SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX

Transcription

1 SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX S. Arnautov, B. Trach, F. Gregor, Thomas Knauth, and A. Martin, Technische Universität Dresden; C. Priebe, J. Lind, D. Muthukumaran, D. O'Keeffe, and M. Stillwell, Imperial College London; D. Goltzsche, Technische Universität Braunschweig; D. Eyers, University of Otago; R. Kapitza, Technische Universität Braunschweig; P. Pietzuch, Imperial College London; C. Fetzer, Technische Universität Dresden 1

2 Trust Issues: The Provider s Perspective Cloud provider does not trust users Use virtual machines to isolate users from each other and the host VMs only provide one way protection Redis OS VMM Firmware Cloud platform Staff trusted 2

3 Trust Issues: The User s Perspective Users trust their application Users must implicitly trust the cloud provider Existing applications implicitly assume trusted operating system Redis OS VMM Firmware Cloud platform Staff untrusted 3

4 Containers are the new VMs Containers provide resource isolation and bundling Smaller resource overhead than virtual machines Convenient tooling to create and deploy applications in the cloud 4

5 Disaster! OS VMM Firmware Cloud platform Staff untrusted 5

6 Disaster! OS VMM Firmware Cloud platform Staff untrusted 6

7 Disaster! OS VMM Firmware Cloud platform Staff untrusted 7

8 Disaster! OS VMM Firmware Cloud platform Staff untrusted 8

9 We want to OS VMM Firmware Cloud platform Staff untrusted 9

10 We want to run unmodified Linux applications OS VMM Firmware Cloud platform Staff untrusted 9

11 We want to run unmodified Linux applications OS in containers VMM Firmware Cloud platform Staff untrusted 9

12 We want to run unmodified Linux applications OS VMM Firmware Cloud platform Staff untrusted in containers in an untrusted cloud 9

13 We want to run unmodified Linux applications OS VMM Firmware Cloud platform Staff untrusted in containers in an untrusted cloud securely and 9

14 We want to run unmodified Linux applications OS VMM Firmware Cloud platform Staff untrusted in containers in an untrusted cloud securely and with acceptable performance 9

15 Secure Guard Extensions Enclave New enclave processor mode OS VMM Firmware Cloud platform Staff untrusted Users can create a HWenforced trusted environment Only trust Intel and Secure Guard Extensions (SGX) implementation 10

16 SGX: HW-enforced Security 18 new instructions to manage enclave life cycle Enclave memory only accessible from enclave Certain instructions disallowed, e.g., syscall untrusted EENTER trusted Execute Return privileged access from OS, VMM, SMM forbidden 11

17 Challenge 1: Interface Library OS inside TCB Haven (OSDI 14): library operating system in enclave Large TCB more vulnerable Small interface (22 system calls) Shields protect the interface External container interface trusted untrusted Application Code Libraries C Library Library OS Shielding layer Host OS 12

18 Challenge 1: Interface Minimal TCB Application Code Small TCB C library interface is complex Libraries Shim C Library Harder to protect C Library Host OS 13

19 Challenge 2: Performance system call frequency (1000s/second) native synchronous enclave exits pwrite() with 32 byte buffer 4 cores with hyper threading Threads

20 Challenge 2: Performance system call frequency (1000s/second) native synchronous enclave exits pwrite() with 32 byte buffer 4 cores with hyper threading Threads

21 SCONE Architecture Application Libraries SCONE module Intel SGX driver Container (cgroups) Host operating system 15

22 SCONE Architecture Enhanced C library small TCB (Challenge 1) Application Libraries SCONE C library SCONE module Intel SGX driver Container (cgroups) Host operating system 15

23 SCONE Architecture Enhanced C library small TCB (Challenge 1) Asynchronous system calls and user space threading reduce number of enclave exits (Challenge 2) Application Libraries M:N threading SCONE C library Asynchronous system calls SCONE module Intel SGX driver Container (cgroups) Host operating system 15

24 SCONE Architecture Enhanced C library small TCB (Challenge 1) Asynchronous system calls and user space threading reduce number of enclave exits (Challenge 2) Network and file system shields actively protect user data Application Libraries Network shield File system shield M:N threading SCONE C library Asynchronous system calls SCONE module Intel SGX driver Container (cgroups) Host operating system 15

