Revealing Temporal Features of Attacks Against Smart Grid

Transcription

1 Revealing Temporal Features of Attacks Against Smart Grid Presenter: Yihai Zhu Authors: Jun Yan, Yihai Zhu, Yan Sun, Haibo He Dept. of Electrical, Computer & Biomedical Engineering University of Rhode Island

2 Outline Security Issues in Smart Grid Modeling and Formulation Temporal Features Revealed 2

3 Outline Security Issues in Smart Grid Modeling and Formulation Temporal Features Revealed 3

4 Challenges in Smart Grid Security Direct attacks - Hacking into power system control center - Bring down transmission facilities Data attacks - Intercept or manipulate data streams o False data injection on PMU/AMI Privacy attacks - Consumer data theft 4

5 Motivation for comprehensive analyses Identifying critical components Assessing the process of cascading propagation Evaluating the impact of malicious attacks from, - Spatial regions - Electrical statistics - Temporal process 5

6 Outline Security Issues in Smart Grid Modeling and Formulation Temporal Features Revealed 6

7 The simulation model Start: End: Fig.2: The flowchart of the cascading simulator 7

8 8 Modeling of Attack and Failure Attack and Load redistribution A victim (or a failed component) will be removed. Disconnection will lead to an immediate local impact o Load of a failed node will be added proportionally to all its alive neighbors ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( v L u L w L w L v N u =

9 Overloading Modeling of Attack and Failure - If the nodal load L(t) > its capacity C = T*L 0 Conceptual measurement of time - Use round as a unit of time, the duration between two consecutive failures. [1] M. Eppstein and P. Hines, A Random Chemistry algorithm for identifying multiple contingencies that initiate cascading failure, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 9

10 Modeling of Attack and Failure Accumulation of overloading and node failure - Accumulative function of rounds to identify a fatal overload Accumulation function of overloading d( n) = n k = 0 Node failure d(n) >η ( L k T * L0) Eta: overloaded by 50% for D rounds [1], where D is time-delay. [1] M. Eppstein and P. Hines, A Random Chemistry algorithm for identifying multiple contingencies that initiate cascading failure, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 10

11 Identifiable Temporal Features 11

12 Identifiable Temporal Features 3. Buffer period The interval of time between leaps Helpful when the defense strength of power grids, before which actions should be taken to avoid further blackouts. 12

13 Outline Security Issues in Smart Grid Modeling and Formulation Temporal Features Revealed 13

14 1. Benchmark power grid o Bay area (510 nodes) Experiment Setup 2. Test parameters o T = 1.1 o D = 0, 1,, 5 14

15 Temporal Features Revealed Finding nodes (substations) of interest *With D = 0 and T =

16 Case study: Temporal Features Revealed Fig.3: The change of PoF with time in the attack of Node 57 16

17 Temporal Features Revealed 17

18 Temporal Features Revealed Conclusions - Different temporal patterns of failure propagation - Impact of time delay D Potential utilization of the features - Critical moments to prevent or intervene cascading failure - Better design of redistribution policy 18

19 Acknowledgement We gratefully acknowledge the support from National Science Foundation (NSF) under Grant # CNS For more information, please contact Prof. Haibo He at he@ele.uri.edu 19

20 References 1. M. Eppstein and P. Hines, A Random Chemistry algorithm for identifying multiple contingencies that initiate cascading failure, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 27, No. 3, August J. Yan, Y. Yang, W. Wang, H. He, Y. Sun, An integrated visualization approach for smart grid attacks, IEEE Intelligent Control and Information Processing (ICICIP), Y. Zhu, Y. Sun and H. He, Load Distribution Vector Based Attack Strategies against Power Grid Systems, in IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference (GLOBECOM 2012 ), Dec W. Wang, Q. Cai, Y. Sun, and H. He, Risk-aware attacks and catastrophic cascading failures in U.S. power grid, in IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference (GLOBECOM 2011)Dec

21 Thank you! Questions? 21