DoS Mitigation Strategies
|
|
- Dora George
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 DoS Mitigation Strategies Chris Morrow - Google NSF Workshop on Unwanted Traffic July 18, 2008, George Mason University (Fairfax, VA)
2 DoS Attack Definition Too many bytes bandwidth exhaustion Too many packets platform exhaustion Too many clock cycles expensive query/request There are different possibilities for ISP and Customers
3 Current Industry 'Best Practices' - Customer Over provision plan for digg-effect, but... Have a good relationship with your ISP/NSP you will never be 'big enough', there are far more bots/bad-things out there than you can handle Instrument your network/applications system/application logs trending/analysis sniffers IDS/traffic profilers netflow analysis/trending get friendly with netflow tools 3am is a bad time to learn them Prioritize your assets and risks Separation between admin and production
4 Customer Best Practices - Over Provisioning Overprovisioning helps with DoS Attacks, some It can be costly to provision too much 10 gig of capacity for 1mbps of traffic...bad plan Resources on the attacker side are not scarce and expensive In the end you will have to push this back into your provider (s) networks
5 Customer Best Practices - ISP Relations What number do you call for support? 24/7 or 9-5? your timezone? What is your 'customer id'? passwd/code/identification information? you'd hate to have your competitor call and ask for your website to be null-routed How do you talk to the ISP Security Team? What do you have to tell them to get support for a DoS Attack? What SLA is in place for such incidents? What information, and in what format, do you have to provide to the Security Support person?
6 Customer Best Practices - Instrumentation Syslog/system/application logs monitoring/alerting/profiling Netflow/Cflow from edge devices trend normal activity trend protocols traffic distributions for source-as/destination-as IDS/Sniffer near critical assets sniffers help when things get ugly is it /r.php?query=superbadquery is it tcp syn SEQ Traffic profiling devices Arbor Cisco Detector/Guard Know where it is important to keep state in your deployment firewalls are not always a good idea
7 Customer Best Practices -Prioritize Understand what resources are most important business oriented discussion e-commerce website b2b portal mail server dns server corporate NAT address Understand when to alert, and what action to take
8 Customer Best Practices - Separation Separate your 'production' assets from your 'administrative' ones corporate sally the admins web browsing million-dollar-a-minute e-commerce site Separation at as many levels as is feasible ISP links database backends NAT devices mail services firewalls
9 Current Industry 'Best Practices' - ISP Monitor traffic patterns netflow tools acl logs device access logs Plan for how/if to assist customers can you absorb this on your edge? do you need to push this back to your upstreams/peers? can you acl/null-route/blackhole? contact procedures for customers to use? Pre-deploy configuration or devices sinkhole/sniffer/monitoring equipment blackhole route configuration customer triggered blackhole purpose built dos mitigation platform
10 ISP Best Practices -Monitoring Know normal customer traffic levels your billing info most likely has this where is that exactly? 3am is a bad time to try to find this Know what traffic your network elements normally receive routers/switches often get unwanted traffic which can be used to identify new or coming problems caught sql-slammer ~3wks prior to the main event Can you enable Cflow/Netflow/Sflow? what sample rate is acceptable? Are there edge filters (iacls)? logging denys? where do these logs go?
11 ISP Best Practices - Customer Service How does the customer get this service/support? typically not the NOC What constitutes an actionable incident? 10kbps RFC1918 traffic on a DS-1 10kpps udp/80 on a DS-3 Can you accept all of the traffic across the network and discard toward the customer? Do you have to find the ingress to your network and block this there? DoS vs DDoS icmp-backscatter/netflow traceback What is acceptable to the customer(s)? acl/nullroute/blackhole/upstream blackholes? What will your gear support? cisco engine-?? linecards
12 ISP Best Practices - Planning Have tools pre-deployed 3am is bad time for a full backbone rollout of RTBH Sinkhole locations can you sink 40G of traffic in NYC? DFW? AUS? 3am is a really bad time to blow up a metro region what sniffer setup? data collection? access? out-ofband... 'Hey, DFW9 just went away, oops!' Integrate customer self-service where appropriate customer triggered Real-time BlackHole Is there a place for a DoS-Mitigation 'service' in your portfolio? deploy, manage, monitor, report on devices training, customer + NOC/SOC + sales can we turn up a new 'customer' at 3am?
