Q1 Labs. QRadar V5.1.2 Security Target V 2.0.4

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1 Q1 Labs QRadar V5.1.2 Security Target V Prepared By: Suite 5200 West 7925 Jones Branch Drive McLean, VA Fax

2 SECTION TABLE OF CONTENTS Security Target Version ii PAGE 1 Security Target Introduction Security Target Identification Security Target Overview Common Criteria Conformance Document Organization TOE Description Product Type Product Description TSF Physical Boundary and Scope of the Evaluation The TOE Components The TOE IT Environment Components Logical Boundary Security Audit Identification and Authentication Security Management Partial TSF Self-Protection Intrusion Detection TOE Security Environment TOE Security Environment Assumptions Threats Organizational Security Policies Security Objectives Security Objectives for the TOE Security Objectives for the Environment Security Objectives for the IT Environment IT Security Requirements TOE Security Functional Requirements Class FAU: Security Audit Class FIA: Identification and Authentication Class FMT: Security Management (FMT) Class FPT: Protection of the TOE Security Functions IDS Component Requirements (IDS) Strength of Function Security requirements for the IT Environment Class FAU: Security Audit Class FPT: Protection of the TOE Security Functions Class FTP: Trusted path/channels...23

3 5.2.4 IDS Component Requirements (IDS) TOE Security Assurance Requirements TOE Summary Specification IT Security Functions Overview Security Audit Identification and Authentication Security Management Partial TSF Self-Protection Intrusion Detection System Functions SOF Claims Assurance Measures PP Claims Rationale Security Objectives Rationale Threats to Security Organizational Security Policies Assumptions Security Requirements Rationale Functional Requirements Dependencies Strength of Function Assurance Requirements Rationale that IT Security Requirements are Internally Consistent Explicitly Stated Requirements Rationale Requirements for the IT Environment TOE Summary Specification Rationale IT Security Functions Assurance Measures PP Claims Rationale Appendix Acronyms References Glossary...63 Security Target Version iii

4 Table of Tables and Figures Table or Figure Page Figure 2-1 QRadar Architecture Diagram and Physical TOE Boundary...5 Table 3-1 Assumptions...9 Table 3-2 TOE Threats...9 Table 3-3 IT System Threats...10 Table 3-4 Organizational Security Policies...10 Table 4-1 Security Objectives for TOE...12 Table 4-2 Security Objectives for the IT Environment...12 Table 4-3 Security Objectives for the Non-IT Environment...13 Table 5-1 Functional Components...14 Table 5-2 Administrator Management of TSF data...17 Table 5-3 Users Management of TSF data...18 Table 5-4 Management of Passwords...19 Table 5-5 Defense perspective data...20 Table 5-6 Functional Components for the IT environment...22 Table 5-7 EAL2 Assurance Components...24 Table 6-1 Security Functional Requirements mapped to Security Functions...25 Table 6-2 Assurance Measures...35 Table 8-1 All Threats to Security Countered...38 Table 8-2 All Organizational Security Policies are addressed...43 Table 8-3 All Assumptions Addressed...45 Table 8-4 Reverse Mapping of Security Objectives of the TOE map to Threat/Policies...47 Table 8-5 Reverse Mapping of Security Objectives of the IT Environment to Threat/Policies/Assumptions...48 Table 8-6 Reverse Mapping of Security Objectives of the Non-IT Environment to Threat/Policies/Assumptions...48 Table 8-7 All Objectives Met by Functional Components...49 Table 8-8 Reverse Mapping of SFRs to Objectives...52 Table 8-9 TOE Dependencies Satisfied...53 Table 8-10 IT Environment Dependencies are Satisfied...53 Table 8-11 All Objectives for the IT Environment map to Requirements in the IT environment...56 Table 8-12 Reverse Mapping of Security Requirements for the Environment to IT Security Objectives of the Environment...57 Table 8-13 Mapping of Functional Requirements to TOE Summary Specification...57 Table 8-14 Assurance Measures Rationale...60 Table 9-1 Acronyms...62 Table 9-2 References...63 Table 9-3 Customer Specific Terms...63 Table 9-4 CC Specific Terms...64 Security Target Version iv

