MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0y1 Security Target Lite

Transcription

1 Rev May 2010 Evaluation Documentation BSI-DSZ-CC-0586 Document information Info Keywords Abstract Content, MF1PLUSx0y1 Evaluation of the NXP Secure Smart Card Controller developed and provided by NXP Semiconductors, Business Line Identification according to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Evaluation (CC) at level EAL4 augmented

2 Revision history Rev Date Description Remarks July 2009 Derived from full Security Target MF1PLUSx0y May 2010 Hardware update reflected; Type identifier v changed form SW-Version to Product Version. Latest version is: Rev. 1.4 (14 May 2010) Contact information For additional information, please visit: For sales office addresses, please send an to: salesaddresses@nxp.com Evaluation Documentation Rev May of 53

3 1. ST Introduction This chapter is divided into the following sections: ST reference, TOE reference, TOE Overview and TOE Description. 1.1 ST reference, Rev. 1.4, NXP Semiconductors, 14 May TOE reference The term NXP is used as short reference for the TOE. The references of all evaluated versions are provided in section TOE Overview Introduction The TOE is a smart card comprising a hardware platform and a fixed software package (Security IC Embedded Software and IC Dedicated Software). The software package provides an operating system with a set of functions used to manage the data stored in the non-volatile EEPROM memory. NXP has developed the NXP to be used with Proximity Coupling Devices (PCDs) according to ISO14443 Type A. The communication protocol complies to part ISO and The MF1PLUSx0y1 is primarily designed for secure contact-less transport applications and related loyalty programs as well as access management systems. It fully complies with the requirements for fast and highly secure data transmission, flexible data storage and interoperability with existing infrastructures. The TOE supports the virtual card architecture by providing a selection mechanism for virtual cards. This allows using the TOE in a complex environment where multiple virtual cards are stored in one physical object, however the TOE does support only one virtual card. The TOE includes IC Dedicated Test Software for test purposes after production. The Smart Card Controller hardware comprises an 8-bit processing unit, volatile and nonvolatile memories, a cryptographic co-processor, security components and a contact-less communication interface. The TOE includes a Functional Specification and a Guidance Document. This documentation contains a description of the hardware and software interface, the secure configuration and usage of the product by the terminal designer. The security measures of the MF1PLUSx0y1 are designed to act as an integral part of the combination of hardware platform and software package in order to strengthen the product as a whole. Several security measures are completely implemented in and controlled by the hardware. Other security measures are controlled by the combination of hardware and software. Evaluation Documentation Rev May of 53

4 1.3.2 TOE Type The TOE is a Smart Card comprising a hardware platform and a fixed software package (Security IC Embedded Software and IC Dedicated Software). The guidance consists of two documents that are also part of the TOE Required non-toe hardware/software/firmware The TOE requires an ISO card terminal to be provided with power and to receive adequate commands. 1.4 TOE Description Physical scope of the TOE The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the smart card integrated circuit named MF1PLUSx0y1 together with its Security IC Embedded Software. It is manufactured in an advanced CMOS process. The TOE includes IC Designer/Manufacturer proprietary IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software. The MIFARE Plus Embedded Software is called Security IC Embedded Software according to the terminology used in [7]. Note that this Security IC Embedded Software is part of the TOE. The following table lists the TOE components. Table 1. Components of the TOE Type Name Release Date Form of delivery Hardware NXP MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0y1 Master t507c t507c.gds2 ( ) Wafer or modules (dice include reference t507c) Hardware NXP MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0y1 Via 002 romt0byf002.eco ( ) Wafer or modules (dice include reference 002 on via) Software Software Software Test ROM Software (the IC Dedicated Test Software) Boot ROM Software (the IC Dedicated Support Software) MIFARE Plus Embedded Software (the Security IC Embedded Software) ROM on the chip (DF8_TestOS_YAM1_ PROD.hex) ROM on the chip (DF8_TestOS_YAM1_ PROD.hex) ROM on the chip (MFP_PROD.hex) Document Data Sheet, MF1PLUSx0 [9] Document Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual, MF1PLUSx0y1, NXP Semiconductors [10] Electronic document Electronic document Evaluation Documentation Rev May of 53

