Specifications of Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Testing Message Authentication

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Specifications of Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Testing Message Authentication"

Transcription

1 Japan Cryptographic Module Validation Program(JCMVP) Specifications of Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Testing Message Authentication September 30, 2009 ATR-01-D-EN Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Testing Requirements INFORMATION-TECHNOLOGY PROMOTION AGENCY, JAPAN

2 Contents 1 Introduction Organization Outline of the JCATT Scope Message Authentication The Tests Description of Message Authentication Message Authentication HMAC CMAC The CMAC Generation Test The Short Messages Test (SMT) The Selected Long Messages Test (SLMT) The Pseudorandomly Generated Messages Test (PGMT)) The CMAC Verification Process Test CCM Mode Tests for Encryption The Variable Associated Data Test The Variable Payload Test The Variable Nonce Test The Variable Tag Test Tests for Decryption Conditions for Issuing Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Certificate Details of Conditions References 9 i

3 1 Introduction This document describes the specifications of cryptographic algorithm implementation testing of the message authentication algorithm. 1.1 Organization Section 2 specifies the message authentication algorithms that are in the scope of this document. Section 3 provides an overview of the tests of each algorithm that make up the JCATT. The following acronyms are used throughout this document. JCATT: Japan Cryptographic Algorithm implementation Testing Tool IUT: Implementation Under Test 1.2 Outline of the JCATT The Japan Cryptographic Algorithm implementation Testing Tool is designed: to test conformance to the cryptographic algorithm specifications, to test each function of the cryptographic algorithm for example, MAC generation, MAC verification, etc for message authentication. to allow the testing of an IUT at locations remote to the JCATT. The JCATT and the IUT communicate data via REQUEST and RESPONSE files. Once configuration information has been provided, appropriate REQUEST files will be generated. REQUEST files are the means by which test data is communicated to the IUT. The IUT is used to process the data in the REQUEST file, and the resulting data is placed in a RESPONSE file. The data in the RESPONSE file is then verified. The specification of the file format is available in ref. [4] and the sample files are available in ref. [5]. Figure 1.1: The Workflow of the Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Testing 1/10

4 2 Scope This document specifies the tests required to validate IUTs implementing the following cryptographic algorithms. 2.1 Message Authentication HMAC CMAC CCM Mode 2/10

5 3 The Tests Description of Message Authentication 3.1 Message Authentication This section provides the tests required to validate the following algorithms of message authentication: HMAC CMAC CCM Mode HMAC The following function of HMAC is tested: Message authentication code generation There are three types of tests for message authentication code generation: The short messages test (SMT) The selected long messages test (SLMT) The pseudorandomly generated messages test (PGMT) These tests are the same as SMT, SLMT, and PGMT described in section 3 of Specifications of Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Testing Hash (ATR-01-C) CMAC The following functions of CMAC are tested: CMAC generation CMAC verification The CMAC Generation Test The specification of CMAC generation test has been made referring to the CMACVS[1] and SHAVS[2]. There are following types of tests. The short messages test (SMT) The selected long messages test (SLMT) The pseudorandomly generated messages test (PGMT) The Short Messages Test (SMT) Let m be the block length (in bit) of the underlying block cipher algorithm. This test generates a number of short messages equal to the number of bytes in the hash block plus one (m/8 + 1). For testing, (m/8 + 1) unpredictable messages will be generated with lengths 0,8,16,...,m bits. The lengths of key and message authentication code are defined in section The Selected Long Messages Test (SLMT) Let m be the block length (in bit) of the underlying block cipher algorithm. This test generates a number of long messages equal to the number of bytes in the block, m/8. The bit size of these messages is m + 8 i ( Upperbound of SLMT 1) bits, where 1 i m/8. Upperbound of SLMT is defined in section 4. The length of key and the length of message authentication code are also defined in section 4. 3/10

6 The Pseudorandomly Generated Messages Test (PGMT)) JCATT tests the correctness of CMACs generated from pseudorandomly generated messages by supplying a seed. The procedure used to generate innerloop outerloop CMACs. outerloop of the innerloop outerloop CMACs, once every innerloop hashes, are recorded as checkpoints to the operation of the generator. The IUT uses the same procedure to generate the same innerloop outerloop CMACs and outerloop checkpoint values. The JCATT compares each of the recorded outerloop CMACs with those generated by IUT. The length of key, the length of message authentication code, innerloop and outerloop are defined in section 4. for (j=0; j<outerloop; j++) { MAC[0] = Seed; MAC[1] = Seed; MAC[2] = Seed; for (i=3; i<innerloop+3; i++) { M[i] = MAC[i-3] MAC[i-2] MAC[i-1]; // Concatenate data MAC[i] = CMAC(M[i], key); } MAC[j] = MAC[i-1]; Seed = MAC[i-1]; OUTPUT MAC[j]; } The CMAC Verification Process Test The CMAC verification process test is performed as follows: IUT shall successfully verify the message authentication code with the valid key and the valid message given by JCATT. The verification result shall be FAIL for the message authentication code, the key, and the message either of which has been altered. The length of key, the length of message, and the length of message authentication code are defined in section 4. 4/10

