Software Security Touchpoint: Architectural Risk Analysis
|
|
- Tabitha Morris
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Software Security Touchpoint: Architectural Risk Analysis Gary McGraw, Ph.D. Chief Technology Officer, Cigital
2 Founded in 1992 to provide software security and software quality professional services Recognized experts in software security and software quality Widely published in books, white papers, and articles Industry thought leaders Cigital
3 ARA in Context: State of the Practice
4 A shift from philosophy to HOW TO Integrating best practices into large organizations Microsoft s SDL Cigital s touchpoints OWASP adopts CLASP
5 What works: BSIMM Building Security In Maturity Model Real data from real initiatives
6 IMPLEMENTATION BUGS Buffer overflow String format One-stage attacks Race conditions TOCTOU (time of check to time of use) Unsafe environment variables Unsafe system calls Cross-site scripting SQL injection Two kinds of security defects ARCHITECTURAL FLAWS Misuse of cryptography Compartmentalization problems in design Privileged block protection failure (DoPrivilege()) Catastrophic security failure (fragility) Type safety confusion error Insecure auditing Broken or illogical access control (RBAC over tiers) Method over-riding problems (subclass issues) Signing too much code 50% 50%
7 The bugs/flaws continuum gets() attacker in the middle BUGS FLAWS Commercial SCA tools: Fortify, Ounce Labs, Coverity Open source tools: ITS4, RATS, grep() Architectural risk analysis Customized static rules (Fidelity)
8 Software security touchpoints
9 Architectural Risk Analysis
10 BSIMM: Ten surprising things 1. Bad metrics hurt 2. Secure-by default frameworks 3. Nobody uses WAFs 4. QA can t do software security 5. Evangelize over audit 6. ARA is hard 7. Practitioners don t talk attacks 8. Training is advanced 9. Pen testing is diminishing 10. Fuzz testing
11 Architectural Risk Analysis For more information, see 11
12 Touchpoint: Architectural risk analysis Input s Documents Exploit Graphs Attack Patterns Secure Design Literature Documents Requirements Architectural Documents Regulatory Requirements/ Industry Standards Security Analyst Perform Attack Resistance Analysis Identify General Flaws Non-Compliance Show where guidelines are not followed Map Applicable Attack Patterns Architectural Risk Analysis Activities Build One Page Architecture Overview Perform Ambiguity Analysis Ponder Design Implications Generate Separate Architecture Diagram Documents Perform Underlying Framework Weakness Analysis Find & Analyze Flaws in COTS Frameworks Network Topology Platform Identify Services Used By Application Outputs Documents Software Flaws Architectural Risk Assessment Report Start by building a onepage overview of your system Then apply the threestep process Attack resistance Ambiguity analysis Weakness analysis Documents External Resources Mailing Lists Product Documentation Attack Patterns Show Risks and Drivers in Architecture Show Viability of Known Attacks Against Analogous Technologies Unify Understanding Uncover Ambiguity Identify Downstream Difficulty (Sufficiency Analysis) Unravel Convolutions Uncover Poor Traceability Map Weaknesses to Assumptions Made by Application
13 Step one: get an architecture Forrest level view Up out of the code Widespread use of common components helps (but also has security impact!) Spring Hibernate Log4J OpenSSL Design patterns also help Touchpoint: Architectural risk analysis
14 Design diagrams need security too C h a t D a t a T i e r C h a t C S R e p I n t e r n e t Data Center B l a d e s S t o r e d P r o c s Data Center O f f i c e H e r r a O L T P A d P a r t n e r S i t e P O D W e b S e r v i c e P O D M a i n S i t e C u s t o m e r S e r v i c e A c c o u n t P r o f i l e R e v i e w S t o r e d P r o c s P r o f i l e C a s t o r S m u r f P i c k e r C h a t C l i e n t M e s s a g i n g S m u r f B r o w s e r S e a r c h T h e B r a i n S t o r e d P r o c s D e p l o y m e n t D e s c r i p t o r ASPX Pages H e l p S e c u r e S i t e P o l l u x I n t e r n e t Data Center Configuration data M a r k e t i n g E - C o m m V e r i s i g n F r e e C o n t e n t U s e r Form request F o r m V i e w F o r m User Creds A u t h e n t i c a t i o n S t a t u s User Creds A u t h e n t i c a t i o n S t a t u s I d e n t i t y S t o r e 14
15 Three steps to ARA Attack Resistance (use a CHECKLIST) Apply a list of known attacks (like STRIDE) Calculate risk-based impact Ambiguity Analysis (multiple PERSPECTIVES) Find attacks based on how the system works Expose invalid assumptions Underlying Analysis Framework Weakness Attack Resistance Analysis Ambiguity Analysis Weakness Analysis (DEPENDENCIES) Think through dependencies: toolkits and frameworks In, Over, Under, Outside 15
16 Attack resistance: build an attack checklist Understand known attacks Designers what controls are needed to prevent common attacks? Attackers what to try again Example: Microsoft SDL s STRIDE model Spoofing, tampering, repudiation, info disclosure, denial of service, elevation of privilege Start with common taxonomies 7 Pernicious Kingdoms; McGraw 19 Deadly Sins; Howard, LeBlanc, Viega 48 Attack Patterns; McGraw/Hoglund Common Weakness Enumeration 16