5 Evaluated package types A number of package types are supported for the TOE. Each package type has a different commercial type name. The TOE will be available in two different packages and two different memory configurations. A commercial type name for the TOE has the following general format: MF1PLUSxeyfdpp/lv Table 2 illustrates the commercial type names that are subject of the evaluation. All package types are manufactured in SSMC. Table 2. Supported package types and memory configurations Type x e y f d pp / l v Description MF1PLUS D UD / 0 3 MF1PLUS D UD / 0 3 MF1PLUS D UD / 0 3 MF1PLUS D UD / 1 3 MF1PLUS D A4 / 0 3 MF1PLUS D A4 / 0 3 MF1PLUS D A4 / 0 3 MF1PLUS D A4 / 1 3 MF1PLUS D UD / 0 3 MF1PLUS D UD / 0 3 MF1PLUS D UD / 0 3 MF1PLUS D UD / 1 3 MF1PLUS D A4 / 0 3 MF1PLUS D A4 / 0 3 MF1PLUS D A4 / 0 3 MF1PLUS D A4 / 1 3 2K EEPROM, 4 byte UID; UID0=xF according to ISO , 120µm sawn wafer, L1 card, Product Version 3 2K EEPROM, 4 byte UID, 120µm sawn wafer, L1 card, Product Version 3 2K EEPROM, 7 byte UID, 120µm sawn wafer, L1 card, Product Version 3 2K EEPROM, 7 byte UID, 120µm sawn wafer, L3 card, Product Version 3 2K EEPROM, 4 byte UID; UID0=xF according to ISO , MOA4 module on reel, L1 card, Product Version 3 2K EEPROM, 4 byte UID, MOA4 module on reel, L1 card, Product Version 3 2K EEPROM, 7 byte UID, MOA4 module on reel, L1 card, Product Version 3 2K EEPROM, 7 byte UID, MOA4 module on reel, L3 card, Product Version 3 4K EEPROM, 4 byte UID; UID0=xF according to ISO , 120µm sawn wafer, L1 card, Product Version 3 4K EEPROM, 4 byte UID, 120µm sawn wafer, L1 card, Product Version 3 4K EEPROM, 7 byte UID, 120µm sawn wafer, L1 card, Product Version 3 4K EEPROM, 7 byte UID, 120µm sawn wafer, L3 card, Product Version 3 4K EEPROM, 4 byte UID; UID0=xF according to ISO , MOA4 module on reel, L1 card, Product Version 3 4K EEPROM, 4 byte UID, MOA4 module on reel, L1 card, Product Version 3 4K EEPROM, 7 byte UID, MOA4 module on reel, L1 card, Product Version 3 4K EEPROM, 7 byte UID, MOA4 module on reel, L3 card, Product Version 3 Evaluation Documentation Rev May of 53

6 The commercial type name is different depending on the memory size (x=6: 2K EEPROM, x=8: 4K EEPROM), the evolution (e=0: the very first evolution of MIFARE Plus), the UID length (y=0: 7 byte UID, y=1: 4 byte UID, y=2: 4 byte UID; UID0=xF according to ISO ), the FAB produced (f=1: product produced in SSMC), the operating temperature range for the product (d=d: -20 < t operating < 70), the package type (pp=ud: 120µm sawn wafer, pp=a4: MOA4 module on reel), the Security Level when switching from Security Level 0 (l=0: L1 card; l=1: L3 card), and the Product-Version (v=3: Product Version 3). Since e, f, d and v only provide 1 option the format is restricted to: MF1PLUSx0y1Dpp/l3 For example, the commercial type name MF1PLUS6011DUD/03 denotes a MIFARE Plus supplied in wafer form, with 2 K EEPROM, 4 byte UID, manufactured in SSMC and supporting security levels 0, 1, 2 and 3, Product Version 3. The commercial type name MF1PLUS8001DA4/13 denotes a MIFARE Plus supplied in modules on a reel, with 4K EEPROM, 7 byte UID, manufactured in SSMC and supporting security levels 0 and 3 only, Product Version 3. The package type does not influence the security functionality of the TOE. For all package types listed above the security during development and production is ensured (refer to section 1.4.3). All commercial types listed in the table above are subject of this evaluation. However the identifier MF1PLUSx0y1 will be used in the remainder of the document to make referencing easier. Unless described explicitly all information given in the remainder of the ST applies to all commercial types Logical Scope of the TOE Hardware Description The CPU of the MF1PLUSx0y1 has an 8-bit architecture with an instruction set that is based on the 8051-family instruction set. The on-chip hardware components are controlled by the Security IC Embedded Software via Special Function Registers. These registers are correlated to the activities of the CPU, the memory management unit, interrupt control, contact-less communication, EEPROM, timers and the AES coprocessor. The communication with the MF1PLUSx0y1 can be performed through the contact-less interface. The device includes ROM (32 kbyte), RAM (512 Byte) and EEPROM (8 kbyte) memory. The ROM is split in Application-ROM and Test-ROM. The AES co-processor supports AES operations with a key length of 128 bits. The random number generator provides true random numbers without pseudo random calculation. Evaluation Documentation Rev May of 53

