Verifying emrtd Security Controls

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1 Blackhat Europe 2010 Verifying emrtd Security Controls Raoul D Costa 1 3M All Rights Reserved.

2 Agenda Overview of ICAO / EU Specifications emrtds decomposed emrtd Infrastructure (PKI) Inspecting emrtd User Interface Design Conclusion 2 3M All Rights Reserved.

3 Introduction Section 1: Overview of emrtd Specifications 3 3M All Rights Reserved.

4 emrtd Specifications ICAO Travel Document - Doc 9303 Core Specifications set by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) NTWG / SC17 collaboration Supplemented by BSI ASM for emrtds (EAC) Authenticated emrtds provide identity verification of emrtd holder Issuing Authorities in nation states or Int l bodies e.g. INTERPOL as enhanced identity security documents Commonly issued emrtds include national epassports and eid Cards but also Seafarers documents, Biometric Residence Permits use same specifications 4 3M All Rights Reserved.

5 emrtd Types 5 3M All Rights Reserved.

6 emrtd RFID Integrated Circuit Card 6 3M All Rights Reserved.

7 Symbol denoting Chipped emrtd 7 3M All Rights Reserved.

8 Nation States that issue MRTDs (2009) 8 3M All Rights Reserved.

9 emrtd Decomposed Section 2: emrtds Decomposed 9 3M All Rights Reserved.

10 emrtd Decomposed 10 3M All Rights Reserved.

11 emrtd Decomposed 11 3M All Rights Reserved.

12 emrtd Decomposed - Chip Master Files USER APPLICATION 12 3M All Rights Reserved.

13 Datagroup 1 Contains the following information Date of Birth Passport Number Expiry Date Access to the file is protected by Basic Access Control 13 3M All Rights Reserved.

14 Datagroup 2 Encoded photograph to ISO Standard to ensure quality of data image Access is protected by Basic Access Control Images encoded in JPEG or JPEG2000 formats Photographs are standardised to ensure visual comparison and automated biometric verification Images to overcome interoperability challenges (different biometric verification algorithms) 14 3M All Rights Reserved.

15 emrtd Verification 15 3M All Rights Reserved.

16 emrtd Decomposed - EF.COM 16 3M All Rights Reserved.

17 Datagroup 3 Fingerprints and Iris are a second generation feature of emrtds Sensitive Data protected by EAC as an enhancement to BAC Access is protected by Extended Access Control (separate PKI authorisation scheme) Images encoded in JPEG or JPEG2000 formats to overcome biometric interoperability problems No International Standard yet 17 3M All Rights Reserved.

18 EF.COM Data Contains a map of the tags, lengths values present in the file Is not protected (digitally signed) by issuing authority Cannot be trusted unless authenticated to EF.SOD 18 3M All Rights Reserved.

19 emrtd Decomposed EF.SOD Contains the hash values of all the data groups Hash values signed by a document signing authority with private key (SOD = Digital Signature) May contain the Document Signer Certificate (DSC) that corresponds public key element used the create the SOD or reference to DSC. Can be trusted provided the Document Signer Certificate is validated 19 3M All Rights Reserved.

20 EF.SOD 20 3M All Rights Reserved.

21 emrtd Deconstructed - EF.SOD SIGNATURE 21 3M All Rights Reserved.

22 Presenting the results 22 3M All Rights Reserved.

23 Verifying EF.SOD Part of the Passive Authentication process Verify the ASN.1 Structure Verify the hash values present Verify the signature against the public key element contained in related Document Signer Certificate Authenticate the Document Signer Certificate Verify the certificate chain of the DSC against the CSCA Certificate dynamically Pre-validated DSCs in protected Certificate Cache Store 23 3M All Rights Reserved.

24 Reliance on genuine passport numbers 24 3M All Rights Reserved.

25 emrtd Infrastructure (PKI) Section 3: emrtd Infrastructure (PKI) 25 3M All Rights Reserved.

26 epassport Infrastructure 1 st Generation ICAO PKD CSCA Authority National Infrastructure Document Signer Service Registration Authority Inspection System Issuance Verification 26 3M All Rights Reserved.

27 Second Generation Extensions SPOC CVCA DVCA Issuance Registration Authority Inspection System Issuance Verification 27 3M All Rights Reserved.

28 epassport Infrastructure 2 nd Generation 28 3M All Rights Reserved.

29 ICAO Public Key Directory Global repository of certificates used to validate emrtds Relies on Issuing Authority subscribers uploading data to the PKD Regularly updated with Document Signer Certificates CRLs Null CRLs MasterLists Serves as a trust anchor on emrtds 29 3M All Rights Reserved.

30 ICAO PKD M All Rights Reserved.

31 emrtd Verification 31 3M All Rights Reserved.

32 Inspecting emrtd Effectively Section 4: Inspecting emrtd Effectively 32 3M All Rights Reserved.

33 Inspection Terminals RFID Readers 33 3M All Rights Reserved.

34 emrtd Verification Process Holder provides emrtd MRTD to Be Inspected Perform Physical Checks Physical Check Y Extract MRZ Validate MRZ MRZ Valid Y Record Result N N Query against whitelist Y Record Result Perform BAC using MRZ Record Result BAC Sucessful N Perform Facial Checks Extract Data Y Record Result AA Present Perform AA Y Perform PA Checks Record Result N Record Result Perform EAC Y Contains 2 nd Gen Features N Produce Result EAC Sucessful N Perform Fingerprint matching Y 34 3M All Rights Reserved.

