Introduction to Bro-IDS. Seth Hall The Ohio State University
|
|
- Hope Blair
- 6 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Introduction to Bro-IDS Seth Hall The Ohio State University
2 Concepts Fundamentally, Bro provides a real-time network analysis framework. Not necessarily aiming to create an IDS turns out to be quite a useful goal. Emphasis on: Application level semantics Tracking information over time and across sessions. Emphasis not placed on signatures! Signatures are supported however!
3 Architecture Network Network Packets are captured using libpcap.
4 Architecture Network Events from Core Events from Core Protocol analyzers raise policyneutral events. Some example events include: connection_attempted connection_established http_request, http_reply dns_request, smtp_data
5 Architecture Network Events from Core Script Policy Script Interpreter Events are handled by policy scripts which could use context from previous events and save state for later use in other event handlers. Analysts using Bro will mostly work at this layer. Interpreter
6 Programming Your Analysis Bro has it s own full programming language. Domain specific language geared toward temporal data analysis since network traffic is inherently based in time. Event based programming. Most analysis is done by handling events passed up from the core. Variable refinement attributes to automatically expire state over time.
7 Event Handling Examples Log all detected local services. If using DPD, indicate detected protocol.
8 Event Handling Examples Log all DNS requests and indicate if a request is in a list of bad domains.
9 Noteworthy Features Dynamic protocol detection (DPD) for detecting protocols on any port. Bro Communications Protocol Bro instances or other applications can send and receive events and state from each other. C library named Broccoli for instrumenting other applications to speak the Bro protocol with bindings available for Python, Ruby, and Perl. Supports use of: libmagic, GeoIP, and p0f BroControl and the cluster! (in upcoming 1.5 release)
10 Noteworthy Features, cont. Resilience in the presence of flooding via the connection compressor. Interactive policy script debugger (similar to gdb). IPv6 Policy script addr type supports v4 and v6 addresses if IPv6 support is compiled in with --enable-brov6. Time Machine Bulk packet record with configurable per-connection recording cutoff and it supports the Bro communications protocol.
11 Running with BroControl BroControl gives a much improved user interface to working with a production Bro installation. Runtime updates for updating sets and tables of data. For example, a list of bad URLs. No restart required. Will be included in the 1.5 release that should be released soon.
12 Use Case HTTP
13 HTTP HTTP is a big protocol for us as it is for most people. Last measurement I did showed approximately 60% of our packets are over port 80. It should average out to ~950Mbps of port 80 traffic at peak.
14 Large scale HTTP analysis That s a terrifying number when you re doing libmagic on every HTTP transfer! (Yes, we do) The Bro Cluster enables us to do that by letting us use a lot of relatively inexpensive machines for our analysis. No special hardware. All off the shelf.
15 MD5 Sums on the Fly Did libmagic indicate a Windows executable? Then calculate the MD5 sum as the file is transferred. Check with Team Cymru s Malware Hash Registry to see if they think this file is malware. All done within Bro at analysis time; no hacky external scripts.
16 Protocol Logging We generate HTTP request logs for all of our local web servers (on any port with DPD). Nearly 3000 servers. Contains: timestamp, connection 4- tuple, method, URL, referrer URL, user agent, and proxy added headers. Easy to parse tab separated format. We do this for other protocols as well. E.g. SMTP, FTP, DNS.
17 External Intelligence We use collected intelligence from open and closed sources to identify suspicious activity and compromised hosts. Malwaredomainlist.com, zeustracker.abuse.ch, Spamhaus, etc... We use this to modify our logging policy too (only inbound requests are logged by default).
18 SQL Injection Attacks We had a data breach a few years ago due to a poorly written web application connected to a database with more data than it should have had. Obvious answer? Detect SQL injection attacks with Bro.
19 SQL Injection Attacks, cont. Regular expression does the initial job identifying potential SQL injections. Policy script watches for too many potential SQL injections against a site and triggers an SQL injection attack protection mode once a threshold has been crossed. Reaction could be to block any attacking hosts.
