Identity Mixer: From papers to pilots and beyond. Gregory Neven, IBM Research Zurich IBM Corporation
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1 Identity Mixer: From papers to pilots and beyond Gregory Neven, IBM Research Zurich
2 Motivation Online security & trust today: SSL/TLS for encryption and server authentication Username/password for client authentication Mostly self-claimed attributes (except , credit card) Server / Verifier User 2
3 Motivation Trusted attribute transfer solutions exist e.g., SAML, WS-Federation, OpenID, Facebook Connect, X.509 v3 but have privacy issues Online identity provider as Big Brother Linkability through unique identifiers or public keys Issuer Trust Verifier User 3
4 Privacy-ABCs Privacy-preserving Attribute-Based Credentials (Privacy-ABCs) generalization of pseudonym systems [Chaum 81] group signatures [Chaum-van Heyst 91] anonymous credentials [Camenisch-Lysyanskaya 01] identity escrow [Kilian-Petrank 98] minimal-disclosure tokens [Brands 99] direct anonymous attestation [Brickel-Camenisch-Chen 04] Issuer untraceable Verifier 1 unlinkable John Doe, Palo Alto User John Doe, Palo Alto Verifier 2 John Doe, Palo Alto 4
5 Overview of this talk Features of Privacy-ABCs Cryptographic realization Non-cryptographic hurdles to deployment Current status of Identity Mixer Future of Identity Mixer 5
6 Overview of this talk Features of Privacy-ABCs Cryptographic realization Non-cryptographic hurdles to deployment Current status of Identity Mixer Future of Identity Mixer 6
7 Credential issuance Credential list of attribute-value pairs issuance key Issuer issuer parameters certified by issuer (optionally) bound to user s secret key non-frameability prevent credential pooling secret key on trusted device device binding secret key credentials User Advanced issuance: carry over attributes or key from existing credentials issuer-blind attributes jointly random attributes 7
8 Presentation Presentation policy (token) requests (reveals) attribute values from credential(s) secret key User predicates over attributes attribute 1 pseudonyms =,>,< attribute 2 or constant unlinkable public key for secret key intentionally create limited linkability (e.g., account creation) re-authenticate later with secret key (no credentials) scope-exclusive pseudonym: unique pseudonym for specific scope string credentials presentation token presentation policy Verifier 8
9 Inspection aka opening, tracing, anonymity revocation, User Verifiably encrypt attribute value(s) to inspector De-anonymization in case of abuse Reveal attributes to 3 rd party e.g., credit card details to bank presentation token Verifier Many inspectors, chosen at presentation Token bound to inspection grounds inspector secret key presentation token encrypted value Inspector inspector public key 9
10 Revocation Render certain credentials unusable for presentation User Revocation authority publishes revocation parameters (public, static) revocation information (public, dynamic) Issuer-driven (global) revocation: issuer assigns revocation authority e.g., credential compromise, changed attributes non-revocation evidence & updates Verifier Verifier-driven (local) revocation: verifier assigns revocation authority e.g., exclude from service after abuse revocation secret key Revocation Authority revocation info Revocation parameters, revocation information 10
11 Overview of this talk Features of Privacy-ABCs Cryptographic realization Non-cryptographic hurdles to deployment Current status of Identity Mixer Future of Identity Mixer 11
12 Cryptographic realization [Brands 99] [Camenisch-Lysyanskaya 02] [Camenisch-Lysyanskaya 04] [Au-Susilo-Mu 06] [Pedersen 91] [Damgard-Fujisaki 02] [Boudot 00] [Groth 05] Verifiable Encryption Signatures Zero-knowledge Proofs Accumulators Commitments Set Membership Range Proofs Σ protocols [Fiat-Shamir 87] [Groth-Sahai 08] [Cramer-Shoup 98] [Camenisch-Damgard 00] [Camenisch-Shoup 03] [Camenisch- [Camensich-Chaabouni- Lysyanskaya 02] Shelat 08] [Nguyen 05] [Camensich-Kohlweiss-Soriente 09] 12
13 Two approaches Issuer Issuer User User Verifier Verifier Multi-use Damgard, Camenisch-Lysyanskaya One-time use (multi through batching) Chaum, Brands Strong RSA, pairings (LMRS, q-sdh) Related to discrete logs, RSA, 13
14 Overview of this talk Features of Privacy-ABCs Cryptographic realization Non-cryptographic hurdles to deployment Current status of Identity Mixer Future of Identity Mixer 14
15 Privacy-ABCs: the full picture Issuer credential revocation Revocation Authority credential issuance User non-revocation evidence credential revocation, revocation info Inspector presentation Verifier token inspection 15
16 Deploying Privacy-ABCs Issuer Verifiers User Anonymous communication Attribute-based access control & authorization Data-minimizing business processes Credential & pseudonym management User interfaces Privacy preferences 16
17 Technical hurdles Policy languages which (combinations of) attributes/predicates from which credentials issuance, presentation, revocation, inspection, hide cryptographic details from application developers? 17
18 Technical hurdles APIs and data formats multiple entities and methods Public-key infrastructure for issuer parameters Ontologies? urn:mynamespace:firstname = urn:yournamespace:givenname Credential backup & revocation Securing layers below cookies, browser history IP addresses, traffic analysis device fingerprinting Integration into access control frameworks Standardization 18
19 Technical hurdles to deployment User interfaces Source: Paul Trevithick ( Source: Paul Trevithick ( 19
20 Non-technical hurdles to deployment Business case: who pays for privacy? companies have inverse incentive (data mining) government/legal incentives: regulation, fines, class-action lawsuits German eid has privacy features no issuers because no verifiers and vice versa cfr. SSL: market enabler Education end users (create demand) developers, industry leaders, paradoxical features challenge intuition confusing crypto terminology (e.g., zero knowledge, witness, ) Legal issues crypto is highly patented software licenses 20
21 Overview of this talk Features of Privacy-ABCs Cryptographic realization Non-cryptographic hurdles to deployment Current status of Identity Mixer Future of Identity Mixer 21
22 Current status More research papers than can fit on this slide EU projects Open-source code Core crypto library: Credential-based policy engine: ABC4Trust reference implementation: (soon) ABC4Trust pilots Patras University: student course evaluation Soderhamn high school: pupil interaction & counselling 22
23 Overview of this talk Features of Privacy-ABCs Cryptographic realization Non-cryptographic hurdles to deployment Current status of Identity Mixer Future of Identity Mixer 23
24 What the future may bring Standards: policy languages, cryptographic formats ISO: SC17/18013 and SC27 OASIS: SAML Attribute predicate profile Better user interfaces Deploy Identity Mixer for eid, toll roads, public transportation Quantum-resistant Privacy-ABCs 24
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