7 3.1.3 CCM Mode The tests for CCM mode is performed as described in CCMVS[3]. The following functions are tested: Encryption Decryption Tests for Encryption There are following types of tests for encryption: The Variable Associated Data Test The Variable Payload Test The Variable Nonce Test The Variable Tag Test The Variable Associated Data Test The Variable Associated Data Test provides a number of sets of associated data and payload to the IUT. The IUT generates a ciphertext as specified by CCM using the data provided. JCATT verifies the correctness of the ciphertext produced by the IUT. The length of key, the length of payload, the length of message authentication code, the length of nonce and the length of associated data are defined in section The Variable Payload Test The Variable Payload Test provides a number of sets of associated data and payload to the IUT. The IUT generates a ciphertext as specified by CCM using the data provided. JCATT verifies the correctness of the ciphertext produced by the IUT. The length of key, the length of payload, the length of message authentication code, the length of nonce, and the length of associated data are defined in section The Variable Nonce Test the Variable Nonce Test provides a number of sets of associated data and payload to the IUT. The IUT generates a ciphertext as specified by CCM using the data provided. The CCMVS verifies the correctness of the ciphertext produced by the IUT. The length of key, the length of payload, the length of message authentication code, the length of nonce, and the length of associated data are defined in section The Variable Tag Test The Variable Tag Test provides a number of sets of associated data and payload to the IUT. The IUT generates a ciphertext as specified by CCM using the data provided. The CCMVS verifies the correctness of the ciphertext produced by the IUT. The length of key, the length of payload, the length of message authentication code, the length of nonce, and the length of associated data are defined in section Tests for Decryption There are following types of tests for decryption: The IUT decrypts the given ciphertext, the key, the message authentication code, the nonce, and the associated data. The data produced from decryption process shall be identical to the original plaintext. The IUT shall output INVALID against the ciphertext, the key, the message authentication code, the nonce, and the associated data that the decryption process should output INVALID. 5/10

8 The length of key and the length of plaintext are defined in section 4. 6/10

9 4 Conditions for Issuing Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Certificate 4.1 Details of Conditions Requirements and default values of the parameters used for cryptographic algorithm implementation testing are shown in table 4.1, table 4.2, and table 4.3. In these tables, the first columns indicate the functions to be tested. There are two classes of functions. One is the class of mandatory functions for validation. The other is the class of optional functions. Mandatory functions are indicated by highlighted text in these tables. For message authentication algorithms, the conditions for issuing cryptographic algorithm validation certificate are: IUT shall implement at least one mandatory function. IUT shall pass the cryptographic algorithm implementation test. Table 4.1: HMAC Function Parameter Default Conditions Hash Function SHA-256 SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA- 384, or SHA-512 Bit length of the key 128 Multiple of 8 and Message Authentication (The size of hash / 2) x Upperbound of SLMT PGMT Inner loop iteration Outer loop iteration Table 4.2: CMAC Function Parameter Default Conditions Block cipher AES AES or 3-Key Triple DES The length of key , 192, or 256 for AES. 192 for 3-Key Triple DES CMAC Generation Bit length of MAC 128 Multiple of for AES, 64 for 3-Key Triple DES Upperbound of SLMT PGMT Inner loop iteration Outer loop iteration Block cipher AES AES or 3-Key Triple DES The length of key , 192, or 256 for AES. 192 for 3-Key Triple DES CMAC Verification Bit length of MAC 128 Multiple of for AES, 64 for 3-Key Triple DES Bit length of the message 256 Multiple of 8 and The number of messages The percentage of altered data (%) 30 1 x 99 7/10

10 Table 4.3: CCM Mode Function Parameter Default Conditions Block cipher AES One of 128-bit block cipher The length of key , 192, or 256 VADT The bit length of associated data 240 Multiple of 8 and The number of payloads Encryption VPT The bit length of payload 256 Multiple of 8 and The number of payloads VNT The bit length of nonce , 64, 72, 80, 88, 96, or 104 The number of payloads VTT The bit length of MAC , 48, 64, 80, 96, 112, or 128 The number of payloads Block cipher AES One of 128-bit block cipher The length of key , 192, or 256 Decryption The bit length of MAC , 48, 64, 80, 96, 112, or 128 The bit length of payload 256 Multiple of 8 and The number of ciphertexts The percentage of altered data (%) 30 1 x 99 8/10

11 Supplementary Provision This procedure shall come into force as of April 1, 2009, and shall be applicable as of April 1, Supplementary Provision This procedure shall come into force as of September 30, 2009, and shall be applicable as of September 30, References [1] Sharon S. Keller, The CMAC Validation System (CMACVS), National Institute of Standards and Technology, March 30, [2] L. E. Bassham III, The secure hash algorithm validation system (SHAVS), National Institute of Standards and Technology, July 22, [3] L. E. Bassham III, The CCM validation system (CCMVS), National Institute of Standards and Technology, July 30, [4] Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, JCATT File Format Specification Message Authentication [in Japanese], jcatt fileformat d.zip [5] Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, JCATT Sample Files Message Authentication, sample d.zip 9/10

12 Revision Record ID ATR-01-D-EN Date of Revision Prepared / Approved by Revision Details April 1, 2009 Hashimoto / Nakata Newly Created September 30, 2009 Hashimoto / Nakata Partially Revised (Removed HMAC-RIPEMD-160.) 10/10

Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program:

Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program: Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program: Roadmap to Testing of New Algorithms Sharon Keller, CAVP Program Manager NIST November 6, 2015 Overview Process of developing validation tests for cryptographic

More information

Cipher Suite Configuration Mode Commands

Cipher Suite Configuration Mode Commands The Cipher Suite Configuration Mode is used to configure the building blocks for SSL cipher suites, including the encryption algorithm, hash function, and key exchange. Important The commands or keywords/variables

More information

The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code Validation System (HMACVS)

The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code Validation System (HMACVS) The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code Validation System (HMACVS) December 3, 2004 Lawrence E. Bassham III National Institute of Standards and Technology Information Technology Laboratory Computer