20 Feeding IDS Results Back Into Other Processes We used the detected SQL injection attacks to determine what sites we would target for penetration testing. Attackers would tend to find a site with an SQL injection problem and then revisit it a couple of week later, but the problem would be fixed by then.
21 Resources Bro: Bro Ticket Tracker: My scripts:
The Bro Network Intrusion Detection System
The Bro Network Intrusion Detection System Robin Sommer Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory rsommer@lbl.gov http://www.icir.org Outline Design of the Bro NIDS Philosophy Architecture LBNL s Bro Installation
More informationNetwork Security Today: Finding Complex Attacks at 100Gb/s
: Finding Complex Attacks at 100Gb/s Robin Sommer International Computer Science Institute, & Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory robin@icsi.berkeley.edu http://www.icir.org/robin The Old Days Border
More informationicast / TRUST Collaboration Year 2 - Kickoff Meeting
icast / TRUST Collaboration Year 2 - Kickoff Meeting Robin Sommer International Computer Science Institute robin@icsi.berkeley.edu http://www.icir.org Projects Overview Project 1 NIDS Evasion Testing in
More informationDistributed Cooperative Security Monitoring
Distributed Cooperative Security Monitoring Robin Sommer Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory rsommer@lbl.gov http://www.icir.org/robin Cooperative Security Monitoring Internet sites monitor their network
More informationThe Bro Cluster The Bro Cluster
The Bro Cluster The Bro Cluster Intrusion Detection at 10 Gig and A High-Performance beyond using the NIDS Bro Architecture IDS for the Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Robin International Computer Science
More informationCSE 565 Computer Security Fall 2018
CSE 565 Computer Security Fall 2018 Lecture 19: Intrusion Detection Department of Computer Science and Engineering University at Buffalo 1 Lecture Outline Intruders Intrusion detection host-based network-based
More informationAn Alert has Fired. Now What?
An Alert has Fired. Now What? Open-source Bro solves security problems traditional tools can t. May 2017 Anyone who works in a security operations center understands the drill: An alert fires from a source
More informationBro: Actively defending so that you can do other stuff
Bro: Actively defending so that you can do other stuff Aashish Sharma & LBNL Cyber Security Team Lawrence Berkeley National Lab UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA The goal of this talk is to provide you with detailed
More informationIntelligent and Secure Network
Intelligent and Secure Network BIG-IP IP Global Delivery Intelligence v11.2 IP Intelligence Service Brian Boyan - b.boyan@f5.com Tony Ganzer t.ganzer@f5.com 2 Agenda Welcome & Intro Introduce F5 IP Intelligence
More informationIndicators of Compromise
Indicators of Compromise Effectively apply threat information Factsheet FS-2016-02 version 1.0 1 June 2017 If you are responsible for securing the network of your organisation, you will often hear the
More informationMcAfee Network Security Platform 9.1
9.1.7.15-9.1.5.9 Manager-NS-series Release Notes McAfee Network Security Platform 9.1 Revision A Contents About this release New features Enhancements Resolved issues Installation instructions Known issues
More informationExploiting Multi-Core Processors For Parallelizing Network Intrusion Prevention
Exploiting Multi-Core Processors For Parallelizing Network Intrusion Prevention Robin Sommer International Computer Science Institute, & Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory robin@icsi.berkeley.edu http://www.icir.org
More informationApplication Security through a Hacker s Eyes James Walden Northern Kentucky University
Application Security through a Hacker s Eyes James Walden Northern Kentucky University waldenj@nku.edu Why Do Hackers Target Web Apps? Attack Surface A system s attack surface consists of all of the ways
More informationWEB SECURITY: WEB BACKGROUND
WEB SECURITY: WEB BACKGROUND CMSC 414 FEB 20 2018 A very basic web architecture Client Server Browser Web server (Private) Data Database DB is a separate entity, logically (and often physically) A very
More informationCounterACT Check Point Threat Prevention Module
CounterACT Check Point Threat Prevention Module Version 1.0.0 Table of Contents About the Check Point Threat Prevention Integration... 4 Use Cases... 4 Additional Check Point Threat Prevention Documentation...