13 External References Backscatter Traceback Customer RTBH ISP Security Primer NANOG ISP Security Curriculum (covers sinkholes, traceback, preparations...)
14 Questions?
Backscatter A viable tool for threat of the past and today. Barry Raveendran Greene March 04, 2009
Backscatter A viable tool for threat of the past and today Barry Raveendran Greene March 04, 2009 bgreene@senki.org Agenda Backscatter: What is it? VzB s use with the Backscatter Traceback Technique. Using
More informationData Plane Protection. The googles they do nothing.
Data Plane Protection The googles they do nothing. Types of DoS Single Source. Multiple Sources. Reflection attacks, DoS and DDoS. Spoofed addressing. Can be, ICMP (smurf, POD), SYN, Application attacks.
More informationDDoS Protection in Backbone Networks Deployed at Trenka Informatik AG (www.trenka.ch)
DDoS Protection in Backbone Networks Deployed at Trenka Informatik AG (www.trenka.ch) Pavel Minarik, Chief Technology Officer SwiNOG meeting, 9 th Nov 2017 Backbone DDoS protection Backbone protection
More informationDDoS Protection in Backbone Networks
DDoS Protection in Backbone Networks The Czech Way Pavel Minarik, Chief Technology Officer Holland Strikes Back, 3 rd Oct 2017 Backbone DDoS protection Backbone protection is specific High number of up-links,
More informationSink Holes, Dark IP, and HoneyNets
Sink Holes, Dark IP, and HoneyNets Sink Hole Routers/Networks Sink Holes are a Swiss Army Knife security tool. BGP speaking Router or Workstation that built to suck in attacks. Used to redirect attacks
More informationDenial of Service Protection Standardize Defense or Loose the War
Denial of Service Protection Standardize Defense or Loose the War ETSI : the threats, risk and opportunities 16th and 17th - Sophia-Antipolis, France By: Emir@cw.net Arslanagic Head of Security Engineering
More information68% 63% 50% 25% 24% 20% 17% Credit Theft. DDoS. Web Fraud. Cross-site Scripting. SQL Injection. Clickjack. Cross-site Request Forgery.
PRESENTED BY: Credit Theft 68% DDoS 63% Web Fraud 50% Cross-site Scripting SQL Injection Clickjack Cross-site Request Forgery 25% 24% 20% 17% Other 2% F5 Ponemon Survey -Me East-West Traffic Flows App
More informationEnhancing DDoS protection TAYLOR HARRIS SECURITY ENGINEER
Enhancing DDoS protection TAYLOR HARRIS SECURITY ENGINEER Overview DDoS Evolution Typical Reactive/Proactive Mitigation Challenges and Obstacles BGP Flowspec Automated Flowspec Mitigation 2 DDoS Evolution
More informationScrutinizer Flow Analytics
Scrutinizer Flow Analytics TM Scrutinizer Flow Analytics Scrutinizer Flow Analytics is an expert system that highlights characteristics about the network. It uses flow data across dozens or several hundred
More informationGrowing DDoS attacks what have we learned (29. June 2015)
Growing DDoS attacks what have we learned (29. June 2015) Miloš Kukoleča AMRES milos.kukoleca@amres.ac.rs financed by the European Union from the START Danube Region Network protection Strict network policy
More informationChapter 7. Denial of Service Attacks
Chapter 7 Denial of Service Attacks DoS attack: An action that prevents or impairs the authorized use of networks, systems, or applications by exhausting resources such as central processing units (CPU),
More informationGARR customer triggered blackholing
GARR customer triggered blackholing Silvia d Ambrosio, Nino Ciurleo Introduction From discussions with the GARR working group on "contrast to DDoS", we understood the importance of a collaboration between
More informationFiltering Trends Sorting Through FUD to get Sanity
Filtering Trends Sorting Through FUD to get Sanity NANOG48 Austin, Texas Merike Kaeo merike@doubleshotsecurity.com NANOG 48, February 2010 - Austin, Texas 1 Recent NANOG List Threads ISP Port Blocking
More informationsnoc Snoc DDoS Protection Fast Secure Cost effective Introduction Snoc 3.0 Global Scrubbing Centers Web Application DNS Protection
Snoc DDoS Protection Fast Secure Cost effective sales@.co.th www..co.th securenoc Introduction Snoc 3.0 Snoc DDoS Protection provides organizations with comprehensive protection against the most challenging
More informationNetwork Security: Network Flooding. Seungwon Shin GSIS, KAIST
Network Security: Network Flooding Seungwon Shin GSIS, KAIST Detecting Network Flooding Attacks SYN-cookies Proxy based CAPCHA Ingress/Egress filtering Some examples SYN-cookies Background In a TCP 3-way
More informationMultihoming Case Study
Multihoming Case Study ISP Workshops Last updated 10 October 2007 Multihoming Case Study p Set of slides based on work assisting an ISP with their multihoming needs between 2000 and 2002 n Should be taken