More information

6 Cryptographic Operations API

6 Cryptographic Operations API 118/202 TEE Internal API Specification Public Release v1.0 6 Cryptographic Operations API This part of the Cryptographic API defines how to actually perform cryptographic operations: Cryptographic operations

More information

Key Management Interoperability Protocol Crypto Profile Version 1.0

Key Management Interoperability Protocol Crypto Profile Version 1.0 Key Management Interoperability Protocol Crypto Profile Version 1.0 Working Draft 0708 25 7 NovemberOctober 2012 Technical Committee: OASIS Key Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP) TC Chairs: Robert

More information

Crypto Catalog. Version: National Information Assurance Partnership

Crypto Catalog. Version: National Information Assurance Partnership Crypto Catalog Version: 1.0 2017-04-19 National Information Assurance Partnership 1 Revision History Version Date Comment 1.0 Contents 1. Introduction 1.1. Overview 1.2. Terms 1.2.1. Common Criteria Terms

More information

Inside the World of Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Testing. Sharon Keller CAVP Program Manager NIST ICMC, May 2016

Inside the World of Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Testing. Sharon Keller CAVP Program Manager NIST ICMC, May 2016 Inside the World of Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Testing Sharon Keller CAVP Program Manager NIST ICMC, May 2016 Mission To provide federal agencies in the United States and Canada with assurance

More information

STS Secure for Windows XP, Embedded XP Security Policy Document Version 1.4

STS Secure for Windows XP, Embedded XP Security Policy Document Version 1.4 STS Secure for Windows XP, Embedded XP Security Policy Document Version 1.4 Inter-4 A Division of Sierra Nevada Corporation December 10, 2008 Copyright Sierra Nevada Corporation 2008. May be reproduced

More information

Slides by Kent Seamons and Tim van der Horst Last Updated: Oct 7, 2013

Slides by Kent Seamons and Tim van der Horst Last Updated: Oct 7, 2013 Digital Signatures Slides by Kent Seamons and Tim van der Horst Last Updated: Oct 7, 2013 Digital Signatures Diagram illustrating how to sign a message Why do we use a one-way hash? How does a collision

More information

FIPS Security Policy

FIPS Security Policy Motorola Mobility Linux Kernel Software Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Module Version 1.0 Document version 1.13 March 11, 2015 This document may be freely copied and distributed provided

More information

Revision History Revision 0 (T10/06-225r0): Posted to the T10 web site on 4 May 2006.

Revision History Revision 0 (T10/06-225r0): Posted to the T10 web site on 4 May 2006. To: INCITS T10 Committee From: Matt Ball, Quantum Corporation Date: March 13, 2007 Subject: SSC-3: Key Entry using Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Revision History Revision 0 (T10/06-225r0): Posted

More information

Tabular Presentation of the

Tabular Presentation of the Tabular Presentation of the Protection Profile for Application Software Version: 1.3 2018-03-07 National Information Assurance Partnership Revision History Version Date Comment Introduction This document

More information

Symantec Corporation

Symantec Corporation Symantec Corporation Symantec PGP Cryptographic Engine FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy Document Version 1.0.4 Revision Date 05/01/2015 Symantec Corporation, 2015 May be reproduced only in its

More information

Unless otherwise indicated additions are shown in blue, deletions in red strikethrough, and comments in green.

Unless otherwise indicated additions are shown in blue, deletions in red strikethrough, and comments in green. ENDL TEXAS Date: 17 January 2008 To: T10 Technical Committee From: Ralph O. Weber Subject: SA Creation corrections and clarifications Introduction Revision History r0 r1 r2 r3 Initial revision Insert correct

More information

Elaine Barker and Allen Roginsky NIST June 29, 2010

Elaine Barker and Allen Roginsky NIST June 29, 2010 Elaine Barker and Allen Roginsky NIST June 29, 2010 Background: Cryptography is used to protect sensitive information Attackers are becoming smarter, and computers are becoming more powerful Many commonly

More information

IKEv2-SCSI (06-449) Update

IKEv2-SCSI (06-449) Update 1 IKEv2-SCSI (06-449) Update David L. Black 2 IKEv2-SCSI (06-449) Plans and Status Plan Revise IKEv2-SCSI draft for approval at this meeting Reality The best laid schemes o' Mice an' Men... gang aft FCoE!!

More information

There are numerous Python packages for cryptography. The most widespread is maybe pycrypto, which is however unmaintained since 2015, and has

There are numerous Python packages for cryptography. The most widespread is maybe pycrypto, which is however unmaintained since 2015, and has 1 There are numerous Python packages for cryptography. The most widespread is maybe pycrypto, which is however unmaintained since 2015, and has unpatched buffer-overflow vulnerabilities. New projects should

More information

Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform (VSP) Encryption Board. FIPS Non-Proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy

Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform (VSP) Encryption Board. FIPS Non-Proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform (VSP) Encryption Board FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy Version: 4.0 Date: July 27, 2016 Copyright Hitachi, 2016 Version 4.0 Page 1 of 19

More information

Revision History Revision 0 (T10/06-225r0): Posted to the T10 web site on 4 May 2006.

Revision History Revision 0 (T10/06-225r0): Posted to the T10 web site on 4 May 2006. To: INCITS T10 Committee From: Matt Ball, Quantum Corporation Date: 27 June 2006 Subject: SSC-3: Using NIST AES Key-Wrap for Key Establishment Revision History Revision 0 (T10/06-225r0): Posted to the

More information

Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document. Full Drive Encryption: Authorization Acquisition. January Version 1.

Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document. Full Drive Encryption: Authorization Acquisition. January Version 1. Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document Full Drive Encryption: Authorization Acquisition January 2015 Version 1.0 CCDB-2015-01-003 Foreword This is a supporting document, intended to complement

More information

Message authentication codes

Message authentication codes Message authentication codes Martin Stanek Department of Computer Science Comenius University stanek@dcs.fmph.uniba.sk Cryptology 1 (2017/18) Content Introduction security of MAC Constructions block cipher

More information

Managed Objects Authenticated Encryption Additional Data Authenticated Encryption Tag Certificate

Managed Objects Authenticated Encryption Additional Data Authenticated Encryption Tag Certificate Object Encoding REQUIRED Capability Information Streaming Capability Asynchronous Capability Attestation Capability Unwrap Mode Destroy Action Shredding Algorithm RNG Mode Table 4242: Capability Information

More information

ECMA-409. NFC-SEC-02: NFC-SEC Cryptography Standard using ECDH-256 and AES-GCM. 2 nd Edition / June Reference number ECMA-123:2009

ECMA-409. NFC-SEC-02: NFC-SEC Cryptography Standard using ECDH-256 and AES-GCM. 2 nd Edition / June Reference number ECMA-123:2009 ECMA-409 2 nd Edition / June 2015 NFC-SEC-02: NFC-SEC Cryptography Standard using ECDH-256 and AES-GCM Reference number ECMA-123:2009 Ecma International 2009 COPYRIGHT PROTECTED DOCUMENT Ecma International

More information

Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document. Full Drive Encryption: Encryption Engine. September Version 1.

Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document. Full Drive Encryption: Encryption Engine. September Version 1. Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document Full Drive Encryption: Encryption Engine September 015 Version 1.5 CCDB-015-01-004 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 0 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 31 3

More information

SOLUTIONS FOR HOMEWORK # 1 ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

SOLUTIONS FOR HOMEWORK # 1 ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS SOLUTIONS OR HOMEWORK # 1 ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS 2.4 A stream cipher is one that encrypts a digital data stream one bit or one byte at a time. A block cipher is one in which a block of plaintext is treated

More information

Feedback Week 4 - Problem Set

Feedback Week 4 - Problem Set 4/26/13 Homework Feedback Introduction to Cryptography Feedback Week 4 - Problem Set You submitted this homework on Mon 17 Dec 2012 11:40 PM GMT +0000. You got a score of 10.00 out of 10.00. Question 1

More information

Cryptography and Network Security Chapter 12. Message Authentication. Message Security Requirements. Public Key Message Encryption

Cryptography and Network Security Chapter 12. Message Authentication. Message Security Requirements. Public Key Message Encryption Cryptography and Network Security Chapter 12 Fifth Edition by William Stallings Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown Chapter 12 Message Authentication Codes At cats' green on the Sunday he took the message from

More information

Data Integrity. Modified by: Dr. Ramzi Saifan

Data Integrity. Modified by: Dr. Ramzi Saifan Data Integrity Modified by: Dr. Ramzi Saifan Encryption/Decryption Provides message confidentiality. Does it provide message authentication? 2 Message Authentication Bob receives a message m from Alice,

More information

FIPS Security Policy

FIPS Security Policy FIPS 140-2 Security Policy BlackBerry Cryptographic Library Version 2.0.0.10 Document Version 1.2 BlackBerry Certifications, Research In Motion This document may be freely copied and distributed provided

More information

FIPS Non-Proprietary Security Policy. Level 1 Validation Version 1.2

FIPS Non-Proprietary Security Policy. Level 1 Validation Version 1.2 Oracle Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework with SPARC T4 and T5 Software Version: 1.0 and 1.1; Hardware Version: SPARC T4 (527-1437-01) and T5 (7043165) FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Level

More information

Lecture 1 Applied Cryptography (Part 1)

Lecture 1 Applied Cryptography (Part 1) Lecture 1 Applied Cryptography (Part 1) Patrick P. C. Lee Tsinghua Summer Course 2010 1-1 Roadmap Introduction to Security Introduction to Cryptography Symmetric key cryptography Hash and message authentication

More information

Juniper Network Connect Cryptographic Module Version 2.0 Security Policy Document Version 1.0. Juniper Networks, Inc.

Juniper Network Connect Cryptographic Module Version 2.0 Security Policy Document Version 1.0. Juniper Networks, Inc. Juniper Network Connect Cryptographic Module Version 2.0 Security Policy Document Version 1.0 Juniper Networks, Inc. September 10, 2009 Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2009. May be reproduced only in

More information

Meru Networks. Security Gateway SG1000 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Document Version 1.2. Revision Date: June 24, 2009

Meru Networks. Security Gateway SG1000 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Document Version 1.2. Revision Date: June 24, 2009 Security Gateway SG1000 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Document Version 1.2 Meru Networks Revision Date: June 24, 2009 Copyright Meru Networks 2008. May be reproduced only in its original entirety

More information

Lecture 6: Symmetric Cryptography. CS 5430 February 21, 2018

Lecture 6: Symmetric Cryptography. CS 5430 February 21, 2018 Lecture 6: Symmetric Cryptography CS 5430 February 21, 2018 The Big Picture Thus Far Attacks are perpetrated by threats that inflict harm by exploiting vulnerabilities which are controlled by countermeasures.