More informationNetwork Intrusion Analysis (Hands on)
Network Intrusion Analysis (Hands on) TCP/IP protocol suite is the core of the Internet and it is vital to understand how it works together, its strengths and weaknesses and how it can be used to detect
More informationWhy Firewalls? Firewall Characteristics
Why Firewalls? Firewalls are effective to: Protect local systems. Protect network-based security threats. Provide secured and controlled access to Internet. Provide restricted and controlled access from
More informationScaling Trust with Millions of Containers: Microsegmentation Strategies for Authorization
Scaling Trust with Millions of Containers: Microsegmentation Strategies for Authorization 1 About Me Drupal Security Team Database Maintainer Service Mgmt for RHEL/Ubuntu Committer Scalable CGroups Management
More informationComputer Forensics: Investigating Network Intrusions and Cybercrime, 2nd Edition. Chapter 2 Investigating Network Traffic
Computer Forensics: Investigating Network Intrusions and Cybercrime, 2nd Edition Chapter 2 Investigating Network Traffic Objectives After completing this chapter, you should be able to: Understand network
More informationFighting Phishing I: Get phish or die tryin.
Fighting Phishing I: Get phish or die tryin. Micah Nelson and Max Hyppolite bit.ly/nercomp_sap918 Please, don t forget to submit your feedback for today s session at the above URL. If you use social media
More informationConfiguring F5 for SSL Intercept
Configuring F5 for Welcome to the F5 deployment guide for configuring the BIG-IP system for SSL intercept (formerly called with Air Gap Egress Inspection). This document contains guidance on configuring
More informationWeb 2.0 and AJAX Security. OWASP Montgomery. August 21 st, 2007
Web 2.0 and AJAX Security OWASP Montgomery August 21 st, 2007 Overview Introduction Definition of Web 2.0 Basics of AJAX Attack Vectors for AJAX Applications AJAX and Application Security Conclusions 1
More informationBIG-IP Application Security Manager : Implementations. Version 13.0
BIG-IP Application Security Manager : Implementations Version 13.0 Table of Contents Table of Contents Preventing DoS Attacks on Applications... 13 What is a DoS attack?...13 About recognizing DoS attacks...
More informationMcAfee Network Security Platform 8.3
8.3.7.86-8.3.7.56 Manager-Virtual IPS Release Notes McAfee Network Security Platform 8.3 Revision C Contents About this release New features Enhancements Resolved issues Installation instructions Known
More informationPass4sure q. Cisco Securing Cisco Networks with Sourcefire IPS
Pass4sure.500-285.42q Number: 500-285 Passing Score: 800 Time Limit: 120 min File Version: 6.1 Cisco 500-285 Securing Cisco Networks with Sourcefire IPS I'm quite happy to announce that I passed 500-285
More informationShiftLeft. Real-World Runtime Protection Benchmarking
ShiftLeft Real-World Runtime Protection Benchmarking Table of Contents Executive Summary... 02 Testing Approach... 02 ShiftLeft Technology... 04 Test Application... 06 Results... 07 SQL injection exploits
More informationCS 161 Computer Security
Paxson Spring 2017 CS 161 Computer Security Discussion 12 Week of April 24, 2017 Question 1 Detection strategies (20 min) Suppose you are responsible for detecting attacks on the UC Berkeley network, and
More informationAdvanced Computer Networks Exercise Session 7. Qin Yin Spring Semester 2013
Advanced Computer Networks 263-3501-00 Exercise Session 7 Qin Yin Spring Semester 2013 1 LAYER 7 SWITCHING 2 Challenge: accessing services Datacenters are designed to be scalable Datacenters are replicated
More informationCyber Common Technical Core (CCTC) Advance Sheet Windows Operating Systems
Cyber Common Technical Core (CCTC) Advance Sheet Windows Operating Systems Section 1: Command Line Tools Skill 1: Employ commands using command line interface 1.1 Use command line commands to gain situational
More informationVulnerability Management & Vulnerability Assessment. Nessus Attack Scripting Language (NASL). CVE databases, NVD database
Case Study 2018 Solution/Service Title Vulnerability Management & Vulnerability Assessment Client Industry Cybersecurity, Vulnerability Assessment and Management, Network Security Client Overview Client
More informationDoS Cyber Attack on a Government Agency in Europe- April 2012 Constantly Changing Attack Vectors
DoS Cyber Attack on a Government Agency in Europe- April 2012 Constantly Changing Attack Vectors 1 Table of Content Preamble...3 About Radware s DefensePro... 3 About Radware s Emergency Response Team
More informationServlet Performance and Apache JServ
Servlet Performance and Apache JServ ApacheCon 1998 By Stefano Mazzocchi and Pierpaolo Fumagalli Index 1 Performance Definition... 2 1.1 Absolute performance...2 1.2 Perceived performance...2 2 Dynamic
More informationQuestion No: 2 Which identifier is used to describe the application or process that submitted a log message?
