GNU Radio Software Defined DSRC Radio

Transcription

1 Institute for Critical Technology and Applied Science GNU Radio Software Defined DSRC Radio Joseph M. Ernst, PhD Research Assistant Professor (540) , 11/2016

2 Motivation Cyber Vulnerabilities Planned DSRC Related Automation Blind spot warnings Forward collision warnings Sudden braking ahead warnings Intersection collision avoidance and movement assistance Approaching emergency vehicle warning Transit or emergency vehicle signal priority Electronic parking and toll payments 11/2016 2

3 Long Term Goals DSRC Radio Implementation DSRC Radio Cyber Security Vehicle Cyber Security 11/2016 3

4 NSHTA Levels of Automation Automation Level Level 0 No-Automation Level 1 Function-specific Automation Level 2 Combined Function Automation Level 3 Limited Self-Driving Automation Level 4 Full Self-Driving Automation Description The driver is in complete and sole control of the primary vehicle controls brake, steering, throttle, and motive power at all times. Automation at this level involves one or more specific control functions. Examples include electronic stability control or pre-charged brakes, where the vehicle automatically assists with braking to enable the driver to regain control of the vehicle or stop faster than possible by acting alone. This level involves automation of at least two primary control functions designed to work in unison to relieve the driver of control of those functions. An example of combined functions enabling a Level 2 system is adaptive cruise control in combination with lane centering. Vehicles at this level of automation enable the driver to cede full control of all safetycritical functions under certain traffic or environmental conditions and in those conditions to rely heavily on the vehicle to monitor for changes in those conditions requiring transition back to driver control. The driver is expected to be available for occasional control, but with sufficiently comfortable transition time. The Google car is an example of limited self-driving automation. The vehicle is designed to perform all safety-critical driving functions and monitor roadway conditions for an entire trip. Such a design anticipates that the driver will provide destination or navigation input, but is not expected to be available for control at any time during the trip. This includes both occupied and unoccupied vehicles. 11/2016 4

5 DSRC Background Category Designated licensed bandwidth Low Latency Fast Network Acquisition High Reliability when Required Description For secure, reliable communications to take place. It is primarily allocated for vehicle safety applications by FCC Report and Order FCC Active safety applications must recognize each other and transmit messages to each other in milliseconds without delay. Active safety applications require the immediate establishment of communication and frequent updates. Active safety applications require a high level of link reliability. DSRC works in high vehicle speed mobility conditions and delivers performance immune to extreme weather conditions (e.g. rain, fog, snow, etc.). Priority for Safety Applications Interoperability Safety applications on DSRC are given priority over non-safety applications. DSRC ensures interoperability, which is the key to successful deployment of active safety applications, using widely accepted standards. It supports both V2V and V2I communications. Security and Privacy DSRC provides safety message authentication and privacy. 11/2016 5

6 DSRC Security Concerns Final Report: Vehicle Infrastructure Integration Proof of Concept Executive Summary (Vehicle) Security Service Number SEC-1 SEC-2 SEC-3 SEC-4 SEC-5 SEC-6 SEC-7 SEC-8 SEC-9 SEC-10 Finding Security system generally works as expected, but testing is difficult since all systems must operate properly. Security system has a tendency to be brittle in that any minor anomaly can cause it to prevent communications; although security system is functioning properly, it cannot always discriminate between other system anomalies or errors and false or malicious messages. WSM verification works properly, but verification performance at higher rates could not be assessed due to operational issues with the OBE. WSA Signing checks effectively ignore WSAs if out of geographic, time or operational scope; however, errors in position can lead to erroneously rejected messages. Messages can be signed by system and successfully validated (or not) based on location, and time (message age); however, misalignment of OBE clocks can cause erroneous rejection of messages. System can replace certificates (identified and anonymous) over the air during typical RSE encounters at road speeds. System successfully rejects messages with expired or revoked credentials. Anonymous certificate functionality (system to prevent the ability to track) was not measured (cost and schedule issues). Certificate Revocation List (CRL) capability appears to be acceptable for moderately sized CRLs; the system was able to download CRLs with up to 30K entries at 65 mph past an RSE. End-to-End encryption of IP packets using IEEE 1609 protocol was successful and operated at usable data rates. Overall viability of anonymous authentication system needs to be refined to determine manageability and to refine management policies and processes. 11/2016 6

7 Software Defined Radio Radio Antenna RF Front End Mixer ADC ASIC Demodulator N210 Computer Antenna RF Front End ADC FPGA Mixer Baseband Demodulator E310 Antenna RF Front End ADC FPGA Mixer Baseband Demodulator 11/2016 7

8 USRP E /2016 8

9 Intermediate Goals Provide complete open source GNU Radio solution for DSRC Implement DSRC solution on E310 (ARM) Test RF characteristics of implementation Initial characterization of cyber concerns 11/2016 9

10 Schedule Objectives ) Equipment Procurement 2) Execution of existing receiver functionality 3) Development of transmitter waveforms 4) GNU Radio simulations 5) Over the air testing of Tx/Rx 6) Investigation of cyber vulnerabilities 7) Final Report 11/

11 Severity Risk Assessment , Likelihood Risk Description 1 Open-Source Software will not be as functional as advertised 2 E310 USRP will not be able to process the waveforms in real time 3 Transmit power for E310 does not have sufficient range for in-vehicle tests 4 DSRC standard is abandoned by connected vehicle community 5 USRP hardware is backordered 6 Appropriate GRA is unavailable 11/

12 Questions? Feel free to contact Joseph Ernst at: (540) /