An Incident Management Ontology
|
|
- Emil Hicks
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 An Incident Management Ontology Presenter - Samuel Perl Co-Authors - David Mundie, Robin Ruefle, Audrey Dorofee, Matthew Collins, John McCloud 2014 Carnegie Mellon University
2 Copyright 2014 Carnegie Mellon University and IEEE This material is based upon work funded and supported by the Department of Defense under Contract No. FA C-0003 with Carnegie Mellon University for the operation of the Software Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development center. NO WARRANTY. THIS CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY AND SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE MATERIAL IS FURNISHED ON AN AS-IS BASIS. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY MAKES NO WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, AS TO ANY MATTER INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR PURPOSE OR MERCHANTABILITY, EXCLUSIVITY, OR RESULTS OBTAINED FROM USE OF THE MATERIAL. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DOES NOT MAKE ANY WARRANTY OF ANY KIND WITH RESPECT TO FREEDOM FROM PATENT, TRADEMARK, OR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT. This material has been approved for public release and unlimited distribution. This material may be reproduced in its entirety, without modification, and freely distributed in written or electronic form without requesting formal permission. Permission is required for any other use. Requests for permission should be directed to the Software Engineering Institute at permission@sei.cmu.edu. CERT is a registered mark of Carnegie Mellon University. DM
3 Need for a common language The JASON Program within MITRE looked at practices in the scientific community for ways to make cybersecurity more scientific 1 They concluded the most important elements the community should adopt are A common language A set of basic concepts Developing a shared understanding In other words, an ontology. 1 JASON is an independent group of scientists which advises the US government on matters of science and technology [Wikipedia] 3
4 The Incident Management Meta-Model In previous work, we created a Meta-Model to capture the essential processes involved in Incident Management. The Meta-Model Was built using 10 standards for incident management including ISO and NIST Has 18 high-level incident management tasks Was organized by IM phases - Prepare, Protect, and Respond. Also included 5 crosscutting capabilities Was the heart of our Incident Management Body of Knowledge (IMBOK) 4
5 IMBOK Meta-Model Phases & Tasks Prepare Develop trusted relationships with external experts Provide staff appropriate education and training Develop policies, processes, procedures Measure incident management performance Provide constituents with security education, training, and awareness Develop an incident response strategy and plan Improve defenses Monitor and Detect Assist constituents with correcting problems identified by vulnerability assessment activities Detect and report events Monitor networks and information systems for security Perform risk assessments and vulnerability assessments on constituent systems Respond Triage Incident Collect and preserve evidence Restore and validate the system Perform a postmortem review of incident management actions Integrate lessons learned with problem management process Analyze incident, including artifacts, causes, and correlations Determine and remove the cause of the incident Crosscuts (across all) Manage information Properly handle collected evidence following best practices Manage the incident management team Communicate incidents Track and document incidents from initial detection through final resolution 5
6 IMBOK Meta-Model Drawbacks The IMBOK suffers in its knowledge representation : Tasks are not directly linked to their subjects Natural language makes machine processing difficult No direct way to perform modeling and simulation Trades detail for simplicity Combines concepts 6
7 An Ontology Overcomes the Drawbacks Converting the Meta-Model to a formal Ontology overcomes these issues Separating entities from relationships allows tasks to be directly linked to their subjects Using classes and relationships ensures complete representation of knowledge The representation is machine-processable Ontologies are already used to model, simulate and construct applications A class hierarchy allows representation of concepts at any needed detail Annotations make the ontology usable as a dictionary No pressure to collapse concepts OWL is widely used in the semantic web community 7
8 Our Method To build our IM ontology: We decomposed 18 high-level tasks in the IMBOK meta-model into component concepts and their respective relationships. We organized the concepts into a hierarchy of subclasses. We developed the relationships among classes from the incident management tasks. We separated classes from relationships 8
