Introducing Hardware Security Modules to Embedded Systems
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1 Introducing Hardware Security Modules to Embedded Systems for Electric Vehicles charging according to ISO/IEC V
2 Agenda Hardware Trust Anchors - General Introduction Hardware Trust Anchors - Utilization within AUTOSAR ISO/IEC Certificate Usage ISO/IEC Impact on Embedded Systems Outlook 2
3 Hardware Trust Anchors - General Introduction General Introduction to Hardware Trust Anchors (HTA) Hardware Trust Anchors (HTA) Protect sensitive data (e.g. crypto material) in ways that software can not manipulate Provide crypto functions (e.g. ECDSA signature generation) to unburden the host controller Different standardized feature sets for HTAs Secure Hardware Extension (SHE) Hardware Security Module (HSM) Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Different brand names for HTA by different HW suppliers Infineon: Aurix HSM / SHE+ driver Renesas: Intelligent Cryptographic Unit (ICU) Freescale: Crypto Service Engine (CSE) ARM: Trust Zone 3
4 Hardware Trust Anchors - General Introduction Hardware Security Module (HSM) History Developed in EU-sponsored project EVITA Consortium: Robert Bosch, BMW, Infineon, Specs available via the EVITA web site HSM design objectives Harden ECUs against attacks > SW as well as selected HW attacks Provide HW acceleration for crypto functions > By offloading the Application Core Support ECU to ECU communication protection > To securely transport sensitive information EVITA HSM profiles HSM full > Support strong authentication (e.g. via RSA, ECC) > Support complex block ciphers > High performance HSM medium > Secure ECU 2 ECU communication HSM small > Secure critical sensors / actuators > Simple block ciphers > Low cost modules 4
5 Hardware Trust Anchors - General Introduction Comparison of SHE and HSM SHE ~ HSM (small) HSM (medium) HSM (full) Integrity of Crypto Material Yes Yes Yes Secure storage of symmetric crypto material Secure storage of asymmetric crypto material Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Dedicated CPU No Yes Yes HW support for symmetric cryptography HW support for asymmetric cryptography Additional things to consider Summary Yes Yes Yes No No Yes + Availability of HW + Allows Firmware Changes + SW security libraries can be executed in HSM Cost effective when system doesn t require asymmetric cryptography and functionality doesn t need to be extended Recommended when asymmetric cryptography is not required, but system shall be extendable + High Performance - Cost - Availability of HW Recommended when high performance is required, i.e. for ISO/IEC PnC 5
6 Agenda Hardware Trust Anchors - General Introduction Hardware Trust Anchors - Utilization within AUTOSAR ISO/IEC Certificate Usage ISO/IEC Impact on Embedded Systems Outlook 6
7 Hardware Trust Anchors - Utilization within AUTOSAR AUTOSAR 4.3 Security Architecture Crypto Service Manager - CSM SWCs use CSM through RTE BSW/CDDs use CSM by inclusion CSM provides job queueing (priority) Crypto Interface CRYIF Supports dispatching of security jobs to HW or SW crypto drivers Host Controller TLS SCC XMLSec CSM CRYIF CRYDRV (SW) Crypto Driver CRYDRV Implementation of cryptographic functions Either in SW or HW (HTA) CRYDRV (HW) Hardware Security Module (full) 7
8 Agenda Hardware Trust Anchors - General Introduction Hardware Trust Anchors - Utilization within AUTOSAR ISO/IEC Certificate Usage ISO/IEC Impact on Embedded Systems Outlook 8
9 ISO/IEC Certificate Usage Introduction X.509 is an ITU-T standard for Public Key Infrastructures The following objects are part of the standard Public Key Certificate (Digital Certificate) > Proves the ownership and provides information about the owner > Public Key belongs to Private Key only known by the owner Attribute Certificate > Trustfully assigns additional attributes to the owner of a public key certificate Certificate Revocation List > Allows to revoke certain certificates before they have expired X.509 certificates are widely used for electronic communication Transport Layer Security (TLS) connections > In case the connection protects HTTP data, it s called HTTPS 9
10 ISO/IEC Certificate Usage Public Key Infrastructure V2G Root MO Root OEM Root EVSE CPO Sub 1 Prov Sub 1 MO Sub 1 OEM Sub 1 EV CPO Sub 2 Prov Sub 2 MO Sub 2 OEM Sub 2 SECC Cert Prov Service Contract Cert OEM Prov Cert 10
