Chapter 5: Database Security

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1 i Chapter 5: Comp Sci 3600

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4 What is a i Structured collection of data stored for use by one or more applications Contains the relationships between data items and groups of data items Can sometimes contain sensitive data that needs to be secured Query language provides a uniform interface to the database management system () Suite of programs for constructing and maintaining the database Offers ad hoc query facilities to multiple users and applications

5 Management System i utilities DDL processor description tables Authorization tables User applications DDL = data definition language DML = data manipulation language User queries DML and query language processor Transaction File manager manager Physical database Concurrent access tables Figure 5.1 Architecture

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7 Relational s i Table of data consisting of rows and columns Each column holds a particular type of data Each row contains a specific value for each column Ideally has one column where all values are unique, forming an identifier/key for that row Enables the creation of multiple tables linked together by a unique identifier that is present in all tables Use a relational query language to access the database Allows the user to request data that fit a given set of criteria

8 Multi-table with Unifying Primary Key i CALLER ID TABLE PhoneNumber Has service? (Y/N) BILLING HISTORY TABLE PhoneNumber Date Transaction type Transaction amount PRIMARY TABLE PhoneNumber Last name First name address ADDITIONAL SUBSCRIBER TABLE PhoneNumber List of subscribers CURRENT BILL TABLE PhoneNumber Current date Previous balance Current charges Date of last payment Amount of last payment Figure 5.2 Example Relational Model. A relational database uses multiple tables related to one another by a designated key; in this case the key is the PhoneNumber field.

9 Relational Elements i Primary key Uniquely identifies a row Consists of one or more column names Foreign key Links one table to attributes in another View/virtual table Result of a query that returns selected rows and columns from one or more tables

10 Relational i Records Attributes A 1 A j A M 1 x 11 x 1j x 1M i x i1 x ij x im N x N1 x Nj x NM Figure 5.3 Abstract Model of a Relational

11 View on a i Did Dname Dacctno Ename Did Salarycode Eid Ephone 4 human resources Robin education Neil accounts Jasmine public relations Cody services Holly primary key Department Table Robin Smith foreign key (a) Two tables in a relational database Dname Ename Eid Ephone human resources Jasmine education Holly education Robin accounts Smith public relations Neil services Robin services Cody (b) A view derived from the database Employee Table primary key Figure 5.4 Relational Example

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13 Structured Query Language () i Standardized language to define schema, manipulate, and query data in a relational database Several similar versions of ANSI/ISO standard All follow the same basic syntax and semantics statements can be used to: Create tables Insert and delete data in tables Create views Retrieve data with query statements

14 Table Creation i CREATE TABLE department ( Did INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, Dname CHAR ( 3 0 ), Dacctno CHAR ( 6 ) )

15 Table Creation i CREATE TABLE employee ( Ename CHAR ( 3 0 ), Did INTEGER, S a l a r y C o d e INTEGER, E i d INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, Ephone CHAR ( 1 0 ), FOREIGN KEY ( Did ) REFERENCES department ( Did ) )

16 Retrieving Information i The basic command for retrieving information is the SELECT statement SELECT Ename, Eid, Ephone FROM Employee WHERE Did = 15 This query returns the Ename, Eid, and Ephone fields from the Employee table for all employees assigned to department 15

17 View Creation i The view in Figure 5.4(b) is created using the following statement: CREATE VIEW n e w t a b l e (Dname, Ename, Eid, Ephone ) AS SELECT D. Dname E. Ename, E. Eid, E. Ephone FROM Department D Employee E WHERE E. Did = D. Did

18 (i) i One of the most prevalent and dangerous network-based security threats Designed to exploit the nature of Web application pages Sends malicious commands to the database server Most common attack goal is bulk extraction of data Depending on the environment, injection can also be exploited to: Modify or delete data Execute arbitrary operating system commands Launch denial-of-service (DoS) attacks

19 i overview i Internet Legend:. Data exchanged between hacker and servers Two-way traffic between hacker and Web server Credit card data is retrieved from database Router Firewall Web servers servers Switch Wireless access point Web application server Figure 5.5 Typical Attack

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21 Technique i The i attack typically works by prematurely terminating a text string and appending a new command Because the inserted command may have additional strings appended to it before it is executed, the attacker terminates the injected string with a comment mark - - Subsequent text is ignored at execution time

22 Example i As a simple example, consider a script that build an query by combining predefined strings with text entered by a user: var Shipcity; ShipCity = Request.form ( ShipCity ); var sql = select * from OrdersTable where ShipCity = + ShipCity + ; The intention of the script s designer is that a user will enter the name of a city