9 Our Method for N-ary Relationships Many of the relationships we want to model in incident management are "n-ary" relationships among more than just two objects. We chose to create a new class to hold the relationships. To illustrate: Original Meta-Model Tasks Revised Incident Management Ontology Tasks (IM leaders) Develop trusted relationships with external experts. (trainers) Provide staff with appropriate education and training. Become developing external relationships: involves external groups (such as external experts) produces trusted relationships is performed by IM leaders staff training: is provided by either external or internal trainers is provided to IM personnel 9
10 Ontology Top Level Thing organizational-groups team-resources life-cycle-phases it-components has subclass knowledge-assets incident-components crosscuts relationships quality-standards im-personnel coordinate activities permeates service-delivery developing-relationships respond-activities sustain-activities process-improvement developing-governance prepare-activities protect-activities 10
11 Other Benefits Moving to a formal ontology had several other advantages: Very flexible typing More powerful modeling Improved knowledge visualization Figure 2 The Activity Classes in the Ontology with the Service Delivery subclass expanded 11
12 Intended Usage We intend to use the ontology to document, compare, and analyze teams We have not yet formally extended the Incident Management Ontology to real world teams Example - The only service these two CSIRTs have in common is incident analysis. This could also make self evaluation easier A comparison of 2 fictitious teams using the ontology (Figure 4 in the paper) 12
13 Future Work Future work on the Incident Management Ontology will focus on studying incident management organizations. Categorization of incident response organizations such as during assessments or for comparative analysis Examining the differences between the functions of CSIRTs and the functions of Coordination Centers. Formally distinguishing CSIRTs and Coordination Centers using defined classes 13
14 Related Work Building an Incident Management Body of Knowledge Mundie and Ruefle Formalizing Information Security Knowledge Fenz Security Ontologies: Improving quantitative risk analysis Ekelhart, Fenz, Klemen, and Weippl And many more (see References) 14
15 References 1 McMorrow, D.: Science of Cyber-Security, in Editor (Ed.)^(Eds.): Book Science of Cyber-Security (DTIC Document, 2010, edn.), pp. 2 Mundie, D.A., and Ruefle, R.: Building an Incident Management Body of Knowledge, in Editor (Ed.)^(Eds.): Book Building an Incident Management Body of Knowledge (Citeseer, 2012, edn.), pp ISO, I., and Std, I.: ISO 27002: 2005, Information Technology-Security Techniques-Code of Practice for Information Security Management. ISO, NIST, S.: , Computer Security Incident Handling Guide, 2004, pp Miller, G.A.: The magical number seven, plus or minus two: some limits on our capacity for processing information, Psychological review, 1956, 63, (2), pp Motik, B., Patel-Schneider, P.F., Parsia, B., Bock, C., Fokoue, A., Haase, P., Hoekstra, R., Horrocks, I., Ruttenberg, A., and Sattler, U.: Owl 2 web ontology language: Structural specification and functional-style syntax, W3C recommendation, 2009, 27, (65), pp Hitzler, P., Krötzsch, M., Parsia, B., Patel-Schneider, P.F., and Rudolph, S.: OWL 2 web ontology language primer, W3C recommendation, 2009, 27, (1), pp Brachman, R.J., and Schmolze, J.G.: An Overview of the KL-ONE Knowledge Representation System*, Cognitive science, 1985, 9, (2), pp Baader, F.: The description logic handbook: theory, implementation, and applications (Cambridge university press, ) 10 Organization, W.H.: International classification of diseases (ICD), Singhal, A.: Introducing the knowledge graph: things, not strings, Official Google Blog, May, Antoniou, G., and Van Harmelen, F.: Web ontology language: Owl : Handbook on ontologies (Springer, 2004), pp Noy, N., Rector, A., Hayes, P., and Welty, C.: Defining n-ary relations on the semantic web, W3C Working Group Note, 2006, 12, pp Ontology, P.: Knowledge Acquisition System, See protege.stanford.edu, Beebe, N.L., and Clark, J.G.: A hierarchical, objectives-based framework for the digital investigations process, Digital Investigation, 2005, 2, (2), pp facetmap.com/ Ellson, J., Gansner, E., Koutsofios, L., North, S.C., and Woodhull, G.: Graphviz open source graph drawing tools, in Editor (Ed.)^(Eds.): Book Graphviz open source graph drawing tools (Springer, 2002, edn.), pp Fenz, S., and Ekelhart, A.: Formalizing information security knowledge, in Editor (Ed.)^(Eds.): Book Formalizing information security knowledge (ACM, 2009, edn.), pp Osorno, M., Laurel, M., Millar, T., Team, E.R., and Rager, D.: Coordinated Cybersecurity Incident Handling, in Editor (Ed.)^(Eds.): Book Coordinated Cybersecurity Incident Handling (2011, edn.), pp. 21 Magklaras, G., and Furnell, S.: Insider threat prediction tool: Evaluating the probability of IT misuse, Computers & Security, 2001, 21, (1), pp Wang, J.A., and Guo, M.: OVM: an ontology for vulnerability management, in Editor (Ed.)^(Eds.): Book OVM: an ontology for vulnerability management (ACM, 2009, edn.), pp Chiang, T.J., Kouh, J.S., and Chang, R.