Program Integrity: Why Worry?

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1 Program Integrity with Steganography and Program Analysis Mike Jochen Lori Pollock Lisa Marvel 28 August 2008 Program Integrity: Why Worry? 8/28/ Mike Jochen 2 1

2 Malicious Code (Malware) What are some things malware does? Installs Spam-bots Reveals personal/private data Platform for other mischief (DDOS attacks, net attacks, etc) What are some ways we get malware? File swapping Web surfing Other vulnerabilities 8/28/ Mike Jochen 3 Brief Chronology of Selected Malware Year Name First well known Internet worm Melissa Worm I Love You Code Red Klez Slammer, Blaster MyDoom, Sasser, Cabir Zotob Cost/Damage $96 million $10 s of millions $10 Billion $2.6 Billion $9 Billion $2.3 Billion $250 Million $97K/company Bottom line: Costs billions of dollars, lost resources (data, worker time, etc.) (source: viruslist.com) 8/28/ Mike Jochen 4 2

3 Outline Background/Motivation Program Tamper Detection Tamper Detection Marking (TDM) Framework Overview Implementation Details Evaluation (Java & SPARC) Future Work Conclusion 8/28/ Mike Jochen 5 Problem Motivation: Program Integrity Mobile Software Trusted/Distrusted Network Remote/Local Hosts & Trust Malicious Code (Malware)/Malicious Hosts Concerns: Loss of data/resources, safety 8/28/ Mike Jochen 6 3

4 Degrees of Current Protection User Do Nothing Pretend To Do Something Some Controls Allow Nothing User SysAdmin Decreased Protection Increased Protection SysAdmin Adversary Increased Flexibility Decreased Flexibility Adversary Restrict functionality to improve protection? What do we want to protect? Code Host Both 8/28/ Mike Jochen 7 Tamper Detection Checksum Perform some calculation over entire message CRC, MD5, SHA, SHA-1, MAC, HMAC Digital Watermark Similar to physical watermark in quality paper Embed information throughout message Classified as either Robust or Fragile Digital Signature Uses Private/Public key-pair MD5 (myimportantfile) = e98997e189b42c94b43d123a7d3776ff ---BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE--- Version: &84dd@10fdjsdjrtt3492iflkQ1FD08nnPOj =K0WJ ---END PGP SIGNATURE--- 8/28/ Mike Jochen 8 4

5 Embedded Program Protection Main Idea: Embed Tamper Detection Mark (TDM) in program Before running program locally, validate TDM Two main phases: Create and Embed Mark (on Trusted Host) Extract and Validate Mark (on Local Host) 8/28/ Mike Jochen 9 TDM Framework Goals Determine tampering with high probability Preserve physical size of program Static method No runtime penalty More appealing than conventional use of digital signatures (no separation, less bandwidth) Optional Computationally fast validation 8/28/ Mike Jochen 10 5

6 How to Tamper Mark a Program What to embed? Hash of file Client and server can generate independently Need good one-way hash function with low probability of collision Encrypt hash value for added protection Encrypted hash = TDM Utilize steganographic technique to embed TDM Where is the noise in the file to hide TDM? Need to hide in a place in code that can be altered without affecting semantics/performance Code may be optimized where is the ambiguity to embed the TDM? 8/28/ Mike Jochen 11 TDM Constraints Presence of TDM must not alter program semantics (computation remains unchanged) TDM is based on some computation over entire program Any change must dictate change in TDM value (good hash function) Must be able to generate TDM independently TDM embedded based on properties of program file Hiding capacity directly related to number of relocatable units in program Let n = # units, b = # TDM bits; n! 2 b 13 units to encode 32 bit value 35 units to encode 128 bit value 8/28/ Mike Jochen 12 6

7 Quick Aside: Stego Example Given an image (matrix of pixels) Given a secret message Replace least significant bits /28/ Mike Jochen 13 TDM Overview: Embed Actions performed on Trusted Host Why canonical form? What is TDM? How TDM embedded? 8/28/ Mike Jochen 14 7