17 Attack resistance: common design elements Flag design elements that are historically vulnerable to attack Enterprise applications share many of the same design elements Distributed architecture Dynamic code generation and interpretation APIs across stateless protocols Rich Internet Applications Service-oriented Architecture 17
18 Example: distributed architecture risks Distributed systems are susceptible to network-based attacks Eavesdropping Tampering Spoofing Hijacking Observing Relevant Attack Patterns Interposition attacks Network sniffing Replay attacks Client (Bob) ` Fake Client Fake Server Interposition Attack ` Attacker (Eve) Server (Alice) Intercept Data Resend Data ` Attacker (Eve) ` Client (Bob) Replay Attack Server (Alice) 18
19 Ambiguity analysis: model your stuff Modeling techniques help expose an application s area of potential vulnerability Multiple points of view (and sets of experience) help Trust Modeling identifies the boundaries for security policy for function and data Data Sensitivity Modeling indentifies privacy and trust issues for application data Threat Modeling identifies the attacker s perspective and areas of weakness 19
20 Scammer Parameter Manipulation Identity Thief Hacker User 6 Internet 5 Automated Messages Backend Code Injection HTML AJAX SOP Browser Cross Site Code Injection Backend Code Injection Forged Requests Against User s Other Sites Messaging Paid Pages Search Profile Free Pages Sign Up Free Search Chemistry Hosting Data Center 2 Direct Call Member No Authorization Direct File Access 1 Chemistry Database User Identity Verifier Identity Service Member Meyer s Briggs Personality Test Direct File Access Malicious Admin Application Ex: Threat modeling Threat: agents of malicious intent Asset: function and data the threat desires Point of Attack: Design element requiring hardening and/or the method of attack 20
21 P a i d M e m b e r M e m b e r G u e s t Internet H T M L A J A X S O P Browser M e s s a g i n g Paid Pages S e a r c h P r o f i l e Free Pages Sign Up F r e e S e a r c h Chemistry Hosting Data Center M e m b e r No Authorization C h e m i s t r y Database User I d e n t i t y V e r i f i e r Identity Service M e m b e r Meyer s Briggs Personality Test A p p l i c a t i o n Ex: modeling users Threats = malicious users Like users, they have capabilities within the system Threats have a goal that usually involves subverting a security control or finding a loophole in the system 21
22 S c a m m e r I d e n t i t y T h i e f H a c k e r User 6 Internet 5 H T M L A J A X S O P Browser Assets of the User Program Control Data M e s s a g i n g Paid Pages S e a r c h P r o f i l e Free Pages Sign Up F r e e S e a r c h Chemistry Hosting Data Center 2 M e m b e r No Authorization Credentials and Keys 1 C h e m i s t r y I d e n t i t y Escalate PrivilegeV e r i f i e r Personally Identifiable Information Credit Card Database User Identity Service Program Control Data PII in Log FIles M e m b e r Meyer s Briggs Personality Test M a l i c i o u s A d m i n A p p l i c a t i o n Application s functions Sensitive data Ex: assets Data controlling the application s state Users and the assets of the other systems the users access 22
23 Scammer Parameter Manipulation Identity Thief Hacker User 6 Internet 5 Automated Messages Backend Code Injection HTML AJAX SOP Browser Cross Site Code Injection Backend Code Injection Forged Requests Against User s Other Sites Messaging Paid Pages Search Profile Free Pages Sign Up Free Search Chemistry Hosting Data Center 2 Member 2 No Authorization 3 Direct Call 4 Direct File Access 1 Chemistry Database User Identity Verifier Identity Service Member Meyer s Briggs Personality Test Direct File Access Malicious Admin Application Ex: points of attack Associate threat and assets (determine what the attacker can do) Ponder nearest, easiest targets first Designers: place controls around assets Attackers: start with direct attacks and graduate to multistep 23
24 Software is built upon layers of other software Framework analysis Application Framework (Struts/Spring) Application Application Middleware (Application Server) Operating System Language Runtime What kind of flaws exist? Known vulnerabilities in open-source or product versions Weak security controls provided with the framework Framework features that must be disabled or configured to their secure form 24
25 Framework analysis: interfaces & contracts Place components or application relative to dependencies It is important to see the relationship of an application or component with other callers of shared code and data Identify libraries and secure library versions Show runtime in diagram where there are security implications: Framework controls VM or other security sandboxes Client-side runtime 25
26 Framework security controls The application environment provides controls. What are the limitations? Cryptography Example: JCA Authentication and Authorization Example: JAAS Input Validation and Output Encoding.NET validaterequest Sandboxing JavaScript Same Origin Policy 26
27 Combine risks and rank Take all of your findings and consider business impact Rank the findings Come up with solutions See chapter 5 of Software Security
28 Code review Widespread Customized tools Training ARA Components help Apprenticeship Training Pen testing No longer solo Security testing Training Abuse cases and security requirements Training Touchpoints adoption
29 Where to Learn More