5 1 Security Target Introduction 1.1 Security Target Identification TOE Identification: QRadar V5.1.2, with modules Offence Resolution v1.0 and Offence Manager ST Title: ST Version: Version ST Date: Assurance Level: Registration: Keywords: Q1 Labs QRadar v5.1.2 Security Target EAL2 VID10050 Intrusion Detection, Intrusion Detection System, Sensor, Scanner, and Analyzer 1.2 Security Target Overview This Security Target (ST) defines the Information Technology (IT) security requirements for Q1 Labs QRadar v5.1.2 network security monitoring system, with modules Offence Resolution v1.0 and Offence Manager. The Q1 Labs QRadar v5.1.2 product is an administrator configurable network intrusion detection and response system. Note that the product is also referred to as QRadar in this ST. QRadar collects and process data both from network taps and from event collectors installed on network devices. The product produces security events by real-time event matching and by comparing the collected data to historical flow-based behaviour patterns. The security events are then correlated by the product to produce weighted alerts which are sent to the product users. Note that all QRadar users are trusted and are granted privileges to manage an Enterprise s network or subnet. QRadar also can be configured to return a security response to configured network devices, either automatically, or in response to an action taken by an authorized user. By this means, a network device may be reconfigured to isolate a detected network security threat. QRadar supports the user in manually isolating threats to specific hosts or groups of hosts through customizable views and reports representing network devices, groups of network devices, and collections of data, security events, and alerts. QRadar includes its own auditing, user identification and authentication, security management, and TSF self protection mechanisms. The security management mechanism specifically supports limiting a user s access to the data collected from the network. QRadar s Offence Resolution v1.0 and Offence Manager modules are product packages that bundle specific user interfaces and product functionality. The Offence Manager module includes the product s functional and user interface components that support the correlation of security alerts to reduce false positives and association of alerts to security events. The Offence Resolution module includes the product s functionality and user interface components needed to associate a security event to a network device (or group of network devices) and return a security response to that network device (or devices). The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a distributed, software-only TOE. The TOE includes all product components, except those that are installed directly on third party devices. However, product components that are installed directly on third party devices were included in the test configuration as interfaces to the TOE. The product components that are installed on third party network devices are the Device Support Module and the External Event Collector. Security Target Version

6 In summary, the product components included in the TOE are the QRadar v5.1.2 server software and user interface components, the product modules Offence Resolution v1.0 and Offence Manager software and user interface components, the product s collectors that access network taps, and the interface to the External Event Collector and the Device Support Module. The TOE is available installed in all-in-one Appliance products, or may be installed by the end-user on a suitable hardware platform. 1.3 Common Criteria Conformance The TOE is Part 2 extended, Part 3 conformant, and meets the requirements of Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 2 from the Common Criteria Version 2.3, ISO/IEC Document Organization The main sections of an ST are the ST Introduction, Target of Evaluation (TOE) Description, TOE Security Environment, Security Objectives, IT Security Requirements, TOE Summary Specification, and Rationale. Section 2, TOE Description, describes the product type and the scope and boundaries of the TOE. Section 3, TOE Security Environment, identifies assumptions about the TOE s intended usage and environment and threats relevant to secure TOE operation. Section 4, Security Objectives, defines the security objectives for the TOE and its environment. Section 5, IT Security Requirements, specifies the TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR), Security Requirements for the IT Environment, and the Security Assurance Requirements. Section 6, TOE Summary Specification, describes the IT Security Functions and Assurance Measures. Section 7, Protection Profile (PP) Claims, is not applicable, as this product does not claim conformance to any PP. Section 8, Rationale, presents evidence that the ST is a complete and cohesive set of requirements and that a conformant TOE would provide an effective set of IT security countermeasures within the security environment. The Rationale has three main parts: Security Objectives Rationale, Security Requirements Rationale, and TOE Summary Specification Rationale. Sections 9 and 10 provide acronym definitions and references. Security Target Version

7 2 TOE Description The TOE is defined as all Q1 Labs QRadar v5.1.2 product components except the Device Support Module and the External Event Collector, which were included in the test configuration as interfaces to the TOE. The QRadar Engine and Console TOE component is enhanced by the inclusion of the product s Offence Resolution v1.0 and Offence Manager modules. As shown in Figure 2-1, the product components included in the TOE are the QRadar Engine and Console and the QFlow Collector. Each of these is described as follows: The QFlow Collector passively collects traffic flows from a network tap and forwards the collected network traffic to the QRadar Engine. The QRadar Engine is the core of the product and supports: o the collection, analyses and storage of data gathered by the QFlow Collector and the external event collectors, o the generation and correlation of alerts to security events, filtering of false positive security alerts, population of user interface views, and generation of reports to support the Administrator in identifying and countering network security threats and vulnerabilities, o the automatic return of a security response to configured network devices upon detection of specific security events, and o the auditing of user actions, user identification and authentication, security management, and TSF self protection mechanisms. The subcomponents of the QRadar Engine are presented in Section The QRadar Console utilizes pre-analyzed data derived by the QRadar Engine to populate the user interface. The QRadar Console GUI screen includes the Dashboard view, the Offence Manager view, the Offence Resolution view, the Network Surveillance view, and the Reports view. o The Dashboard is a customizable view that appears immediately upon user authentication. It allows the user to monitor the overall network behavior, security and vulnerability posture, top targeted assets, top attackers, and worst and most recent security Offences from one window. o The Offence Manager view supports the user in correlating security alerts to reduce false positives and in associating alerts with security events.. o The Offence Resolution view supports the user in associating a security event to a network device (or group of network devices) and returning a security response to that network device (or devices). o The Network Surveillance view supports the user in monitoring the behavioral profiles of network traffic associated with systems and applications. This is useful to trace the source of alerts and events to specific systems and applications. o The Reports view provides out of the box Executive and Operations level reporting capability. Additional customized reports may be defined by the user. 2.1 Product Type The Q1 Labs QRadar v5.1.2 product is an administrator configurable network intrusion detection and response system. 2.2 Product Description The product collects and processes data from network taps through the QFlow Collector and from QRadar External Event Collectors installed on network devices. The QRadar External Event Collector was included in the test configuration only as an interface to the TOE. The product produces security Security Target Version