More information

Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH) Version: National Information Assurance Partnership

Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH) Version: National Information Assurance Partnership Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH) Version: 1.1 2016-11-25 National Information Assurance Partnership Revision History Version Date Comment 0.9 2015-08-19 First Draft - Extended Package for Secure

More information

Cryptography MIS

Cryptography MIS Cryptography MIS-5903 http://community.mis.temple.edu/mis5903sec011s17/ Cryptography History Substitution Monoalphabetic Polyalphabetic (uses multiple alphabets) uses Vigenere Table Scytale cipher (message

More information

TRANSITIONING OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS IN THE ELECTRONIC BIDDING CORE SYSTEM JACIC Hiroyuki ISHIWATA

TRANSITIONING OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS IN THE ELECTRONIC BIDDING CORE SYSTEM JACIC Hiroyuki ISHIWATA TRANSITIONING OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS IN THE ELECTRONIC BIDDING CORE SYSTEM 2013.11.8 JACIC Hiroyuki ISHIWATA JACIC Electronic Bidding Core System Development Consortium introduce myself author name:

More information

Assurance Activity Report (IVPNCPP14) for Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise company Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version 3.

Assurance Activity Report (IVPNCPP14) for Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise company Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version 3. www.gossamersec.com Assurance Activity Report (IVPNCPP14) for Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise company Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version 3.0 Version 0.6 05/03/2018 Prepared by: Gossamer Security

More information

1. OVERVIEW RELEASE ITEMS HOW TO APPLY ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CHANGE FUNCTIONS FROM PREVIOUS EDITION...

1. OVERVIEW RELEASE ITEMS HOW TO APPLY ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CHANGE FUNCTIONS FROM PREVIOUS EDITION... RZ/G Series Release notes for RZ/G Security Solution R01TU0212EJ0100 Document Version 1.00 Table of Contents 1. OVERVIEW... 2 2. RELEASE ITEMS... 4 3. HOW TO APPLY... 6 4. ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CHANGE

More information

Introduction to Network Security Missouri S&T University CPE 5420 Data Integrity Algorithms

Introduction to Network Security Missouri S&T University CPE 5420 Data Integrity Algorithms Introduction to Network Security Missouri S&T University CPE 5420 Data Integrity Algorithms Egemen K. Çetinkaya Egemen K. Çetinkaya Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering Missouri University of

More information

Computer Security: Principles and Practice

Computer Security: Principles and Practice Computer Security: Principles and Practice Chapter 2 Cryptographic Tools First Edition by William Stallings and Lawrie Brown Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown Cryptographic Tools cryptographic algorithms

More information

Request for Comments: 3566 Category: Standards Track Intel September The AES-XCBC-MAC-96 Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec

Request for Comments: 3566 Category: Standards Track Intel September The AES-XCBC-MAC-96 Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec Network Working Group Request for Comments: 3566 Category: Standards Track S. Frankel NIST H. Herbert Intel September 2003 Status of this Memo The AES-XCBC-MAC-96 Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec This

More information

ECE 646 Lecture 8. Modes of operation of block ciphers

ECE 646 Lecture 8. Modes of operation of block ciphers ECE 646 Lecture 8 Modes of operation of block ciphers Required Reading: I. W. Stallings, "Cryptography and Network-Security," 5 th and 6 th Edition, Chapter 6 Block Cipher Operation II. A. Menezes, P.

More information

Chapter 18: wolfcrypt API Reference

Chapter 18: wolfcrypt API Reference Chapter 18: wolfcrypt API Reference Table of Contents March, 2016 Version 3.9.0 18.1 AES 18.2 Arc4 18.3 ASN 18.4 Blake2 18.5 Camellia 18.6 ChaCha 18.7 ChaCha20 with Poly1305 18.8 Coding 18.9 Compression

More information

CSCE 715: Network Systems Security

CSCE 715: Network Systems Security CSCE 715: Network Systems Security Chin-Tser Huang huangct@cse.sc.edu University of South Carolina Security in Network Layer Implementing security in application layer provides flexibility in security

More information

ISO/IEC INTERNATIONAL STANDARD

ISO/IEC INTERNATIONAL STANDARD INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC 9797-1 Second edition 2011-03-01 Information technology Security techniques Message Authentication Codes (MACs) Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher Technologies de l'information

More information

Secure Cryptographic Module (SCM)

Secure Cryptographic Module (SCM) Page 1 of 11 FIPS 140 2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Secure Cryptographic Module (SCM) Document Version 3.0.4 FIPS 140 2 Non Proprietary JVC KENWOOD Corporation Page 2 of 11 Revision History Date

More information

Oracle Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework Software Version 1.0 and 1.1

Oracle Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework Software Version 1.0 and 1.1 Oracle Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework Software Version 1.0 and 1.1 FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Level 1 Validation Version 1.2 12/12/2013 Copyright 2013 Oracle Corporation Table of

More information

Cryptography. Dr. Michael Schneider Chapter 10: Pseudorandom Bit Generators and Stream Ciphers

Cryptography. Dr. Michael Schneider Chapter 10: Pseudorandom Bit Generators and Stream Ciphers Cryptography Dr. Michael Schneider michael.schneider@h-da.de Chapter 10: Pseudorandom Bit Generators and Stream Ciphers December 12, 2017 h_da WS2017/18 Dr. Michael Schneider 1 1 Random and Pseudorandom

More information

FIPS Level 1 Validation March 31, 2011 Version 1.12

FIPS Level 1 Validation March 31, 2011 Version 1.12 KoolSpan TrustChip Developer Kit (TDK) Cryptographic Library Version 3.0 Security Policy FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Validation March 31, 2011 Version 1.12 Table of Contents 1 Introduction... 1 1.1 Acronyms and

More information

The Xirrus Wi Fi Array XS4, XS8 Security Policy Document Version 1.0. Xirrus, Inc.

