BBC Tor Overview. Andrew Lewman March 7, Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
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1 BBC Tor Overview Andrew Lewman March 7, 2011 Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
2 What are we talking about? Crash course on anonymous communications Quick overview of Tor Quick overview of Tor Hidden Services Future directions Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
3 The Tor Project, Inc. 501(c)(3) non-profit organization dedicated to the research and development of technologies for online anonymity and privacy Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
4 What is anonymity? Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
5 Anonymity isn t cryptography Cryptography protects the contents in transit You still know who is talking to whom, how often, and how much data is sent. Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
6 Anonymity isn t steganography Attacker can tell Alice is talking to someone, how often, and how much data is sent. Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
7 Anonymity isn t just wishful thinking... You can t prove it was me! Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
8 Anonymity isn t just wishful thinking... You can t prove it was me! Promise you won t look Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
9 Anonymity isn t just wishful thinking... You can t prove it was me! Promise you won t look Promise you won t remember Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
10 Anonymity isn t just wishful thinking... You can t prove it was me! Promise you won t look Promise you won t remember Promise you won t tell Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
11 Anonymity isn t just wishful thinking... You can t prove it was me! Promise you won t look Promise you won t remember Promise you won t tell I didn t write my name on it! Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
12 Anonymity isn t just wishful thinking... You can t prove it was me! Promise you won t look Promise you won t remember Promise you won t tell I didn t write my name on it! Isn t the Internet already anonymous? Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
13 ..since weak isn t anonymity. You can t prove it was me! Proof is a very strong word. Statistical analysis allows suspicion to become certainty. Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
14 ..since weak isn t anonymity. You can t prove it was me! Proof is a very strong word. Statistical analysis allows suspicion to become certainty. Promise you won t look/remember/tell Will other parties have the abilities and incentives to keep these promises? Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
15 ..since weak isn t anonymity. You can t prove it was me! Proof is a very strong word. Statistical analysis allows suspicion to become certainty. Promise you won t look/remember/tell Will other parties have the abilities and incentives to keep these promises? I didn t write my name on it! Not what we re talking about. Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
16 ..since weak isn t anonymity. You can t prove it was me! Proof is a very strong word. Statistical analysis allows suspicion to become certainty. Promise you won t look/remember/tell Will other parties have the abilities and incentives to keep these promises? I didn t write my name on it! Not what we re talking about. Isn t the Internet already anonymous? Nope! Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
17 Anonymous communication People have to hide in a crowd of other people ( anonymity loves company ) The goal of the system is to make all users look as similar as possible, to give a bigger crowd Hide who is communicating with whom Layered encryption and random delays hide correlation between input traffic and output traffic Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
18 Low versus High-latency anonymous communication systems Tor is not the first system; ZKS, mixmaster, single-hop proxies, Crowds, Java Anon Proxy. Low-latency systems are vulnerable to end-to-end correlation attacks. High-latency systems are more resistant to end-to-end correlation attacks, but by definition, less interactive. Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
19 Low-latency systems are generally more attractive to today s user Interactive apps: web, instant messaging, VOIP, ssh, X11, cifs/nfs, video streaming (millions of users) Multi-hour delays: , nntp, blog posting? (tens of thousands of users?) Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
20 Low-latency systems are generally more attractive to today s user Interactive apps: web, instant messaging, VOIP, ssh, X11, cifs/nfs, video streaming (millions of users) Multi-hour delays: , nntp, blog posting? (tens of thousands of users?) And if anonymity loves company... Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
21 What is Tor? online anonymity software and network Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
22 What is Tor? online anonymity software and network open source, freely available (3-clause BSD license) Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
23 What is Tor? online anonymity software and network open source, freely available (3-clause BSD license) active research environment: Rice, UMN, NSF, NRL, Drexel, Waterloo, Cambridge UK, Bamberg Germany, Boston Univ, Harvard, MIT, RPI, Georgia Tech Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
24 What is Tor? online anonymity software and network open source, freely available (3-clause BSD license) active research environment: Rice, UMN, NSF, NRL, Drexel, Waterloo, Cambridge UK, Bamberg Germany, Boston Univ, Harvard, MIT, RPI, Georgia Tech increasingly diverse toolset: Tor, Torbutton, Tor Browser Bundle, TA(I)LS LiveCD, Tor Weather, Tor auto-responder, Secure Updater, Orbot, Torora, Tor Check, Arm, Nymble, Tor Control, Tor Wall, TorVM Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
25 How is Tor different from other systems? Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
26 How is Tor different from other systems? Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
27 How is Tor different from other systems? Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
28 Twitter in Iran: Good. From Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
29 Twitter in USA: Bad. from raids queens home in g20 protes.php Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
30 Who uses Tor? Normal people Law Enforcement Human Rights Activists Business Execs Militaries Abuse Victims Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
31 estimated 300k to 800k daily users Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
32 Tor hides communication patterns by relaying data through volunteer servers Tor user Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Network Web server Diagram: Robert Watson Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
33 Tor hides communication patterns by relaying data through volunteer servers Entry node Middle node Exit node Tor user Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Network Web server Diagram: Robert Watson Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
34 Tor hides communication patterns by relaying data through volunteer servers Entry node Middle node Exit node Tor user Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Network Encrypted tunnel Unencrypted TCP Web server Diagram: Robert Watson Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
35 Tor hides communication patterns by relaying data through volunteer servers Diagram: Robert Watson Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
36 Vidalia Network Map Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
37 Metrics Measuring metrics anonymously NSF grant to find out Archive of hourly consensus, ExoneraTor, VisiTor Metrics portal: Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
38 Tor hidden services allow privacy enhanced hosting of services Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
39 dot onion you say? Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
40 Hidden services, in text Distributed Hash Table (DHT) Directory Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
41 Hidden services, in text Distributed Hash Table (DHT) Directory Rendezvous points Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
42 Hidden services, in text Distributed Hash Table (DHT) Directory Rendezvous points Anonymity for both the server and client Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
43 Hidden Services, in graphics Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
44 Hidden Services, in graphics Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
45 Hidden Services, in graphics Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
46 Hidden Services, in graphics Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
47 Hidden Services, in graphics Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
48 Hidden Services, in graphics Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
49 Operating Systems leak info like a sieve Applications, network stacks, plugins, oh my... Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
50 Operating Systems leak info like a sieve Applications, network stacks, plugins, oh my... some call this sharing Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
51 Operating Systems leak info like a sieve Applications, network stacks, plugins, oh my... some call this sharing Did you know Microsoft Word and OpenOffice Writer are browsers? Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
52 Operating Systems leak info like a sieve Applications, network stacks, plugins, oh my... some call this sharing Did you know Microsoft Word and OpenOffice Writer are browsers? is a fine test Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
53 Mobile Operating Systems Entirely new set of challenges for something designed to know where you are at all times. Orbot: Tor on Android. Tor on iphone, maemo/meego, symbian, etc Tor on Windows CE, as an example. Guardian Project, Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
54 Next steps Visit for more information, links, and ideas. Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
55 Credits & Thanks who uses tor? Matt Westervelt, CC-BY-SA. danger!, hmvh, CC-BY-SA. 500k, http: // Luka Skracic, used with permission. Andrew Lewman () BBC Tor Overview March 7, / 1
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