Linux Security Usability: Restricting Programs Using SELinux, AppArmor and FBAC-LSM. Z. Cliffe Schreuders. Linux Security Summit 2010
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1 Linux Security Usability: Restricting Programs Using SELinux, AppArmor and FBAC-LSM Z. Cliffe Schreuders Linux Security Summit 2010
2 The Problem User-oriented controls typically assume processes act in the best interests of end users Vulnerable software Malware Rule-based application restrictions
3 Security and Usability Banksy
4 Usability Study SELinux Studied in terms of application restrictions AppArmor FBAC-LSM A new approach Designed to be easy to use Prototype LSM
5 Method Within subjects 39 participants Created policies to confine two programs, one legitimate and one acting maliciously Data collected included usability feedback (the System Usability Scale, SUS) and a count of the threats which were not mitigated Pilot study
6 Results: Perceived Usability All three systems were significantly different from each other
7 Results: Creation of Policies All three systems were significantly different from each other Security System Application No Policy (unconfined) Unenforced Policy (unconfined) Enforced Policy SELinux Opera (n=31) 21 (68%) 3 (10%) 7 (23%) KSirtet (n=9) 6 (67%) 1 (11%) 2 (22%) AppArmor Opera (n=38) 3 (8%) 10 (26%) 25 (66%) KSirtet (n=38) 7 (18%) 4 (11%) 27 (71%) FBAC-LSM Opera (n=39) 4 (10%) 0 (0%) 35 (90%) KSirtet (n=39) 7 (18%) 0 (0%) 32 (82%) Policy creation rates for Opera and KSirtet using SELinux, AppArmor, and FBAC-LSM
8 Results: Overall Risk Exposure All three systems were significantly different from each other
9 Results: Risk Exposure for Opera, Trojan All three systems provided similar protection when the program behaved legitimately and policies were successfully created Significant difference in the Trojan horse risk exposure with FBAC-LSM (M=5.6, SD=4.9) having a significantly lower risk exposure than AppArmor (M=15.2, SD=9.9)
10 Constructive Criticism and Suggestions Based on participant feedback Questionnaires Debriefing sessions Observations
11 Constructive Criticism: SELinux Interface Command line tools Output / policy hard to understand Expertise required / Complexity
12 Suggestions for Improving SELinux GUI tools should: cover the whole process of creating, editing, compiling and enabling policies facilitate the vetting of learned rules provide information about the practical impact of rules provide further documentation and hints
13 Suggestions for Improving SELinux Output from tools should be clearer The policy language, AVCs, and tool feedback should be simplified or other ways of viewing the information should be provided SETroubleshoot could take action to make the policy changes it suggests
14 SELinux Quirks and Flaws The polgengui tool did not inform users that the created policies start in permissive mode too many values to unpack when port numbers are specified window did not fit on low resolution displays and could not be resized
15 SELinux Quirks and Flaws Default policies should provide actual confinement, the default policy for KSirtet did not AVC denial logs were sent to one of two separate log files (messages and audit.log) The failure to log relevant denials, as was the case with Opera, should be investigated
16 Constructive Criticism: AppArmor Expertise required to vet the learnt rules Too many decisions to make Interface
17 Suggestions for Improving Clarify severity levels AppArmor Colour coding, clarify scale Provide more useful information about resources and executables Purpose, risks, recommendations Help explaining on screen elements (eg mrw )
18 Suggestions for Improving Navigate backwards Indication of progress Skip rules (to do later) AppArmor Optionally, provide rules in list format Automatically suggest globing Enforcing state should be made more obvious Have predefined templates which can be used as a starting point to develop profiles
19 FBAC-LSM Usability Features Functionality-based High level policy abstractions Parameterised to adapt to applications Automation A priori policy specification
20 FBAC-LSM Current steps to confine a program: Name Level of automation Functionalities (suggestions automated) Parameters (mostly automated) Review Apply
21 FBAC-LSM Lots of unique features Functional but unstable (kernel-side) Currently working on export to AppArmor Mostly works! Please come and talk to me about it!
22 Conclusions There are a number of opportunities to improve the usability of SELinux and AppArmor A functionality-based approach can provide significant benefits to usability and security
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