30 informit & Justice League No-nonsense monthly security column by Gary McGraw In-depth thought leadership blog from the Cigital Principals Scott Matsumoto Gary McGraw Sammy Migues Craig Miller John Steven
31 IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine + 2 Podcasts Building Security In Software Security Best Practices column edited by John Steven
32 Software Security: the book How to DO software security Best practices Tools Knowledge Cornerstone of the Addison- Wesley Software Security Series
33 Cigital s Software Security Group invents and delivers Software Quality Management For more WE NEED GREAT PEOPLE See the Addison-Wesley Software Security series Send gem@cigital.com So now, when we face a choice between adding features and resolving security issues, we need to choose security. -Bill Gates
Software Security Touchpoint: Architectural Risk Analysis
Software Security Touchpoint: Architectural Risk Analysis Gary McGraw, Ph.D. Chief Technology Officer, Cigital Cigital Founded in 1992 to provide software security and software quality professional services
More informationSoftware Security and the BSIMM
Software Security and the BSIMM Gary McGraw, Ph.D. Chief Technology Officer, Cigital Founded in 1992 to provide software security and software quality professional services Recognized experts in software
More informationSoftware Security: State of the Practice 2009
Software Security: State of the Practice 2009 Gary McGraw, Ph.D. Chief Technology Officer, Cigital Cigital Founded in 1992 to provide software security and software quality professional services Recognized
More informationDevelopment*Process*for*Secure* So2ware
Development*Process*for*Secure* So2ware Development Processes (Lecture outline) Emphasis on building secure software as opposed to building security software Major methodologies Microsoft's Security Development
More informationSecure Development Processes
Secure Development Processes SecAppDev2009 What s the problem? Writing secure software is tough Newcomers often are overwhelmed Fear of making mistakes can hinder Tend to delve into security superficially
More informationIS 2620: Developing Secure Systems. Lecture 2 Sept 8, 2017
IS 2620: Developing Secure Systems Building Security In Lecture 2 Sept 8, 2017 Recap: Trinity of trouble Three trends Connectivity Inter networked Include SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition
More informationThe Building Security In Maturity Model. Quality Assurance Perspective. Sammy Migues Principal Consultant, Cigital. Software Confidence. Achieved.
The Building Security In Maturity Model Quality Assurance Perspective Software Confidence. Achieved. Sammy Migues Principal Consultant, Cigital March 31, 2009 Breaking new ground Building Security In Maturity
More informationIS 2620: Developing Secure Systems. Building Security In Lecture 2
IS 2620: Developing Secure Systems Building Security In Lecture 2 Jan 30, 2007 Software Security Renewed interest idea of engineering software so that it continues to function correctly under malicious
More informationThreat Modeling. SecAppDev Copyright 2010 KRvW Associates, LLC
Threat Modeling SecAppDev 2010 Design flaws are major Difficult and costly to fix post facto Too costly to fix? Often made because of false assumptions Trust models Underestimate attackers Naïveté Ignorance
More informationThreat Modeling. Bart De Win Secure Application Development Course, Credits to
Threat Modeling Bart De Win bart.dewin@ascure.com Secure Application Development Course, 2009 Credits to Frank Piessens (KUL) for the slides 2 1 Overview Introduction Key Concepts Threats, Vulnerabilities,
More informationC1: Define Security Requirements
OWASP Top 10 Proactive Controls IEEE Top 10 Software Security Design Flaws OWASP Top 10 Vulnerabilities Mitigated OWASP Mobile Top 10 Vulnerabilities Mitigated C1: Define Security Requirements A security
More informationUsing Threat Modeling To Find Design Flaws
Using Threat Modeling To Find Design Flaws Introduction Jim DelGrosso Run Cigital's Architecture Analysis practice 20+ years in software development in many different domains ~15 years focusing on software
More informationSoftware Architectural Risk Analysis (SARA) Frédéric Painchaud Robustness and Software Analysis Group
Software Architectural Risk Analysis (SARA) Frédéric Painchaud Robustness and Software Analysis Group Defence Research and Development Canada Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada Canada Agenda
More informationCYSE 411/AIT 681 Secure Software Engineering. Topic #6. Seven Software Security Touchpoints (III) Instructor: Dr. Kun Sun
CYSE 411/AIT 681 Secure Software Engineering Topic #6. Seven Software Security Touchpoints (III) Instructor: Dr. Kun Sun Reading This lecture [McGraw]: Ch. 7-9 2 Seven Touchpoints 1. Code review 2. Architectural
More information4. Risk-Based Security Testing. Reading. CYSE 411/AIT 681 Secure Software Engineering. Seven Touchpoints. Application of Touchpoints
Reading This lecture [McGraw]: Ch. 7-9 CYSE 411/AIT 681 Secure Software Engineering Topic #6. Seven Software Security Touchpoints (III) Instructor: Dr. Kun Sun 2 Seven Touchpoints Application of Touchpoints
More informationSoftware Architectural Risk Analysis (SARA): SSAI Roadmap
Software Architectural Risk Analysis (SARA): SSAI Roadmap Frédéric Painchaud DRDC Valcartier / Systems of Systems November 2010 Agenda Introduction Software Architectural Risk Analysis Linking to SSAI