-I.: Ontology-based Risk Control for the Incident Management, IJCSNS International Journal of Computer Science and Network Security, 2009, 9, (11), pp Division, O.o.C.a.C.N.C.S.: Information Technology (IT) Security Essential Body of Knowledge (EBK): A Competency and Functional Framework for IT Security Workforce Development, Lambo, T.: ISO/IEC 27001: The future of infosec certification, ISSA Journal, Information Systems Security Organization ( issa. org), Ekelhart, A., Fenz, S., Klemen, M., and Weippl, E.: Security ontologies: Improving quantitative risk analysis, in Editor (Ed.)^(Eds.): Book Security ontologies: Improving quantitative risk analysis (IEEE, 2007, edn.), pp. 156a-156a 27 Schlenoff, C., Gruninger, M., Tissot, F., Valois, J., Lubell, J., and Lee, J.: The process specification language (PSL) overview and version 1.0 specification (Citeseer, ) 15
16 Acknowledgements This material is based upon work funded and supported by the Department of Defense under Contract No. FA C with Carnegie Mellon University for the operation of the Software Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development center. This material has been approved for public release and unlimited distribution. Carnegie Mellon and CERT are registered marks of Carnegie Mellon University. DM
17 Contact Info: End Samuel Perl 4500 Fifth Ave, Pittsburgh, PA,
Defining Computer Security Incident Response Teams
Defining Computer Security Incident Response Teams Robin Ruefle January 2007 ABSTRACT: A computer security incident response team (CSIRT) is a concrete organizational entity (i.e., one or more staff) that
More informationEvaluating and Improving Cybersecurity Capabilities of the Electricity Critical Infrastructure
Evaluating and Improving Cybersecurity Capabilities of the Electricity Critical Infrastructure March 2015 Pamela Curtis Dr. Nader Mehravari Katie Stewart Cyber Risk and Resilience Management Team CERT
More informationCyber Hygiene: A Baseline Set of Practices
[DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A] Approved for public Cyber Hygiene: A Baseline Set of Practices Matt Trevors Charles M. Wallen Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Copyright
More informationSoftware, Security, and Resiliency. Paul Nielsen SEI Director and CEO
Software, Security, and Resiliency Paul Nielsen SEI Director and CEO Dr. Paul D. Nielsen is the Director and CEO of Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineering Institute. Under Dr. Nielsen s leadership,
More informationComponents and Considerations in Building an Insider Threat Program
Components and Considerations in Building an Insider Threat Program Carly Huth Insider Threat Researcher, CEWM Carly L. Huth is an insider threat researcher in the Cyber Enterprise and Workforce Management
More informationAdvancing Cyber Intelligence Practices Through the SEI s Consortium
Advancing Cyber Intelligence Practices Through the SEI s Consortium SEI Emerging Technology Center Jay McAllister Melissa Kasan Ludwick Copyright 2015 Carnegie Mellon University This material is based
More informationAnalyzing 24 Years of CVD
public release and unlimited distribution. Allen Householder adh@cert.org Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Copyright. All Rights Reserved. This material is
More informationThe CERT Top 10 List for Winning the Battle Against Insider Threats
The CERT Top 10 List for Winning the Battle Against Insider Threats Dawn Cappelli CERT Insider Threat Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Session ID: STAR-203 Session Classification:
More informationSEI/CMU Efforts on Assured Systems
Unclassified//For Official Use Only SEI/CMU Efforts on Assured Systems 15 November 2018 *** Greg Shannon CERT Division Chief Scientist Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh,
More informationRoles and Responsibilities on DevOps Adoption
Roles and Responsibilities on DevOps Adoption Hasan Yasar Technical Manager, Adjunct Faculty Member Secure Lifecycle Solutions CERT SEI CMU Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh,
More informationInformation Security Is a Business
Information Security Is a Business Continuity Issue: Are You Ready? Dr. Nader Mehravari Cyber Risk and Resilience Management Team CERT Division Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University
More informationGoal-Based Assessment for the Cybersecurity of Critical Infrastructure
Goal-Based Assessment for the Cybersecurity of Critical Infrastructure IEEE HST 2010 November 10, 2010 NO WARRANTY THIS MATERIAL OF CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY AND ITS SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE IS
More informationSoftware Assurance Education Overview
Software Assurance Education Overview Nancy Mead June 2011 ABSTRACT: Complex software systems affect nearly every aspect of our lives, in areas such as defense, government, energy, communication, transportation,
More informationBe Like Water: Applying Analytical Adaptability to Cyber Intelligence
SESSION ID: HUM-W01 Be Like Water: Applying Analytical Adaptability to Cyber Intelligence Jay McAllister Senior Analyst Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University @sei_etc Scuttlebutt Communications