25 Anatomy of a System Call enclave kernel 16

26 Anatomy of a System Call T1 read(fd, read, buf, size) enclave kernel [0] [1] [2] 17 system call slots

27 Anatomy of a System Call T1 S1 read(fd, buf, size) enclave kernel [0] [1] read, fd, buf, size [2] 18 system call slots

28 Anatomy of a System Call T1 read(fd, buf, size) enclave kernel [0] [0] [1] [2] read, fd, buf, size 19 system call slots

29 Anatomy of a System Call T1 read(fd, buf, size) enclave kernel [0] [1] read, fd, buf, size [2] 19 system call slots

30 Anatomy of a System Call T1 read(fd, buf, size) T2 read(fd, read, buf, size) enclave kernel [0] [1] read, fd, buf, size [2] 19 system call slots

31 Anatomy of a System Call T1 read(fd, buf, size) switch to ready user space thread T2 read(fd, read, buf, size) enclave kernel [0] read, fd, buf, size [1] [2] 19 system call slots

32 Anatomy of a System Call T1 read(fd, buf, size) switch to ready user space thread T2 read(fd, read, buf, size) enclave kernel [0] read, fd, buf, size [1] [2] read, fd, buf, size 19 system call slots

33 Anatomy of a System Call T1 read(fd, buf, size) switch to ready user space thread T2 read(fd, read, buf, size) enclave kernel [2] [0] [1] [2] read, fd, buf, size read, fd, buf, size 19 system call slots

34 Anatomy of a System Call T1 read(fd, buf, size) T2 read(fd, read, buf, size) enclave kernel 20 [0] [1] [2] read, fd, buf, size read, fd, buf, size system call slots

35 Anatomy of a System Call T1 read(fd, buf, size) T2 read(fd, read, buf, size) [0] [0] [1] #2&$?% read, fd, buf, size enclave kernel 20 [2] read, fd, buf, size system call slots

36 Anatomy of a System Call T1 read(fd, buf, size) switch to ready user space thread T2 read(fd, read, buf, size) enclave #2&$?% kernel [0] [0] read, fd, buf, size [1] [2] read, fd, buf, size 20 system call slots

37 Anatomy of a System Call T1 read(fd, buf, size) T2 read(fd, read, buf, size) [0] [0] [1] #2&$?% read, fd, buf, size enclave kernel 20 [2] read, fd, buf, size system call slots

38 Anatomy of a System Call T1 GET K1 read(fd, buf, size) decrypt buffer into enclave T2 read(fd, read, buf, size) enclave #2&$?% kernel [0] [0] read, fd, buf, size [1] [2] read, fd, buf, size 20 system call slots

39 Container Integration Repository Docker Engine Secure Image SCONE Client Docker Client Enclave 21

40 Container Integration Repository Docker Engine 1. push image Secure Image SCONE Client Docker Client Enclave 21

41 Container Integration Repository Docker Engine 2. run 1. push image Secure Image SCONE Client Docker Client Enclave 21

42 Container Integration 3. pull image Repository Docker Engine 2. run 1. push image Secure Image SCONE Client Docker Client Enclave 21

43 Container Integration 3. pull image Repository Docker Engine 2. run 1. push image 4. execute Secure Image SCONE Client Docker Client Enclave 21

44 Container Integration 3. pull image Repository Docker Engine 2. run Secure Image 1. push image SCONE Client Docker Client 5. secure channel 4. execute Enclave 21

45 System Call Performance native System call frequency (1000s/second) async sync pwrite() with 32 byte buffer 4 cores with hyper threading Threads

46 System Call Performance async with 1 thread achieves 80% native System call frequency (1000s/second) async sync pwrite() with 32 byte buffer 4 cores with hyper threading Threads

47 System Call Performance async with 1 thread achieves 80% optimized queue may help native System call frequency (1000s/second) async sync pwrite() with 32 byte buffer 4 cores with hyper threading Threads

48 Apache Throughput Latency (seconds) sync async glibc Throughput (requests / second) 23

49 Performance Overview Application Throughput w.r.t. native async (%) sync (%) Memcached Apache NGINX Redis

50 Performance Overview Application Throughput w.r.t. native async (%) sync (%) Memcached Apache NGINX Redis inline encryption has less overhead 24

51 Performance Overview Application Throughput w.r.t. native async (%) sync (%) Memcached Apache NGINX Redis inline encryption has less overhead 24 inline encryption hurts performance with single thread

52 Summary Small trusted computing base ( of native binary size) Low runtime overhead ( of native throughput) Transparent to the container engine (e.g. Docker) 25