Secure Bootstrapping and Routing in an IPv6-Based Ad Hoc Network

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1 Secure Bootstrapping and Routing in an IPv6-Based Ad Hoc Network Yu-Chee Tseng, Jehn-Ruey Jiang and Jih-Hsin Lee Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering National Chiao-Tung University, Taiwan Department of Information Management Hsuan-Chuang University, Taiwan Abstract The mobile ad hoc network (MANET), which is characterized by an infrastructureless architecture and multi-hop communication, has attracted a lot of attention recently. In the evolution of IP networks to version 6, adopting the same protocol would guarantee the success and portability of MANETs. Routing and bootstrapping are two essential issues for MANETs. In this paper, we propose a secure routing protocol called Secure Dynamic Source Routing (S-DSR) for MANETs. The protocol is developed on the basis of IPv6 by incorporating the concept of CGA (cryptographically generated address), neighbor discovery, and DNS autoregistration and discovery in IPv6. The protocol is secure even in the absence of security infrastructures, allows bootstrapping a MANET without manual administration, and is resistant to a variety of security attacks. Keywords: Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), mobile ad hoc network (MANET), mobile computing, network initialization, secure routing, wireless communication. 1 Introduction A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is an infrastructureless network consisting of a set of mobile nodes that are able to communicate with each other in a multi-hop manner without the support of any base station or access point. A node in a MANET is not only a node but also a router that is responsible of relaying packets for other nodes. A MANET has the merit that it is quickly deployable. Applications of MANETs include communications in battlefields, disaster rescue operations, and outdoor activities. Prior research has generally assumed a MANET as a non-hostile, trusted environment. Unfortunately, in the presence of malicious hosts, a MANET is highly vulnerable to attacks due to its openness features, dynamic changing topology, lack of centralized infrastructure, etc. Thus, the security issues for MANETs are very challenging. 1

2 This article intends to present a secure bootstrapping and routing protocol for an IPv6- based MANET. We envision that IPv6 would be more widely deployed and accepted in the next stage. Adopting IPv6 in MANET would warrant the success and portability of MANET. In particular, the important address autoconfiguration feature in IPv6 should be adopted so that mobile nodes do not need predefined IP addresses before entering a MANET. This would greatly facilitate the formation of MANETs in an open environment. Further, while securing the network is essential, mobile nodes should maintain very limited pre-knowledge for this purpose. In our design, we rely on the existence of an IPv6b DNS server to ensure security. Prior to network formation, we only assume the following facts: (i) each node knows the public key of the DNS server, and (ii) a node may or may not have established an IP-domain name pair in the DNS server, depending on whether it want to prevent the impersonate attack or not. The proposed secure routing protocol, called Secure Dynamic Source Routing (S-DSR), is derived based on the DSR protocol [2]. The protocol incorporates the concept of CGA (cryptographically generated address) [1], address autoconfiguration [7], and DNS autoregistration [7] and discovery [3] of IPv6. It allows the network to be bootstrapped without manual administration and can resist a variety of attacks, including the black hole, replay, message forging, message tampering, MAC address spoofing, and DNS impersonation problems. In the literature, some works are for infrastructure networks (such as WEP, 802.1x, Radius, and Diameter) and some are for secure routing in MANETs but not directly linked to IPv6 [6, 11]. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Some backgrounds are given in Section 2. The proposed S-DSR is presented in Section 3. Section 4 shows how S-DSR prevents some attacks. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5. 2 Backgrounds of IPv6 2.1 Address Autoconfiguration In IPv6, there are two ways for a node to configure its address: stateful and stateless. Stateless configuration is more suitable for MANET due to its infrastructureless and dynamic architecture. In stateless address autoconfiguration (SAA), to obtain an IP address, a node has to generate a link-local address and then run the duplicate address detection (DAD) procedure of Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) [5]. In DAD, a node verifies the uniqueness of its link-local address by broadcasting a NS (neighbor solicitation) message to neighboring 2

