TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing
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1 TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing IoT Week 2014, Ignacio García Wellness Telecom
2 Outline Welcome Motivation Objectives TRESCCA client platform SW framework for secure mobile cloud applications Evaluation scenarios Summary Questions TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing
3 Welcome Project participants: Ignacio García, Wellness Telecom, R&D Programme Manager. Antonio Alvarez, Wellness Telecom, R&D Project Manager. TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing
4 Project overview FP7 STREP (4M EUR budget, 3M EUR funding) ICT Call Trustworthy ICT Duration: 10/ / partners from 4 different countries OFFIS (DE) Telecom ParisTech (FR) TEI of Crete (GR) CoSynth (DE) Virtual Open Systems (FR) ST Microelectronics (FR) Wellness Telecom (ES) TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing
5 Motivation Growing number of IoT devices connected to the cloud. Lack of trust between customer and service provider Customer does not trust providers might give away private data Providers do not trust customers might steal or compromise (copyrighted) protected data Encryption does not solve the problem Works for storage, but not for computation EDN? TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing
6 General approach Secure cloud on the client side (IoT Device) Enable providers to trust their users Enable customers to keep control of their data Develop a secure cloud client platform Hardware security through memory bus encryption and Network on Chip firewalls Software security through virtualization and strong isolation Enable mixed operation of trusted and untrusted application on same hardware SW framework for migrating mobile cloud applications with fine grained security policies Virtual Machines TRESCCA Client SoC Hardware with HSM TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing
7 Typical Cloud Application TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing
8 Typical Cloud Security Properties Key Security Properties Confidentiallity Integrity Availability Authenticity Non Repudation Privacy TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing
9 TRESCCA Security Objectives Trusted compartment. To guarantee that a HW and SW trusted compartment exists inside the light client > It shall allow to delegate sensitive computing to the light client. Robustness against software denial of service. Availability of the trusted compartment only when software attacks are considered. Attestation. To set an attestation mechanism to certificate that the trusted compartment has not been tampered with. Authentication of delegated computing tasks. Provide means to authenticate computing tasks that the cloud infrastructure or end users delegate to the client. TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing 6/17/2014 9
10 TRESCCA Security Objectives Software upgrade and boot to boot integrity. Guarantee SW upgrades should no compromise the trusted compartment. Isolation between applications. Mechanism to guarantee perfect memory isolation between VMs. Robustness against software exploits and other logical attacks. Buffer overflows. Inter VMs isolation. Memory injection and/or dump by DMA capable peripherals. TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing 6/17/
11 TRESCCA Threat Model When designing security solutions, it is important to define the adversaries. Hardware side: The adversary has a complete physical access to the light client hardware. Except the internals of the main SoC. Software side: The adversary can load and launch arbitrary applications. In order to guarantee the security objectives two types of extensions will equip the light client: One module for logical security. One module for physical security. TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing 6/17/
12 HW Security Bus encryption Most internet connected devices are nowadays based on System on Chip architectures CPU, HW accelerators and peripheral controllers integrated on one chip Biggest HW threat: external bus probing attacks! Attacking HW on chip is much more expensive Protecting external bus through integrated Hardware Security Module: Prevent tampering with the external memory bus or the memory itself Protecting against bus sniffing and injection Multicore L1 L1 L1 Core Core Core On Chip Network Connectivity PCIe USB Accelerators GPU External RAM Audio Memory Ctrl TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing
13 HW Security Hardware Security Module System-on-Chip with secured memory bus SW-Stack with HSM support TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing
14 SW framework for secure mobile cloud applications Classic applications are static and monolithic Designed to run on only one instance One security policy for whole application TRESCCA approach Applications consist of multiple segments with different security policies Segments may move between clients and clouds Critical segments may only migrate to trusted devices Use HSM and NoC Firewall to secure segments Concept is currently under development Many challenges: heterogeneous environments, no shared storage, attestation, VM footprints, Application Segments TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing
15 Overview on Scenarios Scenarios identified: Securing transactions or authentications Smart Grids and Cloud Systems Digital Right Management Demonstration stage will be based on these scenarios. Digital Right Management Smart Grids & Cloud Systems Securing transactions or authentications TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing 6/17/
16 Evaluation Scenarios Smart Meter Gateway Transmits smart meter data to cloud for accounting Aggregation and anonymization of customer data Protection of integrity and confidentiality DRM (Video on Demand) E commerce Running a DRM service in parallel to untrusted applications on same hardware Attestation, authorization and strong isolation Protecting and limiting sharing of private data Separation of services (shopping, payment, delivery) only controlled by customer Attestation, authorization, application migration TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing
17 Overview on Scenarios Digital Right Management Certificate that the different SW components are trustworthy. Effective authentication of users. Verify device authenticity (boot loader, trusted compartment OS and Services). Users may try to tamper the device. The system must be able to restrict/avoid certain operations if the device has been compromised. The system must be able to guarantee that sensible user information cannot be stolen. TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing
18 Overview on Scenarios TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing
19 Overview on Scenarios Securing transactions or authentications Effective autenthication. Application to data paradigm. Avoiding to hand over sensitive information. Migration from untrusted to trusted execution environments. TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing
20 Overview on Scenarios Smart Grids and Cloud Systems Certificate the trustworthy of the different components. Effective authentication to meters and systems. Authentication of users. Data stored on the cloud a has not been modified by any third party. The system must be able to restrict access for certain operations according to user s profile. The system must be able to guarantee that the metrics collected are trustworthy (Avoid feeding the system with false data). TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing
21 Overview on Scenarios TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing
22 Overview on Scenarios Digital Right Management Smart Grids Securing Transactions UC1: Shared resources as a threat for integrity, confidentiality and availability. X X UC2: Data leakage while storing or transferring data between client and Cloud. X X X UC3: Malicious access or modification of critical information on external memory pages. X X UC4: Uncontrolled access to memory regions. X X UC5: Integrity and confidentiality of memory shared between VMs. X UC6: Integrity of boot process and software stacks. X X UC7: Protection of migrating applications. X TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing
23 Summary Lack of trust limits potential of cloud applications Growing number of mobile embedded devices connected to cloud TRESCCA establishes trust by securing cloud client device Memory bus encryption protects against board level attacks NoC firewalls secure HW IP components on HW and SW level Virtualization technology combined with HW security ensures strong isolation of SW applications Running trusted and untrusted applications in parallel SW Framework for mobile and secure cloud applications Application segments move between clients and cloud depending on use case, policy and level of trust Initial prototypes and results expected at the end of 2014 TRESCCA technology can also be scaled down for smaller devices. Though for some of it there might be limits, e.g. virtualization might not be feasible or useful on small processors and microcontrollers. TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing
24 Main Actual achievements Hybrid migration Initial prototype of VM migration between OpenStack and client, Virtual prototype of HSM Mem and HSM NoC TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing
25 Summary Questions TRESCCA Trustworthy Embedded Systems for Secure Cloud Computing
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