7 Software Description The IC Dedicated Test Software (Test ROM Software) in the Test-ROM of the TOE is used by the TOE Manufacturer to test the functionality of the chip. The test functionality is disabled before the operational use of the smart card. The IC Dedicated Test Software includes the test operating system, test routines for the various blocks of the circuitry, control flags for the status of the EEPROM security row and shutdown functions to ensure that security relevant test operations cannot be executed illegally after phase 3 of the TOE life cycle (cf. section 1.4.4). The TOE also contains IC Dedicated Support Software which is also stored in the Test- ROM. The IC Dedicated Support Software consists of the Boot ROM Software. This software is executed after each reset of the TOE, i.e. every time when the TOE starts. It sets up the TOE and does some basic configuration. The Security IC Embedded Software provides the main functionality of the TOE in the usage phase. The MF1PLUSx0y1 is primarily designed for secure contact-less transport applications and related loyalty programs as well as access management systems. It fully complies with the requirements for fast and highly secure data transmission, flexible data storage and interoperability with existing infrastructures. Its functionality consists of: A data storage system that contains blocks grouped in sectors which can store data (including so called values which are blocks in a specific format representing a number). Authentication on sector level with fine-grained access conditions blocks. Message authentication to support replay attack protection. Data encryption for confidentiality of the contact-less communication. Unique serial number for each device (UID) with optional random ID. The TOE features enable it to be used for a variety of applications: Electronic fare collection Stored value card systems Access management systems Loyalty If privacy is an issue, the TOE can be configured not to disclose privacy-related information to unauthorised users. The card is in one (of in total four) security levels. The TOE is delivered in two configurations, called L1 card and L3 card. In a L1 card all security levels are available whereby in a L3 card only the security levels 0 and 3 are available. The main features of each security level are listed below: Security level 0: The card does not provide any functionality besides initialization. The card is initialized in plaintext, especially keys for the further levels can be brought in. A card in security level 0 is not usable for other purposes. After all mandatory keys and security attributes have been stored in the card it can be switched to a higher security level (security level 1 for a L1 card, security level 3 for a L3 card). Security level 1: The card user can access the blocks in the card after an authentication procedure. The communication with the terminal is protected, however Evaluation Documentation Rev May of 53

8 the authentication and the protected communication in this security level are not evaluated security services of the TOE. It can be switched to a higher security level if an authentication using the AES algorithm with the necessary key is performed. Security level 2: The card user can access the blocks in the card after an authentication procedure involving an authentication using the AES algorithm and an authentication using a proprietary algorithm. The communication with the terminal is protected, however both authentications and the protected communication in this security level are not evaluated security services of the TOE. The TOE can be switched to security level 3 if an authentication using the AES algorithm with the necessary key is performed. Security level 3: The card user can access the data and value blocks in the card via an adequate card terminal after an authentication procedure based on the AES algorithm. The communication with the card terminal can be protected with secure messaging. The authentication and the secure messaging are security services of the TOE. The TOE cannot be switched to a different security level. In all security levels the TOE does additionally support the so-called originality function which allows verifying the authenticity of the TOE. There is also a card state called TERMINATION. In response to detected attacks on the TOE it can switch to the TERMINATION state. This state is irreversible and does not allow any access to the card data Documentation The Functional Specification [9] is also part of the TOE. It contains a functional description of the communication protocols and the commands implemented by the TOE. The provided documentation can be used by a customer to construct applications using the TOE. In addition there is a dedicated guidance manual [10] focused on security aspects Security during Development and Production During the design and the layout process of the IC and the development of the software only people involved in the specific development project have access to sensitive data. The security measures installed within NXP ensure a secure computer system and provide appropriate equipment for the different development tasks. The verified layout data is provided by the developers of NXP Semiconductors, Business Line Identification directly to the wafer fab. The wafer fab generates and forwards the layout data related to the different photo masks to the manufacturer of the photo masks. The photo masks are generated off-site and verified against the design data of the development before the usage. The accountability and the traceability is ensured among the wafer fab and the photo mask provider. The test process of every die is performed by a test centre of NXP. Delivery processes between the involved sites provide accountability and traceability of the produced wafers. NXP embeds the dice into smart card modules based on customer demand. Information Evaluation Documentation Rev May of 53

9 about non-functional items is stored on magnetic/optical media enclosed with the delivery, available for download or the non-functional items are physically marked. In summary the TOE can be delivered in two different forms: Dice on wafers Smart card modules on a module reel The different (package) types are described in detail in section Life Cycle and Delivery of the TOE The life-cycle phases are according to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [7], section 1.2.4: Phase 1: IC Embedded Software Development Phase 2: IC Development Phase 3: IC Manufacturing Phase 4: IC Packaging Phase 5: Composite Product Integration Phase 6: Personalisation Phase 7: Operational Usage For the usage phase the MF1PLUSx0y1 chip will be embedded in a credit card sized plastic card (micro-module embedded into the plastic card) or another sealed package. The module and card embedding of the TOE provide external security mechanisms because they make it harder for an attacker to access parts of the TOE for physical manipulation. Regarding the Application Note 1 of [7] NXP will deliver the TOE at the end of phase 3 in form of wafers or at the end of phase 4 in packaged form. Regarding the Application Note 2 of [7] the TOE provides additional functionality which is not covered in the Security IC Platform Protection Profile. The additional functionality is due to the Security IC Embedded Software that is included in this evaluation. The TOE is able to control two different logical phases. After production of the chip every start-up will lead to the Test Mode and the execution of the IC Dedicated Test Software. At the end of the production test the access to the IC Dedicated Test Software is disabled. With disabled test software every start-up of the chip will lead to the User Mode with the CPU executing the Security IC Embedded Software. The security level 0 is intended for personalisation in phase 6. The security levels 1 to 3 are intended for the phase TOE Intended Usage The TOE user environment is the environment from TOE Delivery to phase 7. At the phases up to 6, the TOE user environment must be a controlled environment. Regarding to phase 7, the TOE is used by the end-user. The method of use of the product in this phase depends on the application. The TOE is intended to be used in an unsecured environment that does not avoid a threat. Evaluation Documentation Rev May of 53

