What s going on in /8. George Michaelson Geoff Huston

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Transcription:

What s going on in 1.0.0.0/8 George Michaelson ggm@apnic.net Geoff Huston gih@apnic.net

Standard Address TesCng IANA assigns /8 to APNIC RIPE NCC, on APNIC s behalf, announces selected subnets to test reachability RIS, other tests applied. Encourage operaconal community to test reachability APNIC releases /8 to registracon services Assignments and allocacons proceed APNIC gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the RIPE NCC and community supporcng tests on AP ranges!

Except.. IANA allocates Net 1.0.0.0/8 to APNIC in January 2010 We had some sense this was going to be different Just how different wasn t clear.

(Not unexpected) First Warning RIPE announces 4 /24s for normal tescng at AMS- IX Link floods announcements withdrawn. Report wri^en up on RIPE labs.

Lets Get Serious about Bad Traffic There is an issue here about 1/8 accng as a traffic magnet for unsolicited traffic Just how bad is 1/8? Are some bits REALLY bad? What sort of badness are we seeing in the traffic? So we commenced a program to analyze the badness in 1/8

Bigger Badder Faster Need mulc- gig collectors and large disk space Exceeds APNIC s transit capacity Sought collaborators in R&D & Ops community Many responses, for which we thank everyone We worked with Merit, AARNet, Google and Youtube for this exercise Rapid deployment possible, Tb file systems available with good IX conneccvity within a couple of days thanks! Long announcements. 1 week+ Explore >24h traffic pa^erns, diurnal behaviours

Tickling Badness Simple code to ACK all incoming TCP SYNs If any follow up packet sent, that s interescng! See if we can draw traffic out of the woodwork DisCnguish one- way probes and DDoS engines, scanners from real uses of the network Based on Geoff s lightweight TCP experimental very bad idea code Not such a bad idea amer all then! PCAP filter to collect all traffic, dump to disk Applicable to passive and accve/cckled capture

Traffic to 1.0.0.0/8

Traffic to 1.0.0.0/8 Peak Burst at 860Mbps 150 Mbps! UDP TCP No strong diurnal pa^ern

Packet Rate to 1.0.0.0/8

Packet Rate to 1.0.0.0/8 Peak Burst at 220Kpps UDP TCP Marked UDP diurnal pa^ern

Per subnet Sum packet counts seen per second, running average, promote to /16 and /24 counts Rapidly idencfies sub- spaces of the /8 range which have high traffic Establishes baseline load across encre net But is it uniform?

Traffic Spread by /16

Traffic Spread by /16 Very Bad Bad Normal

Traffic Spread by /16 Yes, that s a Log Scale! The hot spots appear to lie in the low /16s

What is in all these packets?

Packet Size DistribuCon Most packets are very small (< 120 bytes) BUT 31% of the packets are exactly 200 bytes in length

Packet Size DistribuCon 60 200 1400

IP Protocol DistribuCon 76% UDP 20% TCP 2.5% ICMP 0.6% 6in4 (proto 41) 0.1% GRE This high concentracon of UDP is unusual. Other networks see 55% TCP and 40% UDP in their levels of unsolicited incoming traffic.

UDP Port DistribuCon Port Count Descrip/on 15206 45% SIP response with RTP payload 33368 12% some form of DNS? 0 6% huh? 514 4% syslog 80 3% looks like firewall probing 33528 3% pseudo- DNS again 3072 1.5% and more of the same 53 1.4% real DNS

port 15206? 08:48:36.000111 IP (tos 0x8, ttl 55, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto UDP (17), length 200) 208.48.241.3.36670 > 1.1.1.1.15206: [udp sum ok] UDP, length 172 0x0000: 4508 00c8 0000 4000 3711 7fe7 d030 f103 E...@.7...0.. 0x0010: 0101 0101 8f3e 3b66 00b4 878c 8008 dbba...>;f... 0x0020: cc7b 0288 55dd 8ce2 7a63 677b 7e66 6b14.{..U...zcg{~fk. 0x0030: 6962 1517 1613 1d05 0605 12d4 9d8c 8dea ib... 0x0040: 6617 ef83 8d9e eee5 f85d 6050 919a 9758 f...]`p...x 0x0050: 6c66 49d6 5b4d dac5 c3d9 4453 c2d5 4d7a lfi.[m...ds..mz 0x0060: 647f 7966 6f67 7360 1510 1d14 111f 0404 d.yfogs`... 0x0070: 6490 8e8f 9566 16ce 9b84 859b 93ef 6510 d...f...e. 0x0080: 4491 859c 5b6e 626d 7b4b 4ece d64d 4f7f D...[nbm{KN..MO. 0x0090: 5ac4 555d 4976 7b67 7b7c 7073 6e15 6c15 Z.U]Iv{g{ psn.l. 0x00a0: 141b 0619 1b15 dd86 8e9b c514 d887 8399... 0x00b0: 9e9c 9de0 637a e693 91d9 617b 7f4c 7764...cz...a{.Lwd 0x00c0: 47d5 5e45 7c46 f7c4 G.^E F.. UDP packets of 172 bytes in size, appears to point to some kind of audio streaming going on here

