Routing Security Roadmap

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Transcription:

Routing Security Roadmap Job Snijders NTT Communications job@ntt.net This presentation contains projections and other forward-looking statements regarding future events or our future routing performance. All statements other than present and historical facts and conditions contained in this release, including any statements regarding our future results of operations and routing positions, business strategy, plans and our objectives for future operations, are forward-looking statements (within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended). These statements are only predictions and reflect our

Why are we doing any of this? Creating filters based on public data, forces malicious actors to leave a trail in IRR, WHOIS or other data sources: auditability Bugs happen! your router may suddenly ignore parts of your configuration, you ll then rely on your EBGP peer s filters Everyone makes mistakes a typo is easily made

Average view on routing security

Perception: it is hopeless, too many holes

Exhaustive list of issues in the current ecosystem IRRdb / database inaccuracy (stale, autopiloted, non-validated) IXPs not filtering Lack of Path Validation Lack of sufficient and good enough software

IRR what is broken what can be fixed? Some IRRdbs do not perform validation Meaning that virtually anyone can create virtually any route/route6 object and sneak those into the prefix-filters Eleven relevant IRRs not validating: RIPE, NTTCOM, RADB, ALTDB, ARIN IRR, BBOI, BELL, LEVEL3, RGNET, TC, CANARIE Two solutions: Lock the database down (RIPE / RIPE-NONAUTH) Filter on the mirror level

RIPE NWI-5 proposal & implementation RIPE NCC s IRR previously allowed anyone to register any non-ripemanaged space if it had not yet been registered. *DANGER* The RPSL password & maintainer was used for this Three steps were taken: Cannot register non-ripe-managed space any more All non-ripe space moved to separate RIPE-NONAUTH database Route/route6 ASN authorization rules have been improved More info: https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-asns/db/impact-analysis-for-nwi-5-implementation

OK so current status Ten relevant IRRs not validating: NTTCOM, RADB, ALTDB, ARIN IRR, BBOI, BELL, LEVEL3, RGNET, TC, CANARIE Done: RIPE

ARIN community also recognized this is an issue Consultation at NANOG and through ARIN-Consult mailing list https://www.arin.net/vault/resources/routing/2018_roadmap.html https://teamarin.net/2018/07/12/the-path-forward/ Improve, or kill it

OK so current status Nine relevant IRRs not validating: NTTCOM, RADB, ALTDB, BBOI, BELL, LEVEL3, RGNET, TC, CANARIE Done: RIPE, ARIN IRR How to deal with the remaining nine.? Not all of these are so easily communicated with, not all are really actively managed

The IRR system access The IRR is access through predominantly two gateways whois.radb.net (the bgpq3 and peval default) rr.ntt.net All mirroring is essentially done with one software: IRRd Solution: Let s use the hegemonic duopoly for good!

Improving security at the aggregator? Data sources RIPE IRR Aggregators Clients NTTCOM whois.radb.net RADB APNIC rr.ntt.net bgpq3

Proposal: Let RPKI drown out conflicting IRR RPKI can be used for BGP Origin Validation but also for other things! A RPKI ROA is sort of a route-object It has a prefix, origin and source (the root) We can use RPKI ROAs for provisioning BGP prefix-filters Extend IRRd so that when IRR information is in direct conflict with a RPKI ROA the conflicting information is suppressed (Github)

RPKI filter at the aggregators Data sources RIPE IRR Aggregators Clients NTTCOM whois.radb.net RADB APNIC rr.ntt.net bgpq3

RPKI suppressing conflicting IRR advantages Industry-wide common method to get rid of stale proxy route objects by creating a ROA you hide old garbage in IRRs By creating a ROA you will significantly decrease the chances of people being able to use IRR to hijack your resource

OK so current status IRRs not validating: no longer relevant Done: RIPE, ARIN IRR, NTTCOM, RADB, ALTDB, BBOI, BELL, LEVEL3, RGNET, TC, CANARIE NTT & Dashcare have started a full rewrite of IRRd to make this possible: https://github.com/irrdnet/irrd4

Filtering at IXPs is hard Many IXPs have come to realize their responsibilities to the Internet ecosystem and the commercial benefits of a more secure product. http://peering.exposed/ 9 out of top 10 IXPs are filtering, tenth will later this year. IX.br making good progtress IXP filtering has become much easier, there are multiple fully featured configuration generators: https://www.ixpmanager.org/ http://arouteserver.readthedocs.io/ BIRD s hegemony in the route server software is being challenged: OpenBGPD is funded to be able to compete

Route servers must begin dropping RPKI Invalids Route servers by definition provide partial Internet tables No guarantees whatsoever that a given route will be available via RS When a route server drops a prefix, worst case scenario is rerouting not an outage. ISP Network A Internet Exchange Network B

Not everyone needs to do RPKI Because of the centralization of the web, if a select few companies deploy RPKI Origin Validation millions of people benefit (google, cloudflare, amazon, pch/quad9, facebook, akamai, fastly, liberty global, comcast, etc ) I think only 20 companies or so need to do Origin Validation for there to be big benefits https://dyn.com/blog/bgp-dns-hijacks-target-payment-systems/

RPKI Origin Validation is useless without Path Validation aka BGPSEC The lack of path validation can be resolved through two methods: Densely peer with each other (Example: Google & Akamai have 126+ facilities in common with each other) An AS_PATH blocking mechanisms like peerlock Both effectively are path validation for 1 hop Perhaps 1 hop already is good enough J

There is no healthy software ecosystem RIPE NCC Validator v3 is works and actively maintained NLNetlabs is writing a RPKI Cache Validator (Routinator 3000) A company I can t name is secretly writing one too Almost all serious routing vendors have RPKI support (Cisco, Juniper, BIRD, Nokia, FRR and more are on the way) Solution: more users results in better software, start using!

Timeline IXPs start doing RPKI Origin Validation on your route servers now ISPs / CDNs if you are pointing default somewhere, do it now If you are transit-free, wait a bit

We aren t done yet - Future work Use the RPKI to publish peerlock rules about who are authorized upstreams and who aren t https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-azimov-sidrops-aspa-verification https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-azimov-sidrops-aspa-profile Extend the RPKI to replace IRR AS-SETs (IRR / RPKI feature parity) https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ss-grow-rpki-as-cones ARIN TAL issue needs addressing

LACNIC RPKI invalids Source: https://medium.com/@nusenu/towards-cleaning-up-rpki-invalids-d69b03ab8a8c

Double check your RPKI ROAs! Source: https://medium.com/@nusenu/where-are-rpki-unreachable-networks-located-65c7a0bae0f8

Conclusion