23 Example i When the script is executed, the user is prompted to enter a city, and if the user enters Redmond, then the following query is generated: SELECT * FROM OrdersTable WHERE ShipCity = Redmond Suppose, however, the user enters the following: Redmond ; DROP table OrdersTable- - This results in the following query: SELECT * FROM OrdersTable WHERE ShipCity = Redmond ; DROP table OrdersTable- - The semicolon is an indicator that separates two commands, and the double dash is an indicator that the remaining text of the current line is a comment and not to be executed

24 i Attack Avenues i User input: Attackers inject commands by providing suitable crafted user input Server variables: Attackers can forge the values that are placed in HTTP and network headers and exploit this vulnerability by placing data directly into the headers Second-order injection: A malicious user could rely on data already present in the system or database to trigger an injection attack, so when the attack occurs, the input that modifies the query to cause an attack does not come from the user, but from within the system itself Cookies: An attacker could alter cookies such that when the application server builds an query based on the cookie s content, the structure and function of the query is modified Physical user input: Applying user input that constructs an attack outside the realm of web requests

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26 i Inband Inferential Out-of-band

27 Inband i Uses the same communication channel for injecting code and retrieving results The retrieved data are presented directly in application Web page Include: Tautology: This form of attack injects code in one or more conditional statements so that they always evaluate to true End-of-line comment: After injecting code into a particular field, legitimate code that follows are nullified through usage of end of line comments Piggybacked queries: The attacker adds additional queries beyond the intended query, piggy-backing the attack on top of a legitimate request

28 Tautology Example i Consider the following script, whose intent is to require the user to enter a valid name and password: $query = SELECT info FROM user WHERE name = $ GET [ name ] AND pwd = $ GET [ pwd ] ; Suppose the attacker submits OR 1 = 1 for the name field. The resulting query would look like this: SELECT info FROM users WHERE name = OR 1 = 1 AND pwpd = The injected code disables the password check (due to the comment indicator - -) and turns the entire WHERE clause into a tautology The database uses the conditional as the basis for evaluating each row and deciding which ones to return The conditional is a tautology, the query evaluates to true for each row in the table and returns all

29 Inferential Attack i There is no actual transfer of data, but the attacker is able to reconstruct the information by sending particular requests and observing the resulting behavior of the Website/database server Illegal/logically incorrect queries This attack lets an attacker gather important information about the type and structure of the backend database of a Web application The attack is considered a preliminary, information-gathering step for other attacks Blind injection Allows attackers to infer the data present in a database system even when the system is sufficiently secure to not display any erroneous information back to the attacker

30 Out-of-Band Attack i Data are retrieved using a different channel This can be used when there are limitations on information retrieval, but outbound connectivity from the database server is lax

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32 i i Defensive coding Run-time prevention

33 Defensive Coding i Manual defensive coding practices: a common vulnerability exploited by i attacks is insufficient input validation One solution is to apply defensive coding practices Input type checking: e.g., to check that inputs that match the expected types and formats Performs pattern matching to try to distinguish normal input from abnormal input Parameterized query insertion: Allowing developers to more accurately specify the structure of an query Passing the parameters separately such that any unsanitary user input is not allowed to modify the query structure DOM: A set of classes that enables automated data type validation and escaping This approach uses encapsulation of database queries to provide a safe and reliable way to access databases

34 i Signature based This attempts to match specific attack patterns Must be constantly updated and may not work against self- modifying attacks Anomaly based Define normal behavior and then detect behavior patterns outside the normal range There is a training phase, in which the system learns the range of normal behavior, followed by the actual detection Code analysis Using a test suite to detect i vulnerabilities The test suite is designed to generate a wide range of i attacks and assess the response of the system

35 Run-time Prevention i Check queries at runtime to see if they conform to a model of expected queries Various automated tools are available for this purpose

36 i access control system determines: If the user has access to the entire database or just portions of it What access rights the user has (create, insert, delete, update, read, write) Can support a range of administrative policies Centralized administration: Small number of privileged users may grant and revoke access rights Ownership-based administration: The creator of a table may grant and revoke access rights to the table Decentralized administration: The owner of the table may grant and revoke authorization rights to other users, allowing them to grant and revoke access rights to the table

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38 i Two commands for managing access rights: 1 Grant: Used to grant one or more access rights or can be used to assign a user to a role 2 Revoke: Revokes the access rights Typical access rights are: Select Insert Update Delete References