More informationMPLS-based traffic shunt. Nicolas FISCHBACH Senior Manager - IP Engineering/Security RIPE46 - Sept. 2003
MPLS-based traffic shunt Nicolas FISCHBACH [nico@colt.net] Senior Manager - IP Engineering/Security RIPE46 - Sept. 2003 Contributors COLT Telecom Andreas Friedrich Marc Binderberger Riverhead Networks
More informationFlowMon ADS implementation case study
FlowMon ADS implementation case study Kamil Doležel Kamil.dolezel@advaict.com AdvaICT, a.s. Brno, Czech Republic Abstract FlowMon ADS implementation provides completely new insight into networks of all
More informationComputer Security: Principles and Practice
Computer Security: Principles and Practice Chapter 8 Denial of Service First Edition by William Stallings and Lawrie Brown Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown Denial of Service denial of service (DoS) an action
More informationImma Chargin Mah Lazer
Imma Chargin Mah Lazer How to protect against (D)DoS attacks Oliver Matula omatula@ernw.de #2 Denial of Service (DoS) Outline Why is (D)DoS protection important? Infamous attacks of the past What types
More informationDistributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Defending against Flooding-Based DDoS Attacks: A Tutorial Rocky K. C. Chang Presented by Adwait Belsare (adwait@wpi.edu) Suvesh Pratapa (suveshp@wpi.edu) Modified by
More informationSecurity+ Guide to Network Security Fundamentals, Fourth Edition. Network Attacks Denial of service Attacks
Security+ Guide to Network Security Fundamentals, Fourth Edition Network Attacks Denial of service Attacks Introduction: What is DoS? DoS attack is an attempt (malicious or selfish) by an attacker to cause
More informationRouting and router security in an operator environment
DD2495 p4 2011 Routing and router security in an operator environment Olof Hagsand KTH CSC 1 Router lab objectives A network operator (eg ISP) needs to secure itself, its customers and its neighbors from
More informationVERISIGN DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE TRENDS REPORT
VERISIGN DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE TRENDS REPORT VOLUME 4, ISSUE 4 4TH QUARTER 2017 Complimentary report supplied by CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 VERISIGN-OBSERVED DDoS ATTACK TRENDS: Q4 2017 4 DDoS
More informationPhase 4 Traceback the Attack. 2002, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
Phase 4 Traceback the Attack 1 Six Phases to ISP Security Incident Response Preparation Identification Classification Traceback Reaction Post Mortem 2 Traceback Attacks to their Source Valid IPv4 Source
More informationWAN Application Infrastructure Fueling Storage Networks
WAN Application Infrastructure Fueling Storage Networks Andrea Chiaffitelli, AT&T Ian Perez-Ponce, Cisco SNIA Legal Notice The material contained in this tutorial is copyrighted by the SNIA. Member companies
More informationConfiguring IP Services
This module describes how to configure optional IP services. For a complete description of the IP services commands in this chapter, refer to the Cisco IOS IP Application Services Command Reference. To
More informationRouting Security DDoS and Route Hijacks. Merike Kaeo CEO, Double Shot Security
Routing Security DDoS and Route Hijacks Merike Kaeo CEO, Double Shot Security merike@doubleshotsecurity.com DISCUSSION POINTS Understanding The Growing Complexity DDoS Attack Trends Packet Filters and
More informationSecurity by BGP 101 Building distributed, BGP-based security system
Security by BGP 101 Building distributed, BGP-based security system Łukasz Bromirski lukasz@bromirski.net May 2017, CERT EE meeting Roadmap for the session BGP as security mechanism BGP blackholing project
More informationplixer Scrutinizer Competitor Worksheet Visualization of Network Health Unauthorized application deployments Detect DNS communication tunnels
Scrutinizer Competitor Worksheet Scrutinizer Malware Incident Response Scrutinizer is a massively scalable, distributed flow collection system that provides a single interface for all traffic related to
More informationPROTECTING INFORMATION ASSETS NETWORK SECURITY
PROTECTING INFORMATION ASSETS NETWORK SECURITY PAUL SMITH 20 years of IT experience (desktop, servers, networks, firewalls.) 17 years of engineering in enterprise scaled networks 10+ years in Network Security
More informationInternet2 DDoS Mitigation Update
Internet2 DDoS Mitigation Update Nick Lewis, Program Manager - Security and Identity, Internet2 Karl Newell, Cyberinfrastructure Security Engineer, Internet2 2016 Internet2 Let s start with questions!
