Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus
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1 Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus Hans P. Reiser 1, Rüdiger Kapitza 2 1 University of Lisboa, Portugal 2 University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany September 22, 2009
2 Overview 1 Background Why? When? Where? 2 Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus Wanted: Recovery Recovery in existing BFT algorithms Recoverable BFT: A State Model 3 Provocative Questions and Conclusions Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
3 Why? Security threats NVD, Bugtraq, etc: Countless vulnerabilities Viruses, botnets, cyber warefare: Countless attacks Pervasive IT systems Everything (incl. critical infrastructures) connected to Internet High security requirements no longer limited to traditional critical infrastructures Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
4 Why? Security threats NVD, Bugtraq, etc: Countless vulnerabilities Viruses, botnets, cyber warefare: Countless attacks Pervasive IT systems Everything (incl. critical infrastructures) connected to Internet High security requirements no longer limited to traditional critical infrastructures Current best practices cannot avoid all faults/intrusions New approaches are needed. Intrusion tolerance might be one key building block for more secure, more dependable systems. Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
5 When? I do not know. Hoping for interesting discussions :-) Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
6 When? I do not know. Hoping for interesting discussions :-) Marketing / political issue How to convince people to pay for intrusion tolerance? Quantifying the benefit? Intrusions harder to predict than traditional faults... Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
7 When? I do not know. Hoping for interesting discussions :-) Marketing / political issue How to convince people to pay for intrusion tolerance? Quantifying the benefit? Intrusions harder to predict than traditional faults... Do we still need further improvements? new research directions? Cheaper BFT? (Rüdiger s f + 1 talk) Missing functionality? (e.g., node recovery)... Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
8 Where? Where to use BFT algorithms in practice? Use it to build intrusion-tolerant systems... wherever we will find vulnerabilities & attacks (i.e., almost everywhere)... wherever we can afford the cost Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
9 Where? Where to use BFT algorithms in practice? Use it to build intrusion-tolerant systems... wherever we will find vulnerabilities & attacks (i.e., almost everywhere)... wherever we can afford the cost (don t forget diversity Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
10 Where? Where to use BFT algorithms in practice? Use it to build intrusion-tolerant systems... wherever we will find vulnerabilities & attacks (i.e., almost everywhere)... wherever we can afford the cost (don t forget diversity... and determinism) Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
11 Overview 1 Background Why? When? Where? 2 Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus Wanted: Recovery Recovery in existing BFT algorithms Recoverable BFT: A State Model 3 Provocative Questions and Conclusions Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
12 Wanted: Recovery Using BFT for building intrusion-tolerant systems Function correctly in spite of malicious intrusions Capability of reorganizing itself autonomously Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
13 Wanted: Recovery Using BFT for building intrusion-tolerant systems Function correctly in spite of malicious intrusions Capability of reorganizing itself autonomously Limitation of simple BFT algorithms Sooner or later, attackers might compromise more nodes than the system can tolerate Intrusions usually are hard to detect Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
14 Wanted: Recovery Using BFT for building intrusion-tolerant systems Function correctly in spite of malicious intrusions Capability of reorganizing itself autonomously Limitation of simple BFT algorithms Sooner or later, attackers might compromise more nodes than the system can tolerate Intrusions usually are hard to detect Wanted: Proactive Recovery Replicas should proactively be refreshed periodically, in addition to reactively repairing detected faults. Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
15 Overview 1 Background Why? When? Where? 2 Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus Wanted: Recovery Recovery in existing BFT algorithms Recoverable BFT: A State Model 3 Provocative Questions and Conclusions Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
16 Recovery in existing BFT algorithms PBFT (Castro et al.): Explicit proactive recovery support Prerequisites for proactive recovery Tamper-free device that periodically triggers recoveries Trusted component that stores private key and creates signatures Means for avoiding message replay after recovery Recovering non-faulty replica must not loose state and Recovering faulty replica must not spread wrong information Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
17 Recovery in existing BFT algorithms Algorithm TCB Recovery support PBFT yes yes Q/U no no HQ no no BFT2F no no Zyzzyva no no A2M yes maybe MinBFT yes no Table: Recovery support in BFT algorithms Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