More informationCSWAE Certified Secure Web Application Engineer
CSWAE Certified Secure Web Application Engineer Overview Organizations and governments fall victim to internet based attacks every day. In many cases, web attacks could be thwarted but hackers, organized
More information"Charting the Course to Your Success!" Securing.Net Web Applications Lifecycle Course Summary
Course Summary Description Securing.Net Web Applications - Lifecycle is a lab-intensive, hands-on.net security training course, essential for experienced enterprise developers who need to produce secure.net-based
More informationDeveloping Secure Systems. Associate Professor
Developing Secure Systems Introduction Aug 27, 2014 James Joshi, Associate Professor Contact t James Joshi 706A, IS Building Phone: 412-624-9982 E-mail: jjoshi@mail.sis.pitt.edu Web: http://www.sis.pitt.edu/~jjoshi/courses/is2620/fall14/
More informationSecurity activities during development
Secure Programming Lecture 9: Secure Development David Aspinall, Informatics @ Edinburgh 12th February 2016 Recap We ve looked in detail at two important vulnerability classes: overflows, stack and heap
More informationSession 11: Security Policies 1
Developing Secure Software EECE 412 Session 21 What s cell phones, ATMs, air traffic control systems, emergency service systems, healthcare equipment, and PDAs have in common? Internet security incidents
More informationCopyright
1 Security Test EXTRA Workshop : ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS 1. What do you consider to be the biggest security issues with mobile phones? 2. How seriously are consumers and companies taking these threats?
More informationProtect Your Application with Secure Coding Practices. Barrie Dempster & Jason Foy JAM306 February 6, 2013
Protect Your Application with Secure Coding Practices Barrie Dempster & Jason Foy JAM306 February 6, 2013 BlackBerry Security Team Approximately 120 people work within the BlackBerry Security Team Security
More informationStudents should have an understanding and a working knowledge in the following topics, or attend these courses as a pre-requisite:
Secure Java Web Application Development Lifecycle - SDL (TT8325-J) Day(s): 5 Course Code: GK1107 Overview Secure Java Web Application Development Lifecycle (SDL) is a lab-intensive, hands-on Java / JEE
More informationThreat analysis. Tuomas Aura CS-C3130 Information security. Aalto University, autumn 2017
Threat analysis Tuomas Aura CS-C3130 Information security Aalto University, autumn 2017 Outline What is security Threat analysis Threat modeling example Systematic threat modeling 2 WHAT IS SECURITY 3
More informationApplication Security Design Principles. What do you need to know?
Application Security Design Principles What do you need to know? Anshu Gupta Bio Director of Information Security at HelloSign, a leading esignature company. Served as a trusted advisor on information
More informationW e b A p p l i c a t i o n S e c u r i t y : T h e D e v i l i s i n t h e D e t a i l s
W e b A p p l i c a t i o n S e c u r i t y : T h e D e v i l i s i n t h e D e t a i l s Session I of III JD Nir, Security Analyst Why is this important? ISE Proprietary Agenda About ISE Web Applications
More informationSoftware Security Initiatives for Information Security Officers Marco Morana OWASP Cincinnati Chapter OWASP ISSA Cincinnati Chapter Meeting
Software Security Initiatives for Information Security Officers Marco Morana OWASP Cincinnati Chapter OWASP ISSA Cincinnati Chapter Meeting July 14 th 2010 Copyright 2010 - The OWASP Foundation Permission
More informationMobile Malfeasance. Exploring Dangerous Mobile Code. Jason Haddix, Director of Penetration Testing
Mobile Malfeasance Exploring Dangerous Mobile Code Jason Haddix, Director of Penetration Testing Copyright 2012 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to
More informationBank Infrastructure - Video - 1
Bank Infrastructure - 1 05/09/2017 Threats Threat Source Risk Status Date Created Account Footprinting Web Browser Targeted Malware Web Browser Man in the browser Web Browser Identity Spoofing - Impersonation
More informationTHREAT MODELING IN SOCIAL NETWORKS. Molulaqhooa Maoyi Rotondwa Ratshidaho Sanele Macanda
THREAT MODELING IN SOCIAL NETWORKS Molulaqhooa Maoyi Rotondwa Ratshidaho Sanele Macanda INTRODUCTION Social Networks popular web service. 62% adults worldwide use social media 65% of world top companies
More informationSecurity Testing White Paper
Security Testing White Paper Table of Contents 1. Introduction... 3 2. Need for Security Testing... 4 3. Security Testing Framework... 5 3.1 THREAT ANALYSIS... 6 3.1.1 Application Overview... 8 3.1.2 System
More informationInstructions 1 Elevation of Privilege Instructions
Instructions 1 Elevation of Privilege Instructions Draw a diagram of the system you want to threat model before you deal the cards. Deal the deck to 3-6 players. Play starts with the 3 of Tampering. Play
More informationDeveloping Secure Systems. Introduction Aug 30, James Joshi, Professor, SCI
Developing Secure Systems Introduction Aug 30, 2017 James Joshi, Professor, SCI Contact James Joshi 706A, IS Building Phone: 412-624-9982 E-mail: jjoshi@mail.sis.pitt.edu Web: http://www.sis.pitt.edu/~jjoshi/courses/is2620/fall17/
More informationInstructions 1. Elevation of Privilege Instructions. Draw a diagram of the system you want to threat model before you deal the cards.