8 TDM Overview: Validate Actions performed on Local Host Difference between TDM E and TDM L? Shared key? 8/28/ Mike Jochen 15 TDM Example: SPARC Object File TDM represented by order of Relocatable Basic Blocks (RBBs) Permute order of RBBs to represent a value Given n blocks, can have n! different orderings Each ordering maps to a number Knuth s Permute Test algorithm does this nicely 8/28/ Mike Jochen 16 8

9 TDM Example: SPARC Control Flow Graph Original Version Canonical Form TDM Version 8/28/ Mike Jochen 17 TDM Example: Java Constant Pool Table Less complex algorithm than SPARC Permute order of Constant Pool Table (CPT) What is Constant Pool Table? Table of strings, objects, data types in program Just a big array Other sections in program refer to CPT, so must update CPT addresses 8/28/ Mike Jochen 18 9

10 Compare the Constant Pools 1) CONSTANT_Methodref[10](class_index=6, name_and_type_index=15) 2) CONSTANT_Fieldref[9](class_index=16), name_and_type_index=17) 3) CONSTANT_String[8](string_index=18) 16) CONSTANT_Class[7](name_index=23) 17) CONSTANT_NameAndType[12](name_index=24, signature_index=25) 18) CONSTANT_Utf8[1]( Hello World! ) 23) CONSTANT_Utf8[1]( java/lang/system ) 24) CONSTANT_Utf8[1]( out ) 25) CONSTANT_Utf8[1]( Ljava/io/PrintStream; ) Original Constant Pool table Constant Pool Table with TDM 8) CONSTANT_Methodref[10](class_index=3, name_and_type_index=1) 9) CONSTANT_Fieldref[9](class_index=14, name_and_type_index=20) 10) CONSTANT_String[8](string_index=21) 11) CONSTANT_Utf8[1]( out ) 13) CONSTANT_Utf8[1]( Ljava/io/PrintStream; ) 14) CONSTANT_CLass[7](name_index=23) 20) CONSTANT_NameAndType[12](name_index=11, signature_index=13) 21) CONSTANT_Utf8[1]( Hello World! ) 22) CONSTANT_Utf8[1]( java/lang/system ) 8/28/ Mike Jochen 19 TDM Example: Java Method Table Original Version TDM Version 8/28/ Mike Jochen 20 10

11 TDM Evaluation 47 units (RBBS) to encode 192-bit authentication tag Smaller files use smaller hashes All attempts to tamper with program were detected by system Even when TDM was mangled, system signals validation error Other areas for embedding exist Analysis: Canonical Form O(nlogn) Permute O(n) Update O(n) Inverse Permute O(hash _ size 3 ) 8/28/ Mike Jochen 21 SPARC Evaluation (optimized/nonoptimized code) Name wave Size (KB) 6.5/7.0 Lines 26 Blocks 4/17 Embed Time 0.102/0.102 Validate Time 0.097/0.098 sort 6.7/ / / /0.099 bmm 8.4/ / / /0.101 wc 8.6/ / / /0.099 parafinns 9.3/ / / /0.109 compress 80.0/ / / / /28/ Mike Jochen 22 11

12 TDM Evaluation: SPARC Total Time Unoptimized Code Total Time Optimized Code 8/28/ Mike Jochen 23 Java Evaluation Name # of Files File Size (KB) Pool Size Embed Time Validate Time Average Total Average Total Average Total Average Total mtrt checkit db jess compress check raytrace RMI /28/ Mike Jochen 24 12

13 TDM Evaluation: Java Average Time Per Class file Total Time Per Benchmark 8/28/ Mike Jochen 25 Future Work Provide integrity for program state & input Investigate ability to detect malicious code with other comparison methods Expand to include a PKI 8/28/ Mike Jochen 26 13

14 Summary Introduced problems with program integrity Presented current techniques to address problem Designed & Evaluated TDM framework Transformation Control Specification for Evolving Programs 8/28/ Mike Jochen 27 Security or Dancing Pigs? "Given a choice between dancing pigs and security, users will pick dancing pigs every time. (McGraw & Felten, 1999) 8/28/ Mike Jochen 28 14

15 Questions? 8/28/ Mike Jochen 29 15

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