The R BAC96 RBAC96 M odel Model Prof. Ravi Sandhu
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1 The RBAC96 Model Prof. Ravi Sandhu
2 WHAT IS RBAC? multidimensional open ended ranges from simple to sophisticated 2
3 WHAT IS THE POLICY IN RBAC? LBAC is policy driven: one-directional information flow in a lattice of security labels l DAC is policy driven: owner-based discretion RBAC is a framework to help in articulating policy The main point of RBAC is to facilitate security management 3
4 RBAC96 Policy neutral can be configured to do LBAC roles simulate clearances (ESORICS 96) can be configured to do DAC roles simulate identity (RBAC98) 4
5 RBAC SECURITY PRINCIPLES least privilege separation of duties separation of administration and access abstract operations 5
6 RBAC CONUNDRUM turn on all roles all the time turn on one role only at a time turn on a user-specified specified subset of roles 6
7 RBAC96 FAMILY OF MODELS RBAC3 ROLE HIERARCHIES + CONSTRAINTS RBAC1 ROLE HIERARCHIES RBAC2 CONSTRAINTS RBAC0 BASIC RBAC 7
8 RBAC0 USER-ROLE ASSIGNMENT PERMISSION-ROLE ASSIGNMENT USERS ROLES PERMISSIONS... SESSIONS 8
9 PERMISSIONS Primitive permissions read, write, append, execute Abstract permissions credit, debit, inquiry 9
10 PERMISSIONS System permissions Auditor Object permissions read, write, append, execute, credit, debit, inquiry 10
11 PERMISSIONS Permissions are positive No negative permissions or denials negative permissions and denials can be handled by constraints No duties or obligations outside scope of access control 11
12 ROLES AS POLICY A role brings together a collection of users and a collection of permissions These collections will vary over time A role has significance and meaning beyond the particular users and permissions brought together at any moment 12
13 ROLES VERSUS GROUPS Groups are often defined as a collection of users Aroleis a collection of users and a collection of permissions Some authors define role as a collection of permissions 13
14 USERS Users are human beings or other active agents Each individual should be known as exactly one user 14
15 USER-ROLE ROLE ASSIGNMENT A user can be a member of many roles Each role can have many users as members 15
16 SESSIONS A user can invoke multiple sessions In each session a user can invoke any subset of roles that the user is a member of 16
17 PERMISSION-ROLE ROLE ASSIGNMENT A permission can be assigned to many roles Each role can have many permissions 17
18 MANAGEMENT OF RBAC Option 1: USER-ROLE-ASSIGNMENT and PERMISSION-ROLE ROLE ASSIGNMENT can be changed only by the chief security officer Option 2: Use RBAC to manage RBAC 18
19 RBAC1 ROLE HIERARCHIES USER-ROLE ASSIGNMENT PERMISSION-ROLE ASSIGNMENT USERS ROLES PERMISSIONS... SESSIONS 19
20 HIERARCHICAL ROLES Primary-Care Physician Specialist Physician Physician Health-Care Provider 20
21 HIERARCHICAL ROLES Supervising Engineer Hardware Engineer Software Engineer Engineer 21
22 PRIVATE ROLES Hardware Engineer Supervising Engineer Software Engineer Hardware Engineer Software Engineer Engineer 22
23 EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY Director (DIR) Project Lead 1 (PL1) Project Lead 2 (PL2) Production 1 (P1) Quality 1 (Q1) Production 2 (P2) Quality 2 (Q2) Engineer 1 (E1) Engineer 2 (E2) PROJECT 1 Engineering Department (ED) PROJECT 2 Employee (E) 23
24 EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY Project Lead 1 Project Lead 2 (PL1) (PL2) Production 1 (P1) Quality 1 (Q1) Production 2 (P2) Quality 2 (Q2) Engineer 1 (E1) Engineer 2 (E2) PROJECT 1 Engineering Department (ED) PROJECT 2 Employee (E) 24
25 EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY Director (DIR) Project Lead 1 (PL1) Project Lead 2 (PL2) Production 1 (P1) Quality 1 (Q1) Production 2 (P2) Quality 2 (Q2) Engineer 1 (E1) Engineer 2 (E2) PROJECT 1 PROJECT 2 25
26 EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY Project Lead 1 Project Lead 2 (PL1) (PL2) Production 1 (P1) Quality 1 (Q1) Production 2 (P2) Quality 2 (Q2) Engineer 1 (E1) Engineer 2 (E2) PROJECT 1 PROJECT 2 26
27 RBAC3 ROLE HIERARCHIES USER-ROLE ASSIGNMENT PERMISSIONS-ROLE ASSIGNMENT USERS ROLES PERMISSIONS... SESSIONS CONSTRAINTS 27
28 CONSTRAINTS Mutually Exclusive Roles Static Exclusion: The same individual can never hold both roles Dynamic Exclusion: The same individual can never hold both roles in the same context 28
29 CONSTRAINTS Mutually Exclusive Permissions Static Exclusion: The same role should never be assigned both permissions Dynamic Exclusion: The same role can never hold both permissions in the same context 29
30 CONSTRAINTS Cardinality Constraints on User-Role Assignment At most k users can belong to the role At least k users must belong to the role Exactly k users must belong to the role 30
31 CONSTRAINTS Cardinality Constraints on Permissions-Role Assignment At most k roles can get the permission At least k roles must get the permission Exactly k roles must get the permission 31
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