The Xirrus Wi Fi Array XS4, XS8 Security Policy Document Version 1.0. Xirrus, Inc. The Xirrus Wi Fi Array XS4, XS8 Security Policy Document Version 1.0 Xirrus, Inc. March 8, 2011 Copyright Xirrus, Inc. 2011. May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision]. Page 1 TABLE

More information

CIS 4360 Secure Computer Systems Symmetric Cryptography

CIS 4360 Secure Computer Systems Symmetric Cryptography CIS 4360 Secure Computer Systems Symmetric Cryptography Professor Qiang Zeng Spring 2017 Previous Class Classical Cryptography Frequency analysis Never use home-made cryptography Goals of Cryptography

More information

Chapter 8 Web Security

Chapter 8 Web Security Chapter 8 Web Security Web security includes three parts: security of server, security of client, and network traffic security between a browser and a server. Security of server and security of client

More information

IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme Document

IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme Document IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme Document June 2015 CCS-01 Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan (IPA) IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS-01) i / ii Table of Contents

More information

Network Working Group Request for Comments: Nokia Siemens Networks February 2009

Network Working Group Request for Comments: Nokia Siemens Networks February 2009 Network Working Group Request for Comments: 5433 Category: Standards Track T. Clancy LTS H. Tschofenig Nokia Siemens Networks February 2009 Status of This Memo Extensible Authentication Protocol - Generalized

More information

Cryptography. Summer Term 2010

Cryptography. Summer Term 2010 Cryptography Summer Term 2010 Harald Baier Chapter 3: Pseudo Random Bit Generators and Stream Ciphers Contents Random bits and pseudo random bits Stream ciphers Harald Baier Cryptography h_da, Summer Term

More information

FIPS Security Policy. for Marvell Semiconductor, Inc. Solaris 2 Cryptographic Module

FIPS Security Policy. for Marvell Semiconductor, Inc. Solaris 2 Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for Marvell Semiconductor, Inc. Solaris 2 Cryptographic Module Hardware Version: 88i8925, 88i8922, 88i8945, and 88i8946 Firmware Version: Solaris2-FIPS-FW-V1.0 Document Version:

More information

SSH Algorithms for Common Criteria Certification

SSH Algorithms for Common Criteria Certification The feature provides the list and order of the algorithms that are allowed for Common Criteria Certification. This module describes how to configure the encryption, Message Authentication Code (MAC), and

More information

WiMAX Security: Problems & Solutions

WiMAX Security: Problems & Solutions (JCSCR) - ISSN 2227-328X WiMAX Security: Problems & Solutions Paul Semaan LACSC Lebanese Association for Computational Sciences Registered under No. 957, 2011, Beirut, Lebanon Abstract This paper is a

More information

Security Policy for FIPS KVL 3000 Plus

Security Policy for FIPS KVL 3000 Plus Security Policy for FIPS 140-2 KVL 3000 Plus Version 01.01.19 Motorola General Business Information 1 of 21 Motorola General Business Information 2 of 21 1 INTRODUCTION... 4 1.1 SCOPE... 4 1.2 OVERVIEW...

More information

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments: 7192 Category: Standards Track April 2014 ISSN:

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments: 7192 Category: Standards Track April 2014 ISSN: Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Turner Request for Comments: 7192 IECA Category: Standards Track April 2014 ISSN: 2070-1721 Abstract Algorithms for Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Key Package

More information

CS408 Cryptography & Internet Security

CS408 Cryptography & Internet Security CS408 Cryptography & Internet Security Lecture 18: Cryptographic hash functions, Message authentication codes Functions Definition Given two sets, X and Y, a function f : X Y (from set X to set Y), is

More information

Cryptographic hash functions and MACs

Cryptographic hash functions and MACs Cryptographic hash functions and MACs Myrto Arapinis School of Informatics University of Edinburgh October 05, 2017 1 / 21 Introduction Encryption confidentiality against eavesdropping 2 / 21 Introduction

More information

Misuse-resistant crypto for JOSE/JWT

Misuse-resistant crypto for JOSE/JWT Misuse-resistant crypto for JOSE/JWT Neil Madden OAuth Security Workshop, 2018 1 JOSE Content Encryption Methods Provide authenticated encryption AES-CBC with HMAC-SHA2 Requires random 128-bit IV Must

More information

PKCS #11 Message-Based Encryption and Decryption

PKCS #11 Message-Based Encryption and Decryption PKCS #11 Message-Based Encryption and Decryption Wan-Teh Chang , 2014-03-11 Introduction Message-based encryption refers to the process of encrypting multiple messages using the same encryption

More information

Intended status: Standards Track January 13, 2015 Expires: July 17, 2015

Intended status: Standards Track January 13, 2015 Expires: July 17, 2015 JOSE Working Group M. Jones Internet-Draft Microsoft Intended status: Standards Track January 13, 2015 Expires: July 17, 2015 Abstract JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-40 The

More information

Lecture 9a: Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) March, 2004

Lecture 9a: Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) March, 2004 Internet and Intranet Protocols and Applications Lecture 9a: Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) March, 2004 Arthur Goldberg Computer Science Department New York University artg@cs.nyu.edu Security Achieved by

More information

: Practical Cryptographic Systems March 25, Midterm

: Practical Cryptographic Systems March 25, Midterm 650.445: Practical Cryptographic Systems March 25, 2010 Instructor: Matthew Green Midterm Name: As with any exam, please do not collaborate or otherwise share information with any other person. You are