3 nodes. Any node with the same address as the announced link-local address should reply with a NA (neighbor advertisement) message to enforce the former to choose a new address and retry DAD. For multi-hop MANETs, DAD verification of link-local addresses is insufficient to guarantee uniqueness because the same addresses may be used by hosts that are several hops away. Reference [7] proposes to extend DAD by using routable site-local addresses. An extended DAD scheme is proposed in [9] for MANETs by requiring a node to flood an address request (AREQ) message and to wait for a specific period of time for an address reply (AREP) message. Thus, AREQ and AREP extend NS and NA, respectively. If an AREQ initiator does not receive an AREP after a specific period of time, it assumes that its address is unique and can be used for communication afterwards. 2.2 Secure Neighbor Discovery via CGAs The above address autoconfiguration relies on NS and NA messages. However, in an open environment such as MANET, a host may impersonate another host s address. A few works have addressed how to secure the neighbor discovery protocol. In [1, 4], the cryptographically generated addresses (CGAs) are defined to make NS and NA massages verifiable in the absence of a centralized security infrastructure. The basic idea is to associate a host s address with its public key in order for other hosts to verify the ownership of the address by the host. Below, we discuss how DAD works under the CGA framework. It is assumed that a node owns a public-private key pair (P K, SK) and there is a publicly known one-way, collision-resistant hashing function H. While the upper part of a host s IP address should follow some subnet masking rules, the lower part must consist of the hashing result H(P K, r), where r is a random number to avoid possible collisions. Afterwards, the host can send messages, such as NS and NA, with P K and r attached. A receiving host can then verify the originality and ownership of the IP address by checking the lower part of the IP address. Therefore, a host can not impersonate another host by taking the latter s IP address unless it compromises SK. To resist replay and tamper attacks, the node can also accompany an encrypted information SK(P ), where P is a plaintext or even its IP address, in the message. This allows the receiver to authenticate the message integrity, in addition to address ownership. If the verification fails, the message may be under some attacks. 3

4 2.3 DNS Auto-registration and Discovery IP addresses are usually too long to remember; logical domain names are sometimes more preferable, especially for human. For a node to resolve names of others nodes, DNS servers are used. Three well-known site-local IPv6 addresses are reserved for auto-discovery of DNS servers [10]. They are fec0:0:0:ffff::1, fec0:0:0:ffff::2, and fec0:0:0:ffff::3. To verify the uniqueness of domain names, the 6DNAR (IPv6 network using Domain Name Auto-Registration) protocol [8] proposes to incorporate domain name registration into the DAD procedure of NDP. A new domain name option is added in NS messages, through which a node can announce its domain name together with its IP address. As such, the uniqueness of domain names and IP s can be verified altogether. NA messages are also modified so as to announce duplicate addresses as well as domain names. 3 Secure Boostrapping and Routing in a MANET In this section, we present our mechanisms to securely bootstrap a MANET and securely routing packets in the network. The design basically follows the philosophy of IPv6. Different levels of security are provided. Depending on the level of security need, a mobile node may need to establish different amount of knowledge prior to network formation. More specifically, the following assumptions are made. There is a publicly known one-way, collision-resistant hashing function H, and there exists an IPv6 DNS server in the MANET. The DNS server has a public-private key pair, which is known by all mobile nodes prior to entering the MANET. For a mobile which intends to own a permanent domain name, and an entry (domain name, IP address) should have been placed at the DNS server before the network is formed. In this case, impersonate such hosts would be impossible. For a mobile node which dose not intend to own a permanent domain name, its (domain name, IP address) entry can be registered with the DNS server on-line after the network is formed. We adopt the first-come-first-serve policy for registration of new domain names. However, for a mobile node who only wants to play as a client, establishing a domain name is not always necessary. Note that the above discussion does not make any assumption about a node s IP address. We believe that it will be more suitable to generate IP address on-line, as discussed below. Thus, 4

5 Table 1: Messages used in S-DSR. Type Function Parameters AREQ Address REQuest (S IP, DN, RR) AREP Address REPly (S IP, DN, CT, RR, [S IP, DN, CT ]R SK, R P K, R rn ) RREQ Route REQuest (S IP, D IP, seq, RR, [S IP, D IP, seq]s SK, S P K, S rn ) RREP Route REPly (S IP, D IP, seq, RR, SR(D-S), [S IP, D IP, seq, SR(D-S)]D SK, D P K, D rn ) QREP Quick route REPly (S IP, D IP, seq, RR, SR(S-I), [S IP, D IP, seq, SR(S-I)]I SK, I P K, I rn, [SR(I-D)]D SK, D P K ) RERR Route ERRor (C IP, S IP, SR(C-S), E IP, [C IP, E IP ]C SK, C P K, C rn ) RTRU Route TRUst (S IP, D IP, SR(D-S), [SR(D-S)]S SK, S P K, S rn ) all pre-knowledge needed about the network is domain names. S-DSR uses seven types of control messages: AREQ, AREP, RREQ, RREP, QRREP, RERR, and RTRU, whose formats and parameters are summarized in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively. 3.1 Secure Address Auto-configuration In this section, we introduce how a mobile host securely configures an IPv6 address and verifies its uniqueness in a MANET. The proposed solution is an integration and modification of the ideas in CGA [1], extended DAD scheme [9], and 6DNAR [8]. First, to join a MANET, a host must obtain an IPv6 site-local address. This address is composed of four fields: a 10-bit site-local prefix fec0::/10, a 38-bit all-zero field, a 16-bit subnet ID, and a 64-bit hash value, as illustrated in Fig. 1. In particular, the last 64-bit hash value H(P K, rn) is generated based on the concept of CGA, where rn is a random number to avoid possible collisions. The subnet ID makes no sense for the MANET and can be replaced by the gateway when the node is connecting to the Internet. Here we assume the 16-bit subnet ID to be all 0 s. So the site-local address is fec0::h(p K, rn). Such a design has two advantages. First, an adversary cannot arbitrarily claim the ownership of an IP address unless it finds a proper PK which maps to the same hashing result. Even if the PK is correct, the adversary may be challenged to prove its ownership of the corresponding SK, which is difficult. Second, normal users may occasionally find collisions in the hashing results. If so, the random number rn provides a way to generate a new IP address. Next, the host can verify the uniqueness of its IP address and, if desired, register with the DNS server its domain name. We integrate the extended DAD and 6DNAR to achieve this goal. The NS and NA messages in the original DAD are extended to AREQ and AREP 5