Instructions 1 Elevation of Privilege Instructions Draw a diagram of the system you want to threat model before you deal the cards. Deal the deck to 3 6 players. Play starts with the 3 of Tampering. Play
More information90% of data breaches are caused by software vulnerabilities.
90% of data breaches are caused by software vulnerabilities. Get the skills you need to build secure software applications Secure Software Development (SSD) www.ce.ucf.edu/ssd Offered in partnership with
More informationDeveloping Secure Software. Vulnerability Report Statistics
T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F B R I T I S H C O L U M B I A Developing Secure Software Copyright 2004-2007 Konstantin Beznosov Vulnerability Report Statistics 2 Session 11: Policies 1 Outline Why developing
More informationOWASP Top 10 The Ten Most Critical Web Application Security Risks
OWASP Top 10 The Ten Most Critical Web Application Security Risks The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is an open community dedicated to enabling organizations to develop, purchase, and maintain
More informationCourse 834 EC-Council Certified Secure Programmer Java (ECSP)
Course 834 EC-Council Certified Secure Programmer Java (ECSP) Duration: 3 days You Will Learn How To Apply Java security principles and secure coding practices Java Security Platform, Sandbox, JVM, Class
More informationDeveloping Secure Software
T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F B R I T I S H C O L U M B I A Developing Secure Software EECE 412 Session 21 Copyright 2004 Konstantin Beznosov T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F B R I T I S H C O L U M B I A
More informationThreat Modeling for System Builders and System Breakers!! Dan Copyright 2014 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved
Threat Modeling for System Builders and System Breakers!! Dan Cornell! @danielcornell Dan Cornell Dan Cornell, founder and CTO of Denim Group Software developer by background (Java,.NET, etc) OWASP San
More informationCertified Secure Web Application Engineer
Certified Secure Web Application Engineer ACCREDITATIONS EXAM INFORMATION The Certified Secure Web Application Engineer exam is taken online through Mile2 s Assessment and Certification System ( MACS ),
More informationWeb 2.0, Consumerization, and Application Security
Web 2.0, Consumerization, and Application Security Chenxi Wang, Ph.D. Principal Analyst Forrester Research OWASP, New York City September 25, 2008 Today s enterprises face multitude of challenges Business-driven
More informationOWASP March 19, The OWASP Foundation Secure By Design
Secure By Design March 19, 2014 Rohini Sulatycki Senior Security Consultant Trustwave rsulatycki@trustwave.com Copyright The Foundation Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document
More informationSECURITY TRAINING SECURITY TRAINING
SECURITY TRAINING SECURITY TRAINING Addressing software security effectively means applying a framework of focused activities throughout the software lifecycle in addition to implementing sundry security
More informationDrone /12/2018. Threat Model. Description. Threats. Threat Source Risk Status Date Created
Drone - 2 04/12/2018 Threat Model Description Threats Threat Source Risk Status Date Created Mobile Phone: Sensitive Data Leakage Smart Devices Mobile Phone: Session Hijacking Smart Devices Mobile Phone:
More informationThreat Modeling For Secure Software Design
Threat Modeling For Secure Software Design 2016 Central Ohio InfoSec Summit March 29, 2016 Robert Hurlbut RobertHurlbut.com @RobertHurlbut Robert Hurlbut Software Security Consultant, Architect, and Trainer
More informationWeb Application Penetration Testing
Web Application Penetration Testing COURSE BROCHURE & SYLLABUS Course Overview Web Application penetration Testing (WAPT) is the Security testing techniques for vulnerabilities or security holes in corporate
More informationThe Need for Confluence
The Need for Confluence The Essential Role of Incident Response in Secure Software Development Why do security incidents occur? What is the root cause? Faulty software (more often than not) What is the
More informationUsing and Customizing Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool 2016
Using and Customizing Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool 2016 Boston Code Camp 27 March 25, 2017 Robert Hurlbut RobertHurlbut.com @RobertHurlbut Boston Code Camp 27 - Thanks to our Sponsors! Platinum Gold
More informationHow To Make Threat Modeling Work For You
How To Make Threat Modeling Work For You Strategic Approaches to Real-World Architecture Challenges O Reilly Software Architecture Online Conference March 1, 2016 Robert Hurlbut Robert Hurlbut Software