More informationIt s Flow Time! The Role and Importance of Flow Monitoring in Network Operations and Security
It s Flow Time! The Role and Importance of Flow Monitoring in Network Operations and Security Pavel Minařík, Chief Technology Officer Neutral Peering Days 2018, The Hague Your customers depend on your
More informationFlow-based Traffic Visibility
Flow-based Traffic Visibility Operations, Performance, Security Pavel Minařík, Chief Technology Officer What is Flow Data? Modern method for network monitoring flow measurement Cisco standard NetFlow v5/v9,
More information2nd SIG-NOC meeting and DDoS Mitigation Workshop Scrubbing Away DDOS Attacks. 9 th November 2015
2nd SIG-NOC meeting and DDoS Mitigation Workshop Scrubbing Away DDOS Attacks 9 th November 2015 AKAMAI SOLUTIONS WEB PERFORMANCE SOLUTIONS MEDIA DELIVERY SOLUTIONS CLOUD SECURITY SOLUTIONS CLOUD NETWORKING
More informationCisco Security Monitoring, Analysis and Response System 4.2
Q&A Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis and Response System 4.2 GENERAL Q. What is the Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis and Response System? A. The Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis and Response System
More informationNetwork Security Monitoring with Flow Data
Network Security Monitoring with Flow Data IT Monitoring in Enterprises NPMD (Network Performance Monitoring & Diagnostics) SNMP basics Flow data for advanced analysis and troubleshooting Packet capture
More informationOpenFlow: What s it Good for?
OpenFlow: What s it Good for? Apricot 2016 Pete Moyer pmoyer@brocade.com Principal Solutions Architect Agenda SDN & OpenFlow Refresher How we got here SDN/OF Deployment Examples Other practical use cases
More informationCOMPUTER NETWORK SECURITY
COMPUTER NETWORK SECURITY Prof. Dr. Hasan Hüseyin BALIK (7 th Week) 7. Denial-of-Service Attacks 7.Outline Denial of Service Attacks Flooding Attacks Distributed Denial of Service Attacks Application Based
More informationGlobal DDoS Measurements. Jose Nazario, Ph.D. NSF CyberTrust Workshop
Global DDoS Measurements Jose Nazario, Ph.D. jose@arbor.net NSF CyberTrust Workshop Quick Outline, Conclusions o Measurements - We re screwed o Observations - We know who o The wrong approach: point solutions
More informationAndrisoft Wanguard. On-premise anti-ddos solution. Carrier-grade DDoS detection and mitigation software. Product Data Sheet Wanguard 6.