10 The device is developed for high-end safeguarded applications, and is designed for embedding into contact-less smart cards according to ISO [12]. Usually the smart card is assigned to a single individual only and the smart card may be used for multiple applications in a multi-provider environment. Therefore the TOE may store and process secrets of several systems that must be protected from each other. The secret data shall be used as input for the calculation of authentication data and the encryption of data for communication. In the end-user environment (phase 7) Smart card ICs are used in a wide range of applications to assure authorised conditional access. Examples of such are transportation or access management. The end-user environment therefore covers a wide spectrum of very different functions, thus making it difficult to avoid and monitor any abuse of the TOE. The system integrators such as the terminal software developer may use samples of the TOE during the development phases for their testing purposes. These samples do not differ from the TOE, they do not have any additional functionality used for testing. Note: The phases from TOE Delivery to phase 7 of the smart card life cycle are not part of the TOE construction process in the sense of this Security Target. Information about those phases is just included to describe how the TOE is used after its construction. Nevertheless the security features of the TOE cannot be disabled in these phases Interface of the TOE The electrical interface of the TOE consists of the pads to connect the RF antenna. The functional interface is defined by the commands implemented by the TOE and described in [9]. The chip surface can be seen as an interface of the TOE, too. This interface must be taken into account regarding environmental stress e.g. like temperature and in the case of an attack where the attacker e.g. manipulates the chip surface General IT features of the TOE The TOE IT functionality consists of: Tamper resistant data storage Control of operation conditions to provide correct operation in the specified range Data communication via contact-less interface Strong authentication mechanism to prevent unauthorised use Access management to separate different sectors Data blocks for data storage including values Secure configuration in the field Encryption of communication Random ID to exacerbate tracing of end-users Evaluation Documentation Rev May of 53

11 2. Conformance Claims This chapter is divided into the following sections: CC Conformance Claim, Package Claim, PP Claim and Conformance Claim rationale. 2.1 CC Conformance Claim This Security Target claims to be conformant to Common Criteria version 3.1: Common Criteria, Part 1: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 1, September 2006, CCMB , [1] Common Criteria, Part 2: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 2, September 2007, CCMB , [2] Common Criteria, Part 3: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 2, September 2007, CCMB , [3] For the evaluation the following methodology will be used: Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 2, September 2007, CCIMB , [4] This Security Target claims to be CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant. The extended Security Functional Requirements are defined in chapter Package Claim Furthermore, this Security Target claims conformance to the assurance package EAL4 augmented. The augmentations to EAL4 are ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. In addition the Security Target is augmented using the component ASE_TSS.2 which is chosen to include architectural information on the security functionality of the TOE. 2.3 PP Claim This Security Target claims conformance to the following Protection Profile: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, , registered and certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0035, [7]. The short term for this Protection Profile used in this document is Security IC Platform Protection Profile. 2.4 Conformance Claim rationale According to section 2.3 this Security Target claims conformance to the Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile [7]. The TOE type defined in section of this Security Target is a Smart Card comprising a hardware platform and a fixed software package, together with guidance documentation. This is consistent with the TOE definition for a Security IC in Evaluation Documentation Rev May of 53

12 section of [7], since the Security IC is a part of the Smart Card comprising a hardware platform and a fixed software package. The sections of this document where security problem definition, objectives and security requirements are defined clearly state which of these items are taken from the Protection Profile and which are added in this ST. Therefore this is not repeated here. Moreover, all additional stated items in this ST do not contradict the items included from the PP (see the respective sections in this document). The operations done for the SFRs taken from the PP are also clearly indicated. The evaluation assurance level claimed for this target (EAL4+) is shown in section 6.2 to include respectively exceed the requirements claimed by the PP (EAL4+). These considerations show that the Security Target correctly claims conformance to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile, [7]. Evaluation Documentation Rev May of 53

13 3. Security Problem Definition This Security Target claims conformance to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile, [7]. The Assets, Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies are completely taken from the Protection Profile. In the following only the extension of the different sections are described in detail and the items taken from the Protection Profile are cited for completeness. This chapter is divided into the following sections: Description of Assets, Threats, Organisational Security Policies and Assumptions. 3.1 Description of Assets Since this Security Target claims conformance to the PP Security IC Platform Protection Profile, [7], the assets defined in section 3.1 of the Protection Profile are cited here for completeness. The assets related to standard functionality are: the User Data, the Security IC Embedded Software, stored and in operation, the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded Software. To be able to protect these assets the TOE shall protect its security functionality. Therefore critical information about the TOE shall be protected. Critical information includes: logical design data, physical design data, IC Dedicated Software, and configuration data, Initialisation data and pre-personalisation data, specific development aids, test and characterisation related data, material for software development support, and photomasks. 3.2 Threats Since this Security Target claims conformance to the PP Security IC Platform Protection Profile [7], the threats defined in section 3.2 of the Protection Profile are valid for this Security Target. The following table lists the threats defined by the PP: Table 3. Name Threats defined by the Protection Profile Title T.Leak-Inherent T.Phys-Probing T.Malfunction T.Phys-Manipulation T.Leak-Forced T.Abuse-Func T.RND Inherent Information Leakage Physical Probing Malfunction due to Environmental Stress Physical Manipulation Forced Information Leakage Abuse of Functionality Deficiency of Random Numbers Evaluation Documentation Rev May of 53

