DNS/DNSSEC Workshop. In Collaboration with APNIC and HKIRC Hong Kong. Champika Wijayatunga Regional Security Engagement Manager Asia Pacific

Transcription

1 DNS/DNSSEC Workshop In Collaboration with APNIC and HKIRC Hong Kong Champika Wijayatunga Regional Security Engagement Manager Asia Pacific January

2 DNSSEC 2 2

3 DNS: Data Flow Zone administrator Zone file 1 Primary 4 Caching Servers Dynamic updates Secondaries Resolvers 3 3

4 DNS Vulnerabilities Corrupting data Zone administrator Zone file 1 Impersonating master Primary 4 Caching Servers Cache impersonation Dynamic updates 2 Unauthorized updates 3 Secondaries Cache pollution by Data spoofing Altered zone data 5 Resolver Server protection Data protection 4 4

5 The Bad Cache Poisoning Attacks Vulnerable resolvers add malicious data to local caches DNS Hijacking A man in the middle (MITM) or spoofing attack intercept and forwards DNS queries to a name server that returns forge responses e.g. DNSChanger (One of the biggest cybercriminal takedown in history) Many other DNS hijacks in recent times SSL / TLS doesn't tell you if you've been sent to the correct site, it only tells you if the DNS matches the name in the certificate. 5

6 How DNSSEC Works 6

7 Why DNSSEC? Without DNSSEC With DNSSEC myexamplebank.com = IP address A DNS myexamplebank.com = IP address A DNS myexamplebank.com = Attacker IP address X myexamplebank.com = Attacker IP address X myexamplebank.com DNS myexamplebank.com DNS IP address X IP address A Passwords myexamplebank..com webserver Attacker s Passwords Desired page myexamplebank. com webserver Attacker s page webserver 7

8 DNSSEC cctld Map 8

9 DNSSEC Deployment Current Status 9

10 DNSSEC Validation Current Status 10

11 DNSSEC Validation Current Status 11

12 DNSSEC: So what s the problem? Not enough IT departments know about it or are too busy putting out other security fires? When they do look into it they hear old stories of FUD and lack of turnkey solutions? Registrars*/DNS providers see no demand leading to chicken-and-egg problems. *but required by new ICANN registrar agreement 12

13 The Business Case for DNSSEC Cyber security is becoming a greater concern to enterprises, government, and end users. DNSSEC is a key tool and differentiator. DNSSEC is the biggest security upgrade to Internet infrastructure in over 20 years. It is a platform for new security applications (for those that see the opportunity). DNSSEC infrastructure deployment has been brisk but requires expertise. Getting ahead of the curve is a competitive advantage. 13

14 What you can do For Companies: Sign your corporate domain names Just turn on validation on corporate DNS resolvers For Users: Ask ISPs/DNS Operators to turn on validation on their DNS resolvers For All: Take advantage of DNS and DNSSEC education and training Encourage to join TLD policy discussions through ICANN constituencies such as gnso and ccnso. 14

15 New concepts Secure Entry Point and Chain of Trust Delegating Signing Authority New packet options (flags) CD, AD, DO New RRs DNSKEY, RRSIG, NSEC/NSEC3 and DS Signature expiration Key Rollovers 15

16 Chain of Trust and Secure Entry Point Using the existing delegation based model of distribution Don t sign the entire zone, sign a RRset Parent DOES NOT sign the child zone. The parent signs a pointer (hash) to the key used to sign the data of the child zone (DS record) Example with Secure Entry Point net myzone 16 www 16

17 Delegation of Trust Data authenticity and integrity by signing the Resource Records Sets with a private key Public DNSKEYs published, used to verify the RRSIGs Children sign their zones with their private key Authenticity of that key established by parent signing hash (DS) of the child zone's key Repeat for parent Not that difficult on paper Operationally, it is a bit more complicated DS KEY KEY signs zone data 17

