Misdirection / Hijacking Incidents

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Transcription:

Security Tutorial @ TWNOG SECURE ROUTING WITH RPKI 1 Misdirection / Hijacking Incidents YouTube Incident Occurred 24 Feb 2008 (for about 2 hours) Pakistan Telecom announced YT block Google (AS15169) services downed Occurred 5 Nov 2012 (for 30 minutes) Moratel Indonesia (AS23947) How frequent do these hijacking incidents happen? 1

Cyber Criminals exploiting the vulnerability BGP Hijacking for Cryptocurrency Profit (2014) http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/bgphijacking-for-cryptocurrency-profit/ Spamhaus DDoS Attack (2013) http://www.bgpmon.net/looking-at-the-spamhouse-ddos-from-a-bgpperspective/ Detecting BGP Attacks in 2014 https://pacsec.jp/psj14/psj2014_guillaum_presentation.pdf How we address this A network should only originate his own prefix How do we verify & avoid false advertisement? A provider should filter prefixes they propagate from customers Transitive trust; BGP is a trust-based system Check the legitimacy of address (LoA) Passive Countermeasure Strict filter on Interconnection BGP router can filter in UPDATE Messages Useful filtering can be done by upstream provider Automate Filter Maintenance Use the Route Object 4 2

Current practice Receive request LOA check Create associate prefix / AS filter Tools and techniques LOA check RPKI Manual Automated 3

Technology and learning curve RPSL RPSLng RPKI June 1999 March 2005 January 2013 What is RPKI? RPKI resource public key infrastructure 8 4

What is RPKI? A robust security framework for verifying the association between resource holder and Internet resource Helps to secure Internet routing by validating routes What does it solve? Prevents route hijacking A prefix originated by an AS without authorization due to malicious intent Prevents mis-origination A prefix that is mistakenly originated by an AS which does not own it Also route leakage due to configuration mistake or fat finger 5

How does it work? Is this AS number (ASN) authorized to announce this IP address range? 11 RPKI implementation Origin validation Hosted CA Delegated CA *upgrade at least ASBRs to RPKI capable code 6

RPKI Origin Validation 2406:6400::/48 65551 65550 65549 VALID 2406:6400::/48 65551 65550 65548 INVALID 65551 65550 65549 ü I have 2406:6400::/48 65548 I have 2406:6400::/48 û 13 RPKI Path Validation ü ü ü 2406:6400::/48 65551 65550 65549 Check and verify the complete path (BGPSEC) 14 7

Main Components Certificate Authority (CA) Internet registries (RIR, NIR, LIR) Issues certificates to members (delegates with resources) Allows address holders to use the CA system to issue ROAs for their prefixes Relying Party (RP) Software that gathers data from the CA Issuing Party Internet Registries (RIR, NIR, Large LIRs) Acts as a Certificate Authority and issues certificates to members with resources Often provides a web interface to issue ROAs for customer prefixes Publishes the ROA records into a repository APNIC RPKI Engine publication Repositor y rpki.apnic.net MyAPNIC GUI 8

Relying Party IANA Repo Future setup LIR Repo APNIC Repo rpki.apnic.net LIR Repo RIPE Repo rpki.ripe.net RP Cache (gather) Validate d Cache RPKI-Rtr Protocol Software which gathers data from CAs Also called RP cache or validator 17 RPKI Building Blocks 1.PKI and Trust anchors 2.Route Origin Authorizations (ROA) 3.RPKI Validators 9

X.509 Certificate with 3779 Extension X.509 Certificate RFC 3779 Extension SIA Owner's Public Key Resource certificates are based on the X.509 v3 certificate format defined in RFC 5280 Extended by RFC 3779 binds a list of resources (IP, ASN) to the subject of the certificate SIA Subject Information Access; contains a URI that references the directory Trust Anchors 20 10

Route Origin Authorization (ROA) A signed digital object that contains a list of address prefixes and one AS number It is an authority created by a prefix holder to authorize an AS Number to originate one or more specific route advertisements Prefix originated 203.176.189.0 Maximum prefix length /24 Origin ASN AS17821 ROA is valid if a valid certificate which signs it has the prefix in its RFC 3779 extension Adding ROA Records 11

RPKI Validation RPKI-capable routers can fetch the validated ROA dataset from a validated cache VALID INVALID NOT FOUND / UNKNOWN Indicates that the prefix and ASN pair has been found in the database Indicates that the prefix is found, but ASN received did not match, or the prefix length is longer than the maximum length Indicates that the prefix does not match any in the database RPKI Adoption at the RIRs http://rpki.surfnet.nl/perrir.html 12

Ready to ROA Campaign The Goal Get APNIC members to create ROAs for their resources in MYAPNIC Portal Ready to ROA Campaign The Plan ROA Sessions at NOGs Members Meeting & Consultation Ready to ROA ambassadors to promote the campaign & awareness in specific economies Recent Activities First campaign in SANOG in January 2015 More ROA sessions conducted in 2016 www.apnic.net/roa 26 13

RFCs RFC 6480: Resource Public Key Infrastructure RFC 3779: Extensions for IP addresses and ASNs https://www.apnic.net/roa 28 14

Stay in Touch! blog.apnic.net apnic.net/social 29 30 15

Thank You! END OF SESSION 31 16