A Multi-Application Smart-Card ID System for George Mason University. - Suraj Ravichandran.

Transcription

1 A Multi-Application Smart-Card ID System for George Mason University - Suraj Ravichandran.

2 Current System Magnetic Swipe Card based ID The card has three tracks They each store the following: Name, G# and Issue-ID The readers convey the G# to the database, which then relays the required information Services rendered: Monetary (Mason Money), Library, access to campus residential buildings

3 So Why Change? Lack of encryption makes spoofing/cloning easier No link exists to verify the authenticity of the card in use with the person's actual ID Physical deployment not secure major security risk

4 Proposed System: Overview Contact-less Smart-card based ID system Secure deployment of physical sytems Possible means to link owners ID to card in use Cryptographic scheme for ensuring the above point and to prevent card duplication/ spoofing Suggested System : NFC Smart-cards combined with Encryption and Signatures

5 Contact-less Smart Cards ISO defines the standard for Contact-less Card They utilize the power form the radio waves to operate the chip and behave like a smart-card Major benefit is the utilization of available cryptosystems to accelerate the hardware

6 Contact-less Smart Cards CPU: Control Processing Unit SRAM: Static Random Access Memory ROM: Read Only Memory Static store the Operating System EEPROM: Electrically Erasable and Programmable Read Only Memory Persistent CRYPTO: Cryptographic processor RNG: Random Number Generator

7 NFC NFC stands for Near Field Communication Emerging communication protocol for use in short (about 10cms) range Due to ultra-short range there are no ethical concerns, thus also making it ideal for complementing a cryptographic scheme Very widely accepted for ID and Mass Marketing applications Smart-card implementations already exist and most of the industry giants are NFC certified partners

8 NFC : Tag Types Type 1 Tag Type 2 Tag Type 3 Tag Type 4 Tag Compatible Products Innovation Topaz (now Broadcom) NXP Mifare Ultralight Sony Felica NXP DESFire/ NXP SmartMX JCOP Memory Size 96 bytes 48/144 bytes 1,4,9 kb 4/32 kb Unit Price Low Low Low Medium/High Data Access Read/Write or Read Only Read/Write or Read Only Read/Write or Read Only Read/Write or Read Only Active Content X X X X/Y

9 NFC Card Reader/Writer ACR122 NFC Contact-less Smart Card Reader by Advanced Card Systems Economical on the budget USD 45 NFC Reader :- ISO/IEC18092 (NFC) compliant NFC Tags Access Speed = 212 kbps Contact-less Smart Card Reader :- Support FeliCa card Support ISO Type A & B cards MIFARE cards (Classics, DESFire)

10 NFC Tags Simple Read/Write Tags range from as low as 0.75 USD a card The Smart-card versions cost around 1.25 USD if bought in bulk

11 NFC Security Threats Eavesdropping Data Corruption (DoS attacks) Data Modification Cloning the Card Solution? -- Use of Cryptographic Schemes

12 Zero Knowledge Proof of ID It makes it possible for the prover to prove himself to the verifier without exchanging any key or secret details at all Thus, an eavesdropper only gets to bag assertions or negations, but no solid proof of identity that can later be misused Likewise, it also prevents the verifier from misusing the secret details of the prover in future Zero Knowledge Protocols wont care whether you actually know the password or not, as long as you prove that you know it

13 ZKPI Alibaba Analogy This is supposed to be Alibaba's magic cave Magic Words!!! Open Sesame This is the secret of the cave

14 ZKPI practical algorithms Feige-Fiat-Shamir Zero Knowledge Proof Protocol Uses the difficulty in factorizing to its advantage If the protocol is repeated multiple times the probability that a false positive decreases to almost 1 in a million Multiple instances of protocol can be paralleled to accelerate the operation and further narrow down the chance of false identity

15 ZKPI Drawbacks and Advantages Pros: Comparatively faster than RSA True ZKPI leak absolutely no information to eavesdropper Cons: No hardware accelerators present Difficulty in fabrication of chips No API support for back-end systems Final Card not tamper proof

16 Elliptic Curve Cryptography Competitor of RSA Proven to withstand significant cryptanalysis Provides same level of security as RSA, with lesser number of bits for modulus Lesser amount of memory usage

17 NFC Signature Record Size Signature Algorithm Signature Certificate Total Size (bytes) RSA 1024/SHA RSA 2048/SHA RSA 4096/SHA DSA 1024/SHA ECDSA P-192/SHA ECDSA P-256/ SHA

18 Implicit Certificates - ECC-based Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone (ECQV) Field Size (bytes) Version 1 Certificate Serial Number 8 Certificate Algorithm Identifier for Certificate Issuer s Signature 1 Hash 1 Issuer Identifier 8 Validity Period 4 Subject Identifier 8 Public Key Reconstruction Value 25 Total Certificate Size 56

19 Reduction in Signature RTD by using ECQV Signature Algorithm Signatures (bytes) Certificate Chain (bytes) Total Size (bytes) RSA 1024/SHA ECDSA P-192/SHA ECDSA P-192/SHA-1/ECQV ECDSA P-256/SHA-216/ECQV

20 Signcryption PV signature scheme (Pintsov-Vanstone) can provide confidentiality within the signature itself Keyed PV(its variant), where the signer chooses a recipient and encrypts and signs message (or a part of it) for the recipient Partial message recovery :- the message divided into two parts, hidden and visible part Hidden part is embedded in the signature, visible part is sent as is, along with the signature During verification, the hidden part is recovered from the signature A requirement of keyed PV is that the recipient have an elliptic curve key pair, compatible with the domain parameters of the signer s key pair

21 ECC based Signatures Pros ECC is well established, thus availability of hardware accelerators and library support Proposed scheme saves in memory and hence one can switch to type 2/1 cards, proving economical Cons Substantial amount of computations performed Root CA needs to be established Card is still not tamper proof Still no link of card holder to card in use Frequent issuance of CRLs

22 Then Authentication Solution Place a second layer of security to link card holder to card in use Use any Personal Identity Verification Scheme Suggested: Personal Identification Number (PIN)

23 Alternate System:Biometrics Methods for uniquely recognizing humans based on intrinsic physical or behavioral traits Such traits include fingerprints, palm patterns, retina scans and face detection

24 Biometrics Pros : Inherent tessellation of Identity and authenticity Cons : Expensive on the budget Very difficult to get hack if system is securely deployed No need to carry any accessory around (e.g. id card) Cases of False positives/ negatives Gives value to parts of the body, can lead to be very dangerous

25 Comparison System Current Mag Strip Biometric NFC + ZKPI NFC + ECC Cost Least Highest Moderate Moderate Security rendering None By uniqueness of human traits Due to difficulty in factorization Due to difficulty in factorization Tamper Proof X Y X X True Card Holder Problem X Y X X Ease of Deployment and Integration -- Difficult High Compatibility to current backend High Compatibility to current backend Ease of Fabrication of equipment Mass Production Mass Production Very Difficult/ not an industry standard On the verge of an NFC standard

26 THANK YOU Doubts?