11 ISO/IEC Certificate Usage Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport Layer Security (TLS) encrypts the communication between a client and a server TLS v1.2 is used with one of the two following cipher suites TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 Derived requirements to an HSM Support Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH(E)) > Secure exchange of asymmetric keys over an unprotected channel Support Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) > Signatures guarantee authenticity and integrity Support Advanced Encryption Standard (AES128) > Encrypts the transmitted data using a symmetric key Support Secure Hash Algorithm 2 (SHA256) > Hash arbitrary amount of data to fixed length 11
12 ISO/IEC Certificate Usage Installation and Update of Certificates Certificates installed during production, possibly without using cryptographic operations V2G Root Certificate(s) Provisioning Certificate, incl. its Private Key Certificates installed in public space need to be protected using cryptographic operations Contract Certificate(s), incl. Private Key(s) Contract Sub Certificates Contract Certificate Chain may be installed by mechanism defined in ISO/IEC Certificate Installation > EV uses OEM Provisioning Certificate to receive new Contract Certificate Chain Certificate Update > EV uses current Contract Certificate Chain to receive new Contract Certificate Chain 12
13 ISO/IEC Certificate Usage Certificate Installation Vehicle sends its OEM Provisioning Certificate to Charging Station incl. a list of the installed root certificates. Charging Station forwards this information to a Secondary Actor (SA) which then provides a Contract Certificate chain incl. private key The parameters are validated using the SAProvisioningCertChain The private key of the new Contract Certificate is decrypted using the AES key which is derived from the shared secret of the ECDH key exchange. CertificateInstallationReqType attributes CertificateInstallationReq OEMProvisioningCert ListOfRootCertificateIDs CertificateInstallationResType ResponseCode SAProvisioningCertificateChain CertificateInstallationRes ContractSignatureCertChain ContractSignatureEncryptedPri... DHpublickey emaid 13
14 ISO/IEC Certificate Usage Certificate Installation Public Key of A together with Private Key of B leads to same secret as Public Key of B together with Private Key of A Concatenated Key Derivation Function (KDF) reduces risk of brute force attacks Derived Key is used to encrypt provided data (Private Key of Contract Certificate) with AES128 PublicKey A PrivateKey B ECDH Shared Secret Derived requirements to an HTA (additional to TLS) Support Concatenated Key Derivation Function Accept externally created Private Keys > Being provided in an encrypted format Concatenated KDF (w/ SHA256) Derived Key Data AES128 Encrypted Data 14
15 Agenda Hardware Trust Anchors - General Introduction Hardware Trust Anchors - Utilization within AUTOSAR ISO/IEC Certificate Usage ISO/IEC Impact on Embedded Systems Outlook 15
16 ISO/IEC Impact on Embedded Systems Runtime Without an HTA, cryptographic operations need to be calculated with SW library In case SW library is synchronous, ECU will block for the time the operation takes ECDSA signature generation on an MPC5668G@116Mhz 204ms without cache and jump prediction 102ms with cache and jump prediction Typical task periods are 5 to 20 milliseconds Issues with watch dog will occur CAN may not work properly without proper prioritization in OS Problems can be avoided by using an HSM (full) ECDSA signatures can be generated/validated on HSM s own core HSM may not be faster, but host controller can continue its execution normally > HSM processes cryptographic operations asynchronously and reports back when done 16
17 ISO/IEC Impact on Embedded Systems Storage of Certificates Certificates and their Private Keys have to be stored non-volatile Cars parking in public space could be accessed by attackers Attacker reads out Certificate and Private Key and charges for free HTAs protect memory, so only authorized persons can access Certificates and Private Keys 17
18 Outlook Current Situation and Future Developments Demands on the security increases Cars are opening up to the outside world and are vulnerable for attacks Stronger security requires more powerful hardware, such as HSM (full) Availability of HSM (full) is currently low Use cases like ISO/IEC or Firmware Over-the-Air (FOTA) drive the demand Availability of HSM (full) will increase in the future Working PKI of ISO/IEC doesn t exist yet Architecture of a possible PKI is currently being developed Introduction of inductively charging vehicles speeds up the process PKI for ISO/IEC should be available in the near future 18
19 Your questions are welcome! Author: Eisele, Fabian Vector Germany
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