Covert Channels Towards a Qual Project

Size: px

Start display at page:

Download "Covert Channels Towards a Qual Project"

Derek Goodwin
5 years ago
Views:

1 Covert Channels Towards a Qual Project Rachel Greenstadt Harvard University Covert Channels p.1/21

2 Overview About covert channels Example channel: TCP timestamps Problems with the example channel Directions in covert channel research Covert Channels p.2/21

3 What s a Covert Channel? A channel transfers information in a way that violates a security policy This comes from military literature Alternately, consider... Covert Channels p.3/21

4 Alice and Bob in Jail Alice and Bob plan to escape But the Warden monitors their messages! If the warden suspects -> solitary confinement Covert Channels p.4/21

5 Isn t that a bit subversive? Well, yes... But censorship resistance And privacy And freedom Ok, how do we start? Covert Channels p.5/21

6 Threat Modelling: Know Your Warden Watch traffic over channel Attempt to detect suspicious activity Close off potential channels through filtering Allow legitimate communication. Covert Channels p.6/21

7 Covert Channel Properties Undetectability Plausible (legitimate cover) Open functionality Encode the message to match channel statistically Robustness Message survive natural/malicious lossiness Indispensable Covert Channels p.7/21

8 Example Channel My first publication! joint work with John Giffin, Peter Litwack, Richard Tibbetts Broken in some ways Covert Channels p.8/21

9 Why TCP Timestamps? TCP ubiquitous - plausibility Possible to modify the timestamp/delay packets Slow connection - low order bits random Encryption produces random bits Seems simple, encrypt message, hide it in low order bits Covert Channels p.9/21

10 Robustness??? Don t get TCP reliability if you use the timestamps! Bits delivered out of order Bits dropped randomly Data acknowledged, not packets, can t get reliability there. Timestamps must increase Timestamps are an option, can be replaced/squashed. Covert Channels p.10/21

11 How to get reliability? Divide data into blocks Use a hash of the headers to tell receiver which bit is in timestamp Encrypt that bit Make sure you send each bit o times Assume the receiver will get the block, then move on The receiver keeps a checksum to tell when to move on to next block Covert Channels p.11/21

12 Sending Data Packet Header Secret Key SHA1 Hash of Headers and Key bits 0-7 bit 8 Index KeyBit Current Message Block Plain Text Bit Cipher Text Bit Covert Channels p.12/21

13 Receiving Data Packet Header Secret Key Timestamp SHA1 Cipher Text Bit Hash of Headers and Key bits 0-7 bit 8 Index KeyBit Plain Text Bit Current Message Block Covert Channels p.13/21

14 Rewriting the Timestamp Start LSB of timestamp = cipher text bit? YES Done NO Increment timestamp Did the high order bits change? NO YES Recompute cipher text bit Covert Channels p.14/21

15 Detecting the TCP Timestamp Channel Drew Hintz, Defcon 10 Problem: Low order bits aren t cryptographically random Algorithm: Record all the low bits of the timestamp Put them through a complex randomness test If very random, then covert channel used Covert Channels p.15/21

16 Can This Idea Be Saved? Increase the occupation number (or use some less braindead error correctio scheme) Model the distribution of timestamps Remove some packets to lower the entropy of the channel Arms race? Covert Channels p.16/21

17 Should This Idea Be Saved? Complex, low bandwidth channel. Easy to remove anyway - timestamps are an option you could strip them from the packets or modify them. Maybe better off with another channel (say TCP initial seq numbers) Are they really random? Removable with a 32 bit offset Covert Channels p.17/21

18 Security Through Obscurity? Can you have a widespread covert channel? example: break the Chinese firewall? In crypto, algorithm public, key secret But known channels are closeable Should the channel be secret too? 3 can keep a secret if 2 of them are dead. Covert Channels p.18/21

19 Solutions? Superiminal channels. More generalized covert channel scheme Easy to apply to new channels In band method of channel rotation. Covert Channels p.19/21

20 Back to Randomness Maybe hard if limited to using true cryptographic randomness Need to encrypt to arbitrary distributions Maybe use ECCs and the rejection method Graph desired distribution, Pick uniform distribution which is larger Remove anything which doesn t fit Covert Channels p.20/21

21 Potential Directions Come up with a flexible covert channel scheme which can be used in many channels. Create a protocol for jumping between multiple covert channels. Covert Channels p.21/21

Covert Communication & Malicious Cryptography

Computer Security Spring 2008 Covert Communication & Malicious Cryptography Aggelos Kiayias University of Connecticut Covert Channel A covert channel is a communication channel that carries information