18 New RR: DNSKEY PROTOCOL OWNER TYPE FLAGS ALGORITHM example.net DNSKEY ( AwEAAbinasY+k/9xD4MBBa3QvhjuOHIpe319SFbWYIRj /nbmvzfjnsw7by1cv3tm7zllqnbcb86nvfmsq3jjofmr PUBLIC KEY (BASE64)...) ; ZSK; key id = KEY ID FLAGS determines the usage of the key PROTOCOL is always 3 (DNSSEC) ALGORITHM can be (3: DSA/SHA-1, 5: RSA/SHA1, 8: RSA/SHA-256, 12: ECC- GOST) 18

19 DNSKEY: Two Keys, not one There are in practice at least two DNSKEY pairs for every zone Originally, one key-pair (public, private) defined for the zone private: key used to sign the zone data (RRsets) public: key published (DNSKEY) in the zone DNSSEC works fine with a single key pair Problem with using a single key: Every time the key is updated, the DS record must be updated on the parent zone as well Introduction of Key Signing Key (flags=257) 19

20 KSK and ZSK Key Signing Key (KSK) Pointed to by parent zone in the form of DS (Delegation Signer). Also called Secure Entry Point. Used to sign the Zone Signing Key Flags: 257 Zone Signing Key (ZSK) Signed by the KSK Used to sign the zone data RRsets Flags: 256 This decoupling allows for independent updating of the ZSK without having to update the KSK, and involve the parents (i.e. less administrative interaction) 20

21 New RR: RRSIG (Resource Record Signature) example.net. 600 A example.net. 600 A OWNER TYPE TYPE COVERED ALG #LABELS TTL example.net. 600 RRSIG A ( SIG. EXPIRATION SIG. INCEPTION KEY IDSIGNER NAME example.net. SIGNATURE CoYkYPqE8Jv6UaVJgRrh7u16m/cEFGtFM8TArbJdaiPu W77wZhrvonoBEyqYbhQ1yDaS74u9whECEe08gfoe1FGg... ) 21

22 RRSIG Typical default values Signature inception time is 1 hour before. Signature expiration is 30 from now Proper timekeeping (NTP) is required What happens when signatures run out? SERVFAIL Domain effectively disappears from the Internet for validating resolvers Note that keys do not expire No all RRSets need to be resigned at the same time 22

23 New RR: NSEC NXDomains also must be verified NSEC provides a pointer to the Next SECure record in the chain of records. omega.myzone? RESOLVER NSEC ] delta.myzone., zulu.myzone.[ AUTH for myzone. myzone. NS alpha.myzone. A beta.myzone. CNAME charlie.myzone. A delta.myzone. MX zulu.myzone. A 23

24 New RR: NSEC3 To avoid concerns about zone enumeration To avoid large zone-files: opt-out concept omega.myzone? RESOLVER NSEC3 [ H(charlie.myzone.), H(alpha.myzone.) ] 1-Way Hash AUTH for myzone digests. H(zulu.myzone.) H(myzone.) H(delta.myzone.) H(charlie.myzone.) H(beta.myzone.) H(alpha.myzone.) 24

25 New RR: DS (Delegation Signer) Hash of the KSK of the child zone Stored in the parent zone, together with the NS RRs indicating a delegation of the child zone. The DS record for the child zone is signed together with the rest of the parent zone data NS records are NOT signed (they are a hint/pointer) Digest type 1 = SHA-1, 2 = SHA-256 myzone. DS F6CD025B3F5D A B56D683 myzone. DS CCBC0B557510E4256E88C01B0B1336AC4ED6FE08C8268CC1AA5FBF00 5DCE

26 Signatures Expiration and Key Rollovers 26

27 Signature Expiration Signatures are per default 30 days (BIND) Need for regular resigning: To maintain a constant window of validity for the signatures of the existing RRset To sign new and updated Rrsets Use of jitter to avoid having to resign all expiring RRsets at the same time The keys themselves do NOT expire But they may need to be rolled over... 27