6 Symbol X IP DN CT seq RR SR(S, D) X SK X P K X rn [msg]x SK Table 2: Definitions of symbols in S-DSR. Description IP address of node X Domain name conflict type, which indicates whether an IP address conflict or a domain name conflict has occurred a unique sequence number of a RREQ, which is determined by the initiator of the RREQ message route record, which keeps track of the intermediate nodes that have been traversed by a RREQ a source route from node S to node D the secret (private) key of X the public key of X the random number produced by X as an input of H to generate an IP address the cyphertext obtained from encrypting msg by host X s private key 768bits PK rn H() Site-Local Prefix 10 bits 38 bits 16 bits 64 bits Subnet ID H(PK, rn) Figure 1: The CGA site-local IPv6 address. 6

7 Initiator S AREQ AREP Replyer R DNS Server N Figure 2: The extended DAD procedure (numbers indicate the sequence of message transmission) messages, respectively. The former can only reach one-hop neighbors, while the latter can be flooded to the MANET. All hosts will together to verify the uniqueness of the IP address, and the DNS will verify the uniqueness of the IP-to-domain name binding. To perform the DAD procedure, a node S should broadcast the address request message AREQ(S IP, DN, RR). On receiving the message, each intermediate node appends its address into the route record RR and rebroadcasts the message. Any intermediate node will keep track of the AREQs it has received recently to avoid duplications. When a node R receives an AREQ with S IP equal to its own IP address, it unicasts an address reply message AREP (S IP, DN, CT, RR, [S IP, DN, CT ]R SK, R P K, R rn ) to S along the reverse route derived from RR, where CT is any odd random integer. The AREP message should also be delivered to the DNS server through unicast(which can be supported by the routing protocol). Fig. 2 illustrates an example. When a DNS server N receives the AREQ message and finds that the domain name in the DN field has already been registered by another hosy different from S IP, it will also unicast an AREP message (S IP, CT + 1, DN, RR, [S IP, DN, CT + 1]N SK ) to S, where CT is any even random integer. When the node S with a pending address request for (S IP, DN) receives the AREP message, it authenticates the integrality of the message as follows: 1. It verifies if S IP matches with H(R P K, R rn ). 2. It decrypts [S IP, DN, CT ]R SK by R P K and verifies if the decrypted result matches with [S IP, DN, CT ]. If both checks pass, the AREP message is considered valid. S should then generate a new IP address and restart the DAD procedure again. 7