18 Implications of prerequisites Tamper-free device that triggers recoveries Trusted component that stores private key and creates signatures Means for avoiding message replay after recovery Recovering non-faulty replica must not loose state Recovering faulty replica must not spread wrong information Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
19 Implications of prerequisites Tamper-free device that triggers recoveries Easy: External tamper-free box Trusted component that stores private key and creates signatures Means for avoiding message replay after recovery Recovering non-faulty replica must not loose state Recovering faulty replica must not spread wrong information Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
20 Implications of prerequisites Tamper-free device that triggers recoveries Easy: External tamper-free box Trusted component that stores private key and creates signatures Easy: trusted box + minor implementation changes Means for avoiding message replay after recovery Recovering non-faulty replica must not loose state Recovering faulty replica must not spread wrong information Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
21 Implications of prerequisites Tamper-free device that triggers recoveries Easy: External tamper-free box Trusted component that stores private key and creates signatures Easy: trusted box + minor implementation changes Means for avoiding message replay after recovery Session keys, changes to message format, message filtering? Recovering non-faulty replica must not loose state Recovering faulty replica must not spread wrong information Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
22 Implications of prerequisites Tamper-free device that triggers recoveries Easy: External tamper-free box Trusted component that stores private key and creates signatures Easy: trusted box + minor implementation changes Means for avoiding message replay after recovery Session keys, changes to message format, message filtering? Recovering non-faulty replica must not loose state Highly intrusive: All relevant state on persistent storage Recovering faulty replica must not spread wrong information Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
23 Implications of prerequisites Tamper-free device that triggers recoveries Easy: External tamper-free box Trusted component that stores private key and creates signatures Easy: trusted box + minor implementation changes Means for avoiding message replay after recovery Session keys, changes to message format, message filtering? Recovering non-faulty replica must not loose state Highly intrusive: All relevant state on persistent storage Recovering faulty replica must not spread wrong information Most difficult part: protocol extensions (state validation) Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
24 Observations Observations 1 Recovery requires a (± complex) trusted component 2 Recovery needs to be an integral part of a BFT algorithm 3 Recovery is not supported in most BFT algorithms Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
25 Overview 1 Background Why? When? Where? 2 Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus Wanted: Recovery Recovery in existing BFT algorithms Recoverable BFT: A State Model 3 Provocative Questions and Conclusions Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
26 State Model Figure: State transition model of a recoverable BFT algorithm Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
27 Recoverable BFT: Challenges Main challenges: Recovery trigger (* A,* C) should be synchronous Recovery operation itself (A B, C B) probably executes in weaker synchrony model Refine system model and verify correctness Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
28 Overview 1 Background Why? When? Where? 2 Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus Wanted: Recovery Recovery in existing BFT algorithms Recoverable BFT: A State Model 3 Provocative Questions and Conclusions Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
29 Questions 1 Is there a place for traditional 3f + 1 BFT without proactive recovery? Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
30 Questions 1 Is there a place for traditional 3f + 1 BFT without proactive recovery? 2 Is there a place for traditional 3f + 1 BFT with proactive recovery? Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
31 Questions 1 Is there a place for traditional 3f + 1 BFT without proactive recovery? 2 Is there a place for traditional 3f + 1 BFT with proactive recovery? Proactive recovery in any case requires (rather complex) TCB Simple TCB enables 2f + 1-consensus Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
32 Questions 1 Is there a place for traditional 3f + 1 BFT without proactive recovery? 2 Is there a place for traditional 3f + 1 BFT with proactive recovery? Proactive recovery in any case requires (rather complex) TCB Simple TCB enables 2f + 1-consensus 3 Will all practical BFT implementations be 2f + 1-BFT with a TCB? What kind of TCB (interface, funcionality)? System model? Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
33 Conclusions We need practical intrusion-tolerant systems Long-running systems require proactive recovery Most BFT papers do not consider recovery at all Recovery needs to be an integral part of BFT systems Work in progress Bridge the gap: synchronous trigger vs. asynchronous network Accurately define system model Integrate PR into existing BFT algorithms Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
34 Thank you! Questions? Hans P. Reiser (University of Lisboa) Towards Recoverable Hybrid Byzantine Consensus September 22,
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