28 Key Rollovers Try to minimise impact Short validity of signatures Regular key rollover Remember: DNSKEYs do not have timestamps the RRSIG over the DNSKEY has the timestamp Key rollover involves second party or parties: State to be maintained during rollover Operationally expensive 28

29 Key Rollovers Two methods for doing key rollover Pre-Publish Double Signature KSK and ZSK rollover use different methods. Remember that KSK needs to interact with parent zone to update DS record. 29

30 DNSSEC 30

31 DNSSEC Multi-stakeholder, bottom-up trust model* /w 21 crypto officers from around the world Broadcast Key Ceremonies and public docs SysTrust audited FIPS level 4 HSMs Root DPS DNSSEC Practice Statement *Managed by technical community+icann 31

32 DNSSEC Signing vs. Validation DNS Security Extensions Digital signature is the basic element of work Signing Zone Administrators add digital signatures Validation DNS Caches, DNS Stubs check the signatures in a few ways, cryptographic and other (time, etc.) Impact of DNSSEC root KSK rollover DNSSEC validators (e.g., some ISPs) need to prepare, new "root" of trust 32

33 The Root Zone DNSSEC KSK The Root Zone DNSSEC Key Signing Key KSK is the top most cryptographic key in the DNSSEC hierarchy KSK Public portion of the KSK is configuration parameter in DNS validating revolvers DATA 33

34 Recognizing KSK-2017 The KSK-2017 s Key Tag is The Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Record for KSK-2017 is. IN DS E06D44B80B8F1D39A95C0B0D7C65D084 "Root" 58E880409BBC C7F8EC8D Note: liberties taken with formatting for presentation purposes 34

35 KSK-2017 in a DNSKEY Resource Record The DNSKEY resource record will be:. IN DNSKEY AwEAAaz/tAm8yTn4Mfeh5eyI96WSVexTBAvkMgJzkKTOiW1vkIbzxeF3 +/4RgWOq7HrxRixHlFlExOLAJr5emLvN7SWXgnLh4+B5xQlNVz8Og8kv ArMtNROxVQuCaSnIDdD5LKyWbRd2n9WGe2R8PzgCmr3EgVLrjyBxWezF 0jLHwVN8efS3rCj/EWgvIWgb9tarpVUDK/b58Da+sqqls3eNbuv7pr+e ozg+srdk6nwel3c6h5apxz7ljvc1utidsixxuolya4/ilbmsvizudwfd RUfhHdY6+cn8HFRm+2hM8AnXGXws9555KrUB5qihylGa8subX2Nn6UwN R1AkUTV74bU= "Root" Note: liberties taken with formatting for presentation purposes 35

36 Why are there DS and DNSKEY forms of KSK-2017? Tools that you will use to manage DNSSEC trust anchor configurations work on either the DS form, the DNSKEY form or both For each tool there are historical reasons The DS record contains a hash of KSK-2017 The DNSKEY record contains the public key of KSK-2017 Consult your tool s documentation to know which is appropriate 36

37 Preferred Approach Mindful that the choice is a matter of local policy DNSSEC validation is for the benefit of the receiver Not all operational environments are the same, not all validating tools implement Automated Updates ICANN is doing its best to accommodate different approaches Automated Updates is likely the preferred approach Relies only on what has been trusted before It's the most reliable/stable approach, simplest basis for trust 37

38 What Do Operators Need to Do? Be aware whether DNSSEC is enabled in your servers Be aware of how trust is evaluated in your operations Test/verify your set ups Inspect configuration files, are they (also) up to date? If DNSSEC validation is enabled or planned in your system o o Have a plan for participating in the KSK rollover Know the dates, know the symptoms, solutions 38

39 Latest update on the Root KSK Rollover Project 39

40 Thank You and Questions Visit us at icann.org 40