39 The Grant Command i GRANT [ON TO [IDENTIFIED BY [WITH {privileges role} table] {user role PUBLIC} password] GRANT OPTION] Example GRANT SELECT ON ANY TABLE TO ricflair

40 The Revoke Command i REVOKE [ON FROM {privileges role} table] {user role PUBLIC} Example REVOKE SELECT ON ANY TABLE FROM ricflair

41 Cascading Authorizations i The grant option enables an access right to cascade through a number of users The revocation of privileges also cascaded

42 Privilege Revocation i t = 10 Ann David t = 60 Frank t = 20 Bob Chris t = 30 t = 50 t = 40 Ellen t = 70 Jim t = 10 Bob Ann David t = 60 Frank t = 20 Chris t = 50 Figure 5.6 Bob Revokes Privilege from David

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44 Role-Based (RBAC) i access control eases administrative burden and improves security A database RBAC needs to provide the following capabilities: Create and delete roles Define permissions for a role Assign and cancel assignment of users to roles

45 Categories of Users i Application owner: An end user who owns database objects as part of an application End user: An end user who operates on database objects via a particular application but does not own any of the database objects Administrator: User who has administrative responsibility for part or all of the database

46 Microsoft Server Roles i

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48 What is an Attack? i The process of performing authorized queries and deducing unauthorized information from the legitimate responses received The inference problem arises when the combination of a number of data items is more sensitive than the individual items, or when a combination of data items can be used to infer data of a higher sensitivity

49 i Nonsensitive data Sensitive data Metadata Authorized access Unauthorized access Figure 5.7 Indirect Information Via Channel

50 Example of an Attack on (Salary-Name) i Name Position Salary ($) Department Dept. Manager Andy senior 43,000 strip Cathy Calvin junior 35,000 strip Cathy Cathy senior 48,000 strip Cathy Dennis junior 38,000 panel Herman Herman senior 55,000 panel Herman Ziggy senior 67,000 panel Herman (a) Employee table Position Salary ($) Name Department senior 43, 000 Andy strip junior 35,000 Calvin strip senior 48,000 Cathy strip (b) Two views Name Position Salary ($) Department Andy senior 43,000 strip Calvin junior 35,000 strip Cathy senior 48,000 strip (c) Table derived from combining query answers Figure 5.8 Example

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52 i detection during database design Approach removes an inference channel by altering the database structure or by changing the access control regime to prevent inference Techniques in this category often result in unnecessarily stricter access controls that reduce availability detection at query time Approach seeks to eliminate an inference channel violation during a query or series of queries If an inference channel is detected, the query is denied or altered Some inference detection algorithm is needed for either of these approaches Progress has been made in devising specific inference detection s for multilevel secure databases and statistical databases

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54 i The database is typically the most valuable information resource for any organization Protected by multiple layers of security Firewalls, authentication, general access control systems, DB access control systems, database encryption becomes the last line of defense in database security Can be applied to the entire database, at the record level, the attribute level, or level of the individual field Disadvantages to encryption: Key management: Authorized users must have access to the decryption key for the data for which they have access Inflexibility: When part or all of the database is encrypted it becomes more difficult to perform record searching

55 How to Process Encrypted Query i 1 The user issues an query for fields from one or more records with a specific value of the primary key 2 The query processor at the client encrypts the primary key, modifies the query accordingly, and transmits the query to the server 3 The server processes the query using the encrypted value of the primary key and returns the appropriate record or records 4 The query processor decrypts the data and returns the results

56 : Decrypt only Locally i User Client Meta Data 4. Plaintext result 1. Original query Query Processor Encrypt/ Decrypt metadata 2. Transformed query 3. Encrypted result Data owner Query Executor Server Meta Data Encrypted database Figure 5.9 A Scheme

57 Encrypted Query i SELECT Ename, Eid, Ephone FROM Employee WHERE Did = 15 SELECT Ename, Eid, Ephone FROM Employee WHERE Did =

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59 on Encrypted Data i can Improve Usability for However, it can provide information for inference attacks E(k, B 1 ) I 11 I 1j I 1M E(k, B i ) I i1 I ij I im E(k, B N ) I N1 I Nj I NM B i = (x i1 x i2 x im ) Figure 5.10 Scheme for of Figure 5.3

COMPUTER NETWORK SECURITY

COMPUTER NETWORK SECURITY Prof. Dr. Hasan Hüseyin BALIK (5 th Week) 5. Database and Cloud Security 5.Outline The Need for Database Security Database Management Systems Relational Databases SQL Injection