Volume: 65 Questions Question No: 1 Which definition of a fork in Linux is true? A. daemon to execute scheduled commands B. parent directory name of a file pathname C. macros for manipulating CPU sets
More informationSeeking Visibility Into Network Activity for Security Analysis
Seeking Visibility Into Network Activity for Security Analysis Robin Sommer Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory & International Computer Science Institute robin@icsi.berkeley.org http://www.icir.org
More informationF5 Big-IP Application Security Manager v11
F5 F5 Big-IP Application Security Manager v11 Code: ACBE F5-ASM Days: 4 Course Description: This four-day course gives networking professionals a functional understanding of the BIG- IP LTM v11 system
More informationWho We Are.. ideras Features. Benefits
:: Protecting your infrastructure :: Who We Are.. ideras Features Benefits Q&A Infosys Gateway Sdn Bhd. Incorporated in 2007 Bumiputra owned Company MSC Status Company Registered with Ministry of Finance
More informationINCIDENT HANDLING & RESPONSE PROFESSIONAL VERSION 1
INCIDENT HANDLING & RESPONSE PROFESSIONAL VERSION 1 The most practical and comprehensive training course on incident handling & response elearnsecurity has been chosen by students in over 140 countries
More informationCIS 551 / TCOM 401 Computer and Network Security. Spring 2007 Lecture 12
CIS 551 / TCOM 401 Computer and Network Security Spring 2007 Lecture 12 Announcements Project 2 is on the web. Due: March 15th Send groups to Jeff Vaughan (vaughan2@seas) by Thurs. Feb. 22nd. Plan for
More informationBro vs Suricata Two Approaches to Network Security Monitoring
Bro vs Suricata Two Approaches to Network Security Monitoring Christian Kreibich christian@corelight.com @ckreibich Your speaker Part 1 Background on Bro ( ) Already covered yesterday Part 2 Background
More informationBIG-IP Analytics: Implementations. Version 13.1
BIG-IP Analytics: Implementations Version 13.1 Table of Contents Table of Contents Setting Up Application Statistics Collection...5 What is Analytics?...5 About HTTP Analytics profiles... 5 Overview:
More informationSuricata Performance with a S like Security
Suricata Performance with a S like Security É. Leblond Stamus Networks July. 03, 2018 É. Leblond (Stamus Networks) Suricata Performance with a S like Security July. 03, 2018 1 / 31 1 Introduction Features
More informationMonitoring Standards for the Producers of Web Services Alexander Quang Truong
Monitoring Standards for the Producers of Web Services 02-21-2017 Alexander Quang Truong Contents 1. Summary... 2 2. Metrics... 2 3. Benefits and Explanations of Metrics... 2 4. Tools for Monitoring...
More informationThe Bro Network Security Monitor. Broadmap. Bro Workshop NCSA, Urbana-Champaign, IL. Bro Workshop 2011
The Bro Network Security Monitor Broadmap NCSA, Urbana-Champaign, IL Outline Near- to Medium-term Roadmap Current Research Projects Workshop Wrap-Up 2 Version 2.0 Final 3 Version 2.0 Final Timeline: Early
More informationTechnical Brochure F-SECURE THREAT SHIELD
Technical Brochure F-SECURE THREAT SHIELD F-SECURE THREATSHIELD F-Secure ThreatShield is a gateway-level security solution for protecting email and web traffic, with built-in network sandboxing technology.