35 Physical Checks: Reliance on experts? 35 3M All Rights Reserved.

36 Physical Checks Check that the document has not been tampered with Check the document under various wavelengths of light Check that the document has not expired 36 3M All Rights Reserved.

37 Limitations of Physical Checks Difficult to automate Not standardised Can be subjective Physical inspection is not always logged 37 3M All Rights Reserved.

38 Validate MRZ Validate that the contents of the MRZ are valid Validate the checksum Validate that they match the contents of the passport 38 3M All Rights Reserved.

39 Validation of MRZ Checksum 39 3M All Rights Reserved.

40 BAC Extract the following fields Date of Birth Document Number Expiry Date Send these to the chip These should match DG1 40 3M All Rights Reserved.

41 Facial Biometrics Match the holder to the DG2 using facial biometrics DG2 is required to meet certain standards Used in some countries including Portugal Australia UK (Trial) 41 3M All Rights Reserved.

42 Biometric Facial Checking 42 3M All Rights Reserved.

43 Passive Authentication Check the validity of EF.SOD Check the hash values of the datagroups Check the signature of SOD Check the chain of the document signer certificate Check against null and non null CRLs ICAO PKD Maintains Certificates for subscribers 43 3M All Rights Reserved.

44 Active Authentication Ensures the emrtd is not cloned Challenge response between the terminal and the emrtd 44 3M All Rights Reserved.

45 Passive Authentication CSCAs can be exchanged By diplomatic channels Using CSCA MasterLists A CSCA is a trust anchor and can identify the emrtd Issuing Authority Inspection System Integrity and Performance Security controls must ensure that bogus CSCAs cannot be inserted during the verification process Inspection System Architecture designed to requirements (not one fits all) depends upon operating environment, devices, key management strategy, network reliability 45 3M All Rights Reserved.

46 Extended Access Control Consists of the following Chip Authentication Terminal Authentication Provides the following Mutual authentication between the chip and the terminal Some indication of the issuer of the emrtd Privacy of the fingerprints on the passport 46 3M All Rights Reserved.

47 Second Generation Features EAC requires the implementation of the EAC infrastructure to ensure verification EAC Protects the privacy of the fingerprints on the epassport EAC proves the issuer of the epassport EAC Ensures that only authorised terminals can read fingerprints 47 3M All Rights Reserved.

48 Fingerprint matching DG3 Contains the fingerprint 0 10 digits can be stored depending on the country where fingerprints are captured Fingerprint image contained (not a template) 48 3M All Rights Reserved.

49 Registration: A link in the chain 49 3M All Rights Reserved.

50 Consolidating Checks VALID INVALID NOT PRESENT Physical MRZ Expiry Check BAC TA AA Facial Biometric Fingerprint Biometric 50 3M All Rights Reserved.

51 Use Case 1: Valid 2 nd Gen emrtd VALID INVALID NOT PRESENT NOT IMPLEMENTED Physcial MRZ Expiry Check BAC PA TA AA Facial Biometric Fingerprint Biometric 51 3M All Rights Reserved.

52 Use Case: 1 st Gen Fake Passport VALID INVALID NOT PRESENT NOT IMPLEMENTED Physcial MRZ Expiry Check BAC PA TA AA Facial Biometric Fingerprint Biometric 52 3M All Rights Reserved.

53 Use Case: Cloned 2 nd Gen emrtd VALID INVALID NOT PRESENT NOT IMPLEMENTED Physcial MRZ Expiry Check BAC PA TA AA Facial Biometric Fingerprint Biometric 53 3M All Rights Reserved.

54 Use Case: Possible Fake Passport VALID INVALID NOT PRESENT NOT IMPLEMENTED Physcial MRZ Expiry Check BAC PA TA AA Facial Biometric Fingerprint Biometric 54 3M All Rights Reserved.

55 An expired emrtd VALID INVALID NOT PRESENT NOT IMPLEMENTED Physcial MRZ Expiry Check BAC PA TA AA Facial Biometric Fingerprint Biometric 55 3M All Rights Reserved.

56 Use Case: Fake Passport VALID INVALID NOT PRESENT NOT IMPLEMENTED Physcial MRZ Expiry Check BAC PA TA AA Facial Biometric Fingerprint Biometric 56 3M All Rights Reserved.

57 Usability of emrtd Inspection Systems Section 5: Usability of emrtd Inspection Systems 57 3M All Rights Reserved.

58 Usability Challenges Use their terminology Counterfeit (not PA has failed) Falsified (not Digital Signature is not verified) Cloned (not Active Authentication has been subverted) Access denied (Terminal Authentication does not have appropriate CV chains) Simplicity by design User Interface design aligns with tasks Clear feedback on processing State of device (security) Case Studies Engage with Users 58 3M All Rights Reserved.

59 Conclusion Section 6: Conclusion 59 3M All Rights Reserved.

60 Conclusion emrtds are complex documents and need to be verified appropriately Partial checking of some features is not enough to guarantee that the document is authentic Various designs and physical layouts of documents from various countries can easily lead to confusion although the electronic features are standardised and the same User interface design for emrtd verification apps should provide a result in a clear and concise manner 60 3M All Rights Reserved.

61 Questions? Raoul D Costa redcosta AT mmm DOT com uk.linkedin.com/in/raouldcosta M All Rights Reserved.

62 References Myths about epassports - ICAO 9303 Passport Standards - Wikipedia entry on biometric passports ID Documen ts/electronic Passport/Datenschutz en.html ICAO emrtd Report Volume 203 Number %20No.%202,% pdf UK ID Card - EAC Specification version _v202_pdf Golden Reader Tool for Reading emrtds - node.html 62 3M All Rights Reserved.

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