Carrier-grade DDoS detection and mitigation software Andrisoft Wanguard On-premise anti-ddos solution Andrisoft Wanguard is enterprise-grade software that delivers to NOC, IT and Security teams the functionality
More informationImperva Incapsula Website Security
Imperva Incapsula Website Security DA T A SH E E T Application Security from the Cloud Imperva Incapsula cloud-based website security solution features the industry s leading WAF technology, as well as
More informationF5 DDoS Hybrid Defender : Setup. Version
F5 DDoS Hybrid Defender : Setup Version 13.1.0.3 Table of Contents Table of Contents Introducing DDoS Hybrid Defender... 5 Introduction to DDoS Hybrid Defender...5 DDoS deployments... 5 Example DDoS Hybrid
More informationINTRODUCTION: DDOS ATTACKS GLOBAL THREAT INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2015 :: COPYRIGHT 2015 NTT INNOVATION INSTITUTE 1 LLC
INTRODUCTION: DDOS ATTACKS 1 DDOS ATTACKS Though Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) have been common attack techniques used by malicious actors for some time now, organizations
More informationSilverline DDoS Protection. Filip Verlaeckt
Silverline DDoS Protection Filip Verlaeckt f.verlaeckt@f5.com The evolution of attackers September 1996 First high profile DDoS attack. NY ISP Panix.com that was nearly put out of business. January 2008
More informationIllegitimate Source IP Addresses At Internet Exchange Points
Illegitimate Source IP Addresses At Internet Exchange Points @ DENOG8, Darmstadt Franziska Lichtblau, Florian Streibelt, Philipp Richter, Anja Feldmann 23.11.2016 Internet Network Architectures, TU Berlin
More informationDDoS Protector. Simon Yu Senior Security Consultant. Block Denial of Service attacks within seconds CISSP-ISSAP, MBCS, CEH
DDoS Protector Block Denial of Service attacks within seconds Simon Yu Senior Security Consultant CISSP-ISSAP, MBCS, CEH 2012 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. [PROTECTED] All rights reserved. 2012
More informationSecuring network infrastructure
Securing network infrastructure Matsuzaki maz Yoshinobu maz@iij.ad.jp 1 Our Goals Ensuring Network Availability Controlling Routing Policy Protecting Information Preventing Misuse Mitigating
More informationNISCC Technical Note 06/02: Response to Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks
NISCC Technical Note 06/02: Response to Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks Background This NISCC technical note is intended to provide information to enable organisations in the UK s Critical
More informationCisco Protects Data Center Assets with Network-Based Intrusion Prevention System
Cisco Protects Data Center Assets with Network-Based Intrusion Prevention System Cisco Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) detects and mitigates network threats before the onset of data loss
More informationEnsuring the Success of E-Business Sites. January 2000
Ensuring the Success of E-Business Sites January 2000 Executive Summary Critical to your success in the e-business market is a high-capacity, high-availability and secure web site. And to ensure long-term
More informationVMworld disclaimer This presentation may contain product features that are currently under development. This overview of new technology represents no
LHC3296BUS OVH: Shields Up! Building a True Security Barrier in the Cloud Chris Romano, Principal Systems Engineer #VMworld #LHC3296BUS VMworld disclaimer This presentation may contain product features
More informationAdvanced Attack Response and Mitigation
Advanced Attack Response and Mitigation Agenda Overview of cloud DDoS detection and mitigation which features geographically diverse scrubbing and high velocity auto-mitigation capabilities. - Overview
More informationPrepAwayExam. High-efficient Exam Materials are the best high pass-rate Exam Dumps
PrepAwayExam http://www.prepawayexam.com/ High-efficient Exam Materials are the best high pass-rate Exam Dumps Exam : 642-618 Title : Deploying Cisco ASA Firewall Solutions (FIREWALL v2.0) Vendors : Cisco
More informationFirewalls and NAT. Firewalls. firewall isolates organization s internal net from larger Internet, allowing some packets to pass, blocking others.
