Hacking challenge: steal a car!
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- Amber Reed
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1
2 Hacking challenge: steal a car!
3 Your "local partner in crime" Sławomir Jasek IT security expert since 2005, and still loves this job Agenda BLE vs security How to hack the car New tool Vulnerabilities examples Smart lock Anti-theft device Mobile PoS Other gadgets What can we do better
4 Bluetooth Smart? (aka Low Energy, ) Probably most thriving IoT technology Wearables, sensors, home automation, household goods, medical devices, door locks, alarms, banking tokens, smart every-things... Completely different than previous Bluetooth
5 BLE (v4.0) security: encryption Pairing (once, in a secure environment) JustWorks (R) most common, devices without display cannot implement other 6-digit PIN if the device has a display Out of band not yet spotted in the wild Establish Long Term Key, and store it to secure future communication ("bonding") "Just Works and Passkey Entry do not provide any passive eavesdropping protection" Mike Ryan,
6 BLE (v4.0) security in practice 8 of 10 tested devices do not implement BLE-layer encryption The pairing is in OS level, mobile application does not have full control over it It is troublesome to manage with requirements for: Multiple users/application instances per device Access sharing Cloud backup Usage scenario does not allow for secure bonding (e.g. public cash register, "fleet" of beacons, car rental) Other hardware/software/ux problems with pairing "Forget" to do it, or do not consider clear-text transmission a problem
7 UNENCRYPTED BLE (v4.0) security in practice Security in "application" layer (GATT) Various authentication schemes Static password/key Challenge-response (most common) PKI Requests/responses encryption No single standard, library, protocol Own crypto, based usually on AES SMP Host (OS) GATT ATT L2CAP Host Card Interface Link layer Physical layer Controller (firmware)
8
9 Satisfies regular users, but how about you?
10 So, how to hack the BLE car lock? Remote relay? Relay Attacks on Passive Keyless Entry and Start Systems in Modern Cars
11 So, how to hack the BLE car lock? Remote relay? Jamming? Brute force? Relay Attacks on Passive Keyless Entry and Start Systems in Modern Cars
12 So, how to hack the BLE car lock? Remote relay? Jamming? Brute force? BLE sniffing? Mobile app analysis?... MITM?
13 Man in the Middle? Mallory Alice Bob
14 How to MITM: isolate the signal?
15 How to MITM? Stronger signal? Class 1 adapter? +8dBm, 100m range More signals? "little difference in range whether the other end of the link is a Class 1 or Class 2 device as the lower powered device tends to set the range limit" And how to handle them in a single system?
16 Typical connection flow Start scanning for advertisements Advertise Specific advertisement received, stop scanning Connect the advertising device (MAC) Further communication
17 MITM Start scanning for advertisements Specific advertisement received, stop scanning Connect the advertising device (MAC) Advertise more frequently MITM? Keep connection to original device. It does not advertise while connected ;) Further communication
18 New tool - architecture Get serv services Advertise (high freq) Offer exact services Forward req/resp websockets Data interception and manipulation Gather advertisement and services data for cloning Keep connection to original device forward req/resp Advertise Get serv services
19 New BLE MITM Tool a must have for IoT tester! Open source Node.js Websockets Modular design Json.io website And a cool logo!
20 Car hacking challenge: authentication Get "Challenge" AES("LOGIN", AES (Challenge, Random challenge AES("LOGIN",AES(Challenge,key)) key NOT Commands ENCRYPTED: (Open, Open, Close...)
21 Authentication: attack? Get "Challenge" AES("LOGIN", AES (Challenge, Random challenge AES("LOGIN",AES(Challenge,key)) key Open MITM Other cmd
22 Other commands (based on mobile app): setengineblockadesetting turn on/off setblinker blinker sequence unlocking engine initconfigmode initiate the configuration overwrite the passwords initiatedatatransfer dump the whole configuration (including all passwords)
23 PRNG? - Is there any function which allows to generate a random number? - There is no function to do this. However, there is a reasonably good alternative (...), which reads the module's serial number and uses the two least significant bytes, then triggers a channel 14 (temperature) ADC read and combines the two with some very basic math* to generate a sort of "multiplier seed" which can be used for randomness. * (multiplication of the values by themselves)
24 Smart lock Challenge-response, session key Commands encrypted by session key Challenge looks random Ranging: GPS-enabled, you have to leave the area and return What could possibly go wrong? Let's take a look at the details...
25 Smart lock - protocol Get "Challenge" Challenge SESSION KEY = AES(Challenge, KEY Commands AES-encrypted by session key
26 Smart lock - protocol Get "Challenge" SESSION KEY = AES(Challenge, KEY Challenge Close lock OK, closed MITM (intercept, record, pass through)
27 Smart lock attack The same as recorded session Get "Challenge" Challenge (previously intercepted) SESSION KEY = AES(Challenge, KEY Close lock OK, closed (repeat the encrypted) MITM (replay)
28 Smart lock attack v2 Get "Challenge" MITM STALL Do not forward req to device. CLOSED Advertise status "Closed"
29 Smart lock DEMO
30 Smart lock: AT commands BLE module AT interface exposed
31 AT commands
32 AT commands
33 AT commands
34 Fallback to analog key may be unavailable...
35 DEMO: AT commands
36 DEMO: Anti-thief
37 DEMO: interception static password
38 DEMO: Mobile PoS
39 But what about BLE encryption? Bond encrypted communication
40 "Just Works"? Bond encrypted communication MITM Bond encrypted communication
41
42 Remove pairing, new connection with MITM Bond encrypted New connection communication MITM Bond encrypted communication
43 PIN entry trick into pairing again, sniff, crack Bond encrypted communication MITM
44 PIN entry trick into pairing again, sniff, crack Passive interception of pairing process Bond encrypted communication Crack the PIN using crackle
45 Some attacks Denial of Service Interception Replay Authentication bypass Proximity actions Misconfiguration/excessive services abuse Logic flaws Badly designed crypto Brute force Fuzzing...
46 Risk? It depends... Your pulse indication will not have any significance for by-passing people But an adversary may be extremely interested in it during negotiations Or, if it is used for biometric authentication in banking application
47 How to fix the problem? Use the BLE encryption, bonding, random MACs properly Do not implement static passwords Design own security layers with active interception possibility in mind Beware excessive services, misconfiguration Prepare fallback for Denial of Service... More details in whitepaper
48 Q&A? More information, these slides, whitepaper, videos, tool source code:
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