More informationSecure Application Development. OWASP September 28, The OWASP Foundation
Secure Application Development September 28, 2011 Rohini Sulatycki Senior Security Consultant Trustwave rsulatycki@trustwave.com Copyright The Foundation Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or
More informationTexas Regional Infrastructure Security Conference (TRISC) Dan Cornell
Securing the SDLC: A Case Study Texas Regional Infrastructure Security Conference (TRISC) 2008 Dan Cornell April 22, 2008 Agenda Denim Group introduction and background The problem: Integrate security
More informationAguascalientes Local Chapter. Kickoff
Aguascalientes Local Chapter Kickoff juan.gama@owasp.org About Us Chapter Leader Juan Gama Application Security Engineer @ Aspect Security 9+ years in Appsec, Testing, Development Maintainer of OWASP Benchmark
More informationEndpoint Security - what-if analysis 1
Endpoint Security - what-if analysis 1 07/23/2017 Threat Model Threats Threat Source Risk Status Date Created File Manipulation File System Medium Accessing, Modifying or Executing Executable Files File
More informationThreat Modeling Using STRIDE
Threat Modeling Using STRIDE By: Girindro Pringgo Digdo, M.T., CSX-F http://www.girindropringgodigdo.net/ girindigdo@gmail.com 1 About Dealing with Information Security Fields: VAPT Generate New Attack
More informationThe Attacker s POV Hacking Mobile Apps. in Your Enterprise to Reveal Real Vulns and Protect the Business. Tony Ramirez
The Attacker s POV Hacking Mobile Apps in Your Enterprise to Reveal Real Vulns and Protect the Business Tony Ramirez AGENDA & SPEAKERS Introduction Attacks on Mobile Live Demo Recommendations Q&A Tony
More informationC and C++ Secure Coding 4-day course. Syllabus
C and C++ Secure Coding 4-day course Syllabus C and C++ Secure Coding 4-Day Course Course description Secure Programming is the last line of defense against attacks targeted toward our systems. This course
More informationProduct Security Program
Product Security Program An overview of Carbon Black s Product Security Program and Practices Copyright 2016 Carbon Black, Inc. All rights reserved. Carbon Black is a registered trademark of Carbon Black,
More informationArticle Summary of: Understanding Cloud Computing Vulnerabilities. Michael R. Eldridge
Article Summary of: Understanding Cloud Computing Vulnerabilities Michael R. Eldridge April 14, 2016 2 Introduction News stories abound about the almost daily occurrence of break-ins and the stealing of
More informationWhiteboard Hacking / Hands-on Threat Modeling. Introduction
Whiteboard Hacking / Hands-on Threat Modeling Introduction Sebastien Deleersnyder 5 years developer experience 15+ years information security experience Application security consultant Toreon Belgian OWASP
More informationRiskSense Attack Surface Validation for Web Applications
RiskSense Attack Surface Validation for Web Applications 2018 RiskSense, Inc. Keeping Pace with Digital Business No Excuses for Not Finding Risk Exposure We needed a faster way of getting a risk assessment
More informationProvide you with a quick introduction to web application security Increase you awareness and knowledge of security in general Show you that any
OWASP Top 10 Provide you with a quick introduction to web application security Increase you awareness and knowledge of security in general Show you that any tester can (and should) do security testing
More informationHow Threat Modeling Can Improve Your IAM Solution
How Threat Modeling Can Improve Your IAM Solution John Fehan Senior Consultant OpenSky Corporation October 2 nd, 2015 Agenda Evolution of Identity and Access Management (IAM) Solutions An sample IAM contextual
More informationOWASP InfoSec Romania 2013
OWASP InfoSec Romania 2013 Secure Development Lifecycle, The good, the bad and the ugly! October 25 th 2013 Martin Knobloch OWASP Netherlands Chapter Leader Applications are about information! 3 pillars
More informationMicrosoft SDL 한국마이크로소프트보안프로그램매니저김홍석부장. Security Development Lifecycle and Building Secure Applications
Release Conception Microsoft SDL Security Development Lifecycle and Building Secure Applications KRnet 2010 2010. 6. 22. 한국마이크로소프트보안프로그램매니저김홍석부장 Hongseok.Kim@microsoft.com Agenda Applications under Attack
More informationIANS Pragmatic Threat Modeling. Michael Pinch, IANS Faculty
IANS Pragmatic Threat Modeling Michael Pinch, IANS Faculty Agenda What Is Threat Modeling? Who Should Be Considering Threat Modeling? Methodologies for Threat Modeling Common Pitfalls Introduction of IANS
More informationDeveloping Secure Software!