8 When the node S with a pending address request for (S IP, DN) receives the AREP message from the DNS server N, it authenticates the message by decrypting [S IP, DN, CT + 1]N SK by N P K and verifies if the decrypted result matches with [S IP, DN, CT + 1]. If the check pass, the AREP message is considered valid. S should then choose another domain name and retry. If S receives no AREP After sending out an AREQ within a predefined period of time, it assumes that its address S IP is unique. Similarly, if a DNS server receives no AREP after receiving an AREQ within a predefined period of time, it assumes that S IP is unique. The DNS server then stores (S IP, DN) in its domain name table. 3.2 Secure Routing In this section, we propose a secure routing protocol called Secure DSR (S-DSR), which is based on DSR protocol [2]. S-DSR has two parts: route discovery and route maintenance. The former is for a source node to search for a secure route leading to a destination node when it does not have such an entry in its routing cache, while the latter is for a node to report a link break to a source node while transferring data packets so that the source node can take proper actions to discover a new route. To search for a route to a destination D, a source node S broadcasts a RREQ message: (S IP, D IP, seq, RR, [S IP, D IP, seq]s SK, S P K, S nd ). On receiving the message, each intermediate node appends its address into the route record RR and rebroadcasts the message. Any intermediate node will record the largest sequence number for each node that sends RREQ message recently. If an intermediate node finds that its address is already in the record RR or the sequence number corresponding to S IP is less than or equal to the seq in the RREQ message, it simply ignores the message. When destination node D receives the route request RREQ message, it authenticates the message by the following procedure: 1. It verifies if S IP matches with H(S P K, S rn ). 2. It decrypts [S IP, D IP, seq]s SK by S P K and verifies if the decrypted result matches with [S IP, D IP, seq] indicated in the message. 3. It verifies if seq is greater than the sequence number of any RREQ message sent by S. If all the verifications are passed, the RREQ message is considered valid. The destination node D then unicasts a RREP message (S IP, D IP, seq, RR, SR(D-S), [S IP, D IP, seq, SR(D-S)]D SK, D P K, D rn ) to S along source route SR(D, S), which is derived form RR. 8

9 When the source node S receives the RREP message, it authenticates the message by the following procedure: 1. It verifies if D IP matches with H(D P K, D rn ). 2. It decrypts [S IP, D IP, seq, SR(D-S)]D SK by D P K and verifies if the decrypted result matches with [S IP, D IP, seq, SR(D-S)]. 3. It verifies if it has a pending RREQ message with sequence number seq. 4. It verifies if SR(D-S) matches with route record RR. If all the verifications are passed, the RREP message is considered valid. The source node S will send a RTRU message:(s IP, D IP, SR(D-S), [S IP, SR(D-S)]S SK, S P K, S rn ) to D. Data packets can then be sent along the path indicated by the reverse of SR(D, S) When D receives the RTRU message, it authenticates the message by the following procedure: 1. It verifies if S IP matches with H(S P K, Srn). 2. It decrypts [S IP, SR(D-S)]S SK by S P K and verifies if the decrypted result matches with [SR(D-S)]. If all the verifications are passed, the RTRU message is assumed to be valid. Destination node D will put the signed source route [SR(D-S)]S SK into cache. Afterward, if D receives any route request message destined for S, D can then reply on behalf of S by sending a quick route reply (QREP) message. For example, suppose that source node S is searching a route for destination node D, while an intermediate node I has a singed, unexpired, cached source route destined to D. The node I can then send the following QREP message to S: (S IP, I IP, seq, RR, SR(S-I), [S IP, I IP, seq, SR(S-I)]I SK, I P K, I rn, [SR(I-D)]D SK, D P K ). Fig. 3 illustrates the transmission of RREQ, RREP, and QREP messages. When source node S receives the quick route reply message, it authenticates the message by the following procedure: 1. It verifies if lower half of I IP =H(I P K, I rn ). 2. It decrypts [S IP, I IP, seq, SR(S-I)]I SK by I P K and verifies if the decrypted result matches with [S IP, I IP, seq, SR(I-S)]. 3. It verifies if it has a pending RREQ message with sequence number seq. 9

10 Source RREQ RREP QREP Destination D Intermediate Node I Figure 3: The transmission of RREQ, RREP and QREP messages (numerals and lowercase letters near the arrows indicate the receipt order of the messages; cross marks over messages indicate that the messages are discarded by receivers due to duplication; RREQ messages are broadcast-based; RREP and QREP messages are unicast-based). 4. It verifies if SR(I-S) matches with route record RR. 5. It decrypts [SR(I-D)]D SK by D P K and verifies if the decrypted result matches with [SR(I-D)]. If all the verifications are passed, the QREP message is assumed to be valid. Source node S can now transmit data packets via a route from S to I and then via a route from I to D. Similarly, S can now send a route trust RTRU message to nodes I and D before sending the first packet. However, we omit the details here to save space. 4 Security Analysis In this section, we present several scenarios of attacks and show that the secure bootstrapping and routing mechanisms proposed in this paper can resist such attacks. Black hole attack: Source node S broadcasts a route request message to find a route to destination node D, and a malicious node M sends a fabricated route reply RREP message to source node S, in order to redirect all packets toward itself. This is the so called black hole attack. Because M can t provide a source route signed by D, S will discard M s message. Thus, S-DSR can resist black hole attack. Route request (RREQ) message reply attack: Source node S broadcasts a route request RREQ message to find a route to destination node D, and a malicious node M sends a old route reply RREP message to source node S, in order to make S s route cache 10