More information

Assurance Activity Report for SecuSUITE Client v3.0 and Vodafone Secure Call Client v3.0

Assurance Activity Report for SecuSUITE Client v3.0 and Vodafone Secure Call Client v3.0 Assurance Activity Report for SecuSUITE Client v3.0 and Vodafone Secure Call Client v3.0 Version 2.4, 1 May, 2017 Prepared by: EWA-Canada 1223 Michael Street, Suite 200 Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1J 7T2

More information

Lecture 5. Cryptographic Hash Functions. Read: Chapter 5 in KPS

Lecture 5. Cryptographic Hash Functions. Read: Chapter 5 in KPS Lecture 5 Cryptographic Hash Functions Read: Chapter 5 in KPS 1 Purpose CHF one of the most important tools in modern cryptography and security CHF-s are used for many authentication, integrity, digital

More information

Acronyms. International Organization for Standardization International Telecommunication Union ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector

Acronyms. International Organization for Standardization International Telecommunication Union ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector Acronyms 3DES AES AH ANSI CBC CESG CFB CMAC CRT DoS DEA DES DoS DSA DSS ECB ECC ECDSA ESP FIPS IAB IETF IP IPsec ISO ITU ITU-T Triple DES Advanced Encryption Standard Authentication Header American National

More information

Encryption Algorithms Authentication Protocols Message Integrity Protocols Key Distribution Firewalls

Encryption Algorithms Authentication Protocols Message Integrity Protocols Key Distribution Firewalls Security Outline Encryption Algorithms Authentication Protocols Message Integrity Protocols Key Distribution Firewalls Overview Cryptography functions Secret key (e.g., DES) Public key (e.g., RSA) Message

More information

Credant CmgCryptoLib Version 1.7 Credant Cryptographic Kernel Version 1.5 FIPS Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 Level 1 Validation

Credant CmgCryptoLib Version 1.7 Credant Cryptographic Kernel Version 1.5 FIPS Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 Level 1 Validation Credant CmgCryptoLib Version 1.7 Credant Cryptographic Kernel Version 1.5 FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 Level 1 Validation October 2007 1. INTRODUCTION 3 2. PRODUCT, BOUNDARY,

More information

Data Integrity & Authentication. Message Authentication Codes (MACs)

Data Integrity & Authentication. Message Authentication Codes (MACs) Data Integrity & Authentication Message Authentication Codes (MACs) Goal Ensure integrity of messages, even in presence of an active adversary who sends own messages. Alice (sender) Bob (receiver) Fran

More information

Apple Inc. Apple OS X CoreCrypto Kernel Module, v5.0 FIPS Non-Proprietary Security Policy

Apple Inc. Apple OS X CoreCrypto Kernel Module, v5.0 FIPS Non-Proprietary Security Policy Apple Inc. Apple OS X CoreCrypto Kernel Module, v5.0 FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Document Control Number FIPS_CORECRYPTO_OSX_KS_SECPOL_01.02 Version 01.02 June, 2015 Prepared for: Apple

More information

Plaintext-Recovery Attacks Against Datagram TLS

Plaintext-Recovery Attacks Against Datagram TLS Information Security Group Royal Holloway, University of London 6th Feb 2012 Contents 1 Results 2 3 4 Padding Oracle Realisation Against OpenSSL 5 Attacking the GnuTLS Implementation of DTLS 6 Results

More information

Security Requirements for Crypto Devices

Security Requirements for Crypto Devices Security Requirements for Crypto Devices Version 1.0 02 May 2018 Controller of Certifying Authorities Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology 1 Document Control Document Name Security Requirements

More information

ryptograi "ГС for Tom St Denis, Elliptic Semiconductor Inc. Simon Johnson and Author of the LibTom Project

ryptograi ГС for Tom St Denis, Elliptic Semiconductor Inc. Simon Johnson and Author of the LibTom Project for ryptograi "ГС V6 е Tom St Denis, Elliptic Semiconductor Inc. and Author of the LibTom Project Simon Johnson Contents Preface Chapter 1 Introduction 1 Introduction 2 Threat Models 3 What Is Cryptography?

More information

Encryption. INST 346, Section 0201 April 3, 2018

Encryption. INST 346, Section 0201 April 3, 2018 Encryption INST 346, Section 0201 April 3, 2018 Goals for Today Symmetric Key Encryption Public Key Encryption Certificate Authorities Secure Sockets Layer Simple encryption scheme substitution cipher:

More information

Multiple forgery attacks against Message Authentication Codes

Multiple forgery attacks against Message Authentication Codes Multiple forgery attacks against Message Authentication Codes David A. McGrew and Scott R. Fluhrer Cisco Systems, Inc. {mcgrew,sfluhrer}@cisco.com May 31, 2005 Abstract Some message authentication codes

More information

Acronyms. International Organization for Standardization International Telecommunication Union ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector

Acronyms. International Organization for Standardization International Telecommunication Union ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector Acronyms 3DES AES AH ANSI CBC CESG CFB CMAC CRT DoS DEA DES DoS DSA DSS ECB ECC ECDSA ESP FIPS IAB IETF IP IPsec ISO ITU ITU-T Triple DES Advanced Encryption Standard Authentication Header American National

More information

Assurance Activity Report

Assurance Activity Report www.gossamersec.com Assurance Activity Report (IVPNCPP14) for Oceus Networks VPN Client Version 0.6 January 19, 2017 Prepared by: Gossamer Security Solutions Accredited Security Testing Laboratory Common