14 Considering the Application Note 5 of [7] the following additional threats are defined in this Security Target: T.Data-Modification Unauthorised data modification User data stored by the TOE may be modified by unauthorised subjects. This threat applies to the processing of modification commands received by the TOE, it is not concerned with verification of authenticity. T.Impersonate Impersonating authorised users during authentication An unauthorised subject may try to impersonate an authorised subject during the authentication sequence, e.g. by a man-inthe middle or replay attack. T.Cloning Cloning 3.3 Organisational Security Policies All data stored on the TOE (including keys) may be read out in order to create a duplicate. Since this Security Target claims conformance to the PP Security IC Platform Protection Profile [7], the Organisational Security Policies of the Protection Profile are applied here also. Table 4. Name Organisational Security Policies defined by the Protection Profile Title P.Process-TOE Protection during TOE Development and Production Regarding the Application Note 6 of [7] the following additional policies are defined in this Security Target: P.Encryption Confidentiality during communication The TOE shall provide the possibility to protect selected data elements from eavesdropping during contact-less communication. P.MAC Integrity during communication The TOE shall provide the possibility to protect the contactless communication from modification or injections. This includes especially the possibility to detect replay or man-inthe-middle attacks within a session. P.No-Trace Un-traceability of end-users The TOE shall provide the ability that authorised subjects can prevent that end-user of TOE may be traced by unauthorised subjects without consent. Tracing of end-users may happen by performing a contact-less communication with the TOE Evaluation Documentation Rev May of 53

15 when the end-user is not aware of it. Typically this involves retrieving the UID or any freely accessible data element. The following policies are part of this Security Target because the TOE implements Security IC Embedded Software that addresses the assumptions A.Plat-Appl and A.Resp-Appl made in [7]. 1 P.Plat-Appl Usage of hardware platform The Security IC Embedded Software uses the TOE hardware platform according to the assumption A.Plat-Appl defined in [7]. P.Resp-Appl Treatment of user data 3.4 Assumptions The Security IC Embedded Software treats user data according to the assumption A.Resp-Appl defined in [7]. Since this Security Target claims conformance to the PP Security IC Platform Protection Profile [7], the assumptions defined in section 3.4 of the Protection Profile are valid for this Security Target. Note that the assumptions A.Plat-Appl and A.Resp-Appl are missing in the following table because they were re-assigned to organisational security policies (see section 3.3). Table 5. Name Assumptions defined in the Protection Profile Title A.Process-Sec-IC Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation The following assumptions are made in addition in this Security Target: A.Secure_Values Usage of secure values Only confidential and secure keys shall be used to set up the authentication and access rights. These values are generated outside the TOE and they are downloaded to the TOE. A.Terminal_Support Terminal support to ensure integrity and confidentiality The terminal verifies information sent by the TOE in order to ensure integrity and confidentiality of the communication. Regarding the Application Notes 7 and 8 of [7] this Security Target defines two additional assumptions regarding specific security functionality. 1 The Common Criteria do not explicitly allow re-assigning of Assumptions from a PP to OSPs in a ST, but they also do not explicitly forbid those re-assignments. Since it is allowed to re-assign objectives for the environment to objectives for the TOE (see [1], Annex D.2) theses operations are considered valid for this ST. Evaluation Documentation Rev May of 53

16 4. Security Objectives This chapter contains the following sections: Security Objectives for the TOE, Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Security Objectives Rationale. 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE The TOE shall provide the following security objectives, taken from the Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile [7]: Table 6. Name Security objectives defined in the PP Title O.Leak-Inherent O.Phys-Probing O.Malfunction O.Phys-Manipulation O.Leak-Forced O.Abuse-Func O.Identification O.RND Protection against Inherent Information Leakage Protection against Physical Probing Protection against Malfunctions Protection against Physical Manipulation Protection against Forced Information Leakage Protection against Abuse of Functionality TOE Identification Random Numbers Regarding the Application Notes 9 and 10 of [7] the following additional security objectives are defined based on additional functionality provided by the TOE as specified below. O.Access-Control Access Control The TOE must provide an access control mechanism for data stored by it. The access control mechanism shall apply to all operations for data elements and to reading and modifying security attributes as well as authentication data. The cryptographic keys used for authentication shall never be output. O.Authentication Authentication The TOE must provide an authentication mechanism in order to be able to authenticate authorised users. The authentication mechanism shall be resistant against replay and man-in-themiddle attacks. O.Encryption Confidential Communication The TOE must be able to protect the communication by encryption. This shall be implemented by security attributes that enforce encrypted communication for the respective data elements. Evaluation Documentation Rev May of 53