More informationResearching New Ways to Build a Cybersecurity Workforce
THE CISO ACADEMY Researching New Ways to Build a Cybersecurity Workforce Pamela D. Curtis, Summer Craze Fowler, David Tobar, and David Ulicne December 2016 Organizations across the world face the increasing
More information2013 US State of Cybercrime Survey
2013 US State of Cybercrime Survey Unknown How 24 % Bad is the Insider Threat? Insiders 51% 2007-2013 Carnegie Mellon University Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting
More informationJulia Allen Principal Researcher, CERT Division
Improving the Security and Resilience of U.S. Postal Service Mail Products and Services Using CERT -RMM (Case Study) Julia Allen Principal Researcher, CERT Division Julia Allen is a principal researcher
More informationCyber Threat Prioritization
Cyber Threat Prioritization FSSCC Threat and Vulnerability Assessment Committee Jay McAllister Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information
More informationModeling the Implementation of Stated-Based System Architectures
Modeling the Implementation of Stated-Based System Architectures Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Peter H Feiler June 2009 Are Everywhere What is a state-based
More informationUsing CERT-RMM in a Software and System Assurance Context
Using CERT-RMM in a Software and System Assurance Context Julia Allen SEPG NA 2011 24 March 2011 Agenda What is the CERT Resilience Management Model (CERT-RMM)? Model Building Blocks CERT-RMM for Assurance
More informationARINC653 AADL Annex Update
ARINC653 AADL Annex Update Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Julien Delange AADL Meeting February 15 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
More informationPrioritizing Alerts from Static Analysis with Classification Models
Prioritizing Alerts from Static Analysis with Classification Models PI: Lori Flynn, PhD Team: Will Snavely, David Svoboda, Dr. David Zubrow, Bob Stoddard, Dr. Nathan VanHoudnos, Dr. Elli Kanal, Richard
More informationSmart Grid Maturity Model
Smart Grid Maturity Model Austin Montgomery Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University 2 SEI is a federally-funded research and
More informationSituational Awareness Metrics from Flow and Other Data Sources
Situational Awareness Metrics from Flow and Other Data Sources SEI CERT NetSA 2011 Carnegie Mellon University NO WARRANTY THIS MATERIAL OF CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY AND ITS SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE
More informationProviding Information Superiority to Small Tactical Units
Providing Information Superiority to Small Tactical Units Jeff Boleng, PhD Principal Member of the Technical Staff Software Solutions Conference 2015 November 16 18, 2015 Copyright 2015 Carnegie Mellon
More informationEncounter Complexes For Clustering Network Flow
Encounter Complexes For Clustering Network Flow. Leigh Metcalf, lbmetcalf@cert.org Flocon 2015 Date 2015 Carnegie Mellon University Copyright 2014 Carnegie Mellon University This material is based upon
More informationNISPOM Change 2: Considerations for Building an Effective Insider Threat Program
NISPOM Change 2: Considerations for Building an Effective Insider Threat Program Randall Trzeciak (rft@cert.org) July 7, 2016 Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213
More informationThe Confluence of Physical and Cyber Security Management
The Confluence of Physical and Cyber Security Management GOVSEC 2009 Samuel A Merrell, CISSP James F. Stevens, CISSP 2009 Carnegie Mellon University Today s Agenda: Introduction Risk Management Concepts
More informationPanel: Future of Cloud Computing
Panel: Future of Cloud Computing Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Grace Lewis Advanced Mobile Systems (AMS) Initiative July 9, 2014 Mobile Device Trends Smartphones
More informationThe Insider Threat Center: Thwarting the Evil Insider
The Insider Threat Center: Thwarting the Evil Insider The CERT Top 10 List for Winning the Battle Against Insider Threats Randy Trzeciak 14 June 2012 2007-2012 Carnegie Mellon University Notices 2011 Carnegie
More informationStatic Analysis Alert Audits Lexicon And Rules David Svoboda, CERT Lori Flynn, CERT Presenter: Will Snavely, CERT
Static Analysis Alert Audits Lexicon And Rules David Svoboda, CERT Lori Flynn, CERT Presenter: Will Snavely, CERT Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 2016 Carnegie
More informationCSIRT SERVICES. Service Categories
CSIRT SERVICES One of the primary issues to be addressed in creating a computer security incident response team (CSIRT) is deciding what services the CSIRT will provide to its constituency. This process
More informationFlow Analysis for Network Situational Awareness. Tim Shimeall January Carnegie Mellon University
Flow Analysis for Network Situational Awareness Tim Shimeall January 2010 NO WARRANTY THIS MATERIAL OF CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY AND ITS SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE IS FURNISHED ON AN AS-IS" BASIS.