More informationFireware-Essentials. Number: Fireware Essentials Passing Score: 800 Time Limit: 120 min File Version: 7.
Fireware-Essentials Number: Fireware Essentials Passing Score: 800 Time Limit: 120 min File Version: 7.0 http://www.gratisexam.com/ Fireware Essentials Fireware Essentials Exam Exam A QUESTION 1 Which
More informationNetwork Defenses KAMI VANIEA 1
Network Defenses KAMI VANIEA 26 SEPTEMBER 2017 KAMI VANIEA 1 First the news http://arstech nica.com/secu rity/2015/04/ meet-greatcannon-theman-in-themiddleweapon-chinaused-ongithub/ 2 First the news http://arstechni
More informationI n p u t. This time. Security. Software. sanitization ); drop table slides. Continuing with. Getting insane with. New attacks and countermeasures:
This time Continuing with Software Security Getting insane with I n p u t sanitization ); drop table slides New attacks and countermeasures: SQL injection Background on web architectures A very basic web
More informationIoT in 2016: a serious overview of IoT today and a technical preview of HoneyVNC. By Yonathan Klijnsma
IoT in 2016: a serious overview of IoT today and a technical preview of HoneyVNC By Yonathan Klijnsma Yonathan Klijnsma Senior Threat Intelligence Analyst Perform threat intelligence analysis at keeping
More informationDistributed Systems. 29. Firewalls. Paul Krzyzanowski. Rutgers University. Fall 2015
Distributed Systems 29. Firewalls Paul Krzyzanowski Rutgers University Fall 2015 2013-2015 Paul Krzyzanowski 1 Network Security Goals Confidentiality: sensitive data & systems not accessible Integrity:
More informationSurrogate Dependencies (in
Surrogate Dependencies (in NodeJS) @DinisCruz London, 29th Sep 2016 Me Developer for 25 years AppSec for 13 years Day jobs: Leader OWASP O2 Platform project Application Security Training JBI Training,
More informationNetwork Defenses 21 JANUARY KAMI VANIEA 1
Network Defenses KAMI VANIEA 21 JANUARY KAMI VANIEA 1 Similar statements are found in most content hosting website privacy policies. What is it about how the internet works that makes this statement necessary
More informationSecurity report Usuario de Test
Security report Usuario de Test Servidor Cloud Period: 2018/MAY/13-2018/MAY/20 INDEX SUMMARY 2 Overview 3 Comparison with other users 5 Services and IPs included in this report 6 Traffic 7 Inbound and
More informationCYBER ANALYTICS. Architecture Overview. Technical Brief. May 2016 novetta.com 2016, Novetta
CYBER ANALYTICS Architecture Overview Technical Brief May 2016 novetta.com 2016, Novetta Novetta Cyber Analytics: Technical Architecture Overview 1 INTRODUCTION 2 CAPTURE AND PROCESS ALL NETWORK TRAFFIC
More informationMcAfee Network Security Platform 8.3
8.3.7.52-8.3.3.27-2.11.9 Manager-XC-Cluster Release Notes McAfee Network Security Platform 8.3 Revision C Contents About this release New features Enhancements Resolved issues Installation instructions
More informationRSA INCIDENT RESPONSE SERVICES
RSA INCIDENT RESPONSE SERVICES Enabling early detection and rapid response EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Technical forensic analysis services RSA Incident Response services are for organizations that need rapid access
More informationA Lone Wolf No More: Supporting Network Intrusion Detection with Real-Time Intelligence
A Lone Wolf No More: Supporting Network Intrusion Detection with Real-Time Intelligence Bernhard Amann 1, Robin Sommer 1,2, Aashish Sharma 2, and Seth Hall 1 1 International Computer Science Institute
More informationHighwinds CDN Content Protection Products. August 2009
Highwinds CDN Content Protection Products August 2009 1 Highwinds CDN Content Protection Products August 2009 Table of Contents CDN SECURITY INTRO... 3 CONTENT PROTECTION BY CDN DELIVERY PRODUCT... 3 HTTP
More informationCS50 Quiz Review. November 13, 2017