17 O.MAC Integrity-protected Communication The TOE must be able to protect the communication by adding a MAC. This shall be mandatory for commands that modify data on the TOE and optional on read commands. In addition a security attribute shall be available to mandate MAC on read commands, too. Usage of the protected communication shall also support the detection of injected and bogus commands within the communication session before the protected data transfer. O.Type-Consistency Data type consistency The TOE must provide a consistent handling of the different supported data types. This comprises over- and underflow checking for values and for block sizes. O.No-Trace Preventing Traceability The TOE must be able to prevent that the TOE end-user can be traced. This shall be done by providing an option that disables the transfer of privacy-related information that is suitable for tracing an end-user by an unauthorised subject. Note that the following two objectives are identical to the objectives OE.Plat-Appl and OE.Resp-Appl defined in section 4.2, Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software development Environment, in [7]. 2 O.Plat-Appl Usage of hardware platform To ensure that the TOE is used in a secure manner the Security IC Embedded Software shall be designed so that the requirements from the following documents are met: (i) hardware data sheet for the TOE, (ii) TOE application notes, and (iii) findings of the TOE evaluation reports relevant for the Security IC Embedded Software. O.Resp-Appl Treatment of user data Security relevant User Data (especially cryptographic keys) are treated by the Security IC Embedded Software as required by the security needs of the specific application context. For example the Security IC Embedded Software will not disclose security relevant user data to unauthorised users or processes when communicating with a terminal. 4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment According to the Protection Profile [7], the following security objectives for the environment are specified: 2 CC Part 1 ([1], Annex D.2) permits explicitly, that the ST-author may specify that certain objectives for the operational environment in the PP are security objectives for the TOE in the ST. This is called re-assigning a security objective. Evaluation Documentation Rev May of 53

18 Table 7. Security objectives for the environment, taken from the PP Security objective Description Applies to phase... OE.Process-Sec-IC Protection during composite product manufacturing TOE Delivery up to the end of phase 6 Note that the security objectives for the environment OE.Plat-Appl and OE.Resp-Appl are missing in Table 7 because they were re-assigned to security objectives for the TOE (see section 4.1). The following additional security objectives for the environment are defined in this Security Target: OE.Secure_Values Generation of secure values The environment shall generate confidential and secure keys for authentication purpose. These values are generated outside the TOE and they are downloaded to the TOE during the personalisation or usage in phase 5 to 7 OE.Terminal_Support Terminal support to ensure integrity and confidentiality 4.3 Security Objectives Rationale The terminal shall verify information sent by the TOE in order to ensure integrity and confidentiality of the communication. This involves checking of MAC values, verification of redundancy information according to the cryptographic protocol and secure closing of the communication session. Section 4.4 of the Protection Profile provides a rationale how the assumptions, threats, and organisational security policies are addressed by the objectives that are subject of the PP Security IC Platform Protection Profile. The following table reproduces the table in section 4.4 of [7]. Table 8. Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies Assumption, Threat or OSP Security Objective Note A.Plat-Appl OE.Plat-Appl (Phase 1) Covered by P.Plat-Appl respectively O.Plat-Appl in the ST A.Resp-Appl OE.Resp-Appl (Phase 1) Covered by P.Resp-Appl respectively O.Resp-Appl in the ST P.Process-TOE O.Identification (Phase 2 3) A.Process-Sec-IC OE.Process-Sec-IC (Phase 4 6) T.Leak-Inherent T.Phys-Probing T.Malfunction O.Leak-Inherent O.Phys-Probing O.Malfunction Evaluation Documentation Rev May of 53

19 Assumption, Threat or OSP Security Objective Note T.Phys-Manipulation T.Leak-Forced T.Abuse-Func T.RND O.Phys-Manipulation O.Leak-Forced O.Abuse-Func O.RND The following table provides the justification for the additional security objectives. They are in line with the security objectives of the Protection Profile and supplement these according to the additional threats and organisational security policies. Table 9. Additional Security Objectives versus Threats or Policies Threat/Policy Security Objective Note A.Secure_Values OE.Secure_Values (Phase 5 6) A.Terminal_Support OE.Terminal_Support (Phase 7) T.Data-Modification T.Impersonate T.Cloning P.Encryption P.MAC P.No-Trace O.Access-Control O.Type-Consistency OE.Terminal_Support O.Authentication O.Access-Control O.Authentication O.Encryption O.MAC OE.Terminal_Support O.No-Trace O.Access-Control O.Authentication P.Plat-Appl O.Plat-Appl Covers OE.Plat-Appl of the PP. P.Resp-Appl O.Resp-Appl Covers OE.Resp-Appl of the PP. The justification related to the assumption Generation of secure values (A.Secure_Values) is as follows: Since OE.Secure_Values requires using secure values for the configuration of the authentication and access control as assumed in A.Secure_Values, the assumption is covered by the objective. The justification related to the assumption Terminal support to ensure integrity and confidentiality (A.Terminal_Support) is as follows: The objective OE.Terminal_Support is an immediate transformation of the assumption A.Terminal_Support, therefore it covers the assumption. Evaluation Documentation Rev May of 53