8 events from the data collected by the QFlow Collector by comparing the data with historical behaviour patterns and by performing real-time event matching through Sentries. The security events generated in this way are then correlated by the product with the event data collected from QRadar Event Collectors and refined so that similar events are grouped into a single weighted alert which is sent to the product users. QRadar provides alerts based on behaviors, anomalies, policies and thresholds. Upon receiving the weighted alert, the user can selectively decompose it, exposing the associated security events and collected data for further investigation. The product can be configured to return a security response to configured network devices, either automatically, or in response to an action taken by a user. The built-in security responses are: TCP Resets, ARP Redirection, and the ability to issue commands to network devices such as switches routers and firewalls, but a general interface for passing data and commands to configured network devices is also included. By these means, a network device may be configured to isolate detected network security threats. The product includes its own auditing, user identification and authentication, security management, and TSF self protection mechanisms. The security management mechanism specifically supports limiting a user s access to the data collected from the network. No cryptographic functionality is included in the product or the TOE. The QRadar software included in the TOE is modular and components and subcomponents as identified below in Section The software can support product configurations where product components are installed on independent platforms. However, in the evaluated configuration the QFlow Collector was installed on one platform, and all other TOE components are installed on a single server. In addition, the TOE software components are incorporated into the following QRadar Appliance products, which provide the identified QRadar security services on pre-installed and configured servers: Appliance # 2101 (Entry-Level All in 1 Appliance) This is an all in-one box that enables the user to collect flows (QFlow) and events. Appliance # 2102 (Entry-Level All in 1 Appliance) This is an all in-one box that includes the same features as #2101 but also includes an Endace copper NIC for greater performance Appliance # 3101 (Mid-Level Server Appliance) This includes the same features as Appliance # 2101 except that there is a larger Storage array and QFlow capability is not configured upon delivery. Event Collecting/Processing is included. Appliance # 4101 (High-End Server Appliance) This includes the same features as Appliance # 3101 except that it has a quad CPU and there is no.qflow or Event Collecting/Processing capability included. Appliance # 2101 was tested in the evaluated configuration. Security Target Version

9 Figure 2-1 QRadar Architecture Diagram and Physical TOE Boundary Note: In Figure 2-1 the Flow Processor, Classification Engine, Internal Event Collector, External Event Processor, QRadar Console and Magistrate Processing Core TOE subcomponents are shown as the QRadar Engine and Console. 2.3 TSF Physical Boundary and Scope of the Evaluation The TOE Components The TOE is defined as Q1 Lab s QRadar v5.1.2 software components QRadar Engine and Console and the QFlow Collector. The exact version of the software components is version All product components of the TOE are software. QRadar v5.1.2 includes the following product components and subcomponents: QFlow Collector(s) QRadar Engine and Console o Flow Processor o Classification Engine o Internal Event Collector o External Event Processor o QRadar Console o Magistrate Processing Core Security Target Version

10 The subcomponents of the QRadar Engine and Console are the Flow Processor, the Classification Engine, Internal Event Collector, Event Processor, QRadar Console, and the Magistrate Processing Core. These subcomponents are referenced in this document in order to add clarity to the description of the operation and function of the product. A brief description of each of these subcomponents follows: The QRadar Flow Processor collects and consolidates data from one or more QFlow Collector(s) and passes the consolidated data to the Classification Engine. The Classification engine receives consolidated data from the Flow Processor, and determines if an event should be generated. The Internal Event Collector of the Event process receives policy and security data emitted internally from the QRadar Classification engine. The External Event Processor receives the normalized data from the External Event Collector. The External Event Collector is included in the TOE as an interface only. The QRadar Console includes User access functionality that corresponds with the necessary Security Functionality Requirements. The Magistrate Processing Core (MPC) is responsible for collecting the events generated internally from the Internal Event Collector and externally from the External Event Processor. It correlates these events and takes actions such as issuing alerts and/or executing automated actions triggered by detected events. It also supports the functionality required to enable the user to investigate alerts and events The TOE IT Environment Components The following are the IT Environment components required for operation of the TOE and to support the TOE s security functions: o o o o o Hardware platform(s): Intel PC Platforms, one for each QFlow Collector, and one for all other TOE components. Operating System platform(s): Trustix 2.2 for all product components. The product is also certified to run on Linux Red Hat Enterprise v.4. Supporting S/W on the customer network: o QRadar External Event Collector and its associated Device Support Modules (DSMs) compatible with the network devices being monitored; o 3 rd party vulnerability scanning modules such as Nessus o QFlow Vulnerability Assessment (VA) Integration Server module providing an interface for the vulnerability scanners. Protection of data in transit between the QFlow Collectors and the QRadar server, and between the QRadar Server and the External Event Collector. This can be implemented by physical protection of the network connection between the collectors and the Server, or a virtual LAN such as that supported by cryptographic module(s) such as Open SSL. Network or other connectivity: o Ethernet network to connect the TOE. Note that the TOE can also be installed on a single platform. o Based on customer requirements, connectivity between Network Elements that support a tap for the QFlow Collectors. Security Target Version