More information

Category: Informational NIST August Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm

Category: Informational NIST August Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm Network Working Group Request for Comments: 5649 Category: Informational R. Housley Vigil Security M. Dworkin NIST August 2009 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm Abstract

More information

05 - WLAN Encryption and Data Integrity Protocols

05 - WLAN Encryption and Data Integrity Protocols 05 - WLAN Encryption and Data Integrity Protocols Introduction 802.11i adds new encryption and data integrity methods. includes encryption algorithms to protect the data, cryptographic integrity checks

More information

EgoSecure GmbH. EgoSecure Full Disk Encryption (FDE) Cryptographic Module. FIPS Security Policy

EgoSecure GmbH. EgoSecure Full Disk Encryption (FDE) Cryptographic Module. FIPS Security Policy EgoSecure GmbH EgoSecure Full Disk Encryption (FDE) Cryptographic Module (SW Version: 1.0) FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Document Version 2.5 06/12/2014 Copyright EgoSecure GmbH, 2014. May be reproduced only

More information

Security Policy Document Version 3.3. Tropos Networks

Security Policy Document Version 3.3. Tropos Networks Tropos Control Element Management System Security Policy Document Version 3.3 Tropos Networks October 1 st, 2009 Copyright 2009 Tropos Networks. This document may be freely reproduced whole and intact

More information

Homework 2. Out: 09/23/16 Due: 09/30/16 11:59pm UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRICAL AND COMPUTER ENGINEERING

Homework 2. Out: 09/23/16 Due: 09/30/16 11:59pm UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRICAL AND COMPUTER ENGINEERING UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRICAL AND COMPUTER ENGINEERING ENEE 457 Computer Systems Security Instructor: Charalampos Papamanthou Homework 2 Out: 09/23/16 Due: 09/30/16 11:59pm Instructions

More information

CIS 4360 Introduction to Computer Security Fall WITH ANSWERS in bold. First Midterm

CIS 4360 Introduction to Computer Security Fall WITH ANSWERS in bold. First Midterm CIS 4360 Introduction to Computer Security Fall 2010 WITH ANSWERS in bold Name:.................................... Number:............ First Midterm Instructions This is a closed-book examination. Maximum

More information

Oracle Solaris Userland Cryptographic Framework Software Version 1.0 and 1.1

Oracle Solaris Userland Cryptographic Framework Software Version 1.0 and 1.1 Oracle Solaris Userland Cryptographic Framework Software Version 1.0 and 1.1 FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Level 1 Validation Version 1.3 2014-01-08 Copyright 2014 Oracle Corporation Table

More information

Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document. Foreword

Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document. Foreword Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document PP-Module for Email Clients 2015-06-18 Version: 2.0 National Information Assurance Partnership Foreword This is a Supporting Document (SD), intended to

More information

Security. Communication security. System Security

Security. Communication security. System Security Security Communication security security of data channel typical assumption: adversary has access to the physical link over which data is transmitted cryptographic separation is necessary System Security

More information

Cryptographic Concepts

Cryptographic Concepts Outline Identify the different types of cryptography Learn about current cryptographic methods Chapter #23: Cryptography Understand how cryptography is applied for security Given a scenario, utilize general

More information

WhatsApp Encryption Overview. Technical white paper

WhatsApp Encryption Overview. Technical white paper WhatsApp Encryption Overview Technical white paper July 6, 2017 Originally published April 5, 2016 Contents Introduction................................... 3 Terms......................................

More information

IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M)

IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M) IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M) FIPS 140-2 Non Proprietary Security Policy Level 1 Validation Version 0.3 April 18, 2013 Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION... 3 1.1 PURPOSE... 3 1.2 MODULE VALIDATION

More information

Storage encryption... what about data integrity?

Storage encryption... what about data integrity? Centre for Research on Cryptography and Security Storage encryption... what about data integrity? Milan Brož mbroz@redhat.com DevConf, Brno January 28, 2017 Agenda Data integrity what it is? Encryption

More information

[MS-SSRTP]: Scale Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SSRTP) Extensions

[MS-SSRTP]: Scale Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SSRTP) Extensions [MS-SSRTP]: Scale Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SSRTP) Extensions Intellectual Property Rights Notice for Open Specifications Documentation Technical Documentation. Microsoft publishes Open Specifications

More information

Virtual Private Networks

Virtual Private Networks EN-2000 Reference Manual Document 8 Virtual Private Networks O ne of the principal features of routers is their support of virtual private networks (VPNs). This document discusses transmission security,

More information

Encrypted Data Deduplication in Cloud Storage

Encrypted Data Deduplication in Cloud Storage Encrypted Data Deduplication in Cloud Storage Chun- I Fan, Shi- Yuan Huang, Wen- Che Hsu Department of Computer Science and Engineering Na>onal Sun Yat- sen University Kaohsiung, Taiwan AsiaJCIS 2015 Outline

More information

IEEE C802.16e-04/67r1. IEEE Broadband Wireless Access Working Group <

IEEE C802.16e-04/67r1. IEEE Broadband Wireless Access Working Group < 2004-05-172004-05-17 IEEE C802.16e-04/67r1 Project Title Date Submitted IEEE 802.16 Broadband Wireless Access Working Group Enhancement of 802.16e to Support Secure EAP PKM messages

More information

Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document. Full Drive Encryption: Encryption Engine September Version 2.0

Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document. Full Drive Encryption: Encryption Engine September Version 2.0 Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document Full Drive Encryption: Encryption Engine September 2016 Version 2.0 CCDB-2016 Foreword This is a supporting document, intended to complement the Common

More information