Firews and NAT 1 Firews By conventional definition, a firew is a partition made of fireproof material designed to prevent the spread of fire from one part of a building to another. firew isolates organization
More informationCisco Virtual Networking Solution for OpenStack
Data Sheet Cisco Virtual Networking Solution for OpenStack Product Overview Extend enterprise-class networking features to OpenStack cloud environments. A reliable virtual network infrastructure that provides
More informationAn Aflac Case Study: Moving a Security Program from Defense to Offense
SESSION ID: CXO-W11 An Aflac Case Study: Moving a Security Program from Defense to Offense Tim Callahan SVP & Global CISO Aflac Threat Landscape Selected losses > 30,000 records (updated 10/15/16) Security
More informationNetwork Policy Enforcement
CHAPTER 6 Baseline network policy enforcement is primarily concerned with ensuring that traffic entering a network conforms to the network policy, including the IP address range and traffic types. Anomalous
More informationTDC 375 Network Protocols TDC 563 P&T for Data Networks
TDC 375 Network Protocols TDC 563 P&T for Data Networks Routing Threats TDC 375/563 Spring 2013/14 John Kristoff DePaul University 1 One of two critical systems Routing (BGP) and naming (DNS) are by far
More informationFundamentals of IP Networking 2017 Webinar Series Part 4 Building a Segmented IP Network Focused On Performance & Security
Fundamentals of IP Networking 2017 Webinar Series Part 4 Building a Segmented IP Network Focused On Performance & Security Wayne M. Pecena, CPBE, CBNE Texas A&M University Educational Broadcast Services
More informationAnti-DDoS. FAQs. Issue 11 Date HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD.
Issue 11 Date 2018-05-28 HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD. Copyright Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 2019. All rights reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any
More informationVoIP Gateway Series. Unwanted Call Blocking Service Features (Hacking Call, Illegal Call, etc) AddPac Technology. 2011, Sales and Marketing
VoIP Gateway Series Unwanted Call Blocking Service Features (Hacking Call, Illegal Call, etc) www.addpac.com Technology 2011, Sales and Marketing Contents Overview Unwanted Call Blocking Service for VoIP
More informationBlack Hole Routers Damir Rajnovic Incident manager, Cisco PSIRT
Black Hole Routers Damir Rajnovic Incident manager, Cisco PSIRT 2002, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. 1 What will be covered Why? What? How? 2002, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights
More informationDistributed Denial of Service
Distributed Denial of Service Vimercate 17 Maggio 2005 anegroni@cisco.com DDoS 1 Agenda PREFACE EXAMPLE: TCP EXAMPLE: DDoS CISCO S DDoS SOLUTION COMPONENTS MODES OF PROTECTION DETAILS 2 Distributed Denial
More informationOSSIR. 8 Novembre 2005
OSSIR 8 Novembre 2005 Arbor Networks: Security Industry Leader Arbor s Peakflow products ensure the security and operational integrity of the world s most critical networks Solid Financial Base Sales have
More informationPROTECT NETWORK EDGE WITH BGP, URPF AND S/RTBH. by John Brown, CityLink Telecommunications, LLC
PROTECT NETWORK EDGE WITH BGP, URPF AND S/RTBH by John Brown, CityLink Telecommunications, LLC About Me Based in Albuquerque, NM US Will travel for packet$, food, and good Scotch.! MikroTik Trainer CityLink
More informationAT&T SD-WAN Network Based service quick start guide
AT&T SD-WAN Network Based service quick start guide After you order your AT&T SD-WAN Network Based service, you can: Create administrator accounts Log in to the SD-WAN orchestrator Configure business policy
More informationA Security Orchestration System for CDN Edge Servers
A Security Orchestration System for CDN Edge Servers ELAHEH JALALPOUR STERE PREDA MILAD GHAZNAVI MAKAN POURZANDI DANIEL MIGAULT RAOUF BOUTABA 1 Outline Introduction Edge Server Security Orchestration Implementation
More informationVERISIGN DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE TRENDS REPORT
VERISIGN DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE TRENDS REPORT VOLUME 5, ISSUE 1 1ST QUARTER 2018 Complimentary report supplied by CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 VERISIGN-OBSERVED DDoS ATTACK TRENDS: Q1 2018 4 DDoS
More informationVERISIGN DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE TRENDS REPORT
VERISIGN DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE TRENDS REPORT VOLUME 4, ISSUE 1 1ST QUARTER 2017 Complimentary report supplied by CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 VERISIGN-OBSERVED DDoS ATTACK TRENDS: Q1 2017 4 DDoS