11 2.4 Logical Boundary The TOE provides the following security features: Security Audit Identification and Authentication Security Management Partial TSF Self-Protection Intrusion Detection Security Audit QRadar provides the ability to audit blocks generated by the TOE and the addition, modification, and deletion of configuration information that specifies the blocks. QRadar is able to associate the auditable events with identified users Identification and Authentication QRadar provides user identification and authentication independent of that provided by the operating system through the use of user identifiers and passwords Security Management QRadar supports the following administrative roles: Administrator, User, and Customer and limits the management of TSF Data to users with the appropriate privileges and network access. QRadar provides the following security management functionality: Management of security management data Management of collected event data and collected network data Management of CIDR ranges assigned to users Management of blocks Management of passwords Partial TSF Self-Protection QRadar provides for non-bypassability and for protection of the audit data and defense perspective data in conjunction with the operating system platform, Intrusion Detection QRadar provides for customer network data collection and processing to create the set of surveillance information. This includes a database of flow information, a set of analysis data, and a database of external event information. The intrusion detection function provides the following capabilities: Reads network data in real-time including data from Gigabyte networks Allows for amount of payload information to be configured by bytes per Collector. Analyzes vulnerability data by correlating the event with the various types of raw data, normalized data, and Offences. As a result, weighted Offence alerts can be generated. Provides behavioral and event correlation analysis on surveillance information Records results by date, time, and type Generates internal events and their associated violations Sends alerts based on analysis of defense perspective data Security Target Version

12 Provides security responses to block network security threats based on analysis of defense perspective data. Generates automatic reports on defense perspective data. Provide Administrators and Users the ability to review the defense perspective data they are authorized to view. 2.5 TOE Security Environment It is assumed that there will be no untrusted users or software on the QRadar server(s). The TOE environment is one where the potential attacker is unsophisticated, with access to only standard equipment and public information about the product. The Security Functions provided by the TOE security environment can be categorized as follows: Event and vulnerability data collection on the customer network - The TOE relies on QRadar IT Environment components on the customer network to collect event data from network devices that produce Netflow, Jflow, and Sflow events through the External Event Collector. Cryptographic Support - The TOE relies on the IT environment to provide cryptographic support and the cryptographic module which includes OpenSSL for secure data communication over a trusted channel. The TOE does not include any cryptographic functionality, nor does include an interface to any cryptographic functionality. Partial Protection of TSF - QRadar relies on the underlying platform, OS and hardware, to provide security capabilities for the TOE s protection. These include SFP domain separation, Non-bypassability of the TSP, and a reliable time-stamp. The TOE also relies on the platform to support the protection of the audit and defense perspective data. Security Target Version

13 3 TOE Security Environment This section identifies secure usage assumptions and threats to security. 3.1 Assumptions This section contains assumptions regarding the security environment and the intended usage of the TOE. Table 3-1 Assumptions Item Assumption Assumption Description 1. A.ACCESS The TOE has access to all the IT security management data and defense perspective data it needs to perform its functions. 2. A.DYNAMIC The TOE will be managed in a manner that allows it to appropriately address changes in the IT System the TOE monitors. 3. A.MANAGE There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE and the security of the information it contains. 4. A.NOEVIL The authorized administrators are not careless, willfully negligent, or hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions provided by the TOE documentation. 5. A.PASSWD Authorized users will follow the guidance provided by the TOE documentation for choosing good passwords. 6. A.PROTCT The TOE hardware and software critical to security policy enforcement will be protected from unauthorized physical modification. 7. A.PROTCTCOMM Those responsible for the TOE will ensure the communications between the TOE components are secure via a SSL secure channel. 8. A.SCOPE The TOE is appropriately scalable to the IT System the TOE monitors. 9. A.TRUSTED There will be no untrusted users of the TOE and no untrusted software loaded on the TOE host platforms. Application Note: A.PROTCTCOMM provides for a secure communications between the User Web interface and QRadar Server Console, and among the TOE components when operating in a distributed environment (see Figure 2-2). 3.2 Threats The following are threats identified for the TOE and the IT System the TOE monitors. The TOE itself has threats and the TOE is also responsible for addressing threats to the environment in which it resides. The assumed level of expertise of the attacker is unsophisticated, with access to only standard equipment and public information about the product. The TOE must counter the following threats to security: Table 3-2 TOE Threats Item TOE Threat TOE Threat Description 1. T.COMINT An unauthorized user may attempt to compromise the integrity of the data collected and produced by the TOE by bypassing a security mechanism. 2. T.COMDIS An unauthorized user may attempt to disclose the data collected and produced by the TOE by bypassing a security mechanism. 3. T.NOHALT An unauthorized user may attempt to compromise the continuity of the System s collection and analysis functions by halting execution of the TOE. Security Target Version