More informationAutomated Provisioning of Cloud and Cloudlet Applications
Automated Provisioning of Cloud and Cloudlet Applications Secure and Assured Mobile Computing Components Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Jeff Boleng, PhD
More informationBuilding Global CSIRT Capabilities
Building Global CSIRT Capabilities Barbara Laswell, Ph.D. September 2003 CERT Centers Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense 1 2003
More informationOSATE Analysis Support
OSATE Analysis Support Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Julien Delange/Peter Feiler 07/08/2013 Overview of OSATE2 Eclipse-based AADL editor Support for AADLv2.1,
More informationInference of Memory Bounds
Research Review 2017 Will Klieber, software security researcher Joint work with Will Snavely public release and unlimited distribution. 1 Copyright 2017 Carnegie Mellon University. All Rights Reserved.
More informationInvestigating APT1. Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA Deana Shick and Angela Horneman
Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Deana Shick and Angela Horneman Copyright 2013 Carnegie Mellon University This material is based upon work funded and supported
More informationCausal Modeling of Observational Cost Data: A Ground-Breaking use of Directed Acyclic Graphs
use Causal Modeling of Observational Cost Data: A Ground-Breaking use of Directed Acyclic Graphs Bob Stoddard Mike Konrad SEMA SEMA November 17, 2015 Public Release; Distribution is Copyright 2015 Carnegie
More informationFall 2014 SEI Research Review Verifying Evolving Software
Fall 2014 SEI Research Review Verifying Evolving Software Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Arie Gurfinkel October 28, 2014 Report Documentation Page Form Approved
More information10 Years of FloCon. Prepared for FloCon George Warnagiris - CERT/CC #GeoWarnagiris Carnegie Mellon University
10 Years of FloCon Prepared for FloCon 2014 George Warnagiris - CERT/CC gwarnagi@cert.org #GeoWarnagiris 2014 Carnegie Mellon University Disclaimer NO WARRANTY THIS MATERIAL OF CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY
More informationARINC653 AADL Annex. Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA Julien Delange 07/08/2013
ARINC653 AADL Annex Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Julien Delange 07/08/2013 Context, Rationale ARINC653 Avionics standard Standardized API (called APEX
More informationDenial of Service Attacks
Denial of Service Attacks CERT Division http://www.sei.cmu.edu REV-03.18.2016.0 Copyright 2017 Carnegie Mellon University. All Rights Reserved. This material is based upon work funded and supported by
More informationDesign Pattern Recovery from Malware Binaries
Design Pattern Recovery from Malware Binaries Cory F. Cohen Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Copyright 2015 Carnegie Mellon University This material is based
More informationCloud Computing. Grace A. Lewis Research, Technology and Systems Solutions (RTSS) Program System of Systems Practice (SoSP) Initiative
Grace A. Lewis Research, Technology and Systems Solutions (RTSS) Program System of Systems Practice (SoSP) Initiative SEI Webinar November 12, 2009 Polling Question 1 How did you hear about this webinar?
More informationCurrent Threat Environment
Current Threat Environment Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213, PhD Technical Director, CERT mssherman@sei.cmu.edu 29-Aug-2014 Report Documentation Page Form
More informationCOTS Multicore Processors in Avionics Systems: Challenges and Solutions
COTS Multicore Processors in Avionics Systems: Challenges and Solutions Dionisio de Niz Bjorn Andersson and Lutz Wrage dionisio@sei.cmu.edu, baandersson@sei.cmu.edu, lwrage@sei.cmu.edu Report Documentation
More informationPOMELo: A PML Online Editor
POMELo: A PML Online Editor Alvaro Graves Tetherless World Constellation Department of Cognitive Sciences Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Troy, NY 12180 gravea3@rpi.edu Abstract. This paper introduces
More informationFoundations for Summarizing and Learning Latent Structure in Video
Foundations for Summarizing and Learning Latent Structure in Video Presenter: Kevin Pitstick, MTS Engineer PI: Ed Morris, MTS Senior Engineer Copyright 2017 Carnegie Mellon University. All Rights Reserved.