CS50 Quiz Review November 13, 2017 Info http://docs.cs50.net/2017/fall/quiz/about.html 48-hour window in which to take the quiz. You should require much less than that; expect an appropriately-scaled down
More informationUnderstanding Cisco Cybersecurity Fundamentals
210-250 Understanding Cisco Cybersecurity Fundamentals NWExam.com SUCCESS GUIDE TO CISCO CERTIFICATION Exam Summary Syllabus Questions Table of Contents Introduction to 210-250 Exam on Understanding Cisco
More informationRSA INCIDENT RESPONSE SERVICES
RSA INCIDENT RESPONSE SERVICES Enabling early detection and rapid response EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Technical forensic analysis services RSA Incident Response services are for organizations that need rapid access
More informationHow A Website Works. - Shobha
How A Website Works - Shobha Synopsis 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. What is World Wide Web? What makes web work? HTTP and Internet Protocols. URL s Client-Server model. Domain Name System. Web Browser, Web
More informationFoundations of Python
Foundations of Python Network Programming The comprehensive guide to building network applications with Python Second Edition Brandon Rhodes John Goerzen Apress Contents Contents at a Glance About the
More informationMonitoring the Device
The system includes dashboards and an Event Viewer that you can use to monitor the device and traffic that is passing through the device. Enable Logging to Obtain Traffic Statistics, page 1 Monitoring
More informationForensic Network Analysis in the Time of APTs
SharkFest 16 Forensic Network Analysis in the Time of APTs June 16th 2016 Christian Landström Senior IT Security Consultant Airbus Defence and Space CyberSecurity Topics - Overview on security infrastructure
More informationCDX REPORT TEAM #8 JACOB CHAPMAN SNEHESH THALAPANENI DEVISHA SRIVASTAVA
CDX REPORT TEAM #8 JACOB CHAPMAN SNEHESH THALAPANENI DEVISHA SRIVASTAVA SANJAY ALEX KALLA HOSTING We installed Open VPN daemon, which can be used to securely link two or more private networks using an
More informationForeword by Todd Heberlein
ConteNTS in Detail About the Author Foreword by Todd Heberlein xvii xix Preface xxv Audience... xxvi Prerequisites... xxvii A Note on Software and Protocols... xxvii Scope.... xxviii Acknowledgments...
More informationWeb, HTTP and Web Caching
Web, HTTP and Web Caching 1 HTTP overview HTTP: hypertext transfer protocol Web s application layer protocol client/ model client: browser that requests, receives, displays Web objects : Web sends objects
More informationArming Small Security Programs
Arming Small Security Programs Troopers17 Arming Small Security Programs Network baseline generation with Bropy Disclaimer I borrowed my employers slide template Creating.POT files is hard This is NOT
More informationDetect Cyber Threats with Securonix Proxy Traffic Analyzer
Detect Cyber Threats with Securonix Proxy Traffic Analyzer Introduction Many organizations encounter an extremely high volume of proxy data on a daily basis. The volume of proxy data can range from 100
More informationExam : JK Title : CompTIA E2C Security+ (2008 Edition) Exam. Version : Demo
Exam : JK0-015 Title : CompTIA E2C Security+ (2008 Edition) Exam Version : Demo 1.Which of the following logical access control methods would a security administrator need to modify in order to control
More informationThe NIDS Cluster: Scalable, Stateful Network Intrusion Detection on Commodity Hardware
The NIDS Cluster: Scalable, Stateful Network Intrusion Detection on Commodity Hardware Matthias Vallentin 1, Robin Sommer 2,3, Jason Lee 2, Craig Leres 2 Vern Paxson 3,2, and Brian Tierney 2 1 TU München
More informationTracking Evil with Passive DNS
Tracking Evil with Passive DNS Bojan Ždrnja, CISSP, GCIA, GCIH Bojan.Zdrnja@infigo.hr INFIGO IS http://www.infigo.hr Who am I? Senior information security consultant with INFIGO IS (Croatia) Mainly doing
More informationNovetta Cyber Analytics
