UAS Operation in National Air Space (NAS) Secure UAS Command and Control

Transcription

1 UAS Operation in National Air Space (NAS) Secure UAS Command and Control Dr. Randal Sylvester Division Chief Technologist L3 CSW 26 October 2015 This information consists of L-3 Communications Corporation, Communication Systems-West Division general capabilities information that does not contain controlled technical data as defined within the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) Part or Export Administration Regulations (EAR) Part

2 Examples of L3 CSW UAS Communication Programs Communications for over 650 UAVs 3.7+ million flight hours (on just three of the larger platforms) 2

3 Unique Characteristics of UAVs Small, hand-carried and/or handlaunched systems (e.g., the Raven) utilize LOS communications, while large aircraft (e.g., the Predator, Reaper, Gray Eagle, and Global Hawk) utilize both LOS and BLOS communications Small UAS (< 20 lbs) communication utilize the Armydeveloped digital data link (DDL) system. The DDL design incorporates aspects of a software-defined radio with the ability to field-select the frequency band in which to operate, the channel frequency within that band, the bandwidth of each channel, and the radiated power level. Larger UAS operating LOS incorporate the common data link (CDL) that has been mandated for use in ISR platforms. * *Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY

4 Command and Control Methods Remotely piloted Line-of-Sight (LOS) Beyond Line-of-Sight (BLOS) Automatically piloted Automatic take off and landing Most of the current inventory of DoD unmanned aircraft land themselves with very limited human interaction while still operating under the control of a human and perform this function with greater accuracy, fewer accidents, and less training than a humanintensive process Programmed flight pattern Autonomous flight control (able to make decisions and react without human intervention) Hybrid Mix of remote piloting and automatic control 4

5 Major Themes Convergence Collaboration Cybersecurity Convergence of Government, Defense and Commercial Needs How will commercial innovation efforts collaborate with the Government? Does Massive Scale = Massive Vulnerability? from MITRE 5

6 FAA: Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS) Roadmap* Goals No reduction in current capacity No decrease in safety No negative impact to current operators No increase in risk to airspace users or persons and property on the ground Proposed Applications Security awareness Disaster response, including rescue support Communications and broadcast Cargo transport Spectral and thermal analysis Critical infrastructure monitoring (power plants, ports, pipelines, etc.) Commercial photography, aerial mapping and charting, advertising National Security Issues Security vetting for UAS-related personnel Cyber and communications vulnerabilities Maintain/enhance air defense and air domain awareness *First Edition 2013 FAA 6

7 UAS : Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY Five of the many unmanned issues that required departmental consideration include: Autonomy Make decisions and react without human intervention Data protection Encryption of UAS C2 and data links is critical for protecting UAS operations, ISR, and other communicated information Future encryption solutions will contain products that have a quicker time to market, greater coalition interoperability, and improved key management. Data exploitation Selective innovation Innovation must continue Manned-Unmanned System Teaming (MUM-T) 7

8 Similar roadmap goals/challenges FAA DoD Development of an appropriate C2 link between the UAS and the control station Ensure that the pilot always maintains a threshold level of control of the aircraft Determine values for latency, availability, integrity, continuity, etc. Spectrum identification requires global coordination Protection against intended and unintended jamming, RF interference, link take over and spoofing Frequency management Modeling and Simulation Validate current mitigation proposals Establish a baseline of end-to-end UAS performance measures Establish thresholds for safe and efficient introduction of UAS into the NAS Unmanned systems must Be more survivable with improved and resilient communications, development for antipermissive environments, and more security from tampering. Be more effective through greater automation and greater performance. (Autonomy/Cognitive Behavior) Provide capabilities more efficiently through modularity and interoperability. Challenges: Communication link security Radio frequency spectrum availability Deconfliction of frequencies and bandwidth Network infrastructure Link ranges 8

9 Remotely Piloted UAS C2 Threat Space Data Monitoring / Detection BLOS Forward Link Jamming Data Interception / Detection BLOS Return Link Jamming GPS Denial / Spoofing Cyber Attack (Satellite) Launch & Recovery Denial Cyber Attack (UAS) LOS Jamming Malware Kinetic Attack * Derived from The Future of MILSATCOM, pg 13. Todd Harrison, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, July

10 Convergence The trends commoditizing wireless are also converging defense-specific and commercial architectures Cost, Coverage, Capacity The more modular and abstracted the HW/SW interfaces, the easier to adapt it for military operations Added security, jamming resistance, detection resistance, etc The military will become increasingly selective as to where it deploys unique communications assets Convergence goes in both directions witness the increased interest in UAV-based internet 10

11 Cyber NAS Problem Set Strategic ENDS: Protect Air Traffic Control (ATC) information systems and C2 Secure aircraft avionics used to guide aircraft MEANS: Balance cyber investment Defend critical computing systems Integrate security controls Secure communication channels WAYS: Defense-in-depth concept that evolves as new capabilities and mediums enter cyberspace 11

12 Potential Areas for Collaboration Communication architecture Spectrum sharing/usage Waveform Reliability Security Identity Navigation availability and reliability (need for true location) GPS compromised detection/adaptation GPS denied adaptation Cyber Security Development and verification of autonomy algorithms Test and Evaluation: As unmanned systems become more complicated, more integrated, more collaborative, and more autonomous, establishing test-driven development constructs and infrastructure for supporting early-onset test and evaluation (T&E) and life-cycle 12

13 Complex Network System Test and Evaluation Communication Network Effects Simulator (CNES) Hardware-in-the-Loop Simulation Allows Verification and Post Analysis 13

14 Examples of Existing and Emerging Technology Communication architecture Spectrum sharing/usage: wide band multi-directional antennas, frequency agile RF front ends, spectrum sensing, dynamic spectrum access, higher frequencies, optical Waveform: adaptive modulation and coding, bandwidth efficient, LPD, AJ Reliability: redundancy, ad-hoc networking, disruption tolerant networking, dynamic network management Security: encryption, key management, trusted sources Identity: verification strategies Navigation availability and reliability (need for true location) GPS compromised detection/adaptation: alternate geolocation methods, ultra-cold atom interferometers, precision INS, SAASM GPS GPS denied adaptation: alternate geo-location methods 14

15 Contact information: Dr. Randy Sylvester Division Chief Technologist L3 Communication Systems West 15

16 NAS Cyber Problem Set Defense in Depth Active defense in depth requires an effective mix of redundancy, diversity, and fractionation (i.e., distributed functionality) Minimize system risk by reducing attack surfaces, segregation of critical mission systems, and attack containment Establish autonomous compromise detection and repair (self healing) and real-time response to threats Integrate rapid cyber maneuver enabled by dynamic, randomizable, reconfigurable architectures 16