20 The justification related to the threat Unauthorised data modification (T.Data- Modification) is as follows: According to threat T.Data-Modification the TOE shall avoid that user data stored by the TOE may be modified by unauthorised subjects. The objective O.Access-Control requires an access control mechanism that limits the ability to modify data elements stored by the TOE. O.Type-Consistency ensures that data types are adhered, so that data cannot be modified by abusing type-specific operations. The terminal must provide support by checking the TOE responses, which is required by OE.Terminal_Support. Therefore T.Data-Modification is covered by these three objectives. The justification related to the threat Impersonating authorised users during authentication (T.Impersonate) is as follows: The threat is related to the fact that an unauthorised subject may try to impersonate an authorised subject during authentication, e.g. by a man-in-the middle or replay attack. The goal of O.Authentication is that an authentication mechanism is implemented in the TOE that prevents these attacks. Therefore the threat is covered by O.Authentication. The justification related to the threat Cloning (T.Cloning) is as follows: The concern of T.Cloning is that all data stored on the TOE (including keys) may be read out in order to create a duplicate. The objectives O.Authentication together with O.Access-Control require that unauthorised users cannot read any information that is restricted to the authorised subjects. The cryptographic keys used for the authentication are stored inside the TOE protected by O.Access-Control. This objective states that the TOE shall never output any keys used for authentication. Therefore the two objectives cover T.Cloning. The justification related to the policy Confidentiality during communication (P.Encryption) is as follows: The policy P.Encryption requires the TOE to provide the possibility to protect selected data elements from eavesdropping during contact-less communication. Since O.Encryption requires that the security attribute for a data element contains an option that the communication related to this data element must be encrypted, the objective covers the policy. The justification related to the policy Integrity during communication (P.MAC) is as follows: The policy P.MAC requires the TOE to provide the possibility to protect the contactless communication from modification or injections. This includes especially the possibility to detect replay or man-in-the-middle attacks within a session. O.MAC requires that a security attribute for the card contains an option that the communication must be MACed. In order to ensure the security the terminal must support the TOE by checking the MAC in the TOE responses, which is goal of the objective OE.Terminal_Support. Therefore both objectives cover the policy. The justification related to the policy Un-traceability of end-users (P.No-Trace) is as follows: The policy requires that the TOE has the ability to prevent tracing of end-users. Tracing can be performed with the UID or with any freely accessible data element stored by the Evaluation Documentation Rev May of 53

21 TOE. The objective O.No-Trace requires that the TOE shall provide an option to prevent the transfer of any information that is suitable for tracing an end-user by an unauthorised subject, which includes the UID. The objectives O.Authentication and O.Access-Control provide means to authorise subjects and to implement access control to data elements in a way that unauthorised subjects can read any element usable for tracing. Therefore the policy is covered by the three objectives. The justification related to the policy Usage of hardware platform (P.Plat-Appl) is as follows: The policy states that the Security IC Embedded Software uses the TOE hardware according to the respective PP assumption. O.Plat-Appl has the same objective as OE.Plat-Appl defined in the PP. Since O.Plat-Appl has the same objective as OE.Plat- Appl, OE.Plat-Appl is based on the PP assumption A.Plat-Appl and in the ST the decision was made to cover the assumption by a policy, the objective covers the policy. The justification related to the policy Treatment of user data (P.Resp-Appl) is as follows: In analogy to P.Plat-Appl, the policy P.Resp-Appl is covered in the same way by the objective O.Resp-Appl. The justification of the additional threats and policies show that they do not contradict to the rationale already given in the Protection Profile for the assumptions, policy and threats defined there. Evaluation Documentation Rev May of 53

22 5. Extended Components Definition This Security Target does not define extended components. Note that the PP Security IC Platform Protection Profile, [7] defines extended security functional requirements in chapter 5, which are included in this Security Target. Evaluation Documentation Rev May of 53

23 6. Security Requirements This section consists of the subsections Security Functional Requirements, Security Assurance Requirements and Security Requirements Rationale. 6.1 Security Functional Requirements To support a better understanding of the combination Protection Profile vs. Security Target, the TOE SFRs are presented in the following sections SFRs of the Protection Profile Table 10 below shows all SFRs which are specified in the Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile [7] (in alphabetical order). Some of the SFRs are CC Part 2 extended and defined in the Protection Profile. This is shown in the third column of the table. Table 10. SFRs taken from the PP SFR Title Defined in... FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage PP, Section 5.3 FCS_RNG.1 Quality metric for random numbers PP, Section 5.1 FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control CC, Part 2 FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection CC, Part 2 FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities PP, Section 5.2 FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability PP, Section 5.2 FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state CC, Part 2 FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection CC, Part 2 FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack CC, Part 2 FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance CC, Part 2 The protection profile does not fill in all operations of the components, the remaining operations are filled in the following. For the SFR FAU_SAS.1 the PP [7] leaves the assignment operation open for the non-volatile memory type in which initialisation data, pre-personalisation data and/or other supplements for the Security IC Embedded Software are stored. This assignment operation is filled in by the following statement. Note that the assignment operations for the list of subjects and the list of audit information have already been filled in by the PP [7]. FAU_SAS.1 Hierarchical to: Dependencies: Audit storage No other components. No dependencies. Evaluation Documentation Rev May of 53