T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F B R I T I S H C O L U M B I A! Developing Secure Software! Copyright 2004-2007 Konstantin Beznosov 2! Vulnerability Report Statistics Outline!!! Why developing secure software
More informationApplication Security through a Hacker s Eyes James Walden Northern Kentucky University
Application Security through a Hacker s Eyes James Walden Northern Kentucky University waldenj@nku.edu Why Do Hackers Target Web Apps? Attack Surface A system s attack surface consists of all of the ways
More informationUnit Level Secure by Design Approach
Unit Level Secure by Design Approach Abstract Authors: Vasantharaju MS & Joshua Cajetan Rebelo Vasantharaju_MS@McAfee.com Joshua.Rebelo@Siemens.com With cyber-attacks on the rise and high-profile breaches
More informationWeb Applications (Part 2) The Hackers New Target
Web Applications (Part 2) The Hackers New Target AppScan Source Edition Terence Chow Advisory Technical Consultant An IBM Rational IBM Software Proof of Technology Hacking 102: Integrating Web Application
More informationA Security Practice Evaluation Framework
A Security Practice Evaluation Framework Patrick Morrison Advisor: Dr. Laurie Williams North Carolina State University A Security Practice Evaluation Framework Design, Development, & Deployment create
More informationOWASP 5/07/09. The OWASP Foundation OWASP Static Analysis (SA) Track Session 1: Intro to Static Analysis
Static Analysis (SA) Track Session 1: Intro to Static Analysis Eric Dalci Cigital edalci at cigital dot com 5/07/09 Copyright The Foundation Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this
More informationBuilding Security Into Applications
Building Security Into Applications Cincinnati Chapter Meetings Marco Morana Chapter Lead Blue Ash, July 30 th 2008 Copyright 2008 The Foundation Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify
More information10 FOCUS AREAS FOR BREACH PREVENTION
10 FOCUS AREAS FOR BREACH PREVENTION Keith Turpin Chief Information Security Officer Universal Weather and Aviation Why It Matters Loss of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) Loss of Intellectual
More informationCOMPUTER NETWORK SECURITY
COMPUTER NETWORK SECURITY Prof. Dr. Hasan Hüseyin BALIK (1 st Week) Outline Course Information and Policies Course Syllabus 1. Overview Course Information Instructor: Prof. Dr. Hasan H. BALIK, balik@yildiz.edu.tr,
More informationSecure Programming Techniques
Secure Programming Techniques Meelis ROOS mroos@ut.ee Institute of Computer Science Tartu University spring 2014 Course outline Introduction General principles Code auditing C/C++ Web SQL Injection PHP
More informationSANS Institute , Author retains full rights.
Steven F Burns GIAC Security Essentials Certification (GSEC) Practical Assignment Version 1.4c Threat Modeling: A Process To Ensure Application Security January 5, 2005 Abstract This paper discusses the
More informationSolutions Business Manager Web Application Security Assessment
White Paper Solutions Business Manager Solutions Business Manager 11.3.1 Web Application Security Assessment Table of Contents Micro Focus Takes Security Seriously... 1 Solutions Business Manager Security
More informationVulnerabilities in online banking applications
Vulnerabilities in online banking applications 2019 Contents Introduction... 2 Executive summary... 2 Trends... 2 Overall statistics... 3 Comparison of in-house and off-the-shelf applications... 6 Comparison
More informationSAP Security. BIZEC APP/11 Version 2.0 BIZEC TEC/11 Version 2.0
Welcome BIZEC Roundtable @ IT Defense, Berlin SAP Security BIZEC APP/11 Version 2.0 BIZEC TEC/11 Version 2.0 February 1, 2013 Andreas Wiegenstein CTO, Virtual Forge 2 SAP Security SAP security is a complex
More informationWeb 2.0 and AJAX Security. OWASP Montgomery. August 21 st, 2007
Web 2.0 and AJAX Security OWASP Montgomery August 21 st, 2007 Overview Introduction Definition of Web 2.0 Basics of AJAX Attack Vectors for AJAX Applications AJAX and Application Security Conclusions 1
More informationSecurity Communications and Awareness
Security Communications and Awareness elearning OVERVIEW Recent high-profile incidents underscore the need for security awareness training. In a world where your employees are frequently exposed to sophisticated
More informationHacking by Numbers OWASP. The OWASP Foundation
Hacking by Numbers OWASP Tom Brennan WhiteHat Security Inc. tom.brennan@whitehatsec.com 973-506-9303 skype: jinxpuppy Copyright The OWASP Foundation Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify
More informationGerman OWASP Day 2016 CarIT Security: Facing Information Security Threats. Tobias Millauer
German OWASP Day 2016 CarIT Security: Facing Information Security Threats Tobias Millauer Daimler Business Units German OWASP Day 2016 CarIT Security: Facing Information Security Threats Tobias Millauer