14 Item TOE Threat TOE Threat Description 4. T.PRIVIL An unauthorized user may gain access to the TOE and exploit system privileges to gain access to TOE security functions and data. 5. T.IMPCON An unauthorized user may inappropriately change the configuration of the TOE causing potential intrusions to go undetected. 6. T.INFLUX An unauthorized user may cause malfunction of the TOE by creating an influx of data that the TOE cannot handle. 7. T.FACCNT Unauthorized attempts to access TOE data or security functions may go undetected. Table 3-3 IT System Threats The following identifies threats to the IT System that may be indicative of vulnerabilities in or misuse of IT resources. Item IT Threat IT Threat Description 8. T.SCNCFG Improper security configuration settings may exist in the IT System the TOE monitors. 9. T.SCNMLC Users could execute malicious code on an IT System that the TOE monitors which causes modification of the IT System protected data or undermines the IT System security functions. 10. T.SCNVUL Vulnerabilities may exist in the IT System the TOE monitors. 11. T.FALASC The TOE may fail to identify vulnerabilities or inappropriate activity based on association of IDS data received from all data sources. 12. T.MISUSE Unauthorized accesses and activity indicative of misuse may occur on an IT System the TOE monitors. 13. T.TRANSMIT TSF data may be disclosed or modified by an attacker while being transmitted between the TOE and its users. 3.3 Organizational Security Policies Table 3-4 Organizational Security Policies An organizational security policy is a set of rules, practices, and procedures imposed by an organization to address its security needs. This section identifies the organizational security policies applicable to this TOE. Item Organization Organization Security Policy Description Security Policy 1. P.DETECT Static configuration information that might be indicative of the potential for a future intrusion or the occurrence of a past intrusion of an IT System or events that are indicative of inappropriate activity that may have resulted from misuse, access, or malicious activity of IT System assets must be collected. 2. P.ANALYZ Analytical processes and information to derive conclusions about intrusions (past, present, or future) must be applied to Defense Perspective data and appropriate response actions taken. 3. P.MANAGE The TOE shall only be managed by authorized users. 4. P.ACCESS All data collected and produced by the TOE shall only be used for authorized purposes. 5. P.ACCACT Users of the TOE shall be accountable for their actions when configuring and initiating blocks within the IDS. Security Target Version

15 6. P.INTGTY Data collected and produced by the TOE shall be protected from modification. 7. P.PROTCT The TOE shall be protected from unauthorized accesses and disruptions of TOE data and functions. Security Target Version

16 4 Security Objectives This section identifies the security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment. The security objectives identify the responsibilities of the TOE and its environment in meeting the security needs. 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE The security objectives for the TOE are as follows: Table 4-1 Security Objectives for TOE Item TOE Objective TOE Objective Description 1. O.PARTPROTCT The TOE when invoked by the underlying host OS must protect itself from unauthorized modifications and access to its functions and data within the TOE, through its own interfaces. 2. O.IDBLOCK The TOE must block network security threats or out-of-policy applications. 3. O.IDSCAN The TOE must collect and store static configuration information that might be indicative of the potential for a future intrusion or the occurrence of a past intrusion of an IT System. 4. O.IDSENS The TOE must collect and store information about all events that are indicative of inappropriate activity that may have resulted from misuse, access, or malicious activity of IT System assets and the IDS. 5. O.IDANLZ The TOE must accept data from IDS Sensors or IDS Scanners and then apply analytical processes and information to derive conclusions about intrusions (past, present, or future). 6. O.EADMIN The TOE must include a set of functions that allow effective management of its functions and data. 7. O.ACCESS The TOE must allow authorized users to access only appropriate TOE functions and data. 8. O.IDAUTH The TOE must be able to identify and authenticate users prior to allowing access to TOE functions and data. 9. O.OFLOWS The TOE must appropriately handle potential audit and defense perspective data storage overflows, through its own interfaces. 10. O.AUDITS The TOE must record audit records for accesses and use of the System blocking function. 11. O.PARTINTEGR The TOE with the support of the underlying host OS must ensure the integrity of all audit and defense perspective data, through its own interfaces. 4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment The TOEs operating environment must satisfy the following objectives. Most of these objectives do not levy any IT requirements but are satisfied by procedural or administrative measures Security Objectives for the IT Environment The security objectives for the IT environment are as follows: Table 4-2 Security Objectives for the IT Environment Item IT Environment Objective IT Environment Objective Description 12. OE.COLLECTEVENTVULN The IT Environment must collect event and vulnerability data of an IT System. 13. OE.OFLOWS The IT Environment must appropriately handle potential audit and defense perspective data storage overflows, through the IT Environment s interfaces Security Target Version