More informationCCNA Course Access Control Lists
CCNA Course Access Control Lists Access Control Lists (ACL) Traffic Filtering Permit or deny packets moving through router Permit or deny (VTY) access to or from a router Traffic Identifying for special
More informationNetwork Defense Applications Using Stationary and Event-Driven IP Sinkholes
Network Defense Applications Using Stationary and Event-Driven IP Sinkholes Defeating Denial of Service, Decreasing False Positives, and Enriching Network Intelligence using IP Sinkholes What this presentation
More informationCloudflare Advanced DDoS Protection
Cloudflare Advanced DDoS Protection Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks are on the rise and have evolved into complex and overwhelming security challenges. 1 888 99 FLARE enterprise@cloudflare.com www.cloudflare.com
More informationUnit 4: Firewalls (I)
Unit 4: Firewalls (I) What is a firewall? Types of firewalls Packet Filtering Statefull Application and Circuit Proxy Firewall services and limitations Writing firewall rules Example 1 Example 2 What is
More informationCisco Catalyst 6500 Supervisor Engine 2T: NetFlow Enhancements
Cisco Catalyst 6500 Supervisor Engine 2T: NetFlow Enhancements White Paper March 5, 2011 Contents Overview... 3 NetFlow Introduction... 3 Sup2T Increased NetFlow Scalability... 6 Egress NetFlow... 7 Sampled
More informationIntroduction to Network Address Translation
Introduction to Network Address Translation Campus Network Design & Operations Workshop These materials are licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/)
More informationWhere we are in the Course
Network Layer Where we are in the Course Moving on up to the Network Layer! Application Transport Network Link Physical CSE 461 University of Washington 2 Network Layer How to connect different link layer
More informationWireshark in the Large Enterprise
Wireshark in the Large Enterprise Hansang Bae, Director Riverbed Performance Management, Architect http://www.youtube.com/hansangb has the Camtasia recorded sessions. https://www.box.com/sharkfest2013
More informationSP Infrastructure Security Survey & Attack Classification
SP Infrastructure Security Survey & Attack Classification Danny McPherson danny@arbor.net & Ray Hunt ray.hunt@canterbury.ac.nz Apricot 2006 - Perth, Australia 1 Goals Given time constraints, focus will
More informationAccess Control Lists and IP Fragments
Access Control Lists and IP Fragments Document ID: 8014 Contents Introduction Types of ACL Entries ACL Rules Flowchart How Packets Can Match an ACL Example 1 Example 2 fragments Keyword Scenarios Scenario
More informationChanging the IP Fairness Rule With Flow Management
Changing the IP Fairness Rule With Flow Management Dr. Lawrence Roberts Founder, Chairman, Anagran 1 The Beginning of the Internet ARPANET became the Internet 1965 MIT- 1 st Packet Experiment -Roberts
More informationArbor Solution Brief Arbor Cloud for Enterprises
Arbor Solution Brief Arbor Cloud for Enterprises Integrated DDoS Protection from the Enterprise to the Cloud About Arbor Networks Arbor Networks Inc., the cyber security division of NETSCOUT, helps secure
More informationFighting the Shadows: How to Stop Real-world Cybersecurity Application Threats That You Can t See
Fighting the Shadows: How to Stop Real-world Cybersecurity Application Threats That You Can t See Louis Scialabba Carrier Solutions Marketing Nov 2015 November 16, 2015 Topics What s New in Cybersecurity
More informationChair for Network Architectures and Services Department of Informatics TU München Prof. Carle. Network Security. Chapter 8
Chair for Network Architectures and Services Department of Informatics TU München Prof. Carle Network Security Chapter 8 System Vulnerabilities and Denial of Service Attacks System Vulnerabilities and
More informationOptimizing the Internet Quality of Service and Economics for the Digital Generation. Dr. Lawrence Roberts President and CEO,
Optimizing the Internet Quality of Service and Economics for the Digital Generation Dr. Lawrence Roberts President and CEO, lroberts@anagran.com Original Internet Design File Transfer and Remote Computing
More informationCisco DDoS Solution Clean Pipes Architecture
Cisco DDoS Solution Clean Pipes Architecture Dynamic filters to block attack sources Anti-spoofing to block spoofed packets Legitimate traffic Rate limits Dynamic & Static Filters Active Statistical Verification
More information9 STEPS FOR FIGHTING AGAINST DDOS ATTACKS IN REAL-TIME.