More informationPassive Detection of Misbehaving Name Servers
Passive Detection of Misbehaving Name Servers Based on CMU/SEI-2013-TR-010 Jonathan Spring, Leigh Metcalf netsa-contact (AT) cert.org Flocon 2014, Charleston SC 2014 Carnegie Mellon University Copyright
More informationEngineering Improvement in Software Assurance: A Landscape Framework
Engineering Improvement in Software Assurance: A Landscape Framework Lisa Brownsword (presenter) Carol C. Woody, PhD Christopher J. Alberts Andrew P. Moore Agenda Terminology and Problem Scope Modeling
More informationTEL2813/IS2820 Security Management
TEL2813/IS2820 Security Management Security Management Models And Practices Lecture 6 Jan 27, 2005 Introduction To create or maintain a secure environment 1. Design working security plan 2. Implement management
More informationIntegrating the Risk Management Framework (RMF) with DevOps
Integrating the Risk Management Framework (RMF) with DevOps March 2018 Timothy A. Chick Security Automation Systems Technical Manager Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh,
More informationThe Need for Operational and Cyber Resilience in Transportation Systems
The Need for Operational and Cyber Resilience in Transportation Systems January 14, 2016 Dr. Nader Mehravari, MBCP, MBCI Cyber Risk and Resilience Management Software Engineering Institute Software Carnegie
More informationCertified Information Security Manager (CISM) Course Overview
Certified Information Security Manager (CISM) Course Overview This course teaches students about information security governance, information risk management, information security program development,
More informationMeasuring the Software Security Requirements Engineering Process
Measuring the Software Security Requirements Engineering Process Nancy Mead July 2012 ABSTRACT: Although there has been much research work in security requirements engineering, we do not have adequate
More informationAppendix A. Syllabus. NIST Cybersecurity Foundation. Syllabus. Status: First Draft
Appendix A Syllabus NIST Cybersecurity Foundation Syllabus Status: First Draft Version Status Sign off Date / Names V1.0.0 First Draft Content Group Lead Author: Mark E.S. Bernard Copyright 2018 Secure
More informationPresentation to the ITU on the Q-CERT Incident Management Team. Ian M Dowdeswell Incident Manager, Q-CERT
Presentation to the ITU on the Q-CERT Incident Management Team Ian M Dowdeswell Incident Manager, Q-CERT 2 Q-CERT Mission The Mission of Q-CERT is to be a world-class center of excellence providing expert
More informationHow to implement NIST Cybersecurity Framework using ISO WHITE PAPER. Copyright 2017 Advisera Expert Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
How to implement NIST Cybersecurity Framework using ISO 27001 WHITE PAPER Copyright 2017 Advisera Expert Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved. Copyright 2017 Advisera Expert Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
More informationSecurity Policy Guidelines
Security Policy Guidelines CSH6 Chapter 44 Security Policy Guidelines M. E. Kabay & Bridgett Robertson Selected Topics in CSH6 Ch 44 Terminology Resources for Policy Writers Writing the Policies Organizing
More informationRole of BC / DR in CISRP. Ramesh Warrier Director ebrp Solutions
Role of BC / DR in CISRP Ramesh Warrier Director ebrp Solutions You have been HACKED Now what? Incident Response Incident HANDLING Incident RESPONSE Incident HANDLING Assessment Containment Eradication
More informationComputing Accreditation Commission Version 2.0 CRITERIA FOR ACCREDITING COMPUTING PROGRAMS
Computing Accreditation Commission Version 2.0 CRITERIA FOR ACCREDITING COMPUTING PROGRAMS Optional for Reviews During the 2018-2019 Accreditation Cycle Mandatory for Reviews During the 2019-2020 Accreditation
More informationSecurity Management Models And Practices Feb 5, 2008
TEL2813/IS2820 Security Management Security Management Models And Practices Feb 5, 2008 Objectives Overview basic standards and best practices Overview of ISO 17799 Overview of NIST SP documents related
More informationNW NATURAL CYBER SECURITY 2016.JUNE.16
NW NATURAL CYBER SECURITY 2016.JUNE.16 ADOPTED CYBER SECURITY FRAMEWORKS CYBER SECURITY TESTING SCADA TRANSPORT SECURITY AID AGREEMENTS CONCLUSION QUESTIONS ADOPTED CYBER SECURITY FRAMEWORKS THE FOLLOWING
More informationComputer Security Incident Response Plan. Date of Approval: 23-FEB-2014
Computer Security Incident Response Plan Name of Approver: Mary Ann Blair Date of Approval: 23-FEB-2014 Date of Review: 31-MAY-2016 Effective Date: 23-FEB-2014 Name of Reviewer: John Lerchey Table of Contents
More informationCloud Computing. Grace A. Lewis Research, Technology and Systems Solutions (RTSS) Program System of Systems Practice (SoSP) Initiative
Grace A. Lewis Research, Technology and Systems Solutions (RTSS) Program System of Systems Practice (SoSP) Initiative SEI Webinar November 12, 2009 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
More informationStructuring Security for Success
University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln Innovation in Pedagogy and Technology Symposium Information Technology Services 2018 Structuring Security for Success Matt
More informationCybersecurity Auditing in an Unsecure World
About This Course Cybersecurity Auditing in an Unsecure World Course Description $5.4 million that s the average cost of a data breach to a U.S.-based company. It s no surprise, then, that cybersecurity
More informationPreventing Insider Sabotage: Lessons Learned From Actual Attacks
Preventing Insider Sabotage: Lessons Learned From Actual Attacks Dawn Cappelli November 14, 2005 2005 Carnegie Mellon University Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting
More informationSecure Coding Initiative
Secure Coding Initiative Robert C. Seacord 2010 Carnegie Mellon University NO WARRANTY THIS MATERIAL OF CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY AND ITS SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE IS FURNISHED ON AN AS-IS" BASIS.