17 Item IT Environment Objective IT Environment Objective Description 14. OE.PARTINTEGR The IT Environment must ensure the integrity of all audit and defense perspective data, through the IT Environment s interfaces within its scope of control. 15. OE.PARTPROTCT The IT Environment must protect itself from unauthorized modifications and access to its functions and data within the TOE, through the IT Environment s interfaces within its scope of control. 16. OE.PROTCTCOMM The IT environment must protect communications between the TOE and its components. 17. OE.TIME The underlying operating system will provide reliable time stamps. Table 4-3 Security Objectives for the Non-IT Environment Item Non-IT Environment Objective Non-IT Environment Description Objective 18. ON.INSTALL Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that the TOE is delivered, installed, managed, and operated in a manner which is consistent with IT security. 19. ON.PHYCAL Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that those parts of the TOE critical to security policy are protected from any physical attack. 20. ON.CREDEN Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that all access credentials are protected by the users in a manner which is consistent with IT security. 21. ON.PERSON Personnel working as authorized administrators shall be carefully selected and trained for proper operation of the System. 22. ON.INTROP The TOE is interoperable with the IT System it monitors. 23. ON.EXPORT When any IDS component makes its data available to other IDS components, the IT Environment will ensure the confidentiality of the defense perspective data. 24. ON.PASSWD Personnel working as authorized users must follow the password policy parameters in the TOE guidance about choosing good passwords such as minimum length requirements. 25. ON.PRTCTCOMM Those responsible for the TOE will ensure the communications between the TOE components are secure via a SSL secure channel. Security Target Version

18 5 IT Security Requirements This section provides the TOE security functional and assurance requirements. In addition, the IT environment security functional requirements on which the TOE relies are described. Formatting Conventions The notation, formatting, and conventions used in this security target (ST) are consistent with version 2.3 of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. Font style and clarifying information conventions were developed to aid the reader. The CC permits four functional component operations: assignment, iteration, refinement, and selection to be performed on functional requirements. These operations are defined in Common Criteria, Part 2 and paragraph as: assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter; refinement: allows the addition of details or the narrowing of requirements; selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list; and iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. This ST indicates which text is affected by each of these operations in the following manner: Assignments and Selections specified by the ST author are in [italicized bold text]. Refinements are identified with "Refinement:" right after the short name. Additions to the CC text are specified in italicized bold and underlined text. Iterations are identified with a dash number "-#". These follow the short family name and allow components to be used more than once with varying operations. * refers to all iterations of a component. Explicitly stated requirements are named _EXP to denote that the requirement has been explicitly stated. For example IDS_ANL_EXP.1. Application notes provide additional information for the reader, but do not specify requirements. Application notes are denoted by italicized text. Comments are provided as an aid to the ST author and evaluation team. These items will be deleted in the final version of the ST. 5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements The functional security requirements for the TOE consist of the following components derived from Part 2 of the CC and explicit components, summarized in the Table 5-1 below. Table 5-1 Functional Components No. Component Component Name 1. FAU_LOG_EXP.1 Audit log generation 2. FAU_GEN.2 User identity association 3. FAU_SAR.1 Audit review 4. FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review 5. FIA_ATD.1* User attribute definition 6. FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets 7. FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action 8. FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action Security Target Version

19 No. Component Component Name 9. FMT_MTD.1* Management of TSF data 10. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions 11. FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 12. FPT_RVM_EXP.1-1 Non-bypassability of the TSP 13. IDS_DPD_EXP.1 Defense perspective data collection 14. IDS_ANL_EXP.1 Analyzer analysis 15. IDS_SA_EXP.1 Security alarms 16. IDS_SR_EXP.1 Security response 17. IDS_RDR_EXP.1 Restricted data review 18. IDS_STG_EXP.1-1 Guarantee of defense perspective data availability 19. IDS_DRS_EXP.1 Data reporting Class FAU: Security Audit FAU_LOG_EXP.1 Audit log generation Hierarchical to: No other components. FAU_LOG_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events: a) All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit; and b) [the following auditable events: QRadar Response Module (Offence Resolution) Audit: o Blocks generated by the TOE, both automatically based on the alert rules and by an authorized User; o the addition, modification, and deletion of the configuration information that specifies the blocks. FAU_LOG_EXP.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information: a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST: [no additional audit information]. Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps FAU_GEN.2 User identity association Hierarchical to: No other components. FAU_GEN.2.1 The TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event. Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification FAU_SAR.1 Audit review Hierarchical to: No other components. FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [Administrator and Users with Offence Resolution privileges] with the capability to read [all audit information and audit information for the User, respectively] from the audit records. Security Target Version