Know your network. Arm your analysts. Introduction Novetta Cyber Analytics is an advanced network traffic analytics solution that empowers analysts with comprehensive, near real time cyber security visibility
More informationFlightPATH. User Manual:
User Manual: FlightPATH Author: Andrew Knowlson Review: Greg Howett Version: 1.0-DRAFT Date: 05 st April 2011 Created: 05 st April 2011 Modified ---------------- Contents: What is FlightPATH? So what can
More informationPCP: Ingest and Export
PCP: Ingest and Export pcp-conf2018 Mark Goodwin mgoodwin@redhat.com @goodwinos PCP Ingest / Export Ingest Standard Agents Specialized agents: MMV BCC Trace Prometheus.. many others LOGIMPORT(3) Ingest
More informationGöran Pestana. Incident handler and developer
Göran Pestana Incident handler and developer Megatron Automated Abuse Handling by Who is Megatron? Who is Megatron? A system that collects and processes information about bad hosts on the Internet Input
More informationSPOOFING. Information Security in Systems & Networks Public Development Program. Sanjay Goel University at Albany, SUNY Fall 2006
SPOOFING Information Security in Systems & Networks Public Development Program Sanjay Goel University at Albany, SUNY Fall 2006 1 Learning Objectives Students should be able to: Determine relevance of
More informationCisco IOS Firewall Intrusion Detection System Commands
Cisco IOS Firewall Intrusion Detection System Commands This chapter describes the commands used to configure the integrated Intrusion Detection System (IDS) features in Cisco IOS Firewall. Intrusion detection
More informationVERISIGN DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE TRENDS REPORT
VERISIGN DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE TRENDS REPORT VOLUME 4, ISSUE 3 3RD QUARTER 2017 Complimentary report supplied by CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 VERISIGN-OBSERVED DDoS ATTACK TRENDS: Q3 2017 4 DDoS
More informationSecuring Production Applications & Data at Runtime. Prevoty
Securing Production Applications & Data at Runtime Prevoty Introducing Prevoty Scalable visibility and protection for all applications and services 20+ 3 Over Verticals: Awards & Recognitions Years in
More informationMcAfee Network Security Platform 8.3
8.3.7.28-8.3.3.9 Manager-Mxx30-series Release Notes McAfee Network Security Platform 8.3 Revision C Contents About this release New features Enhancements Resolved issues Installation instructions Known
More information1-1. Switching Networks (Fall 2010) EE 586 Communication and. September Lecture 10
EE 586 Communication and Switching Networks (Fall 2010) Lecture 10 September 17 2010 1-1 Announcement Send me your group and get group ID HW3 (short) out on Monday Personal leave for next two weeks No
More informationConfiguring Access Rules
Configuring Access Rules Rules > Access Rules About Access Rules Displaying Access Rules Specifying Maximum Zone-to-Zone Access Rules Changing Priority of a Rule Adding Access Rules Editing an Access Rule
More informationIntegrate Microsoft IIS
Integrate Microsoft IIS EventTracker Enterprise Publication Date: Jan. 5, 2017 EventTracker 8815 Centre Park Drive Columbia MD 21045 www.eventtracker.com Abstract IIS (Internet Information Services) is
More informationDatabase proxies in Perl
Bernd Ulmann ulmann@vaxman.de IT-Symposium 2007 16th April 20th April 2007 Nuremberg Introduction About two years ago I ported Germany s largest vegan recipe database from a LINUX system running MySQL
More informationIPv6 Security. David Kelsey (STFC-RAL) IPv6 workshop pre-gdb, CERN 7 June 2016
IPv6 Security David Kelsey (STFC-RAL) IPv6 workshop pre-gdb, CERN 7 June 2016 Outline MORE MATERIAL HERE THAN TIME TO PRESENT & DISCUSS (BUT SLIDES AVAILABLE FOR LATER REFERENCE) IPv6 security & threats
More informationChapter Three test. CompTIA Security+ SYO-401: Read each question carefully and select the best answer by circling it.
