CISC859: Topics in Advanced Networks & Distributed Computing: Network & Distributed System Security. A Brief Overview of Security & Privacy Issues

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Transcription:

CISC859: Topics in Advanced Networks & Distributed Computing: Network & Distributed System Security A Brief Overview of Security & Privacy Issues 1

Topics to Be Covered Cloud computing RFID systems Bitcoin Anonymous comm. Social networks Sybil attacks Location privacy Mobile crowdsourcing Telecom networks Internet of Things Cognitive radios Anything interesting 2

Cloud Computing 3

Typical Scenarios Datasets Untrusted Cloud Service Provider Users 4

Security and privacy issues How to verify the computation/query results returned by CSPs? How to process queries over encrypted datasets? How to deduplicate files encrypted under different keys? How to verify that my uploaded files are retrievable? 5

RFID System http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_xnhl39ud7i RFID = Radio Frequency IDentification. An ADC (Automated Data Collection) technology that: Uses radio-frequency waves to transfer data between a reader and a movable item to identify, categorize, track.. Is fast and does not require physical sight or contact between reader/scanner and the tagged item. Performs the operation using low cost components. Attempts to provide unique identification and backend integration that allows for wide range of applications. Other ADC technologies: Bar codes, OCR. 6

A typical RFID system backoffice database(s) Reader LF / UHF Communication range Coupling Backscatter communication Tag active / passive 1 bit 64 kb (EEPROM/SRAM) controller / CPU read-only / read-write 7

Frame Slotted Aloha Protocol 8

Current RFID Systems Unsafe No authentication No friend/foe distinction No access control Rogue reader can link to tag Rogue tag can mess up reader No encryption Eavesdropping possible Predictable responses Traffic analysis, linkability No GUI and distance not enforced by tag 9

Security & Privacy Issues Privacy-preserving tag identification/authentication/counting Missing tag detection/identification Batch tag authentication Clone/counterfeit detection etc. 10

Bitcoin & Blockchain A nice introductory video on bitcoin Youtube, search How Bitcoin Works Under the Hood A decentralized digital ledger that records transactions such that the registered transactions cannot be altered retroactively Important concepts: transactions, blocks, mining, mining pools, etc. Cryptographic techniques: cryptographic hash and digital signature 11

Research issues Double spending Proof-of-work Stability Consensus protocol Payment verification Key management etc. Additional reading: SoK: Research Perspectives and Challenges for Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies IEEE S&P 2015 12

Anonymous communication Hiding the identitie(s) of the parties involved in digital communications from each other, or from third-parties Types of Anonymity Sender anonymity Receiver anonymity Sender-Receiver (a.k.a. relationship) anonymity 13

Mix Proxies and Onion Routing <K P, K S > <K P, K S > <K P, K S >

Traffic Mixing Arrival Order Send Order 4 2 1 1 2 3 3 4 15

Dummy / Cover Traffic Simple idea: Send useless traffic to help obfuscate real traffic 16

Tor Largest, most well deployed anonymity preserving service on the Internet Publicly available since 2002 Continues to be developed and improved Currently, ~5000 Tor relays around the world All relays are run by volunteers It is suspected that some are controlled by intelligence agencies 500K 900K daily users Numbers are likely larger now, thanks to Snowden Additional reading: Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router, Usenix Security 2004 17

Research Issues Novel anonymous communication systems Attacks on existing anonymous communication systems, e.g., Tor Improvement for Tor etc. 18

Social Networks 19

Sybil Attack Definition: an individual entity masquerades as multiple simultaneous identities Why named Sybil attack Severe impact on many distributed applications and everyday services Commonly assume that every participating entity controls exactly one identity Examples of the Sybil attack Rig Internet polls by using multiple IP addresses to submit votes Gain advantage in any results of a chain letter A well-known major problem in real-world selections Increase the Google PageRank ratings of customers pages 20

Sybil Attack Examples of the Sybil attack (cont d) A common attack on social networking websites, e.g., Facebook, Twitter A common attack on real-world reputation systems like Ebay Obtain multiple accounts on free-email systems by spammers Cause P2P computing systems which use voting to verify correct answers, such as SETI@home, to accept false solutions from a Sybil attacker Reveal the initiator of a connection in a system that provides anonymous communications between peers, like Tor Out-votes honest users in other collaborative tasks such as resource allocation, voting, 21

Defenses against Sybil Attack Using a trusted central authority Tie identities to actual human beings Not always desirable Can be hard to find such authority Sensitive info may scare away users Potential bottleneck and target of attack Without a trusted central authority Impossible unless using special assumptions [Douceur 02] Resource challenges not sufficient -- adversary can have much more resources than a typical user 22

Research Issues Detect fake/malicious accounts in social networks Explore social networks to thwart Sybil attacks Additional reading: Using Social Networks to Overcome Sybil Attacks, Distributed Computing 2011. 23