20 FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information. Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review Hierarchical to: No other components. FAU_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have been granted explicit read-access. Dependencies: FAU_SAR.1 Audit review Class FIA: Identification and Authentication FIA_ATD.1-1 User attribute definition Hierarchical to: No other components. FIA_ATD Refinement: The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to administrators and Customer Support users: [User Name ; Authentication data ; Assigned Role, either Administrator or Customer Support.] Dependencies: No dependencies. Application note: The access privileges held by a user acting in the Customer Support Role is defined in FMT_MTD.1-4, while the privileges held by a user acting in the Administrator Role are defined in FMT_MTD.1-1. FIA_ATD.1-2 User attribute definition Hierarchical to: No other components. FIA_ATD Refinement: The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to users: [User Name; Authentication data; CIDR Address Ranges; Assigned Privileges ( Reports, Offence Resolution, Offense Manager, Network Surveillance )] Dependencies: No dependencies. FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets Hierarchical to: No other components. FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [a length greater than or equal to 5, and may contain numeric, underscore, hyphen, lower case and upper case characters]. Dependencies: No dependencies FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1 Security Target Version

21 FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to identify itself before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. Dependencies: No dependencies Class FMT: Security Management (FMT) FMT_MTD.1-1 Management of TSF data Application Note: FMT_MTD.1-1 describes the management of TSF data in regards to the Administration of Security Functions FMT_MTD The TSF shall restrict the ability to [Operations listed below] the [TSF data listed below] to [Administrator]: Table 5-2 Administrator Management of TSF data Operations selection and assignment query, modify, delete Query TSF Data Assignment Security Management Data: TSF data required to manage users Identification and Authentication, see the attributes defined in FIA_ATD.1* except password. IDS Data: Configure collection of data from IDS_DPD_EXP.1. Configure and initiate blocks based on all the Defense Perspective Data. Configure the Global Exclusions, the addresses protected from blocks. Reporting interface to all the Defense Perspective Data Rules and Sentries applied to Offense Manager data and flow data, respectively, from which alerts (IDS_SA_EXP.1) and blocks (IDS_SR_EXP.1) are generated, includes notification and logging. Threshold level and notice location for Defense Perspective data storage required for IDS_STG_EXP.1-1. Define the data to be collected by the QFlow Collectors, as specified in IDS_DPD_EXP.1, Security Management Data: Audit log data IDS Data: All Defense Perspective Data Alerts generated by the TSF Blocks generated by the TSF Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles Security Target Version

22 FMT_MTD.1-2 Management of TSF data Application Note: FMT_MTD.1-2 describes the management of TSF data in regards to the Users with Privileges. FMT_MTD Refinement: The TSF shall restrict the ability to [Operations listed below] the [TSF data listed below for the data related to the CIDR ranges specified by the Administrator for each User] to [Role Assignment listed below]. Table 5-3 Users Management of TSF data Operations selection and assignment TSF Data Assignment Role Assignment Query Pre-defined Dashboard Report Users Query, modify, delete, create Query Query Query, modify, delete, create Query, modify, delete, create Query, modify, delete, create Query Configure and initiate blocks based on the Defense Perspective Data Blocks generated by the TSF Audit log data Reporting interface to the Defense Perspective Data Configuration for rules applied to the Offense Manager data from which Alerts (IDS_SA_EXP.1) and blocks (IDS_SR_EXP.1) are generated, includes notification and logging. Configuration for the Sentries applied to the flow data from which alerts (IDS_SA_EXP.1) and blocks (IDS_SR_EXP.1) are generated, includes notification and logging. Flow data Users with Offence Resolution privileges Users with Reports privileges Users with Offense Manager with Customized Rule privileges Users with Network Surveillance and Users with Offense Manager privileges Query Rules and Sentries applied to Offense Manager data and flow data, respectively, from which alerts (IDS_SA_EXP.1) and blocks (IDS_SR_EXP.1) are generated Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_MTD.1-3 Management of TSF data Users with Offense Manager privileges Application Note: FMT_MTD.1-3 describes the management of TSF data in regards to Users with sharing privileges. FMT_MTD Refinement: The TSF shall restrict the ability to [query] the [ Reporting interface to the Defense Perspective Data for User-specified CIDR ranges within the (granting) Users domain, and Alerts on Defense Perspective Data for User-specified CIDR ranges within the (granting) Users domain] to [Users] with User-specified report sharing privileges and Offense Manager sharing privileges, respectively. Security Target Version

