Registry Vulnerabilities An Overview
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1 Registry Vulnerabilities An Overview Edward Lewis ccnso Tech ICANN 46 April 8,
2 Goal of the Presentation» High-level overview of where security matters» Reduce the chances that something (big) is missed» To help identify how other presentations can help 2
3 What is Security?» Component of reliability, availability» Available means being up» Security means not being taken down or corrupted» Security blends with general availability issues» What s covered here is related to malicious threats, not environmental threats (like power outages) 3
4 What Does Security Do?» Limits the damage caused by malicious(-like) activity» Never prevents an attack» To attack or not is someone else s decision» Not absolute» What an attacker is willing to do versus how well a defense is constructed» Risk management 4
5 Where To Start?» What needs protecting?» How much can be allocated to defense?» Analyze the operation (architecturally)» Define the normal states of operation» Define what activity represents a risk and monitor» Automate responses and clean up 5
6 Where To Stop?» Needed but not desired» Balance!» Avoid» Preventing valid uses of the network» Becoming a burden on legitimate users» State goals in planning so done can be accomplished» Done being good enough for now 6
7 What Is Most Important» A registry s role is to match objects to entities» Reliably, always available» Domain Name Industry» Mapping domain names to registrants» In DNS time» Enforcement of policies» For Number Resources (the RIRs)» Except that the names are numbers (IP, AS)» The rest is the same 7
8 Think About Normal» The heart is the database» Services provided surrounding this database» To input data (provisioning)» To export data (e.g., DNS)» How do these interact on a as expected basis?» Specifics can differ from registry to registry 8
9 Domain Name Registry An Ecosystem View Customers Data base Regulator The Internet 9
10 Provisioning Services Customers Registration Web Billing Data base Rules Regulator 10
11 Reporting Services Data base WhoIs DNS DNSSEC The Internet 11
12 Basic Security» All organizations must have basic security» Physical security such as locks, video cameras» Financial security such as business continuity» Personnel security such as HR rules and regulations» Information Technology security such as firewalls» And make sure it works» Security audits» Penetration tests, other security exercises 12
13 When All Else Fails, Escrow» If everything else comes crashing down» A well planned escrow system is needed» Escrow means a copy of the database held in a secured location away from the registry» Test escrow» But hope to never use it! 13
14 Provisioning Services» The Registration Interface» This might be EPP (doesn t have to be)» General Information Website» Low-profile but a service nonetheless» Billing» Not often considered by engineers Customers 14 Registration Web Billing
15 Provisioning Vulnerabilities» Denial of Service or Hogging» Access has to be guaranteed for customers» Need to prevent one from blocking out others» Poorly formatted Data» Such as an SQL injection attack» Corrupt Data» Stolen credentials» Fraudulent registrations Registration 15
16 Techniques» For registry website» Basic security» For registration protocol» Traffic shaping» Restricting addresses» For poorly formatted data Web Registration» Better software, proven tools, limit testing» For corrupt data» Business transaction security» Malicious domain name takedown process 16
17 For Billing» Protect credit card numbers (if applicable)!» Learn about the PCI Security Standards Council» Protect any kind of account information» An attack might target the accounts of customers» Or the attack might use stolen credits to register names Billing 17
18 Internal Systems» Database» Contains the resource to holder mapping» Might contain contact information» Might contain credentials» Contains all other needed operational information» Business rules enforcement» Who is allowed to register what Data base» What enforcement is needed? Rules Regulator 18
19 Database Threats Data» Beyond fraudulent data base» Structure database appropriately» Limit access by anyone, even staff» Even read only» Limit insider attacks» Limit damage from social engineering persuading staff to give out information that should not be reported 19
20 Rules» Ensure they are properly followed» Available and functioning» Work with regulators to ensure policies are sensible, well understood and achieving the right goals Rules Regulator 20
21 Reporting Services» WhoIs» Directory Inspection/Access Services» DNS» The reason for all of this work WhoIs» DNSSEC» Key management is new» HSM or not? DNS DNSSEC The Internet 21
22 WhoIs Threats» TCP based attacks» Well understood, not so scary anymore WhoIs» Data Mining» For some registries, WhoIs is not a target» Bulk access is provided within terms of use» Abusing WhoIs is just annoying 22
23 WhoIs Defenses» Host security for TCP issues» General availability techniques (multiple sites, servers)» Rate limits when a source is a nuisance» For data mining» Bulk access agreement limiting data use» Captcha in the UI» Monitoring and throttling of requests WhoIs 23
24 DNS Threats» Popular target» Denying service by knocking out servers DNS» Kill packets are possible» Packet flood attacks (DDoS)» Registry as victim» Registry as unwitting accomplice» Cache Poisoning» Not a threat to registry servers, but registries can help limit it» Data Disclosure» Some jurisdictions consider the list of domains sensitive 24
25 Reflection/Amplification Attack» One class of attacks uses registries as unwitting accomplices. Attacker Small DNS query False return address DNS DNSSEC Victim Large DNS response 25
26 What Does This Mean to DDoS» Traditionally plans assume that one is the victim» Can my systems withstand a DDoS attack?» Do I need more capacity?» Reflection attacks change this» More capacity might mean more ammunition for the attack» What an operator can do now» Rate Limiting, specifically Response Rate Limiting, now implemented in various distributions: BIND, NSD, Knot 26
27 DNS Defenses» Host security, up to date/customized name server code» Dispersed set limit shared fate» Anycast can isolate attack regions» Rate limiting of responses» DNSSEC DNS DNSSEC 27
28 DNSSEC Considerations» The key management function» Many documents dedicated to this topic (e.g. US NIST)» DNSSEC private key material has to be kept a secret» Poorly derived» Exported via an employee, lost hardware» Crypt-analysis DNSSEC» Signature generation process» False data submitted for signing 28
29 DNSSEC Techniques» Use of NSEC3 or NSEC» Choose parameters well, decide on workload» Too much, it s a burden» Too little, it s forgotten» HSM or not?» Data is more important than the private key» Complicate high availability plans DNSSEC 29
30 DNSSEC and Amplification» Improvements make it more useful to malicious use» IPv6, more data» DNSSEC DNSSEC» Larger NXDOMAIN responses» What can be done?» Ignore DNSSEC and go insecure is not a desirable choice» Look for ways to limit size of responses» Be efficient on records, choose key sizes wisely» Response rate limiting 30
31 Conclusion» There are a lot of attack surfaces in a registry» There are a lot of techniques in defense» Security needs to be planned ahead of time» Too little and - panic» Too much and - inhibiting» Questions? 31
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