More informationCYBERSECURITY FOR STARTUPS AND SMALL BUSINESSES OVERVIEW OF CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORKS
CYBERSECURITY FOR STARTUPS AND SMALL BUSINESSES OVERVIEW OF CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORKS WILLIAM (THE GONZ) FLINN M.S. INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY MANAGEMENT; COMPTIA SECURITY+, I-NET+, NETWORK+; CERTIFIED
More informationElements of a Usability Reasoning Framework
Elements of a Usability Reasoning Framework Jinhee Lee Len Bass September 2005 Software Architecture Technology Initiative Unlimited distribution subject to the copyright. Technical Note CMU/SEI-2005-TN-030
More informationModel-Driven Verifying Compilation of Synchronous Distributed Applications
Model-Driven Verifying Compilation of Synchronous Distributed Applications Sagar Chaki, James Edmondson October 1, 2014 MODELS 14, Valencia, Spain Copyright 2014 Carnegie Mellon University This material
More informationAdvanced Cyber Risk Management Threat Modeling & Cyber Wargaming April 23, 2018
Advanced Cyber Risk Management Threat Modeling & Cyber Wargaming April 23, 2018 The Homeland Security Systems Engineering and Development Institute (HSSEDI ) is a trademark of the U.S. Department of Homeland
More informationCERT Overview. Jeffrey J. Carpenter 2008 Carnegie Mellon University
CERT Overview Jeffrey J. Carpenter 2008 Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute Department of Defense R&D Laboratory FFRDC Created in 1984 Administered by Carnegie Mellon
More informationlocuz.com SOC Services
locuz.com SOC Services 1 Locuz IT Security Lifecycle services combine people, processes and technologies to provide secure access to business applications, over any network and from any device. Our security
More informationVerifying Periodic Programs with Priority Inheritance Locks
Verifying Periodic Programs with Priority Inheritance Locks Sagar Chaki, Arie Gurfinkel, Ofer Strichman FMCAD, October, 03 Software Engineering Institute, CMU Technion, Israel Institute of Technology Copyright
More informationRFC2350 TLP1: WHITE. Έκδοση National CSIRT-CY RFC2350
Έκδοση 1.2-2018.02.14 TLP1: WHITE 1 TLP Sources may use TLP: WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.
More informationConsolidation Committee Final Report
Committee Details Date: November 14, 2015 Committee Name: 36.6 : Information Security Program Committee Co- Chairs: Ren Flot; Whitfield Samuel Functional Area: IT Functional Area Coordinator: Phil Ventimiglia
More informationSemantic Importance Sampling for Statistical Model Checking
Semantic Importance Sampling for Statistical Model Checking Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Jeffery Hansen, Lutz Wrage, Sagar Chaki, Dionisio de Niz, Mark
More informationSC27 WG4 Mission. Security controls and services
copyright ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27, 2012. This is an SC27 public document and is distributed as is for the sole purpose of awareness and promotion of SC 27 standards and so the text is not to be used for commercial
More informationArchitectural Implications of Cloud Computing
Architectural Implications of Cloud Computing Grace Lewis Research, Technology and Systems Solutions (RTSS) Program Lewis is a senior member of the technical staff at the SEI in the Research, Technology,
More informationInformation Technology Security Plan Policies, Controls, and Procedures Identify Risk Assessment ID.RA
Information Technology Security Plan Policies, Controls, and Procedures Identify Risk Assessment ID.RA Information Security Policy and Procedures Identify Risk Assessment ID.RA Table of Contents Identify
More informationIncident response to a breach: Right of boom you find ashes
Incident response to a breach: Right of boom you find ashes Dr. Samuel Liles http://selil.com Opinions, or other information expressed are presenters and do not reflect current, former, future, or unaffiliated
More informationFunction Category Subcategory Implemented? Responsible Metric Value Assesed Audit Comments
Function Category Subcategory Implemented? Responsible Metric Value Assesed Audit Comments 1 ID.AM-1: Physical devices and systems within the organization are inventoried Asset Management (ID.AM): The