23 Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_MTD.1-4 Management of TSF data Application Note: FMT_MTD.1-4 describes the management of TSF data in regards to Customer Support Users. FMT_MTD The TSF shall restrict the ability to [query] the [ blocks based on the Defense Perspective Data] to [Customer Support]. Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_MTD.1-5 Management of TSF data Application Note: FMT_MTD.1-5 describes the management of TSF data in regards to the management of passwords. FMT_MTD The TSF shall restrict the ability to [see table below] the [see table below] to [see table below]. Table 5-4 Management of Passwords Operations selection and assignment TSF Data Assignment Role Assignment modify, delete, create All passwords Administrator modify Own password User Application Note: User passwords in their original state must be created by the Administrator, Customer Support Users do not manage their own passwords, they are created and maintained by the Administrator. Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions Hierarchical to: No other components. FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions: [Security Management: Audit (as described in Sections and 6.1.6) and I&A(as described in Sections 6.1.3); IDS Management: Access Control over Defense Perspective data, control over reports, blocks and alerts, as specified in FMT_MTD.1*]. Dependencies: No Dependencies FMT_SMR.1 Security roles Hierarchical to: No other components. FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [Administrator, Customer Support, and User]. FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification Security Target Version

24 5.1.4 Class FPT: Protection of the TOE Security Functions FPT_RVM_EXP.1-1 Non-bypassability of the TSP Hierarchical to: No other components. FPT_RVM_EXP The TSF, when invoked by the underlying host OS, shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and succeed before each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed. Dependencies: No dependencies IDS Component Requirements (IDS) IDS_DPD_EXP.1 Defense perspective data collection Hierarchical to: No other components IDS_DPD_EXP.1.1 The TOE shall be able to collect the following information from the targeted IT System resource(s): see column 1 of Table 5-5. IDS_DPD_EXP.1.2 At a minimum, the TOE shall collect and record the following information: a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and b) The additional information specified in the Details column of Table 5-5 defense perspective data. Table 5-5 Defense perspective data Events Details Network traffic Host Profiles Protocol, Application, Content, Source Port, Destination Port, source address, destination address, TCP Flags Open Ports, Services, IP address Dependencies: No dependencies. IDS_ANL_EXP.1 Analyzer analysis Hierarchical to: No other components IDS_ANL_EXP.1.1 The TOE shall perform the following analysis function(s) on all defense perspective data received: a) behavioral and event correlation b) No other analytical functions. IDS_ANL_EXP.1.2 The TOE shall record within each analytical result at least the following information: a) Date and time of the result, type of result, identification of data source; and b) Analysis results. Dependencies: IDS_DPD_EXP.1 Defense perspective data collection IDS_EVD_EXP.1 Event and vulnerability data collection FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps Security Target Version

25 IDS_SA_EXP.1 Security alarms Hierarchical to: No other components. IDS_SA_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall take action to send an alert to the Offense Manager console, send the alert to the QRadar system log, or send a notification via upon detection of a potential security violation. Dependencies: IDS_ANL_EXP.1 Analyzer analysis IDS_SR_EXP.1 Security response Hierarchical to: No other components IDS_SR_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall take the following actions: Block - Prevent network traffic from moving through the network. The QRadar Response Module (Offence Resolution) provides several blocking mechanisms. o TCP Resets: TCP Resets have the capability to block an individual host and layer 4 sessions. o ARP Redirection: ARP Redirection (Poisoning) blocks the host from any and all communications to other subnets/cidrs and VLANs. ARP Redirector can redirect the quarantined host to a customizable website that informs the host that they have been quarantined. o Network Devices: The QRadar Response Module can issue commands to 3 rd party devices which support ACLs and blocking rules (such as switches, routers, and firewalls) Application Note: The block can be enabled manually or automatically. Dependencies: IDS_ANL_EXP.1 Analyzer analysis IDS_RDR_EXP.1 Restricted data review Hierarchical to: No other components IDS_RDR_EXP.1.1 The TOE shall provide the Administrator with the capability to read all data from the Defense Perspective data. IDS_RDR_EXP.1.2 The TOE shall provide the TOE data in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information. IDS_RDR_EXP.1.3 The TOE shall prohibit all users read access to the Defense Perspective data, except those users that have been granted explicit read-access. Dependencies: IDS_DPD_EXP.1 Defense perspective data collection IDS_EVD_EXP.1 Event data collection IDS_STG_EXP.1-1 Guarantee of defense perspective data availability Hierarchical to: No other components IDS_STG_EXP The TOE shall protect the stored Defense Perspective data from unauthorized deletion through its own TSFI. IDS_STG_EXP The TOE shall protect the stored Defense Perspective data from modification through its own TSFI. IDS_STG_EXP The TOE shall ensure that the most recent, limited by available storage space defense perspective data will be maintained when defense perspective data storage exhaustion occurs. Security Target Version