And SIP as well.. 08:48:36.003010 IP 77.165.37.131.5060 > 1.1.1.1.5060: SIP, length: 486 0x0000: 4508 0202 bf3e 0000 3411 507b 4da5 2583 E...>..4.P{M.%. 0x0010: 0101 0101 13c4 13c4 01ee b101 5245 4749...REGI 0x0020: 5354 4552 2073 6970 3a31 2e31 2e31 2e31 STER.sip:1.1.1.1 0x0030: 2053 4950 2f32 2e30 0d0a 4672 6f6d 3a20.SIP/2.0..From:. 0x0040: 3c73 6970 3a47 6c6f 6261 6c55 4131 4031 <sip:globalua1@1 0x0050: 2e31 2e31 2e31 3a35 3036 303e 3b74 6167.1.1.1:5060>;tag 0x0060: 3d38 3061 6537 6530 302d 6330 6138 3031 =80ae7e00-c0a801 0x0070: 6665 2d31 3363 342d 3435 3032 382d 3533 fe-13c4-45028-53 0x0080: 6264 6234 2d34 3036 6638 3837 332d 3533 bdb4-406f8873-53 0x0090: 6264 6234 0d0a 546f 3a20 3c73 6970 3a47 bdb4..to:.<sip:g 0x00a0: 6c6f 6261 6c55 4131 4031 2e31 2e31 2e31 lobalua1@1.1.1.1 0x00b0: 3a35 3036 303e 0d0a 4361 6c6c 2d49 443a :5060>.

TCP Port DistribuCon Port Count Descrip/on 21 40% mp 80 9% h^p 1433 4% ms- sql (slammer lives!) 455 3% ms- ds (slammer again!) 6112 2%? 25 2% smtp

Who s Bad? /16 Address Prefix Average Traffic(AS35361) Average Traffic(AS237) 1.1.0.0/16 86,757 kbps 79,981 kbps 1.4.0.0/16 19,714 kbps 12,564 kbps 1.0.0.0/16 10,241 kbps 8,816 kbps 1.10.0.0/16 3,656 kbps 3,320 kbps 1.2.0.0/16 3,611 kbps 12,010 kbp?

Bad, or Hanlon s Razor: Never a^ribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by stupidity. (or cock- up before conspiracy! ) A lot of this traffic appears to be leakage from private network domains Some traffic is scanning, some is virus and worms, but the majority of traffic is leakage

Outcomes Holdback on the worst 5 /16s of net- 1 recommended for the moment Subject to ongoing tescng Parts of these blocks may become viable to release to community Some parts clearly unusable for foreseeable future Ongoing tests of all new nets now part of APNIC s process

VisualizaCon Look at the data in Cme- series, convert to movie see the pa^erns of usage, idencfy subnets for futher work Applicable to net address and port Allows side- by- side comparison of src, dst behaviours Easy to do, easy to understand

What does the net look like? Map of /16s, as {x,y} points Colour denotes density of the /24 in use for that /16 Thick Black stripes: IANA reserve White stripe 224-255 MulCcast/Reserved

/16s Listed VerCcally The last /8s MulCcast/Reserved space 255.255.255.255/32 0.0.0.0/32 193.0.0.0-193.0.7.255

What does net 1.0.0.0/8 look like? Map of /24s as {x,y} points. /16 run verccally Colour denotes intensity of traffic directed to the /24

/24s Listed VerCcally What Ranges does of /24 net- 1 inside /16 under look higher traffic like? Hotspot: 1.0.0.0/24, 1.2.3.0/24 etc DisCnct /24 under high traffic

Lets go to the movies