More informationInternational Standard ISO/IEC 17799:2000 Code of Practice for Information Security Management. Frequently Asked Questions
November 2002 International Standard ISO/IEC 17799:2000 Code of Practice for Information Security Management Introduction Frequently Asked Questions The National Institute of Standards and Technology s
More informationOpen Systems: What s Old Is New Again
Open Systems: What s Old Is New Again Tricia Oberndorf & Dr. Carol Sledge NO WARRANTY THIS CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY AND SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE MATERIAL IS FURNISHED ON AN AS-IS" BASIS. CARNEGIE
More informationCYBER CAMPUS KPMG BUSINESS SCHOOL THE CYBER SCHOOL FOR THE REAL WORLD. The Business School for the Real World
CYBER CAMPUS THE CYBER SCHOOL FOR THE REAL WORLD. KPMG BUSINESS SCHOOL The Business School for the Real World In the real world, cyber security applies to all: large firms and small companies, tech experts,
More informationISO/IEC INTERNATIONAL STANDARD
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC 27006 Second edition 2011-12-01 Information technology Security techniques Requirements for bodies providing audit and certification of information security management systems
More informationMETHODOLOGY AND CRITERIA FOR THE CYBERSECURITY REPORTS
METHODOLOGY AND CRITERIA FOR THE CYBERSECURITY REPORTS The cybersecurity maturity has been assessed against 25 criteria across five themes. Each of the criteria are given a Yes, No, Partial, or Not Applicable
More informationData Security and Privacy Principles IBM Cloud Services
Data Security and Privacy Principles IBM Cloud Services 2 Data Security and Privacy Principles: IBM Cloud Services Contents 2 Overview 2 Governance 3 Security Policies 3 Access, Intervention, Transfer
More informationThe Priority Ceiling Protocol: A Method for Minimizing the Blocking of High-Priority Ada Tasks
Special Report CMU/SEI-88-SR-4 The Priority Ceiling Protocol: A Method for Minimizing the Blocking of High-Priority Ada Tasks John B. Goodenough Lui Sha March 1988 Special Report CMU/SEI-88-SR-4 March
More informationFall 2014 SEI Research Review FY14-03 Software Assurance Engineering
Fall 2014 SEI Research Review FY14-03 Software Assurance Engineering Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Carol Woody, Ph.D. October 28, 2014 Report Documentation
More informationCybersecurity for Health Care Providers
Cybersecurity for Health Care Providers Montgomery County Medical Society Provider Meeting February 28, 2017 T h e MARYLAND HEALTH CARE COMMISSION Overview Cybersecurity defined Cyber-Threats Today Impact
More informationCERT Development EFFECTIVE RESPONSE
CERT Development EFFECTIVE RESPONSE CERT Development: EFFECTIVE RESPONSE 2 Effective Response Effective Response Well funded, organized attackers threaten your network IT attacks can result in: Loss of
More informationDr. Kenneth E. Nidiffer Director of Strategic Plans for Government Programs
War Fighting Technologies: Enhance Advance - Modernize: -Technological/Acquisition Advances Enabling a More Responsive 24th Anniversary - Systems & Software Technology Conference April 23-26, 2012 Salt
More informationCarnegie Mellon University Notice
Carnegie Mellon University Notice This video and all related information and materials ( materials ) are owned by Carnegie Mellon University. These materials are provided on an as-is as available basis
More informationFPM-IT-420B: FAC-P/PM-IT Planning & Acquiring Operations of IT Systems Course Details
FPM-IT-420B: FAC-P/PM-IT Planning & Acquiring Operations of IT Systems Course Details 2 FPM IT 420B: FAC P/PM IT Planning & Acquiring Operations of IT Systems FPM-IT-420B: FAC-P/PM-IT PLANNING & ACQUIRING
More informationSafeguarding unclassified controlled technical information (UCTI)
Safeguarding unclassified controlled technical information (UCTI) An overview Government Contract Services Bulletin Safeguarding UCTI An overview On November 18, 2013, the Department of Defense (DoD) issued
More informationDOS AND DON'TS OF DEVSECOPS
SESSION ID: DEV-F01 DOS AND DON'TS OF DEVSECOPS Hasan Yasar Technical Manager, Adjunct Faculty Member CERT Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University @SecureLifeCycle Notices Copyright 2018
More information