24 FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the test process before TOE Delivery 3 with the capability to store the Initialisation Data and/or Prepersonalisation Data and/or supplements of the Security IC Embedded Software 4 in the EEPROM 5. For FCS_RNG.1.1 the PP [7] partially fills in the assignment for the security capabilities of the RNG by requiring a total failure test of the random source and adds an assignment operation for additional security capabilities of the RNG. In addition, for FCS_RNG.1.2 the PP [7] partially fills in the assignment operation for the defined quality metric for the random numbers by replacing it by a selection and assignment operation. For operations of FCS_RNG.1 the original operations defined in chapter 5 of the PP [7] have been replaced by the open operations of the partially filled in operations in the statement of the security requirements in chapter 6 of [7] for better readability. Note that the selection operation for the RNG type has already been filled in by the PP. FCS_RNG.1 Hierarchical to: FCS_RNG.1.1 FCS_RNG.1.2 Dependencies: Note: Random number generation No other components. The TSF shall provide a physical 6 random number generator that implements total failure test of the random source 7. The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet independent bits with Shannon entropy of bits per octet 8. No dependencies. Application Note 20 in [7] requires that the Security Target specifies for the security capabilities in FCS_RNG.1.1 how the results of the total failure test of the random source are provided to the Security IC Embedded Software. The TOE features a hardware test which is called by the Security IC Embedded Software. The results of the internal test sequence are provided to the Security IC Embedded Software as a pass or fail criterion by means of a special function register Additional SFRs regarding access control Access Control Policy The Security Function Policy (SFP) Access Control Policy uses the following definitions: [assignment: list of subjects] [assignment: list of audit information] [assignment: type of persistent memory] [selection: physical, non-physical true, deterministic, hybrid] [assignment: list of additional security capabilities] [selection: independent bits with Shannon entropy of bits per octet, Min-entropy of 7.95 bit per octet, [assignment: other comparable quality metric]] Evaluation Documentation Rev May of 53

25 The following roles are supported: The Personaliser who can personalise the TOE. The Card Administrator who can change security attributes which do not require being changed in the field. The Card Manager who can change security attributes which may require being changed in the field. The Card Security Level Manager who can switch the card to a higher security level. The Card User who can perform operations with blocks. The Originality Key User who can authenticate himself to prove the authenticity of the Card. Note that multiple subjects may have the same role, e.g. for every sector there are two Card Users (identified by the respective Key A and Key B for this sector). The assigned rights to the Card Users can be different, which allows having more or less powerful Card Users. There are also more than one Originality Key User and Card Security Level Manager. Any other subject belongs to the role Anybody which is not modelled explicitly in the policy because no access rights are granted to this role. This role includes the card holder (i.e. end-user) and any other subject e.g. an attacker. The objects are blocks that are grouped in sectors. Each sector consists of either 4 or 16 blocks. One block of each sector contains the access conditions and is called sector trailer. One specific type of data stored in a block is a value. The operations that can be performed with the objects and security attributes are read data from a block, write data to a block, increase, decrease, transfer or restore a value and read or modify the security attributes. The security attributes are the MFP Configuration Block, the Field Configuration Block, the sector trailer for a sector and the security level of the TOE. Note that subjects are authorised by cryptographic keys. These keys are considered as authentication data and not as security attributes. The TOE stores a dedicated cryptographic key for every subject. The key of the Card Administrator is called Card Master Key and the key for the Card Manager is called Card Configuration Key. The Card Security Level Manager keys are called Level 2 Switch Key and Level 3 Switch Key. The keys of the Card Users are called AES Sector Keys. Since there are two keys for every sector the keys are called AES Sector Key A and AES Sector Key B or in short Key A and Key B. The keys of the Originality Key User are called Originality Keys. Evaluation Documentation Rev May of 53

26 The TOE shall meet the requirements Security roles (FMT_SMR.1) as specified below. FMT_SMR.1 Hierarchical to: FMT_SMR.1.1 FMT_SMR.1.2 Dependencies: Security roles No other components. The TSF shall maintain the roles Personaliser, Card Administrator, Card Manager, Card Security Level Manager, Card User and Originality Key User 9. The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification The TOE shall meet the requirements Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) as specified below. FDP_ACC.1 Hierarchical to: FDP_ACC.1.1 Dependencies: Subset access control No other components. The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Policy 10 on all subjects, objects, operations and attributes defined by the Access Control Policy 11. FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control The TOE shall meet the requirement Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) as specified below. FDP_ACF.1 Hierarchical to: FDP_ACF.1.1 FDP_ACF.1.2 Security attribute based access control No other components. The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Policy 12 to objects based on the following: all subjects, objects and attributes 13. The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: The Personaliser can change all blocks. For every sector the Card User can read or write a data block; read, increase, decrease, transfer or restore a value based on the access control settings in the respective sector trailer [assignment: the authorised identified roles] [assignment: access control SFP] [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP] [assignment: access control SFP] [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFPrelevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes] [assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects] Evaluation Documentation Rev May of 53