Falling Trees or If a DNS Server is Lame but Nobody Queries It, Should You Send an ?

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Transcription:

Falling Trees or If a DNS Server is Lame but Nobody Queries It, Should You Send an E-mail? Shane Kerr <shane@isc.org> DNS Working Group, RIPE 59 Lisbon, 2009-10-08

Background The RIPE NCC implemented a system which checks for lame DNS servers in the part of the reverse DNS tree they maintain. I thought maybe we should check to see if lameness is a real problem. The RIPE NCC asked me if I would be willing to investigate this.

Co-operation The RIPE NCC DNS department provided data & explanation OARC provided the system to hold the data & perform analysis

Methodology RIPE NCC runs checks 1.Resolve NS to A/AAAA record 2.SOA lookup of zone at A/AAAA RIPE NCC captures traffic At RIPE NCC's master, ns-pri.ripe.net For a set of 1-hour periods Compare actual traffic with lame zones

On the Checking of Traffic Parse each reply to get NS RRSET A very small mismatch with data sets Lameness check run at different time than packet captures 3 NS in an hour of packet captures If no NS, stop NXDOMAIN, SOA query, errors, If NS, check for errors

Skinning Cats or, There's More Than One Way to Make a Lame DNS Server 1.The NS entry may not resolve to an A or AAAA record. example.org NS ns1.example.cmo NS ns2.exmaple.info 2.Nothing at the IPv4 or IPv6 address answers. ns.example.net A 0.0.1.16

Diagrammatically Explained or Explained Diagrammatically 66.6.0.193.in-addr.arpa Query NS ns-sec.ripe.net NS evil-ns1.example.info NS evil-ns2.example.info Answer NS RRSET 193.0.0.196 good 2001:610:240:0:53::4 good 193.0.6.66 bad Server response ns-sec.ripe.net 193.0.0.196 2001:610:240:0:53::4 evil-ns1.example.info 193.0.6.66 evil-ns2.example.info XXX NS to A/AAAA

Impact of Bad NS in RRSET Might be an immediate failure ns.exxample.org gives NXDOMAIN Might be a set of timeouts All NS in the RRSET may fail Current data does not distinguish

Chance of Using a Bad NS Two NS, one bad 50% chance bad NS is chosen 1 st Three NS, one bad 33% chance bad NS is chosen 1 st Three NS, two bad 66% chance bad NS is chosen 1 st 50% chance bad NS is chosen 2 nd And so on...

Impact of Bad Servers Server at IP address does not answer Set of timeouts Delay for the user! Logic about chance of using a bad server same as for using a bad NS...

Applicability Statement An Aside Before the Results If anyone running a delegation-only server wants to perform similar analysis on their domains, you can have the code or work with me to perform similar analysis.

The Numbers Total packets scanned: 16618986 Replies sent from server: 8309072 Unparsable replies: 9350 Packets with non-0 RCODE: 3165031 Packets with stale NS: 17839 Packets with NS in RRSET: 5096414 Estimate about 25030.984 lookups have NS lookup failures Estimate about 39303.618 NS lookup failures Estimate about 64100.080 lookups use non-answering IP Estimate about 77258.599 queries to non-answering IP

A Carta Parse Error Stale NS in RRSET NS lookups with failures (estimate) Queries to nonanswering servers (estimate) Non-0 RCODE Success (estimate)

Results 0.3% of queries had bad NS 0.8% of queries had an A/AAAA resulting in a DNS lookup failure About 1% of queries affected by lameness

Caveats Results do not account for caching Code based on IP, rather than IP+domain (oops) Effects of bad NS very uncertain Effects of bad servers slightly uncertain

Discussion But 5% of servers lame! Unused lame servers don't get fixed Used lame servers DO get fixed 1% is still a bit much... DNSMON error rate for ns-pri was 0.3% Average DNSMON error rate is 0.8%

Proposals 1.No more blanket e-mails 2.Annual report to LIRs? 3.Targeted e-mails to most-impacted users?