11 stale. The signed sequence number in the route reply RREP message can resist such attacks. Forged route request (RREQ) message attack: A malicious node M masquerades S and broadcasts a fabricated route request message with a very large sequence number to obstruct S s normal route requests. Because M can t provide a signed sequence number of S, the fabricated message will be discarded. Note that the RREQ message thus should be authenticated hop-by-hop to resist such an attack. Forged address reply (AREP) message attack: A node S floods an AREQ message, and a malicious node M always sends a fabricated address reply (AREP) message to node S to prevent S finish DAD procedure. Because M can t provide a signature to prove that it owns the public-private key pair (PK, SK), where PK is associated to S s IP address, the fabricated AREP will be discarded by S. Forged route error (RERR) message attack: Source node S sends packets via a source route SR including an intermediate node E, and a malicious node M sends a fabricated route error (RERR) message to S. Because M can t provide a signature of the node that precedes E in SR, S will thus discard the message. Tampered control message attacks: A malicious node M tamper a control message of S-DSR when it relies the message. Since all core information of the control message is signed by the sender s secret key, the receiver can thus authenticate the message by sender public key attached with the message. Consequently, the tampered message will be discarded. MAC address spoofing attack: A malicious M binds itself s MAC address with the IP address of node S s so that it can overtake all the packets destined to S. To achieve this, M must provide a public key whose hash value equals to the lower half of the S s IP address. Also, M should also provide a signed message digest that can be decrypted by S s public key to be M s MAC address. M cannot achieve all these unless it knows the private key of S. Thus, the S-DSR can resist such an attack. DNS server impersonation attack: A source node S wants to communicate with a destination node D of some specific domain name. It contacts the DNS server to query D s IP address. A malicious node M pretends itself as a DNS server and sends a false reply message. Since any DNS server encrypts the reply message with its private key, 11

12 and every node decrypts DNS server s reply with the previously known DNS server s public key, the false reply message cannot be decrypted properly and is thus discarded. 5 Conclusions In this paper, we have proposed a secure routing protocol called S-DSR for MANETs. The protocol is developed on the basis of IPv6 and has three parts: neighbor discovery, route discovery and route maintenance. With the help of the CGA (cryptographically generated address), the protocol allows nodes to bootstrap securely without manual administration and can resist a variety of attacks. We claim that by applying similar concept, we can also make secure other protocols, such as AODV, etc. In the future, we plane to make DNS dynamic update secure with the help of CGAs. References [1] J. Arkko, P. Nikander, and V. Mantyla. Securing IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Using Crytographically Generated Address (CGAs). Internet Draft: draft-arrko-send-cga-00.txt, June Work in Progress. [2] D. Johnson, D. Maltz, and J. Broch. DSR: The Dynamic Source Routing Protocol for Multihop Wireless Ad Hoc Networks. in Ad Hoc Networking, edited by Charles E. Perkins, chapter 5, Addison-Wesley, pages , [3] H. Kitamura. Domain Name Auto-Registration for Plugged-in IPv6 Nodes. Internet Draft: draft-ietf-dnsext-ipv6-name-auto-reg-00.txt, Work in Progress. [4] G. Montenegro and C. Castelluccia. Statistically Unique and Cryptographically Verifiable (SUCV) Identifiers and Addresses Network and Distributed System Security Conference, [5] T. Narten, E. Nordmark, and W. Simpson. Neighbor Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6). RFC2461, [6] P. Papadimitratos and Z. J. Haas. Secure Routing for Mobile Ad hoc Networks. Proceedings of the SCS Communication Networks and Distributed Systems Modeling and Simulation Conference (CNDS 2002), San Antonio, TX,

13 [7] J.-S. Park, Y.-J. Kim, and S.-W. Park. Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks using Site-local Address. Internet Draft: draft-park-zeroconf-manetipv6-00.txt, Work in Progress. [8] S. D. Park, P. Kim, and Y. Kim. IPv6 Domain Name Auto-Registration (6DNAR). Internet Draft: draft-park-6dnar-01.txt, Work in Progress. [9] C. Perkins, E. Royer, and S. Das. IP Address Autoconfiguration for Ad Hoc Networks. Internet Draft: draft-ietfmanet-autoconf-01.txt, Work in Progress. [10] D. Thaler and J. Hagino. IPv6 stateless DNS Discovery. Internet Draft: draft-ietf-ipv6- dns-discovery-04.txt, Work in Progress. [11] M. G. Zapata. Secure Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (SAODV) Routing. draftguerrero-manet-saodv-00.txt,

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