More informationTest Harness for Web Application Attacks
IJSRD National Conference on Advances in Computer Science Engineering & Technology May 2017 ISSN: 2321-0613 Test Harness for Web Application Attacks Kishan Chudasama 1 Mr. Girish Khilari 2 Mr. Suresh Sikka
More informationSecuring Web Applications. Architecture Alternatives. Web Application Security Roadmap. Defense in Depth. Defense in Depth
V User Terminal Key Secure Storage Personal Computers AntiVirus Certificate Mgmt Authority :::::: Multiplexor Securing Web Applications Jennifer L. Bayuk jennifer@bayuk.com www.bayuk.com 1 Mainframe Wireless
More informationThreat Modeling OWASP. The OWASP Foundation Martin Knobloch OWASP NL Chapter Board
Threat Modeling Martin Knobloch martin.knobloch@owasp.org NL Chapter Board Global Education Committee Education Project Copyright The Foundation Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify
More informationSecurity Philosophy. Humans have difficulty understanding risk
Android Security Security Philosophy Humans have difficulty understanding risk Safer to assume that Most developers do not understand security Most users do not understand security Security philosophy
More informationMARCH Secure Software Development WHAT TO CONSIDER
MARCH 2017 Secure Software Development WHAT TO CONSIDER Table of Content Introduction... 2 Background... 3 Problem Statement... 3 Considerations... 4 Planning... 4 Start with security in requirements (Abuse
More informationExcerpts of Web Application Security focusing on Data Validation. adapted for F.I.S.T. 2004, Frankfurt
Excerpts of Web Application Security focusing on Data Validation adapted for F.I.S.T. 2004, Frankfurt by fs Purpose of this course: 1. Relate to WA s and get a basic understanding of them 2. Understand
More information113 BSIMM Activities at a Glance
113 BSIMM Activities at a Glance (Red indicates most observed BSIMM activity in that practice) Level 1 Activities Governance Strategy & Metrics (SM) Publish process (roles, responsibilities, plan), evolve
More informationCyberSecurity. Penetration Testing. Penetration Testing. Contact one of our specialists for more information CYBERSECURITY SERVICE DATASHEET
DATASHEET Gavin, Technical Director Ensures Penetration Testing Quality CyberSecurity Penetration Testing CHESS CYBERSECURITY CREST-ACCREDITED PEN TESTS PROVIDE A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF YOUR ORGANISATION
More informationDeveloping Secure Applications with OWASP OWASP. The OWASP Foundation Martin Knobloch
Developing Secure Applications with OWASP Martin Knobloch martin.knobloch@owasp.org OWASP OWASP NL Chapter Board OWASP Global Education Committee Chair Copyright The OWASP Foundation Permission is granted
More informationWeb Applications Part 1 The Weak Link in Information Security Your Last Line of Defense
Web Applications Part 1 The Weak Link in Information Security Your Last Line of Defense Anthony Lim MBA FCITIL CISSP CSSLP Director, Security Rational Software - Asia Pacific 1 Hong Kong 17 Nov 2009 Welcome
More informationGUI based and very easy to use, no security expertise required. Reporting in both HTML and RTF formats - Click here to view the sample report.
Report on IRONWASP Software Product: IronWASP Description of the Product: IronWASP (Iron Web application Advanced Security testing Platform) is an open source system for web application vulnerability testing.
More informationTable of Contents Computer Based Training - Security Awareness - General Staff AWA 007 AWA 008 AWA 009 AWA 010 AWA 012 AWA 013 AWA 014 AWA 015
Table of Contents Computer Based Training - Security Awareness - General Staff AWA 007 - Information Privacy and Security Awareness for Executives (Duration: 45 minutes)...1 AWA 008 - Information Privacy
More informationOWASP TOP Release. Andy Willingham June 12, 2018 OWASP Cincinnati
OWASP TOP 10 2017 Release Andy Willingham June 12, 2018 OWASP Cincinnati Agenda A quick history lesson The Top 10(s) Web Mobile Privacy Protective Controls Why have a Top 10? Software runs the world (infrastructure,
More informationTop 10 Database Security Threats and How to Stop Them. Rob Rachwald Director of Security Strategy
Top 10 Database Security Threats and How to Stop Them Rob Rachwald Director of Security Strategy Data Has Value Data Has Value Top 7 Attacks Discussed in Hacker Forums 11% 9% 12% 12% 15% 21% 20% dos/ddos
More informationWeb insecurity Security strategies General security Listing of server-side risks Language specific security. Web Security.
Web Security Web Programming Uta Priss ZELL, Ostfalia University 2013 Web Programming Web Security Slide 1/25 Outline Web insecurity Security strategies General security Listing of server-side risks Language
More information