Chapter Three test Name: Period: CompTIA Security+ SYO-401: Read each question carefully and select the best answer by circling it. 1. What protocol does IPv6 use for hardware address resolution? A. ARP
More informationI, J, K. Lightweight directory access protocol (LDAP), 162
Index A Access Control, 183 Administration console, 17 home page, 17 managing instances, 19 managing requests, 18 managing workspaces, 19 monitoring activity, 19 Advanced security option (ASO), 58, 262
More informationAnalyzing Huge Data for Suspicious Traffic. Christian Landström, Airbus DS
Analyzing Huge Data for Suspicious Traffic Christian Landström, Airbus DS Topics - Overview on security infrastructure - Strategies for network defense - A look at malicious traffic incl. Demos - How Wireshark
More informationFIPS Management. FIPS Management Overview. Configuration Changes in FIPS Mode
This chapter contains the following sections: Overview, on page 1 Configuration Changes in FIPS Mode, on page 1 Switching the Appliance to FIPS Mode, on page 2 Encrypting Sensitive Data in FIPS Mode, on
More informationIntegrate WatchGuard XTM. EventTracker Enterprise
EventTracker Enterprise Publication Date: November 9, 2017 Abstract This guide provides instructions to configure WatchGuard XTM to send the event logs to EventTracker Enterprise. Once events are configured
More informationNetwork Security Platform 8.1
8.1.3.6-8.1.3.5 M-series Release Notes Network Security Platform 8.1 Revision A Contents About this release New features Enhancements Resolved issues Installation instructions Known issues Product documentation
More informationAsynchronous and Synchronous Messaging with Web Services and XML Ronald Schmelzer Senior Analyst ZapThink, LLC
Asynchronous and Synchronous Messaging with Web Services and XML Ronald Schmelzer Senior Analyst ZapThink, LLC The Business Objective Automated Business Collaboration Facilitating exchange of information
More informationAnonymous Reporting and Smart Call Home
This chapter describes how to configure the services. About Anonymous Reporting, page 1 About Smart Call Home, page 2 Guidelines for, page 8 Configure, page 9 Monitoring, page 20 Examples for Smart Call
More informationSOC Operations on the Autobahn. Don t let the green grass fool you
SOC Operations on the Autobahn Don t let the green grass fool you Who am I? Adrian Kelley 15+ Years of IT Experience Current: Sands Corp. (Vulnerability Management Engineer) United States Computer Emergency
More informationHTTP Reading: Section and COS 461: Computer Networks Spring 2013
HTTP Reading: Section 9.1.2 and 9.4.3 COS 461: Computer Networks Spring 2013 1 Recap: Client-Server Communication Client sometimes on Initiates a request to the server when interested E.g., Web browser
More informationCorrigendum 3. Tender Number: 10/ dated
(A premier Public Sector Bank) Information Technology Division Head Office, Mangalore Corrigendum 3 Tender Number: 10/2016-17 dated 07.09.2016 for Supply, Installation and Maintenance of Distributed Denial
More informationReview of Previous Lecture
Review of Previous Lecture Network access and physical media Internet structure and ISPs Delay & loss in packet-switched networks Protocol layers, service models Some slides are in courtesy of J. Kurose
More informationPenetration Testing with Kali Linux
Penetration Testing with Kali Linux PWK Copyright Offensive Security Ltd. All rights reserved. Page 1 of 11 All rights reserved to Offensive Security No part of this publication, in whole or in part, may
More informationFortiDDoS REST API Reference
FORTINET DOCUMENT LIBRARY http://docs.fortinet.com FORTINET VIDEO GUIDE http://video.fortinet.com FORTINET BLOG https://blog.fortinet.com CUSTOMER SERVICE & SUPPORT https://support.fortinet.com http://cookbook.fortinet.com/how-to-work-with-fortinet-support/
More information