9 STEPS FOR FIGHTING AGAINST DDOS ATTACKS IN REAL-TIME www.haltdos.com info@haltdos.com Slow network performance or a single website downtime can cause serious revenue damage to any online business, both
More informationEnterprise IPv6 Deployment Strategies: The NAT is back
Enterprise IPv6 Deployment Strategies: The NAT is back IPv6 Forum (Singapore Chapter) Sanjeev Gupta sanjeev@dcs1.biz 0-1 Copyright @2016 IPv6 Forum (Singapore Chapter). CC-BY-SA 0-2 @2016 IPv6 Forum (Singapore
More informationSCP-500. SolarWinds Certified Professional Exam Exam.
SolarWinds SCP-500 SolarWinds Certified Professional Exam Exam TYPE: DEMO http://www.examskey.com/scp-500.html Examskey SolarWinds SCP-500 exam demo product is here for you to test the quality of the product.
More informationArbor White Paper Keeping the Lights On
Arbor White Paper Keeping the Lights On The Importance of DDoS Defense in Business Continuity Planning About Arbor Networks Arbor Networks Inc., the cyber security division of NETSCOUT, helps secure the
More informationVERISIGN DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE TRENDS REPORT
VERISIGN DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE TRENDS REPORT VOLUME 4, ISSUE 3 3RD QUARTER 2017 Complimentary report supplied by CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 VERISIGN-OBSERVED DDoS ATTACK TRENDS: Q3 2017 4 DDoS
More information5 What two Cisco tools can be used to analyze network application traffic? (Choose two.) NBAR NetFlow AutoQoS Wireshark Custom Queuing
1 Refer to the exhibit. After configuring QoS, a network administrator issues the command show queueing interface s0/1. What two pieces of information can an administrator learn from the output of this
More informationSecure your Web Applications with AWS WAF & AWS Shield. James Chiang ( 蔣宗恩 ) AWS Solution Architect
Secure your Web Applications with AWS WAF & AWS Shield James Chiang ( 蔣宗恩 ) AWS Solution Architect www.cloudsec.com What to expect from this session Types of Threats AWS Shield AWS WAF DEMO Real World
More informationAn Aflac Case Study: Moving a Security Program from Defense to Offense
SESSION ID: TTA-F02 An Aflac Case Study: Moving a Security Program from Defense to Offense Tim Callahan SVP & Global Chief Security Officer Aflac Threat Landscape Security risks are growing at a faster
More informationAttack Fingerprint Sharing: The Need for Automation of Inter-Domain Information Sharing
Attack Fingerprint Sharing: The Need for Automation of Inter-Domain Information Sharing RIPE 50 Stockholm, Sweden Danny McPherson danny@arbor.net May 3, 2005 Agenda What s a bot and what s it used for?
More informationnetwork security s642 computer security adam everspaugh
network security s642 adam everspaugh ace@cs.wisc.edu computer security today Announcement: HW3 to be released WiFi IP, TCP DoS, DDoS, prevention 802.11 (wifi) STA = station AP = access point BSS = basic
More informationSDN Applications and Use Cases. Copyright 2015 ITRI
SDN Applications and Use Cases Copyright 20 ITRI Bachelor B Ph.D (IR) (ITRI) Engineer 20 Copyright 20 ITRI 2 Outline SDN Basics SDN Use Cases & Applications Google B WAN NEC VTN OpenDefenseFlow Firewall
More informationPeer to Peer Infrastructure : QoS enabled traffic prioritization. Mary Barnes Bill McCormick
Peer to Peer Infrastructure : QoS enabled traffic prioritization Mary Barnes (mary.barnes@nortel.com) Bill McCormick (billmcc@nortel.com) p2pi - QoS 1/24/09 1 Overview!! Discuss the mechanisms and implications
More informationset active-probe (PfR)
set active-probe (PfR) set active-probe (PfR) To configure a Performance Routing (PfR) active probe with a forced target assignment within a PfR map, use the set active-probe command in PfR map configuration
More informationIntroduction to DDoS Attacks
Introduction to DDoS Attacks Chris Beal Chief Security Architect MCNC chris.beal@mcnc.org @mcncsecurity on Twitter 2015 MCNC General Use v1.0 DDoS in the News July 2015 2015 MCNC General Use v1.0 DDoS
More information