e i n f i l e : i f " heap " i n l i n e : heapno += 1 s p a c e = l i n e [ : 1 7 ] s p a c e S p l i t = r e. s p l i t (" ", s p a c e ) f o r key, v a l u e i n h e a p s p a c e. i t e r i t e m s ( ) : startheap = value [ ' s t a r t ' ] endheap = v a l u e [ ' end ' ] h e a p s p a c e. u p d a t e ({ s t r ( heapno ) : { " s t a r t " : s p a c e S p l i t [ 0 ], " end " : s p a c e S p l i t [ 1 ] } } ) w i t h open ( memcontent, ' rb ' ) a s f i l e : f o r key, v a l u e i n h e a p s p a c e. i t e r i t e m s ( ) : s t a r t H e a p = i n t ( v a l u e [ ' s t a r t ' ], 16) endheap = i n t ( v a l u e [ ' end ' ], 16) memsize = endheap s t a r t H e a p f i l e. s e e k ( s t a r t H e a p ) c o n t e n t s = f i l e. r e a d ( memsize ) c o n t e n t s = b i n a s c i i. h e x l i f y ( c o n t e n t s ) t r y : 8

10 Recording TLS tickets Chapter 3 f i n d k e y = r e. s e a r c h ( ' [ 0 9 ] 0 3 ( 0 0 ) { 6 } ( 0 0 ) { 8 } 3 0 ( 0 0 ) { 3 } ' \ ' [ a za Z0 9 ] {96}20(00){3}[ a za Z0 9]{64} ', c o n t e n t s ) r e s u l t s = f i n d k e y. g roup ( 0 ) s s l V e r s i o n = r e s u l t s [ : 8 ] masterkey = r e s u l t s [ 4 0 : ] s e s s i o n I d = r e s u l t s [ : ] p r i n t " S e s s i o n ID : " + s e s s i o n I d p r i n t " Master Key : " + masterkey e x c e p t ( A t t r i b u t e E r r o r ) : p r i n t "No TLS S e s s i o n s f o u n d " RFC5077 states that "If a ticket is presented by the client, the server MUST NOT attempt to use the Session ID in the ClientHello for stateful session resumption". However during our research we found out that Nginx is actually regenerating SessionID's that have a direct relation to the master key. The RFC recommends that the client should keep sessions alive with the TLS ticket, but it seems that this is also done via the Session ID itself. The session ID is sent non-encrypted over the line and the Master Key related to the Session can be directly pulled from the server with the Python shown above. This is not always the case, when sning the network with Wireshark you can actually see that the Client sends a '0 byte' Session ID when a TLS ticket is included. But for an unknown reason, the client and server will also generate use TLS Session ID's at random times. 3.2 Conclusion It's much more dicult to extract session IDs, since web servers as NGINX and Apache will attempt to force the use TLS tickets. The crawler will also have to read memory continuously to nd the keys and the session IDs will disappear after a short time if TLS tickets are used. The reason why PFS is 'not so secrecy', is that the when TLS Tickets are used, they Master key for the tickets are stored in memory until the master web process itself restarts. This can be hours, days or months depending on the frequency of reboots. Searching for the Ticket name (which is also sent plain text over the line by the client) on the server's memory will result in the withdrawal of entire Ticket stack which includes the encrypted master key. How the master key can be decrypted from memory depends on the implementation, but we did not found ways to do so yet. 9

11 Who did what Chapter 4 4 Who did what This chapter tries to explain who did what during this research. First Sean Rijs explains what he has done followed by Joey Dreijer. Sean Rijs I primarily focused on the rst question of this research, trying to look for an easy target which we can later try to exploit in the second research question. I began by looking into Wireshark dumps of TLS trac and tried to compare what the dierence is when you use a non-pfs cipher. After I found what I was looking for to answer the rst research question I tried to assist Joey with the second research question. I looked in the source code of openssl and NGINX and examined process memory dumps. Joey Dreijer During the research I primarily focused on analyzing memory and nding proper ways to extract the keys. I tried to analyze the behavior of my browser and see when TLS tickets and sessions were used. Together with Sean, I attempted to answer the second research question and see whether or not it was possible to extract the keys from memory without root rights. Even though this wasn't entirely possible (unless you're able to upload CGI scripts), we still tried to nd means to explain why PFS doesn't automatically mean that future decryption is entirely impossible. 10

12 Acronyms Appendix A A Acronyms PFS Perfect Forward Secrecy TLS Transport Layer Security 11

13 References Appendix B B References [1] J. Homan-Andrews, Forward Secrecy at Twitter, twitter.com/2013/forward-secrecy-at-twitter-0. [2] J. Salowey, H. Zhou, P. Eronen, and H. Tschofenig, Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without Server-Side State, org/rfc/rfc5077. [3] W. Die, P. C. V. Oorschot, and M. J. Wiener, Authentication and authenticated key exchanges, [4] J. Homan, How to Decrypt OpenSSL Sessions using Wireshark and SSL Session Identiers, how-to-decrypt-openssl-sessions-using-wireshark-and-ssl-session-identifiers. 12

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